State ex rel. Davic v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Davic v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Slip Opinion No. 

.]




                                           NOTICE
      This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
      advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
      promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
      formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
      the opinion is published.




                          SLIP OPINION NO. 

  THE STATE EX REL . DAVIC, APPELLANT, v. FRANKLIN COUNTY COURT OF
                              COMMON PLEAS, APPELLEE.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
  may be cited as State ex rel. Davic v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas,
                          Slip Opinion No. 

.]
Prohibition—Inmate had adequate remedies in ordinary course of law to raise
        alleged errors of which he complains, and trial court had subject-matter
        jurisdiction over his criminal case—Court of appeals’ dismissal of
        complaint affirmed.
(No. 2023-0588—Submitted November 14, 2023—Decided December 19, 2023.)
      APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 22AP-301,
                                      

.
                                   __________________
        Per Curiam.
        {¶ 1} Appellant, Bradford S. Davic, appeals the Tenth District Court of
Appeals’ judgment dismissing his complaint for a writ of prohibition under Civ.R.
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




12(B)(6). Davic also requests oral argument. Appellee, the Franklin County Court
of Common Pleas (“trial court”), asks us to affirm the Tenth District’s judgment
and to declare Davic a vexatious litigator under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(B).
          {¶ 2} Because Davic failed to state a valid claim in prohibition, we affirm
the judgment of the court of appeals. We deny Davic’s motion for oral argument
and the trial court’s request to declare Davic a vexatious litigator.
              I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
          {¶ 3} In November 2010, a Franklin County grand jury indicted Davic on
five counts of rape, one count of importuning, and one count of gross sexual
imposition. Each rape count included a sexually-violent-predator specification, and
all seven counts of the indictment specified that Davic’s victim was under 13 years
of age.
          {¶ 4} In April 2011, Davic agreed to plead guilty to importuning, gross
sexual imposition, and four counts of rape. In exchange for Davic’s plea of guilty,
the state agreed that a nolle prosequi be entered as to one count of rape and all the
sexually-violent-predator specifications. The guilty-plea form signed by Davic and
his attorney states that the maximum prison terms for the offenses to which he was
pleading guilty totaled 53 years to life.
          {¶ 5} The trial court held a plea-and-sentencing hearing in April and May
2011. At the hearing, the trial court noted that Davic had signed a guilty-plea form
and asked Davic whether he understood what he had signed. Davic responded
affirmatively but stated that his understanding was that he was agreeing “to a plea
deal that was going to be a sentence of * * * ten years to a life sentence.” Later in
the hearing, however, Davic replied “Yes, sir” when the trial court asked Davic
whether he understood that the total maximum sentence he could receive was 53
years to life in prison.




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                                January Term, 2023




       {¶ 6} The trial court sentenced Davic to an aggregate term of 40 years to
life in prison, lifetime registration as a Tier III sex offender under R.C. 2950.01(G),
and a mandatory five-year term of postrelease control. Davic’s convictions were
affirmed on appeal. State v. Davic, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-555, 2012-Ohio-
952, appeal not accepted, 

, 

, 

.
Since then, Davic has tried unsuccessfully to either correct his sentence or withdraw
his guilty plea. See, e.g., State v. Davic, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-1000, 2016-
Ohio-4883 (affirming denial of motion for resentencing), appeal not accepted, 

, 

, 

; State v. Davic, 10th Dist.
Franklin No. 18AP-569, 

 (affirming denial of motion to correct
sentence), appeal not accepted, 

, 

, 

; State v. Davic, 

, 

 (10th Dist.) (affirming denial
of Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw guilty plea), appeal not accepted, 

, 

, 

; State v. Davic, 10th Dist. Franklin
No. 11AP-555, 

 (Oct. 19, 2021) (denying motion for
leave to file delayed application for reconsideration), appeal not accepted, 

, 

, 

.
       {¶ 7} Davic commenced this action in the Tenth District in May 2022,
seeking a writ of prohibition ordering either that he be immediately released from
prison or that his criminal case be remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. Davic argued that the trial court had lacked jurisdiction to sentence
him based on “a non-existent, unenforceable plea contract.” Invoking contract-law
principles, Davic alleged that there had been no “meeting of the minds” with respect
to the “core terms” of his plea agreement with the state.
       {¶ 8} The trial court filed a motion to dismiss Davic’s complaint under
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) and asked the court of appeals to declare him to be a vexatious
litigator. The trial court’s sole arguments in support of the motion to dismiss were
that (1) Davic had had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law by way



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of appeal to raise his arguments regarding the validity of the plea agreement and
(2) Davic’s R.C. 2969.25(A) affidavit describing each civil action and appeal he
had filed during the previous five years was inadequate. The matter was referred
to a court-of-appeals magistrate, who recommended granting the motion to dismiss.
The magistrate recommended dismissal on the basis that Davic had had an adequate
legal remedy at law by way of appeal to contest the voluntariness of his plea
agreement. The magistrate declined to recommend that Davic be declared a
vexatious litigator but warned him that “his continued filing of appeals, original
actions, and any other actions that are not reasonably grounded in fact or warranted
by law may result in his being declared a vexatious litigator pursuant to R.C.
2323.52.” Davic filed objections to the magistrate’s decision.
        {¶ 9} The court of appeals overruled Davic’s objections and dismissed his
prohibition complaint. The court agreed with the magistrate that the trial court had
not patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over Davic’s sentencing and
that Davic had had an adequate remedy by way of appeal to challenge any defects
in his plea.
        {¶ 10} Davic appealed to this court as of right and also requests oral
argument. The trial court asks this court to declare Davic a vexatious litigator under
S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(B).
                                   II. ANALYSIS
                      A. Davic’s Motion for Oral Argument
        {¶ 11} Oral argument is not mandatory in this case, but we have discretion
to grant it under S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.02(A). In exercising this discretion, we consider
“whether the case involves a matter of great public importance, complex issues of
law or fact, a substantial constitutional issue, or a conflict among courts of appeals.”
State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 

