State v. Jackson

181 L.Ed.2d 911

 (2012), quoting United States v. Knotts,

460 U.S. 276, 286

103 S.Ct. 1081

75 L.Ed.2d 55

 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
Second, under the more-recently developed privacy doctrine, announced in Katz v.
United States,

389 U.S. 347, 360

88 S.Ct. 507

19 L.Ed.2d 576

 (1967), a search
occurs when there is an official intrusion into a sphere in which there exists a
reasonable expectation of privacy with an intent to obtain information.

Jones at 408, fn. 5

. Importantly, for our purposes, under either doctrine a search occurs only
when there is “an attempt to find something or obtain information.”





                                           5
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




        {¶ 16} The lead officer’s opening of the door was not a search because he
did not act with the purpose of finding out what was inside the car. As in other
Fourth Amendment contexts, an officer’s intent is determined through an objective
inquiry. See Torres v. Madrid, __ U.S. __, __,

141 S.Ct. 989, 999

209 L.Ed.2d 190

 (2021); Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386, 397

109 S.Ct. 1865

104 L.Ed.2d 443

 (1989); United States v. White,

928 F.3d 734, 741

 (8th Cir.2019). The body-
camera footage makes clear that the officer was focused on securing Jackson, who
was being uncooperative. The officer’s intent to secure Jackson is apparent from
both his words and his actions. First, he asked Jackson to remove the key from the
ignition so that Jackson could not “pull off.” Then, after removing Jackson from
the car, he reached in to remove the keys. Because the officer acted with the intent
to secure Jackson and not with “the intent to obtain information,” he did not conduct
a search. Taylor v. Saginaw,

11 F.4th 483

, 487 (6th Cir.2021). None of this is to
say that an officer’s opening of a car door can never constitute a search. If an officer
opened a car door without the owner’s permission for the purpose of ascertaining
what was inside the car, such conduct might well constitute a search—it would be
a physical trespass “conjoined with * * * an attempt to find something or to obtain
information.” See

Jones at 408, fn. 5

. But that is not what happened here. Nothing
in the record indicates that the officer opened the door for any reason other than to
get Jackson out of the car.
  C. The dissenting opinion misconstrues binding United States Supreme Court
                        caselaw on what constitutes a search
        {¶ 17} The dissenting opinion ignores the United States Supreme Court’s
framework in Jones for determining whether conduct amounts to a “search” for the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. It accuses the majority opinion of “focusing
on the subjective motivation of the officer who opened the door of Jackson’s car.”
Dissenting opinion, ¶ 31. But we do no such thing. Instead, we focus on objective
factors to determine whether the officer opened Jackson’s door in “an attempt to




                                           6
                                 January Term, 2022




find something or to obtain information.” See

Jones at 408, fn. 5

. Relevant here,
(1) the officer ordered to Jackson to remove the keys from the ignition, (2) the
officer subsequently opened the car door, and (3) the officer removed the car keys
after he opened the door.
         {¶ 18} Indeed, the very cases that the dissenting opinion cites to support the
proposition that subjective intent should not be considered demonstrates that the
factors we consider are part of an objective inquiry. See Michigan v. Bryant,

562 U.S. 344, 360

131 S.Ct. 1143, 1156

179 L.Ed.2d 93

 (the objective primary-
purpose inquiry involves examining the “the individuals’ statements and actions”
[emphasis added]); Rhode Island v. Innis,

446 U.S. 291, 301

100 S.Ct. 1682

64 L.Ed.2d 297

 (1980) (“words and actions on the part of the police” are relevant to
the objective inquiry as to whether an interrogation occurred [emphasis added]).
         {¶ 19} In trying to drive home the point that the officer conducted a search
when he opened Jackson’s door, the dissenting opinion cites New York v. Class,

475 U.S. 106

 (1986), a case that bears only
superficial resemblance to the present case. In that case, the Supreme Court found
that an officer had conducted a search when he opened a car door and leaned in to
move papers obscuring a VIN number, discovering a gun in the process.

 at 114-
115. But unlike in our case, the officer in Class opened the door of the defendant’s
car to look for the VIN number, an action that easily qualifies as “an attempt to
* * * obtain information.” Jones 505 U.S. at 408,

