Commonwealth v. Russo

OPINION

We granted allowance of appeal in the instant case to determine whether, under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, a landowner has a reasonable expectation of privacy against enforcement of Pennsylvania’s Game Code in his open fields. Because we conclude that the Fourth Amendment open fields doctrine as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) applies equally under the Constitution of this Commonwealth, we affirm, albeit on different grounds, the order of the Commonwealth Court.

*122At 6:45 a.m. on November 25, 2002, nine minutes after the opening of Pennsylvania’s bear-hunting season, appellant Joseph Russo, Jr., claimed to have killed a bear near his hunting cabin in Mehoopany Township, Wyoming County. Pursuant to Section 2323(a)(2) of the Game Code,1 appellant transported the bear to the Game Commission station in Dallas for examination and tagging. Later that day, the Game Commission received a tip that appellant’s hunting camp was “baited” in violation of Section 2308(a)(8) of the Game Code.2 The information was relayed to Wildlife Conservation Officer (hereinafter “WCO”) William Wasserman, who, in turn, directed Deputy WCO William Jeffrey Pierce to go to appellant’s camp to investigate.3

Upon arriving after dark at approximately 6:00 p.m., WCO Pierce found appellant’s camp apparently unoccupied. Appellant’s property was clearly posted with “No Trespassing” signs. After parking his truck, Officer Pierce stepped over a *123cable across the driveway and walked approximately six hundred feet toward appellant’s cabin until he observed, in plain view, an eight- by ten-foot pile of “apple mash”4 located about ninety feet from the cabin. The officer also noticed in the apple mash a large indentation consistent with a bear having lain there, a clearly identifiable bear paw print, and leaves with blood droplets. Officer Pierce called Officer Wasserman and informed him of the bait pile. Pursuant to Officer Wasserman’s instructions, Officer Pierce seized the bloody leaves as evidence. Continuing his investigation, Officer Pierce discovered a second pile of apple mash as well as a corn feeder approximately one hundred fifty yards from appellant’s cabin. Finally, Officer Pierce returned to his vehicle and drove down a dirt road about four hundred yards into the woods.5 After parking his truck, the officer got out and found what he recognized as bear entrails. Although the rest of the body was not at the location, an examination of the entrails revealed that the bear had recently eaten corn and mashed apples. The officer then seized the bear’s stomach and its contents as evidence.

Meanwhile, once Officer Pierce had informed him of the bait pile, Officer Wasserman contacted Officer James Jolley, a WCO stationed in Luzerne County, where appellant maintained his residence. Officers Wasserman and Jolley, accompanied by two deputy WCOs, proceeded to appellant’s home in Pittston. Upon pulling into appellant’s driveway, the officers *124observed a dead black bear carcass hanging from a piece of construction equipment. When the officers knocked on appellant’s door, he answered and invited them in. In response to their questioning, appellant indicated that he was aware of the bait at his camp but asserted that the bear was not shot at either of the bait piles. The officers then seized the bear carcass as evidence and departed.

Officers Pierce and Wasserman returned to appellant’s camp the next morning to take photographs and measurements and to gather additional evidence. At the first apple mash pile discovered by Officer Pierce, the officers found and seized a small piece of bear tissue. A forensic DNA analysis subsequently performed by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service established that all the blood and tissue recovered by the officers in the course of their investigation came from the bear whose carcass was seized at appellant’s residence. Thereafter, appellant was charged with two summary violations of the Game Code: Unlawful Taking or Possession of Game or Wildlife, 34 Pa.C.S. § 2307;6 and Unlawful Devices and Methods, 34 Pa.C.S. § 2308, see supra. After being found guilty of both offenses before a district judge, appellant appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Wyoming County.

Prior to trial de novo before President Judge Brendan J. Vanston, appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized by Officers Pierce and Wasserman, challenging the legality of their entry onto and search of his property under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. On March 31, 2004, the trial court held a suppression hearing, which the court consolidated with appellant’s trial de novo, and denied the motion. Officers Pierce and Wasserman testified for the Commonwealth, describing in detail the course of the investigation they conducted on November 25 and 26, 2002. Appellant’s case-in-chief consisted primarily of the testimony *125of his neighbor to the effect that apple trees were located on land near appellant’s property. At the conclusion of the trial, the court convicted appellant of the two offenses and ordered him to pay $1,000 in lines, $2,599.87 in restitution, and the costs of prosecution.

