Medcorp, Inc. v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Services
Medcorp, Inc., Appellee, v. Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, Appellant
Attorneys
Chester, Willcox & Saxbe, L.L.C., Geoffrey E. Webster, and J. Randall Richards, for appellee., Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, Stephen P. Carney, Deputy Solicitor, Rebecca L. Thomas, Assistant Solicitor, and Ara Mekhjian, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant., Crabbe, Brown & James, L.L.P., and Andy Douglas, urging reconsideration on behalf of amicus curiae Ohio Academy of Nursing Homes, Inc., Lumpe & Raber, J. Richard Lumpe, and David A. Raber, urging reconsideration on behalf of amici curiae, Ohio Council of Retail Merchants, Ohio Convenience Store Association, Ohio Licensed Beverage Association, and Wholesale Beer & Wine Association of Ohio.
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
{¶ 1} On May 7, 2009, this court released its opinion and judgment in this matter. Medcorp, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 121 Ohio St.3d 622, 2009-Ohio-2058, 906 N.E.2d 1125 (āMedcorp I ā). We reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and held that in order to satisfy the āgrounds of the partyās appealā requirement in R.C. 119.12, parties appealing under that statute must identify specific legal or factual errors in their notices of appeal. Id. at syllabus.
{¶ 2} Appellee filed a motion for reconsideration, urging that the court vacate its decision and instead adopt the position of the dissenting opinions or, in the alternative, modify the decision so as to restrict its effect to matters for which appeals have been filed after the date of the decision. We ordered the parties to brief whether the decision in Medcorp I should be applied prospectively only and, if so, to what cases it should be applied. 122 Ohio St.3d 1488, 2009-Ohio-3830, 910 N.E.2d 1041.
{¶ 3} The United States Supreme Court recognized in Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. (1932), 287 U.S. 358, 53 S.Ct. 145, 77 L.Ed. 360, that state courts have broad authority to determine whether their decisions should operate prospectively only. We have applied the Sunburst Doctrine to limit a decision to prospective application only as a means of avoiding injustice in cases dealing with questions having widespread ramifications for persons not parties to the action. See, e.g., OAMCO v. Lindley (1987), 29 Ohio St.3d 1, 29 OBR 122, 503 N.E.2d 1388; Minster Farmers Coop. Exchange Co., Inc. v. Meyer, 117 Ohio St.3d 459, 2008-Ohio-1259, 884 N.E.2d 1056.
{¶ 4} Upon consideration of the briefs filed pursuant to the courtās request, we conclude that application of the Sunburst Doctrine is appropriate in this case.
So ordered.