181 L.Ed.2d 922, fn. 5

.
         {¶ 20} The dissenting opinion also misunderstands Mimms,

434 U.S. 106

98 S.Ct. 330

54 L.Ed.2d 331

, and Evans,

67 Ohio St.3d 405

618 N.E.2d 162

. Both
of those cases make clear that police may order a driver out of a car without
violating the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures so long as the initial stop is lawful. See Mimms at 333, fn. 6;

Evans at 408

.
If the initial stop is lawful, no further justification is necessary. Here, Jackson



                                           7
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




stipulated that he was lawfully stopped. Thus, the order for Jackson to get out of
the car was constitutionally permissible. The issue of who opened the door is
irrelevant. See New Jersey v. Mai,

202 N.J. 12, 22-23

993 A.2d 1216

 (2010) (there
is no relevant difference between lawfully ordering the occupant out of the car and
opening the door as part of a lawful order); State v. Ferrise,

269 N.W.2d 888, 890

(Minn.1978) (“there is little practical difference [under Mimms] between ordering
a driver to open his door and get out of his car, on the one hand, and opening the
door for the driver and telling him to get out”); United States v. Stanfield,

109 F.3d 976, 983

 (4th Cir.1997) (“the actual invasion of privacy entailed in an officer’s
opening of the vehicle door is indistinguishable from * * * that which occurs when
an occupant is required to open a door to exit a vehicle pursuant to * * * Mimms”).
The door had to be opened for Jackson to get out of the car.
       {¶ 21} The officer’s ultimatum was clear, “You can go ahead and give me
your ID, and if you don’t we’ll be getting out of the car.” Yet, Jackson failed to
comply or even answer the officer. And for the dissenting opinion to characterize
Jackson’s response as “inquisitive” is more than charitable. Dissenting opinion at
¶ 59. The first couple of times Jackson asked why he was being pulled over might
be considered “inquisitive,” but repeatedly asking the same question even when
provided with the answer and ordered to show his ID is far from “inquisitive”—it’s
uncooperative.
       {¶ 22} Equally, misguided is the analogy offered by the dissenting opinion
about an “an officer kicking in a door * * * frustrated at having been denied a
warrant to search the house.” Dissenting opinion at ¶ 55. The dissenting opinion
contends that the “unlawfulness of kicking in the door prevents the later discovery
of contraband from being a legitimate discovery of evidence in plain view,
notwithstanding the subjective intentions the officers may have had.”

 That may
be true enough, but in our case the officer did not illegally open the car door.
Whether the officer opened the door, or whether the passenger opened the door




                                          8
                               January Term, 2022




when complying with a lawful order to get out of the car under Mimms and Evans,
the opening of the car door did not amount to a search under firmly established
Fourth Amendment principles.
                 D. The second officer did not conduct a search
       {¶ 23} Jackson contends that even if the first officer did not conduct a
search by opening the car door, the second officer conducted one when he looked
through the open car door and spotted the marijuana cigarette.
       {¶ 24} To be sure, the second officer acted with an intent to obtain
information when he looked into the car. He had no other reason to walk over and
peer into the car.    In addition, his body camera lingered over the driver’s
compartment, indicating that he was taking a long investigative look. However, the
second officer’s intent alone did not turn his action into a search. An officer must
also conduct a physical trespass or an invasion of privacy for his actions to amount
to a search. Jones,

565 U.S. at 408

181 L.Ed.2d 911, fn. 5

.
       {¶ 25} The second officer did not conduct a search under the trespass
doctrine because he did not physically enter the car until after he had spotted the
marijuana cigarette. See Taylor, 11 F.4th at 487. All the second officer did was
look through an already open door. He did not open the door himself, and the
officer who did open the door did so without an intent to obtain information.
Without a physical trespass, the second officer’s conduct cannot be considered a
search under the trespass doctrine.
       {¶ 26} Likewise, the second officer did not conduct a search under the Katz
privacy doctrine. A person does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in an
object that is in plain view. Minnesota v. Dickerson,

508 U.S. 366, 375

113 S.Ct. 2130

124 L.Ed.2d 334

 (1993). And it “has long been settled that objects falling in
the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.” Harris v. United States,