The trial court found “[b]ased on the testimony of the officers and the photographic evidence presented” that “the nearest bait pile is not within the curtilage of [appellant’s] cabin.” Trial Ct. Op. at 5. Consequently, the court rejected appellant’s argument that Article I, Section 8 prohibited the officers’ warrantless search of the fields where the bait piles were found. “To rule otherwise,” the court reasoned, “would emasculate the enforcement of the Game Code on any privately owned realty, as one would only have to post ‘no trespassing’ signs to keep out the game wardens.” Id. The court stated that such a result would be absurd and a result that the constitutional framers surely did not intend. Appellant appealed to the Commonwealth Court, pursuing his suppression claim.

On January 7, 2005, a three-judge panel of the Commonwealth Court unanimously affirmed the order of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Russo, 864 A.2d 1279 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2005). In a published opinion authored by the Honorable Renée Cohn Jubelirer, the court held that, under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, appellant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property upon which the bait piles were found. The court began and ended its analysis with appellant’s argument that the “No Trespassing” signs that he posted created a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property. Thus, the court noted that a person does not commit trespass if he is “licensed or privileged to ... enter[ ][the] place as to which notice against trespass is given.” Id. at 1284 (quoting 18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(b)(l)(ii) (defining the offense of criminal trespass) (emphasis omitted)). Turning to the Game Code, the court observed that Section 901(a)(2) specifically authorizes a WCO to “go upon any land or water outside of buildings, posted or otherwise, in the performance of the officer’s duty.” Id. (quoting 34 Pa.C.S. *126§ 901(a)(2)). Therefore, • the court concluded, “[appellant’s posting of the signs cannot form the basis of a reasonable expectation of privacy[ ] [because] it would be unreasonable for him to expect that game officers, who are privileged to enter the land, would not do so to assure compliance with the Game Law.” Id. at 1285. Indeed, the Commonwealth Court agreed with the trial court’s observation that, otherwise, “criminals could very easily carry on illegal enterprises by merely placing ‘No Trespassing’ signs around the perimeter of their property.” Id. Finally, in a footnote, the court noted the Commonwealth’s reliance on the open fields doctrine as set forth in Oliver, supra, but determined that it was unnecessary to decide whether the doctrine applied under the Pennsylvania Constitution because of the court’s holding in the case. Id. at n. 13.

Appellant petitioned this Court for allowance of appeal. On November 22, 2005, we granted appellant’s petition and directed the parties to address the following issue: “Whether 34 Pa.C.S. § 901(a)(2) is unconstitutional because Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides a landowner with a reasonable expectation of privacy in his posted property.” Commonwealth v. Russo, 585 Pa. 1, 887 A.2d 1212 (2005).

Our standard of review of a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion is well established:

[W]e may consider only the Commonwealth’s evidence and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Boczkowski, 577 Pa. 421, 846 A.2d 75, 89 (2004). An appellate court, of course, is not bound by the suppression court’s conclusions of law. Commonwealth v. Duncan, 572 Pa. 438,817 A.2d 455, 459 (2003).

The open fields doctrine was first recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L.Ed. 898 (1924). In that case, while surveil*127ling the home of Hester’s father (where Hester lived), two revenue officers observed Hester exit the house and hand a quart bottle to an individual whom the officers suspected to be attempting to purchase illegal bootleg whiskey. After the officers began pursuing the two men, they fled, Hester discarding a jug and his would-be customer the bottle. Thereafter, the officers recovered the vessels at an undisclosed distance from the house and determined them to contain “moonshine whisky, that is, whisky illicitly distilled.” Id. at 58, 44 S.Ct. at 446. Hester claimed that the evidence was inadmissible under the Fourth Amendment because the officers seized it without a warrant.7 In a brief opinion for a unanimous court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., concluded that “[i]t is obvious that even if there had been a trespass, the [evidence] was not obtained by an illegal search or seizure.” Id. Citing Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, Justice Holmes held that “the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their ‘persons, houses, papers and effects,’ is not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common law.” Id. at 59, 44 S.Ct. at 446.

