State v. Logan

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
v. Logan, Slip Opinion No. 

.]




                                           NOTICE
      This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
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      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
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      the opinion is published.




                          SLIP OPINION NO. 

              THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. LOGAN, APPELLEE.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
       may be cited as State v. Logan, Slip Opinion No. 

.]
Criminal law—Sentencing—R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) requires a trial court to impose a
        prison sentence on an offender convicted of a felony offense that has a
        corresponding firearm specification—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed
        and cause remanded to trial court.
 (No. 2023-1318 and 2023-1417—Submitted January 7, 2025—Decided May 21,
                                            2025.)
   APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,
                               No. 111533, 

                                   __________________
        KENNEDY, C.J., authored the opinion of the court, which FISCHER, DEWINE,
DETERS, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ., joined. BRUNNER, J., dissented, with an
opinion.
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       KENNEDY, C.J.
       {¶ 1} We accepted a certified conflict from the Eighth District Court of
Appeals and agreed to answer the following question: “Does R.C. 2929.13(F)(8)
require a mandatory prison term and preclude the imposition of community-control
sanctions on an underlying felony when a defendant is found guilty on a
corresponding firearm specification?” 

. We also accepted the
State’s discretionary appeal on this proposition of law: “The trial court must impose
a prison term for the underlying felony offense when the offender had a firearm on
or about the offender’s person or under the offender’s control while committing the
felony.” See 

 We sua sponte consolidated the two cases for briefing. 

       {¶ 2} We answer the certified question in the affirmative. Under the version
of R.C. 2929.13(F)(8), in effect at appellee Jadyn Logan’s sentencing, a court must
impose a prison sentence for “any [felony] offense . . . with respect to a portion of
the sentence imposed pursuant to [R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)],” the statutory provision
requiring a prison sentence for a firearm specification. When R.C. 2929.13(F)(8)
directs the sentencing court to impose a prison sentence for “any offense . . . that is
a felony,” it can mean only that a trial court must impose a sentence on the
underlying felony because a firearm specification is not an offense. Rather, it is a
sentencing enhancement that attaches to the underlying offense.                   R.C.
2929.13(F)(8) therefore requires a trial court to impose a prison sentence for a
defendant’s underlying felony offense if a firearm specification is attached. The
felony-sentencing scheme confirms as much, and this interpretation addresses the
Eighth District’s holding that R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) refers only to specifications.
       {¶ 3} Accordingly, the Eighth District erred when it determined that the trial
court did not have to impose a prison term for a felony offense when a firearm
specification is attached. We reverse the Eighth District’s judgment and remand
this matter to the trial court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.




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                          Facts and Procedural History
       {¶ 4} In January 2018, Jadyn Logan was convicted of aggravated robbery,
a first-degree felony. Under R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), that conviction prevented her
from possessing a firearm. A few years later, a Cuyahoga County grand jury
indicted her for having weapons while under a disability in violation of R.C.
2923.13(A)(2) and (A)(3), improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle in
violation of R.C. 2923.16(B), and carrying a concealed weapon in violation of R.C.
2923.12(A)(2).
       {¶ 5} Logan pleaded guilty to attempting to have weapons while under a
disability along with a one-year firearm specification under R.C. 2941.141(A); her
plea nolled the other charges. The trial court imposed a one-year sentence for the
firearm specification and two years’ community control for the attempt to have
weapons while under a disability.
       {¶ 6} The State appealed the trial court’s decision to the Eighth District,
arguing that R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) required the trial court to impose a prison term for
the attempt offense. 

 (8th Dist.). The Eighth District affirmed
her sentence. Id. at ¶ 3. The State requested en banc consideration. The en banc
court of appeals rejected the State’s argument, holding that R.C. 2929.13(F)(8)
required the trial court to impose a prison sentence for the firearm specification, not
for the underlying felony offense. 

 (8th Dist.) (en banc).
       {¶ 7} The State appealed to this court, and we accepted its discretionary
appeal. 

. We also determined that the Eighth District’s decision
conflicted with State v. Wofford, 

 (1st Dist.), State v. Shields, 2020-
Ohio-3204 (2d Dist.), State v. Wolfe, 

 (3d Dist.), State v. Culp, 2020-
Ohio-5287 (6th Dist.), State v. Christian, 

 (7th Dist.), and State v.
White, 

 (10th Dist.). 