390 U.S. 234, 236

88 S.Ct. 992

19 L.Ed.2d 1067

 (1968). Because the officer



                                         9
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




observed the marijuana in plain view when he looked through the open car door,
there was no invasion into Jackson’s legitimate expectation of privacy.
       {¶ 27} Jackson attempts to conflate the actions of the two officers,
contending that but for the first officer opening the car door, the marijuana cigarette
would not have been in plain view and would not have been noticed by the second
officer. That may be true, but it does not make for a Fourth Amendment violation.
The Fourth Amendment by its terms protects against unreasonable searches.
Neither officer conducted a search under the facts of this case.
 E. Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the discovery of
   the marijuana cigarette in plain view allowed the officers to search the car
       {¶ 28} Once the second officer observed the marijuana cigarette, he had
probable cause to believe that Jackson’s car contained contraband. Under the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement, officers may search a vehicle
without obtaining a warrant when they have probable cause to believe the vehicle
contains evidence of illegal activity. See Chambers v. Maroney,

399 U.S. 42, 51

90 S.Ct. 1975

26 L.Ed.2d 419

(1970). Thus, the officers did not transgress the
Fourth Amendment when they searched the vehicle and found the pistol.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 29} The police conduct in this case did not violate the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. We sustain the decision of the court
of appeals affirming the denial of Jackson’s motion to suppress.
Judgment affirmed.
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, and DONNELLY, JJ., concur.
BRUNNER, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by STEWART, J.
_________________

10
January Term, 2022

BRUNNER, J., dissenting.
I. INTRODUCTION
{¶ 30} The majority opinion in this case recognizes the law that a car is a
space protected from unreasonable searches by the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. It also recognizes that law-enforcement officers
generally could not have intruded into appellant Jackie Jackson’s car without
having cause to believe that Jackson was committing an offense. Officers stopped
Jackson for what they believed were illegally tinted windows, but the officers did
not have equipment to measure the extent of the tint to prove a violation. During
the stop, one of the eight officers present observed evidence of a crime, finding a
marijuana cigarette on the floor of a car after Jackson’s door had been opened by
another officer. The door was opened before the officer ordered Jackson out of the
car, and Jackson was not able to shut the door before other officers moved him to
the rear of the vehicle. After finding the cigarette, the officers searched the car and
found a gun buried deep in a bin of clothing in the back seat.
{¶ 31} Jackson was charged with several violations related to his possession
of the gun. The majority opinion holds that no Fourth Amendment violation
occurred, because it finds that there was no search. The majority opinion
improperly isolates the actions of each officer involved in the stop. The majority
opinion then errs by focusing on the subjective motivation of the officer who
opened the door of Jackson’s car before asking him to get out of the car. It states
that this officer did not conduct a search when he breached the privacy of Jackson’s
car by opening its door, arguing that the officer did not intend to search the car but
to secure Jackson. The majority opinion then looks separately at the actions of the
officer who peered under the driver’s seat—while using a flashlight—and observed
the cigarette, believing it to be marijuana. The majority opinion does not take into
consideration that these two officers were working together. It holds that the

11
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

second officer validly observed contraband in plain view, because this officer did
no more than take advantage of the open car door.
{¶ 32} I respectfully disagree with this analysis. Considered as a whole,
this course of conduct was not only a search, it was a fishing expedition and not a
constitutional law-enforcement technique. I would order that the evidence of the
gun be suppressed, and I would reverse the judgment of the First District Court of
Appeals.
II. CASE BACKGROUND AND LEGAL HISTORY
{¶ 33} The majority opinion’s discussion of the facts of this case begins
with the premise that Jackson was an “uncooperative driver” Majority opinion,
¶ 1. It finds that Jackson, a young black male, was uncooperative after being
stopped by eight officers for an alleged window-tint violation when none of them
had a tint meter with them; Jackson openly questioned whether the stop was about
his window tint. After stating that Jackson was uncooperative, the majority
opinion’s recitation of the facts does not take into account several important
features of the stop, which was captured by body cameras worn by three of the
officers. Moreover, the majority opinion does not point out that the video footage
of the stop was the only evidence considered by the trial court on Jackson’s motion
to suppress or that the trial court never made findings of fact after it viewed the
videos. Thus, I will restate the facts as seen on the videos to clarify our role when
the trial court has not made findings of fact when deciding a motion to suppress.
A. The stop, search, and arrest as seen on the videos
{¶ 34} There are three videos of the stop and the ensuing events. The first
comes from the body camera of the officer who pulled Jackson over. The officer
approached the open driver’s-side window and instructed Jackson to roll down his
front passenger-side window (which was tinted, as were all the windows of the car
except the front windscreen). After Jackson complied, the officer asked Jackson to
turn off his car and surrender his keys. Jackson turned off the car but did not