Sixty years later, in a 6-8 decision in Oliver v. United States, supra, the High Court “reaffirm[ed]” the vitality of the open fields doctrine as announced in Hester. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178, 104 S.Ct. at 1741; id. at 176 n. 6, 104 S.Ct. at 1740 n. 6 (rejecting the notion that “subsequent cases discredited Hester’s reasoning”). Turning its attention initially to the constitutional text, the Oliver Court noted that open fields are not “effects” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, the Court observed, “[t]he Framers would have understood the term ‘effects’ to be limited to personal, rather than real, property.” Id. at 177 n. 7, 104 S.Ct. at 1740 n. 7 (citing, as Justice Holmes did, Blackstone’s Commentaries, among other sources).

*128Even assuming one had a subjective expectation of privacy in his open fields, the Oliver Court went on to reason, such an expectation is not one that society would be prepared to recognize as reasonable:

[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance. There is no societal interest in protecting the' privacy of those activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields. Moreover, as a practical matter these lands usually are accessible to the public and the police in ways that a home, an office, or commercial structure would not be. It is not generally true that fences or “No Trespassing” signs effectively bar the public from viewing open fields in rural areas. And both petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton concede that the public and police lawfully may survey lands from the air.

Id. at 178,104 S.Ct. at 1741-12.

Finally, the Oliver Court explicitly rejected the contention that the reasonableness of one’s expectation of privacy in his open fields should be determined on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis:

Under this approach, police officers would have to guess before every search whether landowners had erected fences sufficiently high, posted a sufficient number of warning signs, or located contraband in an area sufficiently secluded to establish a right of privacy.... The lawfulness of a search would turn on a highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions. The ad hoc approach not only makes it difficult for the policeman to discern the scope of his authority; it also creates a danger that constitutional rights will be arbitrarily and inequitably enforced.

Id. at 181-82, 104 S.Ct. at 1743 (citations and quotation marks omitted). In this regard, the Court specifically

*129reject[ed] the suggestion that steps taken to protect privacy establish that expectations of privacy in an open field are legitimate. It is true, of course, that petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton, in order to conceal their criminal activities, planted the marihuana upon secluded land and erected fences and “No Trespassing” signs around the property. And it may be that because of such precautions, few members of the public stumbled upon the marihuana crops seized by the police. Neither of these suppositions demonstrates, however, that the expectation of privacy was legitimate in the sense required by the Fourth Amendment. The test of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly “private” activity. Rather, the correct inquiry is whether the government’s intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment.

Id. at 182-83, 104 S.Ct. at 1743 (footnote omitted).

There can be no question that the search sub judice was lawful under the Fourth Amendment, given the open fields doctrine.8 The issue, however, is whether Pennsylvania has departed, or should depart, from that doctrine when applying Article I, Section 8 of our Constitution. To determine whether the open fields doctrine as enunciated in Oliver is consonant with Article I, Section 8, we will undertake an independent analysis of that provision as guided by our seminal decision in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887 (1991). Under Edmunds, a principled consideration of state constitutional doctrine should include an examination of: (1) the text of the provision of our Constitution; (2) the history of the provision, including the caselaw of this Commonwealth; (3) relevant caselaw from other jurisdictions; and (4) policy considerations, “including unique issues of state and local concern, and applicability within modern Pennsylvania jurisprudence.” Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895. Consistently with Edmunds, appellant has dutifully discussed the four *130factors in his brief, whereas the Commonwealth fails even to cite our decision in that case.9

1. Text

We begin our Edmunds analysis with a comparison of the language of Article I, Section 8 to that of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides as follows:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Similarly, Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides as follows:

The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.

Given the textual similarity between the two provisions, it is not surprising that appellant fails to make any textually based arguments for departing from the federal open fields doctrine. Like the word “effects” in the Fourth Amendment, “possessions” appears as the last among four objects in which the people have a right to be secure, the others being their “persons,” “houses,” and “papers.” Pursuant to the interpretative doctrine of ejusdem generis, the term “possessions” should be construed in light of the particular words preceding it, all of which refer to intimate things about one’s *131person.10 If “possessions” had been intended to refer to everything one owned, such as open fields, then there would have been no need to specify the other three objects. We therefore find persuasive for present purposes the Oliver Court’s interpretation of the text of the Fourth Amendment. Nothing in the plain text of Article I, Section 8 suggests that open fields are entitled to the same degree of privacy as one’s person, house, papers, and possessions.