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                                 Law and Analysis
                              Statutory Interpretation
       {¶ 8} This case presents a straightforward question of statutory
interpretation, which we review de novo. State v. Reed, 

. As
we have long explained, “[t]he question is not what did the general assembly intend
to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it did enact.” Slingluff v. Weaver,

 (1902), paragraph two of the syllabus. “When the statutory
language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, we
must rely on what the General Assembly has said.” Jones v. Action Coupling &
Equip., Inc., 

, ¶ 12, citing Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth,

, ¶ 12. And as always, “[a]n unambiguous statute is to be applied,
not interpreted.” Sears v. Weimer, 

 (1944), paragraph five of the
syllabus.
                      Firearm Specifications Are Not Offenses
       {¶ 9} We begin by distinguishing between offenses and firearm
specifications. In Ohio, all offenses are statutory. State v. Cimpritz, 

 (1953), paragraph one of the syllabus. R.C. 2901.03 states that “[n]o conduct
constitutes a criminal offense against the state unless it is defined as an offense in
the Revised Code,” R.C. 2901.03(A), and “[a]n offense is defined when one or more
sections of the Revised Code state a positive prohibition or enjoin a specific duty,
and provide a penalty for violation of such prohibition or failure to meet such duty,”
R.C. 2901.03(B).
       {¶ 10} In State v. Ford, we recognized that “a firearm specification is a
penalty enhancement, not a criminal offense.” 

, paragraph one of
the syllabus; see also State ex rel. Rodriguez v. Barker, 

(holding that a sentencing entry was a final, appealable order even though it did not
address every firearm specification because firearm specifications are not separate
criminal offenses).




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       {¶ 11} We have also explained that “[t]he purpose of a firearm specification
is to enhance the punishment of criminals who voluntarily introduce a firearm while
committing an offense and to deter criminals from using firearms.” State v. White,

, ¶ 31; see also Ford at ¶ 1 (holding that the offense of discharging
a firearm into a habitation and the accompanying firearm specification are not
“allied offenses of similar import”).
       {¶ 12} Consequently, when the trial court sentences a defendant for a
firearm specification, it is not sentencing for a separate offense but instead is
imposing additional punishment for the underlying offense.
                           R.C. 2929.13(F)(8)’s Meaning
       {¶ 13} We now turn to the statute at issue here, R.C. 2929.13(F)(8), which
at the time of Logan’s sentencing provided as follows:


               (F) Notwithstanding divisions (A) to (E) of this section, the
       court shall impose a prison term or terms under sections 2929.02 to
       2929.06, section 2929.14, section 2929.142, or section 2971.03 of
       the Revised Code and except as specifically provided in section
       2929.20, divisions (C) to (I) of section 2967.19, or section 2967.191
       of the Revised Code or when parole is authorized for the offense
       under section 2967.13 of the Revised Code shall not reduce the term
       or terms pursuant to section 2929.20, section 2967.19, section
       2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120.
       of the Revised Code for any of the following offenses:
               (8) Any offense, other than a violation of section 2923.12 of
       the Revised Code, that is a felony, if the offender had a firearm on
       or about the offender’s person or under the offender’s control while
       committing the felony, with respect to a portion of the sentence




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        imposed pursuant to division (B)(1)(a) of section 2929.14 of the
        Revised Code for having the firearm.


(Emphasis added.) Former R.C. 2929.13(F)(8), 2019 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 166.
        {¶ 14} R.C. 2929.13(F)(8)’s relevant portion states “the trial court shall
impose a prison term . . . for . . . [a]ny offense . . . that is a felony . . . with respect
to a portion of the sentence imposed pursuant to [R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)] for having
the firearm.”    R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a) provides for the imposition of a prison
sentence for a firearm specification.
        {¶ 15} We assume that the General Assembly knows that this court has
defined “offense.” See Riffle v. Physicians & Surgeons Ambulance Serv., Inc.,

. So, where R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) requires the trial court to
impose a prison sentence for “any offense,” it applies only to the underlying felony,
not to the firearm specification. Construing R.C. 2929.13(F) in State v. Johnson,
we stated that the statute “addresses mandatory prison terms and lists offenses for
which a sentencing court is obligated to impose a prison term.” 

,
¶ 9.
        {¶ 16} And the legislature knows how to expressly refer to specifications.
For example, R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a) outlines sentences for “specification[s]” that
are “described in section 2941.141, 2941.144, or 2941.145 of the Revised Code.”
In contrast, the General Assembly specified that R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) applies to
offenses. Had the General Assembly intended to require a sentence for only firearm
specifications, it would have written the statute differently: “the trial court shall
impose a prison term . . . for . . . [a specification] . . . imposed pursuant to [R.C.
2929.14(B)(1)(a)] for having the firearm.” The legislature did not pass that statute,
and we cannot amend it by judicial fiat.




