Commonwealth v. Snyder

OPINION

In this appeal we are asked to determine whether the lower courts erred in finding Appellees’ federal due process rights were violated, and thus suppressing evidence against them based on our decision in Commonwealth v. Deans, 530 Pa. 514, 610 A.2d 32 (1992), in light of. the United States Supreme Court’s subsequent pronouncement in Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 124 S.Ct. 1200, 157 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2004). For the reasons which follow, we reverse.

Beginning in January 2001, Appellee Group Two Properties (“Group Two”) owned a dirt lot in Reading, Pennsylvania, which previously had been the property of Reading Industrial Scrap, Inc. (“RISCO”). At the time in question, Appellee Frederick Snyder served as Chief Executive Officer of Group Two and Vice President of Group One Properties (“Group One”). Appellee Gary Lee Gerber, Jr., owned Mount Carbon Industries, who Snyder had hired to clean up the RISCO property. Appellee Dale Smith, a Group One employee, told the Attorney General’s office he served as a “go-fer” for Snyder, but was introduced to Gerber as the site manager.

While Gerber initially had been instructed to transport the waste to sites in Morgantown, West Virginia, Blandón, Pennsylvania, and Temple, Pennsylvania, Snyder missed his first payment and, according to Gerber, subsequently ordered the waste buried on the property rather than transported offsite. Gerber claims Smith told him the company had obtained the necessary permits from the Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”).

*661After conducting an investigation, DEP concluded none of the relevant individuals had permits to dispose of solid waste on the property. See Affidavit of Probable Cause at ¶ 21, R.R. at 81a. DEP referred the matter to the Attorney General’s office, alleging illegal burial activity was being conducted. Between August 21 and 26, 2002, the Attorney General’s office executed a search warrant on the property and removed, inter alia, 199 drums which had been buried in the ground and certain soil samples which were later tested. DEP tested the samples using the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (“TCLP”), authorized for that purpose by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) in 40 C.F.R. § 261.24 and implemented into Pennsylvania law by 25 Pa. Code § 261a.!.1 According to the Commonwealth’s affidavit of probable cause, the tests indicated levels of silver and lead were present in the soil samples which exceeded the limits set out in the Solid Waste Management Act, 35 P.S. §§ 6018.101 et seq. (“the Act”). Specifically, the Commonwealth alleged Sample # 2981434 had a concentration of 1294 mg/1 of lead; Sample # 2367364 had a concentration of 12.1 mg/1 of silver; Sample # 2994537 had a concentration of 52.3 mg/1 of lead and 10 mg/1 of silver; Sample #2994541 had a concentration of 10.7 mg/1 of lead; Sample # 2994545 had a concentration of 21.1 mg/1 of lead; and Sample # 2994524 had a concentration of 14.2 mg/1 of lead. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.24 Table 1 (setting the maximum permissible concentration of both silver and lead at 5 mg/liter).

After conducting TCLP tests, DEP disposed of the samples. The Commonwealth then brought charges against Appellees for violations of the Act and, in pretrial motions, Appellees moved to suppress the test results because the samples had been destroyed, arguing under our decision in Deans, supra, the destruction of the samples violated their federal due process rights and thus required suppression. Reasoning Deans requires “the defendant in a criminal case [be provided] *662an opportunity to conduct an expert examination of physical evidence that is critical to the issue of guilt,” the trial court granted the motion. Trial Ct. Op., 6/21/05, at 4. The court noted remediation of the site had begun by the time charges were filed, so Appellees could not obtain identical evidence; found the TCLP does not produce consistent results; and held though Appellees had access to the site and performed additional tests, those results did not constitute “comparable evidence” under California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984).2 Accordingly, the trial court suppressed the TCLP test results.

The Commonwealth appealed and filed a Dugger statement, certifying the trial court’s decision would terminate or substantially handicap, the instant prosecution. Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537, 486 A.2d 382 (1985); see Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). After hearing argument, a unanimous three-judge panel of the Commonwealth Court affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The court concluded the Commonwealth had sought to use the evidence at trial; the trial court was within its discretion in finding the evidence in question was not exceedingly reliable; and, under our decision in Deans, those facts required suppression. The court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that Fisher, supra, which we discuss further below, nonetheless forbade suppression of the results of tests performed on destroyed samples unless the samples were destroyed in bad faith, reasoning that, in Fisher, the evidence which had been destroyed had been subjected to a test which “possessed] a high degree of reliability.” Commonwealth v. Snyder, Gerber, Group Two Properties and *663Smith, Nos. 1009, 1010, 1011, and 1012 C.D.2005, unpublished memorandum at 6 (Pa.Cmwlth. filed June 27, 2006). The court also noted that in Fisher the evidence at issue had been destroyed two months before Fisher was arrested, but ten years after the trial at which he had failed to appear. Id. Here, in contrast, the evidence “became unavailable before criminal charges were filed.” Id. at 5.