2. History

Turning to the history prong of the Edmunds analysis, appellant generally observes that in the past decades it has been stated that, unlike the Fourth Amendment, Article I, Section 8 was motivated by a desire to safeguard citizens’ privacy. Thus, appellant cites recent decisions in which this *132Court has accorded greater protection under Article I, Section 8 in certain other, limited contexts. See Appellant’s Brief at 11-12 (citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Shaw, 564 Pa. 617, 770 A.2d 295 (2001)) (requiring warrant for seizure of hospital-administered blood-alcohol content test results under Article I, Section 8 where warrant not required under Fourth Amendment) (lacking Edmunds analysis); Commonwealth v. Matos, 543 Pa. 449, 672 A.2d 769 (1996) (holding that police pursuit of individual is a “seizure” within meaning of Article I, Section 8 even though it is not under Fourth Amendment) (applying Edmunds); Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45, 669 A.2d 896 (1995) (rejecting federal rule allowing warrantless search of vehicle when incident to arrest) (lacking Edmunds analysis and characterizing it as dicta). Appellant, however, fails to explain how the instant case implicates the heightened privacy interest recognized in these other contexts, nor does he draw our attention to any case that is remotely analogous to the one at bar. Indeed, a sufficient rebuttal to appellant’s argument in this regard would be to point to the many decisions in which this Court has held that Article I, Section 8 does not afford greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Duncan, 572 Pa. 438, 817 A.2d 455 (2003) (lack of privacy right in one’s name and address); Commonwealth v. Glass, 562 Pa. 187, 754 A.2d 655 (2000) (anticipatory search warrants); Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 558 Pa. 517, 738 A.2d 427 (1999) (voluntariness of consent to search); Commonwealth v. Waltson, 555 Pa. 223, 724 A.2d 289 (1998) (particularity requirement for warrants); Commonwealth v. Williams, 547 Pa. 577, 692 A.2d 1031 (1997) (warrantless parole searches); Commonwealth v. Melendez, 544 Pa. 323, 676 A.2d 226 (1996) (“stop and frisk” under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

Taking a broader and more fundamental historical examination, it is worth noting that, at the time the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the Fourth Amendment and the then-recent federal exclusionary rule did not apply to open fields, the unbroken, prevailing interpretation of Article I, Section 8 by the Pennsylvania courts was that that provision *133offered no exclusionary remedy whatsoever. Indeed, notwithstanding that the federal exclusionary rule had been in existence since the 1914 decision in Weeks, supra, this Court, and the Superior Court enforcing our decisions, repeatedly refused to find a similar remedy encompassed in Article I, Section 8. Instead, this Court’s historical interpretation of Article 1, Section 8 always followed “the fundamental principle of the common law that the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means by which it was obtained.” Commonwealth v. Chaitt, 380 Pa. 532, 112 A.2d 379, 381 & n. 1 (1955) (collecting cases); Commonwealth v. Agoston, 364 Pa. 464, 72 A.2d 575, 585 (1950); Commonwealth v. Hunsinger, 290 Pa. 185, 138 A. 683 (1927); Commonwealth v. Dabbierio, 290 Pa. 174, 138 A. 679, 681 (1927); Commonwealth v. Montanero, 173 Pa.Super. 133, 96 A.2d 178 (1953); Commonwealth v. Dugan, 143 Pa.Super. 383, 18 A.2d 84 (1941). The exclusionary rule itself, then, was not an organic part of Article I, Section 8; it was a federal imposition, made applicable against the states for Fourth Amendment purposes by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). Thus, any historical survey respecting open fields and privacy under Article I, Section 8, like examination of any suppression case under the Pennsylvania charter, hits a brick wall in 1961: there is no relevant history to support a broader state constitutional interpretation because there was no point in seeking such an interpretation, at least in a criminal case, since there was no exclusionary remedy available.