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                                  Statutory Context
        {¶ 17} Furthermore, R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) cannot be read in isolation,
divorced from the General Assembly’s felony-sentencing statutory scheme. See
State v. Turner, 

, ¶ 18. Context matters—“‘[i]n ascertaining the
plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language
at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.’” Id., quoting
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 

 (1988). When the General
Assembly enacts a statute, it is “assumed to have been aware of other statutory
provisions concerning the subject matter of the enactment.” Meeks v. Papadopulos,

 (1980).
        {¶ 18} Because only the General Assembly “‘is vested with the power to
define, classify, and prescribe punishment for offenses committed in Ohio,’” State
v. Gwynne, 

 (lead opinion), quoting State v. Taylor, 2014-
Ohio-460, ¶ 12, judges must determine whether the statutory scheme authorizes
sentences that they impose. “‘Judges have no inherent power to create sentences’
and instead ‘are duty-bound to apply sentencing laws as they are written.’” 

quoting State v. Fischer, 

, overruled on other grounds by
State v. Harper, 

.
        {¶ 19} R.C. Ch. 2929 outlines Ohio’s felony-sentencing scheme. See R.C.
2929.11 through 2929.201. Relevant here are sections R.C. 2929.11 through
2929.14 and R.C. 2929.15. R.C. 2929.11 admonishes trial courts to craft sentences
guided by the “overriding purposes of felony sentencing,” such as protecting the
public and punishing the offender, and to “accomplish those purposes without
imposing an unnecessary burden on” government resources. R.C. 2929.12 gives
trial courts a variety of factors regarding the offender, the offense, and the victim to
consider at sentencing. R.C. 2929.13 dictates the sanctions trial courts are required
to impose for certain offenses and degrees of offenses. R.C. 2929.14 establishes
“definite” and “indefinite” prison terms.




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       {¶ 20} Finally, R.C. 2929.15 allows trial courts to impose community-
control sanctions when the General Assembly does not require them to impose a
prison sentence: “If in sentencing an offender for a felony the court is not required
to impose a prison term, a mandatory prison term, or a term of life imprisonment
upon the offender, the court may directly impose a sentence that consists of one or
more community control sanctions . . . .” R.C. 2929.15(A)(1). We have therefore
held that the felony sentencing statutes require trial courts to impose either a prison
term or community-control sanctions. State v. Anderson, 

, ¶ 23.
       {¶ 21} R.C.    2929.14     and   R.C.    2929.15    work    together.      R.C.
2929.14(B)(1)(a) requires trial courts to impose prison sentences for firearm
specifications, while R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) prohibits community-control sanctions
when a statute requires a trial court to impose a prison sentence. Here, if the Eighth
District were correct, these two statutes would be irreconcilable, because its
interpretation would allow a trial court to impose a prison sentence for a firearm
specification and community control for a felony. But R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) forbids
community-control sanctions when the trial court must impose a prison sentence.
In line with the statutory scheme, R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) requires the trial court to
impose a prison sentence for “any offense.”
       {¶ 22} At bottom, R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) applies to the underlying felony and
firearm specification. To interpret the statute differently would run afoul of its
text—text that explicitly requires trial courts to impose prison sentences for
“offenses,” not for specifications. Moreover, the statutory scheme, which is a trial
court’s sole source of authority for crafting sentences, prohibits imposing
community control when the statute requires the trial court to impose a prison
sentence. See R.C. 2929.15(A)(1).
       {¶ 23} The Eighth District concluded that reading the statute as applying to
specifications and offenses would read the last phrase of R.C. 2929.13(F)(8)—
“with respect to a portion of the sentence imposed pursuant to [R.C.




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                                 January Term, 2025




2929.14(B)(1)(a)]” for having the firearm—out of the statute. 

 (8th Dist.). We disagree.
        {¶ 24} The statute contemplates a trial court sentencing a defendant for
multiple offenses. The distinction is apparent when a court sentences a defendant
for multiple crimes, with only some carrying a firearm specification. For example,
when the trial court sentences an offender for a felony offense that does not carry a
firearm specification and a felony that does contain a firearm specification, the
portion of the sentence imposed for the offense carrying the firearm specification
requires a prison term while the portion of the sentence imposed for the offense that
does not carry the specification does not.
                                      Conclusion
        {¶ 25} R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) requires a trial court to impose a prison sentence
on an offender convicted of a felony offense that has a corresponding firearm
specification. Because the Eighth District’s en banc decision misinterprets the
statute’s text, we reverse its judgment and remand this case to the trial court to
conduct a resentencing consistent with this opinion.
                                                                    Judgment reversed
                                                                  and cause remanded.
                                __________________
        BRUNNER, J., dissenting.
        {¶ 26} I would affirm the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals
sitting en banc based on the plain language of R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) in effect at the
time of appellee Jadyn Logan’s sentencing. The plain language of that provision
says that the sentencing court must impose a prison sentence for “[a]ny [felony]
offense . . . with respect to a portion of the sentence imposed pursuant to [R.C.
2929.14(B)(1)(a)].” (Emphasis added.) I accept the facts and procedural history
of this case as stated by the majority and its recitation of caselaw that is precedential
regarding questions of statutory interpretation. Indeed, as the majority recites,