Before both the trial court and the Commonwealth Court, the Commonwealth, in addition to Fisher, relied on Trombetta, supra, to argue no due process violation took place, and so suppression was inappropriate. As we discuss more fully below, in Trombetta, the high Court held the results of DUI breathalyzer tests were admissible in evidence even though the breath samples themselves had been destroyed because the samples were only potentially useful, not materially exculpatory, and had not been destroyed in bad faith. The Commonwealth argued the soil samples were also only potentially useful to the defendants and, under Trombetta, the results of tests performed on such evidence are only subject to suppression if the evidence possessed a clear exculpatory value and the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other means. Here, they averred, the trial court found the samples were not destroyed in bad faith and Appellees had access to comparable evidence.

We granted the Commonwealth’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal to consider whether the Commonwealth Court erred in affirming the trial court’s order suppressing the test results. In particular, we address whether the Commonwealth Court’s reliance on our decision in Deans is tenable in light of the United States Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Fisher, supra. We heard argument on April 16, 2008, and now reverse.

When the Commonwealth appeals a suppression order, we consider only the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together with the portion of the Commonwealth’s evidence which is uncontroverted. Commonwealth v. Nester, 551 Pa. 157, 161, 709 A.2d 879, 880-81 (1998). Our standard of *664review is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record, but we exercise de novo review over the suppression court’s conclusions of law. Id.

On appeal, the parties reiterate the arguments offered below. The Commonwealth argues that under Fisher and Trombetta the lower courts erred in granting suppression because the soil samples were not destroyed in bad faith. By contrast, Appellees argue Deans requires suppression because the prosecution seeks to use the samples at trial, and the evidence is central to the prosecution’s ease. They further reiterate their argument that the TCLP test is unreliable.3 See Briefs for Appellees at 13-17.4 Appellees also suggest we reject Fisher’s inquiry, which focuses on whether the prosecution acted in bad faith.

The instant case implicates “what might loosely be called the area of constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence.” Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 55, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988) (quoting U.S. v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982)). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires defendants be provided certain access to certain kinds of evidence prior to trial, so they may “be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528.5 The guarantee of *665access to evidence underlies the requirements that the prosecution turn over, if requested, any evidence which is exculpatory and material to guilt or punishment, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and turn over exculpatory evidence which might raise a reasonable doubt as to guilt even if the defense fails to request it, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976).6 In Trombetta and Youngblood, the high Court first addressed the effect of the same principles on cases like the instant one, where evidence which is not materially exculpatory, but potentially useful, is destroyed before the defense has an opportunity to examine it.

In Trombetta, the high Court considered a case where the defendants were pulled over on California highways and subjected to breathalyzer tests, the results of which were introduced into evidence although the breath samples themselves had not been preserved by authorities. As a result of the samples’ destruction, the defendants had not been able to subject them to additional independent tests and introduce the results into evidence.

The Court concluded the state did not violate due process in destroying the samples, noting there was no evidence the police acted in bad faith in destroying them. 467 U.S. at 488, 104 S.Ct. 2528. Moreover, and “[m]ore importantly,” the Court concluded that a state’s duty to preserve evidence is triggered only where the evidence has clear exculpatory value, and it is of such a nature that the defendant could not obtain “comparable evidence” by reasonably available means. 467 U.S. at 488-89, 104 S.Ct. 2528. Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall noted the breath samples came into the authorities’ possession “for the limited purpose of providing raw data to the Intoxilyzer. The evidence to be presented at trial was not the breath itself but rather the Intoxilyzer results.” 467 U.S. *666at 487-88, 104 S.Ct. 2528 (footnote omitted). He further noted the officials who destroyed the samples were acting “in good faith and in accord with their normal practice.” Id. at 487, 104 S.Ct. 2528 (quoting Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 242, 82 S.Ct. 302, 7 L.Ed.2d 256 (1961)).