Matters changed after Mapp, of course, and Pennsylvania courts, having become familiar by necessity with the command and operation of the federal exclusionary rule, began to entertain equivalent claims under the guise of Article I, Section 8. The progression was not consciously announced or explained, and indeed, in many instances, such disclosure was unimportant because this Court, while citing both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8, employed a coterminous approach. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963); Commonwealth v. Eazer, 455 Pa. 320, 312 A.2d 398 (1973); Commonwealth v. White, 459 Pa. 84, 327 *134A.2d 40 (1974); Commonwealth v. Brooks, 468 Pa. 547, 364 A.2d 652 (1976); Commonwealth v. Holzer, 480 Pa. 93, 389 A.2d 101 (1978). Eventually, however, exclusionary decisions arose that were rendered exclusively under Article I, Section 8, and other decisions were so rendered while recognizing that the course taken represented a break from U.S. Supreme Court authority, and an embrace of a greater protection of privacy rights than that which was commanded under the Fourth Amendment and Mapp. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32, 403 A.2d 1283 (1979); Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 470 A.2d 457 (1983); Edmunds, supra. Even this development was not entirely clear, for no decision of this Court has squarely purported to examine and disapprove of the long and unbroken line of pre-Mapp decisions holding that, far from recognizing greater exclusionary-rule-related privacy rights, Article I, Section 8 contained no exclusionary remedy whatsoever.

Our decisional task in this case, however, does not require us to explain and synthesize this Court’s pre- and post-Mapp expressions concerning Article I, Section 8. The reality is that, in the past few decades, a substantial body of cases has arisen under Article I, Section 8, all involving the exclusionary remedy. Some holdings have been explained with an Edmunds analysis, see, e.g., Edmunds, while others contain holdings that are unexplained in Edmunds terms, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Shaw, 564 Pa. 617, 770 A.2d 295 (2001); Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45, 669 A.2d 896 (1995); Commonwealth v. Mason, 535 Pa. 560, 637 A.2d 251 (1993); Commonwealth v. Hess, 532 Pa. 607, 617 A.2d 307 (1992).11 What is most *136important for present purposes, however, is that our own unique history and caselaw simply do not reflect any “societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields.” Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179, 104 S.Ct. at 1741. As the Oliver Court observed, a notation with which we agree, these lands are, as a practical matter, readily accessible to the public and to law enforcement. Id. Thus, in Pennsylvania, as in almost every other state, open fields do not provide the setting for the kinds of intimate activities with respect to which citizens would reasonably expect to be free from governmental surveillance. Article I, Section 8’s protection of privacy has been in existence for over two hundred years, and yet, there has never been any suggestion, in any Pennsylvania source, that would militate a contrary conclusion. In fact, the decisions of the courts of this Commonwealth that are most analogous reflect a recognition of the distinction between the home and open fields when determining the legitimacy of one’s expectation of privacy under Article I, Section 8. See Commonwealth v. Rood, 686 *137A.2d 442, 450 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996) (en banc), alloc, denied, 548 Pa. 683, 699 A.2d 736 (1997) (holding that landowner had no reasonable expectation of privacy under Article I, Section 8 in outdoor wooded area beyond curtilage of his home); Commonwealth v. Trefiz, 465 Pa. 614, 351 A.2d 265, 270 (1976) (noting, in holding that defendant lacked standing to challenge seizure of corpse of murder victim under Article I, Section 8, that corpse was found in backwoods area accessible to hunters); see also Commonwealth v. Bender, 811 A.2d 1016, 1023 (Pa.Super.2002) (rejecting Article I, Section 8 challenge to admissibility of tape recording made “not ... inside of [defendant’s] home[ but] [r]ather, ... at some location outside the four walls of [defendant’s] residence and then continu[ing] exclusively within ... vehicle” parked on defendant’s property).

Appellant ably summarizes this Court’s general observations in Edmunds regarding the unique history of Article I, Section 8. Missing from appellant’s analysis, however, is an attempt to relate that unique history to the specific question of the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy in one’s open fields. Compare with Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 899 (addressing propriety of “good-faith” exception to exclusionary rule in light of unique history of Article I, Section 8). The mere fact that this Court has, under certain circumstances, accorded greater protections to the citizens of this Commonwealth under Article I, Section 8 “does not command a reflexive finding in favor of any new right or interpretation asserted. To the contrary, we should apply the prevailing standard where our own independent state analysis does not suggest a distinct standard.” Commonwealth v. Glass, 562 Pa. 187, 754 A.2d 655, 660 (2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Appellant fails to suggest any aspect of the unique history of Article I, Section 8 that would put the lie to the “old as the common law” distinction between house and open fields that Justice Holmes invoked in Hester, an observation that, as author of the classic, The Common Law, Justice Holmes was supremely well positioned to make. Pennsylvania history, in short, *138weighs strongly against any notion that open fields are entitled to the same heightened privacy as one’s person or home.