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under this court’s precedents, courts must determine “not what did the general
assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it did enact,”
Slingluff v. Weaver, 

 (1902), paragraph two of the syllabus.
       {¶ 27} But the majority’s approach here falls short of judicial restraint by
failing to apply the plain meaning of the phrase “with respect to a portion of the
sentence imposed pursuant to [R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)],” as stated in R.C.
2929.13(F)(8). Instead, the majority opinion jumps directly to interpretation,
hypothesizing that the phrase has been placed in the statute to account for those
cases in which a trial court is “sentencing a defendant for multiple offenses.”
Majority opinion, ¶ 24. But in some cases, like this one, a sentence is imposed for
just one offense. Hypotheticals are helpful for illustrating a point, but when used
to create caselaw, they are advisory and not permitted. Smith v. Leis, 2006-Ohio-
6113, ¶ 16 (collecting well-settled precedent establishing that this court will not
indulge in advisory opinions).
       {¶ 28} The language of R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) as written requires no
speculation about what the General Assembly intended when it enacted the law.
Interpretation is unnecessary when the plain language is clear. State v. Fork, 2024-
Ohio-1016, ¶ 13, 17 (“We begin and end our analysis with the plain language of
these statutes.”); State v. Jones, 

 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) plainly does not require a prison
sentence to be imposed for the underlying felony in Logan’s case. Moreover, even
if interpretation were necessary, we would be required to strictly construe R.C.
2929.13(F)(8) against the state. See R.C. 2901.04 (“sections of the Revised Code
defining offenses or penalties shall be strictly construed against the state, and
liberally construed in favor of the accused”).
       {¶ 29} Proper application of R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) turns on the meaning of
R.C. 2929.13(F)(8).      R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) states that a court may impose
community-control sanctions if a prison sentence is not required. The plain




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language of R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) does not require a prison sentence to be imposed
for the underlying felony here, nor does R.C. 2929.15(A) in any way change the
plain meaning of R.C. 2929.13(F)(8)’s phrase “with respect to a portion of the
sentence imposed pursuant to [R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)].” Thus, R.C. 2929.15(A)(1)
should not be construed, as the majority construes it here, to prohibit imposition of
community-control sanctions in this case.
       {¶ 30} The majority opinion should have first applied the plain language of
R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) enacted by the legislature. Prison sentences not required by
statute should not be imposed by the words of this court. State v. Taylor, 2014-
Ohio-460, ¶ 12 (“The General Assembly is vested with the power to define, classify,
and prescribe punishment for offenses committed in Ohio.”); State v. Fischer, 2010-
Ohio-6238, ¶ 22, overruled on other grounds by State v. Harper, 

(“Judges have no inherent power to create sentences” but, rather, “are duty-bound
to apply sentencing laws as they are written”); see also State ex rel. Bray v. Russell,

, ¶ 9, 14-15, 17 (determining that a statute that authorized extending
a prisoner’s prison term when the executive branch has determined that the prisoner
committed a violation during the course of the prisoner’s sentence violates the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and was therefore unconstitutional).
This is especially important considering the principle of stare decisis and the
obligations of lower courts to follow the law as expressed in our opinions. See
Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 

, ¶ 48 (the bedrock of the doctrine of
stare decisis is that it “is designed to provide continuity and predictability in our
legal system”). Moreover, we should not constrain trial-court discretion imbued by
the Ohio Constitution, or trial-court jurisdiction set by the legislature, to craft
sentences that are within the full breadth of options available under the felony
sentencing scheme. See Ohio Const., art. IV, § 1, 4; R.C. 2931.02; R.C. 2931.03.
       {¶ 31} For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Eighth District
Court of Appeals sitting en banc, and I therefore respectfully dissent.




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                              __________________
        Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecutor, and Tasha L.
Forchione, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
       Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and John T. Martin,
Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.
       Elizabeth R. Miller, Ohio Public Defender, and Katherine Ross-Kinzie,
Assistant Public Defender, in support of appellant for amicus curiae, Ohio Public
Defender.
                              __________________




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