Finally, Justice Marshall concluded the policy itself was “without constitutional defect”: he noted the test results had no apparent exculpatory value, since they demonstrated the defendants were intoxicated. Id. at 489, 104 S.Ct. 2528. He further concluded that though the Intoxilyzers were highly reliable, the defendant's could have “impeach[ed] the machine’s reliability,” “cross-examine[d] the law enforcement officer who administered the Intoxilyzer test,” asserted “radio waves” or “chemicals that appear in the blood of those who are dieting” interfered with test results, or “attempted] to raise doubts in the mind of the factfinder whether the test was properly administered.” As a result, he determined, adequate comparable evidence was available to them. Id. at 490, 104 S.Ct. 2528.

Next, in Youngblood, the Court considered a situation where the defendant was arrested and convicted of child molestation, sexual assault, and kidnapping in connection with a little boy who had been abducted at a church carnival, driven to a secluded area near a ravine, molested, taken to a secluded house, sodomized repeatedly, and then returned to the carnival and threatened with death if he told anyone. The state of Arizona failed to preserve the semen samples taken from the victim’s body and clothing, and so on federal grounds the Arizona Court of Appeals reasoned the defendant’s conviction should be reversed. State v. Youngblood, 153 Ariz. 50, 734 P.2d 592 (Ariz.App.1986).

After comprehensively summarizing its jurisprudence on the subject, the Court held that absent a showing of bad faith on the part of law enforcement, the state’s failure to preserve evidence which was “merely potentially useful” to a defendant—because any benefit to him was purely hypothetical— did not violate due process. In support of its determination, the late Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:

*667[T]he Due Process Clause [does not require suppression] when we deal with the failure of the State to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant ... We think that requiring a defendant to show bad faith on the part of the police both limits the extent of the police’s obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable bounds and coniines it to that class of cases where the interests of justice most clearly require it, ie., those cases in which the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant.

488 U.S. at 57, 109 S.Ct. 333.7 The Court also concluded, though the evidence in question was more likely to be useful to Youngblood than had been the evidence in Trombetta, such distinction was not dispositive because “the State did not attempt to make any use of the materials in question.” Id. at 56, 109 S.Ct. 333. Youngblood did not reiterate or apply Trombetta’s analysis of comparable evidence, instead focusing solely on the bad faith of the state actors. Id. at 58, 109 S.Ct. 333 (“We therefore hold that unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law”).8

We applied Trombetta and Youngblood in Deans. There, we held suppression was required where the Commonwealth sought to introduce expert testimony that a lottery ticket was forged and the ticket was lost after the prosecution expert examined it, but before the defense could conduct an independent examination.9 See 530 Pa. at 521, 610 A.2d at 35-36. We looked to two factors in so holding. Initially, we noted the missing evidence was “the primary evidence in the case.” Id. at 518, 610 A.2d at 34. We concluded this distinguished the *668case from Youngblood, since there the missing evidence had been, in our judgment, merely supplementary. Next, we noted that in Youngblood, “[b]oth prosecution and defense were denied the use of ‘evidence’ which was unavailable because no tests were conducted on samples until the passage of time made such testing futile,” whereas in Deans, “the prosecutor conducted an examination and is attempting to introduce the results of his examination as evidence against the defendant while denying to the defendant any possible benefit to be derived from an examination of the primary evidence in the case.” Id. at 518-519, 610 A.2d at 34. Finally, although we did not explicitly cast unreliability as an independent basis for suppression, we noted that where confidence in a test result rises “almost to a certainty,” the loss of evidence does not require suppression. We concluded:

Loss of evidence need not preclude expert reports or testimony in every case. Results of tests conducted on different types of evidence will produce differing degrees of probability, sometimes amounting almost to a certainty. Chemical analyses of blood, breath, and narcotic substances produce consistent, highly reliable results. By contrast, psychiatric examination ... may produce opinions which are much more subjective and conclusions which are much more likely to be inconsistent or contradictory. The issue of the authenticity of the lottery ticket in this case appears to be at least somewhat subjective.

Id. at 520-21, 610 A.2d at 35.

