State ex rel. Spencer v. Forshey

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Spencer v. Forshey, Slip Opinion No. 

.]




                                           NOTICE
      This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
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      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
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      the opinion is published.




                          SLIP OPINION NO. 

THE STATE EX REL. SPENCER, APPELLANT , v. FORSHEY, WARDEN, APPELLEE.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
        may be cited as State ex rel. Spencer v. Forshey, Slip Opinion No.
                                     

.]
Habeas corpus—Inmate had adequate remedy in ordinary course of law through
        direct appeal of his convictions and sentence, and trial court did not lack
        jurisdiction over his criminal case—Court of appeals’ judgment granting
        warden’s motion to dismiss affirmed.
(No. 2023-0465—Submitted November 14, 2023—Decided December 19, 2023.)
                APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Noble County,
                            No. 22 NO 0500, 

.
                                   __________________
        Per Curiam.
        {¶ 1} Appellant, Brian N. Spencer, an inmate at the Noble Correctional
Institution, filed a complaint for a writ of habeas corpus in the Seventh District
Court of Appeals against appellee, Jay Forshey, the warden of the Noble
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Correctional Institution. Spencer argues that the trial court violated his right to
counsel during his criminal trial and that his resulting convictions are void. The
Seventh District granted the warden’s motion to dismiss and denied the writ, and
Spencer has appealed. We affirm the Seventh District’s judgment dismissing
Spencer’s complaint.
            I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       {¶ 2} In 2016, a Franklin County Court of Common Pleas jury convicted
Spencer of possession of heroin with a firearm specification, possession of
marijuana with a firearm specification, and having a weapon while under disability.
The trial court sentenced him to a total of 16 years in prison.
       {¶ 3} Spencer had court-appointed counsel prior to trial, but on the morning
of trial, Spencer requested that the trial court appoint him a new attorney. Spencer
claimed that his attorney was working with the prosecutor and was talking badly
about Spencer to Spencer’s family. The court refused to appoint Spencer new
counsel because the trial had already been rescheduled multiple times and Spencer
had waited until the morning of trial to express his concerns. Spencer then asked
to be permitted to represent himself at trial. The court repeatedly advised Spencer
about the risks of representing himself and recommended that Spencer keep his
attorney, but Spencer continued to request that he be permitted to represent himself
and the court ultimately allowed him to do so. Spencer also declined to allow his
former attorney to serve as stand-by counsel.
       {¶ 4} Following his convictions and sentencing, Spencer brought a direct
appeal in the Tenth District Court of Appeals. State v. Spencer, 10th Dist. Franklin
No. 16AP-444, 

. The Tenth District affirmed, determining that the
trial court had not violated Spencer’s right to counsel. Id. at ¶ 11, 16-18.
       {¶ 5} In October 2022, Spencer filed his habeas complaint in the Seventh
District. He argued that his convictions and sentence are void because the trial




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court violated his right to counsel. The warden filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to
dismiss, which the court of appeals granted. Spencer has appealed as of right.
                              II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
                                A. Standard of review
        {¶ 6} We review de novo a court of appeals’ Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal of a
habeas corpus petition. Orr v. Schweitzer, 

, 

,

. Dismissal is appropriate if it appears beyond doubt, after
taking all allegations in the petition as true and making reasonable inferences in the
petitioner’s favor, that the petitioner can prove no set of facts entitling him to a writ
of habeas corpus. 

  B. Spencer properly included an inmate-account statement with his complaint
        {¶ 7} As an initial matter, the warden argues that Spencer did not file with
his complaint a statement setting forth the balance of his inmate account for each
of the preceding six months as required by R.C. 2969.25(C), which is a ground for
dismissing his complaint. See State ex rel. Manns v. Henson, 

,

, 

. The warden also asserted this argument in
his motion to dismiss before the Seventh District, but the Seventh District did not
address the argument.
        {¶ 8} Spencer did, in fact, file a statement of his account with his complaint.
Spencer thereby complied with R.C. 2969.25(C), and although we affirm the
Seventh District’s dismissal of Spencer’s complaint, we do not do so on this basis.
        C. The trial court had jurisdiction to convict and sentence Spencer
        {¶ 9} Spencer argues that the trial court violated his right to counsel and
that this violation deprived the court of jurisdiction over his case, voiding his
convictions and sentence.
        {¶ 10} A writ of habeas corpus is generally available only when the
petitioner’s maximum sentence has expired and he is being held unlawfully or when
the sentencing court patently and unambiguously lacked subject-matter



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jurisdiction. Bell v. McConahay, 

, 

, 

. “The writ is not available when the petitioner has an adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law unless the trial court’s judgment is void for lack of
jurisdiction.” 

       {¶ 11} Spencer had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law
through direct appeal of his convictions and sentence. See Casey v. Hudson, 

, 

, 

, ¶ 3. He must therefore show
that his convictions and sentence are void because the trial court patently and
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to convict or sentence him.
       {¶ 12} The courts of common pleas have subject-matter jurisdiction over
felony cases. R.C. 2931.03; Smith v. Sheldon, 

, 

,

, ¶ 8. Spencer argues that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel and that this violation deprived the court of jurisdiction. Spencer
is wrong.
       {¶ 13} Even if the trial court had violated Spencer’s right to counsel, as we
recently held in State ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking Cty. Common Pleas Court, __ Ohio
St.3d __, 

, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 21, a “violation of the defendant’s right
to counsel does not deprive the sentencing court of subject-matter jurisdiction any
more than any other constitutional or trial error does.” Such a violation is a
structural error that is reversible on appeal, but it does not result in a sentence that
is void for the court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

       {¶ 14} The trial court therefore did not lack jurisdiction over Spencer’s
case, and his convictions and sentence are not void. The Seventh District therefore
correctly granted the warden’s motion to dismiss the complaint.
                                III. CONCLUSION
       {¶ 15} The trial court did not lack jurisdiction over Spencer’s case, and his
convictions and sentences are not void. Thus, he is not entitled to a writ of habeas




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corpus. We therefore affirm the Seventh District Court of Appeals’ judgment
dismissing Spencer’s complaint.

                                                            Judgment affirmed.
       KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER,
and DETERS, JJ., concur.
                             _________________
       Brian N. Spencer, pro se.
       Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Stephanie L. Watson, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
                             _________________




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