12
January Term, 2022

surrender his keys. Instead, Jackson asked why he needed to surrender his keys.
The officer indicated that it was so that he would not “pull off.” Jackson then asked
why he would drive away and asked why he was pulled over; the officer indicated
that he stopped Jackson for having an illegal window tint. By this time, at least six
officers were on the scene. Jackson expressed disbelief that the encounter was
really about window tint. As Jackson continued to express disbelief, a female
officer on the passenger side of the car asked, in a voice barely audible on the video,
whether he had a license and insurance.
{¶ 35} One second later, the officer whose body camera was recording the
encounter engages in the following dialogue with Jackson:

Jackson: So my window tint is why I’m being pulled over?
Officer: Yeah. You can give us your [identification (“ID”)
then you can still talk about that, yeah.
Jackson: Now y’all want my keys and—
Officer: That’s common for safety reasons, yeah. And
you— You can go ahead and give me your ID and, uh, if you don’t
we’ll be gettin’ out the car, so you want—you want [opens door]
we’re gonna get ya out the car.

In short, Jackson did not immediately comply with the suggestion that he give the
officer an ID and appeared instead to be doing something with his phone. The
officer, within seconds, opened the door and ordered Jackson from the car. Other
officers ushered, and to a minimal extent, pulled Jackson toward the rear of the
vehicle, giving him no time to close the door. Meanwhile, the first officer reached
in the car, removed the key from the ignition, and placed it on the vehicle roof.
Neither the officer who opened the door nor any other officer closed the door, and
Jackson was not given an opportunity to do so.

13
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

{¶ 36} Jackson was then subjected to a pat-down search.1 He informed the
officers that his tint was legal, that his insurance information was in his phone, and
that he was trying to activate his camera to record the stop for his own safety. One
officer commented that it was “stupid” of Jackson to be fearful of the officers who
were present. That officer’s body camera, the second video, shows that by the time
the officer spoke, eight officers were on the scene. Shortly after, the officers
realized that they did not have a meter to measure the tint of the windows.
{¶ 37} A bike-mounted officer who arrived on the scene shortly after
Jackson was pulled over also was wearing a body camera. The video from his
camera, the third video, began approximately 30 seconds before the first officer
opened the door and ordered Jackson from the car. No one closed the driver’s-side
door once Jackson was moved behind his car. Instead, it was left open and hanging
into the roadway. The officer who was recording the second video walked to the
open driver’s door, pulled out his flashlight, and shined the light in the gap between
the door sill and the seat. He then reported to the other officers that he could see a
marijuana cigarette underneath the seat. The officer moved his body camera toward
the gap between the seat and door sill, where a slim white cigarette, which appeared
to be hand-rolled, could be seen. No one explained why the officer thought the
cigarette was marijuana rather than tobacco. Nonetheless, based on finding the
cigarette, officers conducted a full search of the car, including several bags and
containers of clothing in the back seat.
{¶ 38} The second video was also recorded by one of the six bike-mounted
officers. That officer mostly stood by, observing and commenting until the
marijuana was discovered. He helped search the car and recovered a gun from deep
inside a Rubbermaid-style storage container full of clothing in the back seat.

1. The search was patently illegal, given the lack of reasonable suspicion at that time that Jackson
was “armed and dangerous.” Arizona v. Johnson,

555 U.S. 323, 327

129 S.Ct. 781

172 L.Ed.2d 694

 (2009).




                                                 14
                                     January Term, 2022




         B. The indictment and motion to suppress evidence of the gun
         {¶ 39} Jackson was indicted on March 27, 2019, for having a weapon while
under disability, carrying a concealed weapon, and improperly handling a firearm
in a motor vehicle. The trial court held two hearings on Jackson’s motion to
suppress. In the first, the parties stipulated that the videos provided the necessary
facts but presented no testimony. After it reviewed the videos and heard oral
argument in the second hearing, the trial court, without stating any reasoning,
overruled the motion to suppress. Jackson thereafter entered a no-contest plea to
the charges in the indictment. He was found guilty and was sentenced to two years
of intensive supervision on community control. On appeal, the First District Court
of Appeals affirmed.
         {¶ 40} The majority affirms the judgment of the First District. I would not.
                                      III. ANALYSIS
         {¶ 41} Generally, according to State v. Tidwell,

165 Ohio St.3d 57

, 2021-
Ohio-2072,

175 N.E.3d 527, ¶ 18

, appellate review of a ruling on a motion to
suppress presents a mixed question of fact and law. See also State v. Burnside,

100 Ohio St.3d 152

2003-Ohio-5372

797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8

. The trial court’s findings of
fact must be accepted by the appellate court if they are supported by competent,
credible evidence.