3. Other jurisdictions

Consistently with guidance from Edmunds, we next consider relevant caselaw from other jurisdictions. In his brief, appellant discusses four decisions from our sister states that have refused to adopt the federal open fields doctrine for purposes of their constitutions. -First, appellant cites People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920, 593 N.E.2d 1328 (1992), in which the Court of Appeals of New York held that a landowner had a protectable privacy interest in land beyond the curtilage of his home under Article I, Section 12 of the New York constitution. As appellant notes, the text of the New York constitutional provision is substantially similar to that of Article I, Section 8 of our Constitution. See N.Y. Const, art. I, § 12 (protecting “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures”). Nevertheless, the Scott court expressly disavowed “the Oliver majority’s ... literal textual analysis,” instead preferring to focus on the compatibility of the federal open fields doctrine with New York caselaw. Scott, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920, 593 N.E.2d at 1335. Appellant fails to suggest that any of the New York decisions cited in Scott is consistent with the Article I, Section 8 jurisprudence of this Commonwealth. In fact, the New York decisions’ emphasis on state trespass statutes is, if anything, contrary to Pennsylvania caselaw. Compare People v. Gleeson, 36 N.Y.2d 462, 369 N.Y.S.2d 113, 330 N.E.2d 72 (1975), cited in Scott, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920, 593 N.E.2d at 1336 (suppressing information obtained as a result of a “trespass” by sheriff) with Rood, 686 A.2d at 450 (noting that officer “was specifically authorized and, in fact, required by law to investigate the field and wooded area located on Rood’s property” (citing former Section 741(2), now Section 901(a)(2), of the Game Code)).

Appellant next cites State v. Johnson, 75 Wash.App. 692, 879 P.2d 984 (1994) and State v. Kirchoff, 156 Vt. 1, 587 *139A.2d 988 (1991), in which the Court of Appeals of Washington and the Supreme Court of Vermont each determined that the federal open fields doctrine was incompatible with the respective provisions of those states’ constitutions. Both the Johnson and Kirchoff courts noted, however, that the relevant general inquiry under their respective constitutions was not, as under the Fourth Amendment, the reasonableness of one’s privacy expectation. See Johnson, 879 P.2d at 990 (“Unlike the inquiry into subjective and reasonable expectations of privacy that must be made when the Fourth Amendment is implicated, the critical inquiry under the Washington State Constitution focuses on ... [whether] the law enforcement officers unreasonably intrude[d] into the defendant’s ‘private affairs[.]’ ”);12 Kirchoff, 587 A.2d at 995 (expressing “reluctan[ce] to use the phrase ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ ”). Conversely, “[i]n determining the scope of protection afforded under Article I, Section 8, this Court employs the same two-part test employed by the United States Supreme Court to determine the sweep of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Duncan, 572 Pa. 438, 817 A.2d 455, 463 (2003). That test requires a person to demonstrate: (1) a subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) that the expectation is one “that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable and legitimate.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Gordon, 546 Pa. 65, 683 A.2d 253, 256 (1996)).

Finally, appellant cites State v. Bullock, 272 Mont. 361, 901 P.2d 61 (1995), in which the Supreme Court of Montana rejected the open fields doctrine for purposes of that state’s constitution. In so holding, the Bullock court emphasized that the Montana constitution includes, in addition to its own counterpart to the Fourth Amendment, an additional provision not found in the federal Constitution. Id. at 75. Indeed, *140Article II, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution provides that “[t]he right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.” Given the absence of any such provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution, we find Bullock unpersuasive in determining the compatibility of the federal open fields doctrine with Article I, Section 8.