, 2006-Ohio-
5339, 

. This case involves none of those elements. The
dispositive issue in this case is whether the trial court had subject-matter



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jurisdiction to accept Davic’s guilty plea and to sentence him. Because oral
argument is not necessary to illuminate that issue, we deny Davic’s motion.
      B. Court of Appeals’ Dismissal of Davic’s Prohibition Complaint
       {¶ 12} We review de novo a court of appeals’ Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal of
an extraordinary-writ action. State ex rel. Zander v. Judge of Summit Cty. Common
Pleas Court, 

, 

, 

. Dismissal
is appropriate if it appears beyond doubt, taking all factual allegations in the
complaint as true, that the relator can prove no set of facts entitling him to
extraordinary relief. 

       {¶ 13} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Davic must establish that (1)
the trial court exercised judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power was
unauthorized by law, and (3) denial of the writ would result in injury for which no
adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Jones v.
Paschke, 

, 

, 

. The third
element is not required if the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked
jurisdiction. 

 If jurisdiction was patently and unambiguously lacking, a writ of
prohibition will issue to correct a judgment issued by a court that lacked
jurisdiction. State ex rel. V.K.B. v. Smith, 

, 

, 

.
       {¶ 14} In this case, Davic argues that his guilty plea and plea agreement
were unenforceable because there was no “meeting of the minds as to all of the
essential terms of the agreement.” Specifically, Davic argues that he was not
adequately notified of the mandatory consecutive sentences that were applicable to
the crimes to which he had pleaded guilty or the sex-offender registration and the
postrelease-control requirements of his sentence. Accordingly, Davic argues that
his guilty plea was “void” and that the trial court therefore was divested of
jurisdiction to sentence him. Davic also contends that the trial court’s lack of
jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous.



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        {¶ 15} Davic is wrong. “There is a distinction between a court that lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction over a case and a court that improperly exercises that
subject-matter jurisdiction once conferred upon it.” Pratts v. Hurley, 

, 

, 

, ¶ 10. “Once a tribunal has jurisdiction
over both the subject matter of an action and the parties to it, ‘* * * the right to hear
and determine is perfect; and the decision of every question thereafter arising is but
the exercise of the jurisdiction thus conferred * * *.’ ” (Ellipses sic.) State ex rel.
Pizza v. Rayford, 

, 

 (1992), quoting
Sheldon’s Lessee v. Newton, 

, 499 (1854). An error in the exercise
of jurisdiction “renders the court’s judgment voidable, not void.” State v. Harper,

, 

, 

. And extraordinary
relief is not available to attack a voidable judgment. See 

 (“Generally, a voidable
judgment may be set aside only if successfully challenged on direct appeal”).
        {¶ 16} In this case, there is no question that the trial court had subject-matter
jurisdiction over Davic’s criminal case.        The indictment alleged that Davic
committed felony offenses in Franklin County, and pursuant to R.C. 2931.03, a
court of common pleas possesses subject-matter jurisdiction in all felony cases,
State ex rel. Boler v. McCarthy, 

, 

, 

. The validity of Davic’s guilty plea, which is the foundation of his
arguments, is not a matter that calls into question the subject-matter jurisdiction of
the trial court.
        {¶ 17} Davic complains, at most, of error in the trial court’s exercise of its
existing jurisdiction. See Dunbar v. State, 

, 

,

 (conviction based on invalid guilty plea was error in exercise
of jurisdiction). But Davic had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of the
law—including a direct appeal, a petition for postconviction relief, and a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea—to raise the alleged errors of which he complains. See
State ex rel. Parker v. Russo, 

, 

, 

                                 January Term, 2023




602, ¶ 21; Shie v. Leonard, 

, 

 (1998).
Therefore, the court of appeals correctly dismissed Davic’s complaint for failure to
state a valid claim in prohibition.
                              C. Vexatious Litigator
        {¶ 18} The trial court asks us to declare Davic to be a vexatious litigator
under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(B). Under Rule 4.03(B), we may declare a party to be
vexatious if that party “habitually, persistently, and without reasonable cause
engage[d] in frivolous conduct.”
        {¶ 19} We deny the trial court’s request. The trial court’s only basis for the
request to declare Davic vexatious is the observation that he “has filed numerous
appeals and post-judgment actions alleging similar arguments” to those raised in
this appeal. However, under Rule 4.03(A), to be declared a vexatious litigator in
this court, a party must have engaged in frivolous conduct in an appeal or other
action in this court. We decline to declare Davic a vexatious litigator at this time
because the trial court does not argue that Davic has engaged in frivolous conduct
in this court.
                                III. CONCLUSION
        {¶ 20} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court of
appeals, deny Davic’s motion for oral argument, and deny the trial court’s request
to declare Davic to be a vexatious litigator.
                                                                 Judgment affirmed.
        KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER,
and DETERS, JJ., concur.
                                _________________
        Bradford S. Davic, pro se.
        G. Gary Tyack, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brandon Coy
Hendrix, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
                                _________________



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