Tidwell at ¶ 18

. Questions of law are reviewed de novo without
deference to the legal conclusions of the lower court. Id.; Burnside at ¶ 8.
         {¶ 42} The trial judge took no testimony and made no factual findings2: she
watched the videos and concluded that the evidence obtained by the officers from
Jackson should not be suppressed. Therefore, we should first determine whether
the trial court’s decision may be examined by an appellate court. Then, we must



2. Crim.R. 12(F) requires: “Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court
shall state its essential findings on the record.” This did not occur here, but neither party made a
timely request for findings of fact.




                                                15
                                   SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




determine whether, in the absence of findings of fact, the video evidence is
competent, credible evidence that supports the trial court’s decision.
       A. Reviewing evidence before the trial court when no findings of fact
                                                 were made
         {¶ 43} In State v. Pate, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-130490 and C-130492,

2014-Ohio-2029, ¶ 11-12

, the First District relied on our decision in State v. Brown,

64 Ohio St.3d 476, 481

597 N.E.2d 97

 (1992),3 to apply a sufficient-evidence
standard, Pate at ¶ 8, i.e., was there competent, credible evidence before the trial
court, even though no findings of fact were made, and on State v. Shields, 1st Dist.
Hamilton No. C-100362,

2011-Ohio-1912

. Pate at ¶ 10.
         {¶ 44} In Shields, the defendant argued that because he had waived his
rights under Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436

86 S.Ct. 1602

16 L.Ed.2d 694

(1966), only after he was threatened by a police officer, his statement should be
suppressed. No findings of fact were made by the trial court. The First District
determined that it could “directly examine the record to determine whether there
[was] sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the trial court’s decision was
supported by the record and legally justified.” Id. at ¶ 9; see Pate at ¶ 11.
{¶ 45} Thus, it is appropriate for this court to determine whether a trial
court’s decision on a motion to suppress was supported by competent, credible
evidence even when the trial court failed to make findings of fact. I therefore agree
with the majority that it is appropriate to review the denial of Jackson’s motion to
suppress. I note that in “[a]pplying Brown, we do not weigh the evidence; we
simply determine if there is evidence in the record sufficient to support the trial

3. In Brown, the trial court did not make findings of fact when denying a motion to dismiss for lack
of a speedy trial. The court of appeals held that because the trial court did not make findings of fact,
nothing in the record verified that a parole holder had been placed on the defendant. On that basis,
the court of appeals overturned the defendant’s conviction. We reversed, holding that despite the
trial court’s failure to make findings of fact, there was “sufficient evidence demonstrating that the
trial court’s decision was legally justified and supported by the record.”

Brown at 482

.




                                                  16
                                 January Term, 2022




court’s decision.” Pate at ¶ 13. However, I dissent from the majority’s judgment.
Based on the videos, the only evidence in the record, I would find that Jackson’s
convictions were not based on competent, credible evidence. I would hold that the
officers’ search violated the Fourth Amendment, that the gun should be suppressed,
and that Jackson’s convictions must be vacated because they were based solely on
his possession of the gun.
     B. De novo review of the law as applied to the evidence in the video
       {¶ 46} In Pate, the First District cited Burnside for the proposition that an
appellate court reviews “de novo the trial court’s application of the law to * * *
facts.” Pate at ¶ 9, citing Burnside,

100 Ohio St.3d 152

2003-Ohio-5372

797 N.E.2d 71, at ¶ 8

. This court must determine whether the trial court based its
decision to deny Jackson’s motion to suppress on competent, credible evidence,
that is, “whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.”