As appellant responsibly notes, other states have adopted the federal open fields doctrine for purposes of their respective constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures. The wording of the constitutional provisions of these states, unlike Montana and Washington, is substantially similar to that of Article I, Section 8 of our Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Pinder, 128 N.H. 66, 514 A.2d 1241, 1246 (1986) (adopting federal open fields doctrine under N.H. Const, part I, art. 19); State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554, 385 N.W.2d 436, 440 (1986) (Neb. Const, art. I, § 7); Williams v. State, 201 Ind. 175, 166 N.E. 663 (1929) (Ind. Const, art. I, § 11); Wolf v. State, 110 Tex.Crim. 124, 9 S.W.2d 350 (1928) (Tex. Const, art. I, § 9); State v. Zugras, 306 Mo. 492, 267 S.W. 804, 806 (1924) (Mo. Const, art. II, § 11); Ratzell v. State, 27 Okla.Crim. 340, 228 P. 166, 168 (1924) (Okla. Const. Bill of Rights § 30); Brent v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 504, 240 S.W. 45, 48 (1922) (Ky. Const. § 10); State v. Gates, 306 N.J.Super. 322, 703 A.2d 696, 701 (1997) (N.J. Const, art. I, ¶ 7); Betchart v. Dep’t of Fish & Game, 158 Cal.App.3d 1104, 205 Cal.Rptr. 135 (1984) (Cal. Const, art. I, § 13). For this reason, we find the decisions from these states more persuasive than the decisions from the four states upon which appellant relies.

4. Policy considerations

Appellant concludes his Edmunds analysis by referencing five policy considerations that he claims support his position. According to appellant, the guarantees of Article I, Section 8 should extend to open fields in order: (1) to prevent “overly zealous police officers” from conducting “fishing expeditions”; (2) to “protect [ ] the right of privacy”; (3) to prevent WCOs from “treating] the property of others as their own”; (4) to *141avoid confrontations between WCOs and landowners; and (5) to encourage WCOs to apply for search warrants. Appellant’s Brief at 17-18.

In a recent scholarly article, our learned colleague Mr. Justice Thomas Saylor explained why “[ijmplementation of a state constitutional value ... necessarily entails a searching, evaluative inquiry” into genuinely “unique state sources, content, and context as bases for independent interpretation.” Thomas G. Saylor, Prophylaxis in Modem State Constitutionalism: Neto Judicial Federalism and the Acknowledged Prophylactic Rule, 59 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 283, 309-13 (2003). Indeed, were it otherwise, the tag-line “policy” could metamorphose into cover for a transient majority’s implementation of its own personal value system as if it were an organic command. As support for his policy arguments, appellant cites general principles of Pennsylvania law, decisions from other states, and our trespass statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502, without actually explaining how any of these authorities pertains to “unique issues of state and local concern, and applicability within modern Pennsylvania jurisprudence.” Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895. Appellant’s reliance on authorities that either come directly from another state 13 or are indistinct from those of most other jurisdictions 14 merely highlights the absence of Pennsylvania sources to support his position. This argument falls short of the kind of searching inquiry required to determine that public policy considerations unique to Pennsylvania suggest that the federal open fields doctrine is inconsistent with Article I, Section 8 of our Constitution.

The citizens of this Commonwealth throughout our history have shown a keen interest in protecting and preserving as an asset the diverse wildlife that find refuge in the fields and forests within our borders. This interest is so strong that it is *142enshrined by a separate provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution:

The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.

Pa. Const, art. 1, § 27. The legislative and executive branches, in turn, have enacted and executed a plethora of statutes and regulations designed to enforce the people’s right to the preservation of our wildlife.15 Thus, our Constitution and enacted statutes — as well as the agencies created to enforce them — all confirm that, in Pennsylvania, any subjective expectation of privacy against governmental intrusion in open fields is not an expectation that our society has ever been willing to recognize as reasonable. In short, the baseline protections of the Fourth Amendment, in this particular area, are compatible with Pennsylvania policy considerations insofar as they may be identified. More importantly, there is nothing in the unique Pennsylvania experience to suggest that we should innovate a departure from common law and from federal law and reject the open fields doctrine.

In light of the foregoing, we hold that the guarantees of Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution do not extend to open fields; federal and state law, in this area, are coextensive.16 Therefore, we affirm the Commonwealth Court’s determination that Officers Wasserman and Pierce did *143not violate appellant’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.17

Affirmed.