Following our decision in Deans, in 2004, the high Court further clarified Trombetta and Youngblood in Fisher. There, the Court held due process did not require dismissal of charges where the police destroyed evidence of tests performed on cocaine during the ten years the defendant was a fugitive: even though the test results were submitted into evidence and constituted a central component of the prosecution’s case, the evidence was only potentially useful to the defendant and it had not been destroyed in bad faith. The Court reaffirmed that the critical distinction for purposes of the Constitutional right to preservation of evidence was be*669tween “potentially useful evidence”-—evidence “of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant,” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57, 109 S.Ct. 388—and “materially exculpatory evidence.” The Court explicitly rejected the argument that “Youngblood does not apply whenever the contested evidence provides a defendant’s ‘only hope for exoneration’ and is ‘essential to and determinative of the outcome of the case,’ ” 540 U.S. at 548, 124 S.Ct. 1200, holding instead “the applicability of the bad-faith requirement in Youngblood depended not on the centrality of the contested evidence to the prosecution’s case or the defendant’s defense, but on the distinction between ‘materially exculpatory’ evidence and ‘potentially useful’ evidence.” Id. at 549, 124 S.Ct. 1200.10

In holding that even where destroyed evidence is central to the prosecution’s case, a defendant must show bad faith to justify suppression, the high Court vitiated the first aspect of our holding in Deans, which considered such centrality in determining whether the evidence was admissible. Although the Court did not directly address the second aspect of our holding, distinguishing between evidence introduced at trial and evidence not introduced at trial, we conclude such a distinction must likewise fail.11

Whether the prosecution uses the evidence at trial is, like the distinction between central and supplementary evidence, a distinction rooted in the importance of a particular piece of evidence to the prosecution’s case, rather than the *670exculpatory value of the evidence. . Reliance on such a distinction is untenable in light of Fisher’s holding that bad faith is .required for a due process violation where merely potentially useful evidence is destroyed, no matter how useful to the prosecution. See Fisher, 540 U.S. at 549, 124 S.Ct. 1200. Moreover, as the Commonwealth points out, Brief for the Commonwealth at 14-15, the prosecution in Fisher also made use of the evidence in question and the high Court nonetheless held there was no due process violation absent a showing of bad faith. Accordingly, we conclude Deans’ distinction between evidence introduced at trial and evidence not introduced at trial is also infirm in light of Fisher.

Appellees argue we should not be guided by Fisher in interpreting this right, but instead, follow the Texas Court of Appeals in holding a criminal defendant has an absolute right to an independent chemical analysis of a challenged substance regardless of bad faith. Briefs for Appellees at 10 (citing Pena v. State, 166 S.W.3d 274 (Tex.App.2005)). In that case, Texas’ intermediate appellate court adopted the test laid out by the Supreme Court of Delaware in Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d 744 (Del.1983), which requires a court to consider (1) whether the evidence in question would have been subject to disclosure either under Brady or under the Delaware rules of criminal procedure, if it had still been in existence; (2) whether the state had a duty to preserve the material; and (3) what consequences should flow from a breach of that duty, consider- . ing the degree of bad faith or negligence involved, the importance of the evidence in question, and—if the issue arises after trial—whether the other evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to support the conviction.

We first note the Pena decision is not binding on us and, ■indeed, has-since been vacated. 191 S.W.3d 133 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). On remand, the intermediate appellate court determined a cautionary instruction—not suppression—was the appropriate remedy. Pena v. State, 226 S.W.3d 634 (Tex.App.2007). Further, the Pena decisions applied the Texas Constitution, not the federal due process clause instantly at issue. See 166 S.W.3d at 281. In fact, there is division within the *671Texas Court of Appeals about the issue even under the Texas Constitution. See State v. Vasquez, 230 S.W.3d 744 (Tex.App.2007) (rejecting Pena and applying the bad faith standard from Fisher). Since Appellees herein rely only on the federal Constitution and Pena did not interpret the federal Constitution, we find Pena unpersuasive, especially as compared to a clear statement of law from the United States Supreme Court.

Appellees’ reliance on Commonwealth v. Arenella, 306 Pa.Super. 119, 452 A.2d 243 (Pa.Super.1982), in which the Superior Court held a defendant was entitled to an independent chemical examination of contraband alleged to be marijuana, is similarly misplaced. Arenella predated Trombetta, Youngblood, Deans, and Fisher, and is clearly no longer controlling authority on this issue. Moreover, the Superior Court has since held failing to preserve breath samples does not constitute a due process violation in the absence of bad faith. Commonwealth v. Gamber, 352 Pa.Super. 36, 42-43, 506 A.2d 1324, 1328 (1986).