Id.,

 citing State v.
McNamara,

124 Ohio App.3d 706

707 N.E.2d 539

 (4th Dist.1997). Because the
trial court did not make findings of fact, this court must review the videos to see
whether competent, credible evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that
suppression of the gun was not required.
                        C. Opening the door was a search
       {¶ 47} The videos show that the first officer who approached Jackson did
not order him out of the car until after the officer had opened Jackson’s car door.
An officer may, without offending the Fourth Amendment, require the occupants
of a lawfully stopped car to exit the vehicle. Arizona v. Johnson,

555 U.S. 323, 331

129 S.Ct. 781

172 L.Ed.2d 694

 (2009); Maryland v. Wilson,

519 U.S. 408, 410

117 S.Ct. 882

137 L.Ed.2d 41

 (1997); Pennsylvania v. Mimms,

434 U.S. 106, 111

98 S.Ct. 330

54 L.Ed.2d 331

 (1977). If an occupant does not comply with a
lawful order to exit a vehicle, a police officer may be justified in removing the
occupant from the car. Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386, 396

109 S.Ct. 1865

104 L.Ed.2d 443

 (1989) (“Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized



                                          17
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the
right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it”). Here,
the officer opened the driver’s-side door, where Jackson was sitting, before he
ordered Jackson out of the car. The time between asking for Jackson’s driver’s
license and proof of insurance and opening the door was unduly brief.
                              D. Plain-view analysis
       {¶ 48} A law-enforcement officer is entitled under the plain-view exception
to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to “seize what clearly is
incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place where the
officer has a right to be.” Washington v. Chrisman,

455 U.S. 1, 5-6

102 S.Ct. 812

70 L.Ed.2d 778

 (1982), citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire,

403 U.S. 443

91 S.Ct. 2022

29 L.Ed.2d 564

 (1971), and Harris v. United States,

390 U.S. 234

88 S.Ct. 992

19 L.Ed.2d 1067

 (1968). And an officer may observe and seize any evidence
in plain view when ordering an occupant to step out of a stopped car.

Wilson at 411

(seizing crack cocaine that had fallen to the ground was not unreasonable); Mimms
at 107 (officers who frisked a defendant after seeing a large bulge in his jacket
lawfully seized a revolver found in the defendant’s waistband).
       {¶ 49} Thus, how contraband came to be in plain view cannot be ignored.
If Jackson had opened the door and left it open himself, thereby exposing the
marijuana cigarette to the officers’ view, the state’s argument that discovery of the
cigarette was legal would be stronger. Similarly, if Jackson had indicated that he
would not comply with the officer’s lawful order to exit the vehicle, the officer may
have been justified in opening the door in order to remove him from the car and, if
the cigarette was seen at that point, the discovery may have been legal. The
majority appears to endorse this second scenario by asserting that Jackson was
“uncooperative.” Majority opinion at ¶ 1.
       {¶ 50} But those scenarios are not supported by the videos. Jackson was
not given the opportunity to open his own door. He was not explicitly ordered to




                                         18
                                January Term, 2022




step out of the car before the officer opened the door. Instead, the officer stated
that if Jackson did not present his ID, the officer would get Jackson out of the car.
Within a second of making that observation, the officer opened the door and
ordered Jackson out of the car. Then, some of the other officers on the scene moved
Jackson from the vicinity of the door, which stopped him from closing the door to
protect his privacy. Though the open door jutted into the road, no officer closed
the door. Another officer then took advantage of the open interior of the car to
observe what, with the door closed, could not have been seen.
       {¶ 51} The officer who opened Jackson’s door was not legally justified to
do so. Nor was there legal justification for leaving the car door open. The action
of the officer in opening the door before ordering Jackson from the car was a
physical trespass into Jackson’s private property. Some may argue that the act was
de minimis, but even a seemingly de minimis trespass can constitute an illegal
search. See United States v. Jones,

565 U.S. 400, 404-411

181 L.Ed.2d 911

 (2012) (officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they trespassed
by planting a magnetic Global-Positioning-System device on a car); Arizona v.
Hicks,

480 U.S. 321, 324-325

107 S.Ct. 1149

94 L.Ed.2d 347

 (1987) (moving
stereo equipment suspected to be stolen so that the officer could read the serial
numbers constituted an unlawful search without a warrant); New York v. Class,

475 U.S. 106, 114-115

 (1986) (opening a car door and
moving papers obscuring a vehicle-identification number (“VIN”), which allowed
an officer to see the handle of a gun, was a lawful search when federal regulations
required that the VIN be visible).
          E. Subjective intent of the officer who opened the car door
       {¶ 52} The majority states, “The lead officer’s opening of the door was not
a search because he did not act with the purpose of finding out what was inside the
car.” Majority opinion at ¶ 16. The majority argues that the lead officer was
“focused on securing Jackson, who was being uncooperative,” id. at ¶ 16, and that