Finally, we reject the interpretation, urged by Appellees and the courts below, that Deans requires the results of tests performed on destroyed evidence to be suppressed if the test is not exceedingly reliable (Appellees argue, and the lower courts agreed, that the TCLP is unreliable). See Briefs for Appellees at 13-17, Cmwlth Ct. Op., 6/27/06, at 6. As discussed above, in Deans, we held “Loss of evidence need not preclude expert reports or testimony in every case. Results of tests conducted on different types of evidence will produce differing degrees of probability, sometimes amounting almost to a certainty.” 530 Pa. at 620-21, 610 A.2d at 931. However, Deans did not characterize unreliability as an independent basis for the suppression of such test results; we merely held that where results were reliable it might render suppression unnecessary regardless of other factors, not that where results were unreliable, it might render suppression necessary even if other indicia were lacking. Moreover, Trombetta construed challenges to testing reliability as factual issues for the jury rather than issues to be determined by a court as a matter of law, and we see no reason to depart from that path. See 467 *672U.S. at 489-90, 104 S.Ct. 2528 (describing challenges to the reliability of the test as “comparable evidence” to be offered in rebuttal, not a justification for suppression); see also Trevino v. Dahm, 2 F.3d 829, 832 (8th Cir.1993) (holding “[a]s long as the defendant has an adequate opportunity to impeach the reliability of a scientific test, and the qualifications of the person administering the test, due process is not implicated by a state’s good faith failure to preserve a sample for independent testing”).

Having concluded Fisher is the governing standard, we now address Appellees’ allegations that their federal due process rights were violated. First, we must determine whether the original samples were “materially exculpatory” or “potentially useful.” We recognize this is a “treacherous task,” requiring a court to “divin[e] the import of materials whose contents are unknown and, very often, disputed.” Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 486, 104 S.Ct. 2528 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we have required support for an allegation that destroyed evidence was exculpatory, holding it cannot be based on a “mere assertion.” Commonwealth v. Small, 559 Pa. 423, 441-42, 741 A.2d 666, 676 (1999); see also U.S. v. Martinez, 744 F.2d 76, 79-80 (10th Cir.1984) (rejecting a claim of a due process violation where the defendant’s assertion that the lost evidence was exculpatory was “based purely on speculation and conjecture”)..

Here, common sense as well as the trial court’s findings of fact make clear we are faced with “potentially useful,” rather than “materially exculpatory,” evidence. Compare Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57, 109 S.Ct. 333 (evidence is potentially useful if “no more could be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant” (emphasis added)); with Trial Ct. Op., 4/21/05, at 5, ¶ 12 (“The soil samples discarded by the DEP were potentially exculpatory; if the defense had had an opportunity to conduct an independent analysis of the samples, they may have obtained different results which would have exonerated the defendants”); see also N.T. Hearing, 9/29/04, at 17 (trial court describing the evidence as “potentially exculpatory”). *673The samples had already been tested and had shown concentrations of toxins which were significantly above the statutory limits. Appellees may only hypothesize, in response, that further testing would have produced different results. This is a textbook case of potentially useful evidence. Accordingly, under Fisher, the test results may not be suppressed unless the Commonwealth acted in bad faith in destroying the soil samples.

The trial court found the Commonwealth did not act in bad faith, see N.T. Hearing, 9/29/04, at 60, N.T. Hearing, 3/28/05, at 106, and we are bound by that finding if supported by the record. Appellees argue the policy under which the samples were destroyed was informal and not required by EPA regulations, and both parties’ expert witnesses, in other cases, had tested samples preserved more than six months. Briefs for Appellees at 12-14. Neither argument is adequate to demonstrate bad faith. While it is very unlikely we could find bad faith where samples are destroyed pursuant to standard procedure, see U.S. v. Beckstead, 500 F.3d 1154, 1159-60 (10th Cir.2007) (collecting cases), evidence destroyed outside a standard procedure is not ipso facto destroyed in bad faith. In this case, DEP appears to have disposed of the evidence pursuant to a procedure for disposing of hazardous waste which was—even if not rigorously formalized or mandated by EPA—at least somewhat regularized. Since Appellees’ assertions demonstrate, at most, the disposal was unnecessary, they provide no grounds for affirming the trial court’s finding. Accordingly, since the destroyed evidence was merely potentially useful, and the record supports the trial court’s finding that it was not destroyed in bad faith, suppression is not warranted under Fisher. On this basis, we must reverse the Commonwealth Court’s order affirming the trial court’s suppression order, and remand for further proceedings.12

Order reversed and jurisdiction relinquished.