                                         19
                               SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




the intrusion and trespass into Jackson’s private space therefore did not constitute
a search. Under what lens was Jackson uncooperative? And how does the video
demonstrate the officer’s subjective intent?
           {¶ 53} The United States Supreme Court has consistently rejected
consideration of subjective intent as a measurement of constitutionality. Michigan
v. Bryant,

562 U.S. 344, 360

131 S.Ct. 1143

179 L.Ed.2d 93

 (2011) (the primary
purpose of police questioning of a victim is to be assessed by objective facts, not
subjective motivations of the participants); Whren v. United States,

517 U.S. 806, 813

116 S.Ct. 1769

135 L.Ed.2d 89

 (1996) (refusing to evaluate Fourth
Amendment reasonableness in light of the law-enforcement officers’ actual
subjective motivations); New York v. Quarles,

467 U.S. 649, 655-656

104 S.Ct. 2626

81 L.Ed.2d 550

 (1984), fn. 6 (a law-enforcement officer’s subjective
motivation is irrelevant to determining the applicability of the public-safety
exception to Miranda,

384 U.S. 436

86 S.Ct. 1602

16 L.Ed.2d 694

); Rhode Island
v. Innis,

446 U.S. 291, 301-302

100 S.Ct. 1682

64 L.Ed.2d 297

 (1980) (a police
officer’s subjective intent to obtain incriminatory statements is not relevant to
determining whether an interrogation has occurred). And with a record that is
devoid of testimony as well as of findings of fact, the subjective motivations of the
police officer who stopped Jackson are simply not in the record.
           {¶ 54} The majority apparently concedes that an officer’s subjective intent
is not a relevant consideration; it instead claims to determine intent through an
objective inquiry. Yet, it ascribes a subjective intent when describing why the
officer opened the door; based on this intent, the majority holds that a search did
not occur. In Class,

475 U.S. at 114-115

, however,
the Supreme Court held that a search did occur when an officer opened a door and
leaned in to move papers obscuring the VIN, although it held that the search was
reasonable because a federal regulation required that a VIN be visible from outside
the car.




                                           20
                                January Term, 2022




       {¶ 55} Consider the hypothetical of an officer kicking in a door, perhaps
frustrated at having been denied a warrant to search the house. Would we say that
his action was not a search because he acted in frustration and not out of a desire to
find anything? Would we thereafter conclude that his fellow officers, standing
behind him as he kicked in the door, were entitled to confiscate what now was in
plain view once the open door revealed the interior of the home? The answer is
clearly no. The unlawfulness of kicking in the door prevents the later discovery of
contraband from being a legitimate discovery of evidence in plain view,
notwithstanding whatever subjective intentions the officers may have had.
       {¶ 56} The majority admits the illegality of the plain-view discovery of
evidence that is presented in the above hypothetical but distinguishes it from
Jackson’s circumstances, stating, “but in our case the officer did not illegally open
the car door.” Majority opinion at ¶ 22. This is the point of plain disagreement
between the majority and this dissent.
       {¶ 57} As the majority states, Mimms and Evans “make clear that police
may order a driver out of a car without violating the Fourth Amendment’s
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures so long as the initial stop
is lawful.” Majority opinion at ¶ 20. The majority then asserts, “The door had to
be opened for Jackson to get out of the car.” Id. at ¶ 20. Making this illogical
jump—claiming that it consequently does not matter who opened the door—takes
us down a path toward the erosion of privacy rights due all persons, even those who
neither have contraband nor carry it in their car.
       {¶ 58} The Fourth Amendment protects privacy interests within the
reasonable expectation of privacy. That is, “[w]hen an individual ‘seeks to preserve
[something] as private,’ ” Carpenter v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___,

138 S.Ct. 2206, 2213

201 L.Ed.2d 507

 (2018), quoting Katz v. United States,

389 U.S. 347, 351

88 S.Ct. 507

19 L.Ed.2d 576

 (1967), and “his expectation of privacy is ‘one
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,’ ”

id.,

 quoting Katz at 361



                                          21
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




(Harlan, J. concurring), “official intrusion into that private sphere generally
qualifies as a search and requires a warrant supported by probable cause.”

Although the mobility of a car justifies an exception to the warrant requirement, a
car is expected to be a relatively private space, and an intrusion into one is a search.
Carroll v. United States,

267 U.S. 132, 153-154

45 S.Ct. 280

, 69 L.Ed.543 (1925);
Class,

475 U.S. at 114-115