Full Opinion (html_with_citations)

State of New York                                                       OPINION
Court of Appeals                                         This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision
                                                           before publication in the New York Reports.




 No. 88
 In the Matter of Jun Wang,
         Appellant,
      v.
 Letitia James, &c.,
         Respondent.




 Andrew R. Borelli, for appellant.
 Kevin C. Hu, for respondent.




 CANNATARO, J.:

       The issue presented on this appeal is whether petitioner, a physician who rendered

 professional services to a person incarcerated by the State, was “acting at the request of”

 the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) within the meaning


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of Correction Law § 24-a such that he is entitled to defense and indemnification from the

State in an ensuing medical malpractice action.         Because the statutory language

contemplates an express request for professional services by DOCCS, the State has no

obligation to defend and indemnify petitioner.

      While incarcerated at the Auburn Correctional Facility, an individual (the patient)

developed a mass in his right armpit and was referred to Dr. R. Wayne Cotie, a surgeon

who provided professional services to incarcerated individuals pursuant to a contract with

DOCCS. Dr. Cotie recommended a biopsy of the mass and DOCCS approved the

procedure. The biopsy was performed at the Cortland Regional Medical Center (CRMC),

where Dr. Cotie had surgical privileges. Dr. Cotie sent the biopsy specimen to CRMC’s

pathology department for examination. The hospital had a contractual arrangement with

Cortland Pathology, a private pathology group that had sole and exclusive rights to perform

clinical pathology services for CRMC. Petitioner, Dr. Jun Wang, the Medical Director of

CRMC’s pathology department and a member of Cortland Pathology, examined the

specimen and concluded that the mass was benign. Approximately one year later, the

patient was diagnosed with Hodgkin’s lymphoma.

      In February 2015, the patient commenced a medical malpractice action against,

among others, CRMC, alleging that they misdiagnosed his condition as benign and failed

to timely diagnose or refer him for treatment of Hodgkin’s lymphoma. CRMC thereafter

filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and Cortland Pathology, seeking

contribution and indemnification. Petitioner then sought defense and indemnification from

the State, asserting that he was entitled to coverage under Public Officers Law § 17 and

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Correction Law § 24-a because the alleged acts or omissions giving rise to the malpractice

action arose from the treatment of an incarcerated person at the request of DOCCS. The

Attorney General declined to defend and indemnify petitioner, opining that petitioner

treated the incarcerated individual pursuant to his employment arrangement with CRMC

and that, in the absence of any contract or agreement directly between the State and

petitioner to treat incarcerated persons, the State had no statutory obligation to provide

defense or indemnification.

      After the Attorney General denied petitioner’s request for reconsideration,

petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul the determination,

asserting that the conclusion that he was not entitled to defense and indemnification was

irrational, arbitrary and capricious, and an abuse of discretion. Supreme Court denied the

petition. Concluding that the Attorney General’s determination was entitled to deference

because the statutory interpretation question involved the specific application of a broad

statutory term, the court held that the determination was properly made.

      The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing that the Attorney General’s

determination was entitled to deference (
207 AD3d 1176
 [3d Dept 2022]). The Court

observed that there was no record evidence to support the conclusion that DOCCS

expressly requested petitioner’s services and rejected petitioner’s contrary argument that

Correction Law § 24-a applied to an implied request for professional healthcare services

(see
207 AD3d at 1178
). This Court granted petitioner’s motion for leave to appeal (
39 NY3d 906
 [2023]) and we now affirm.



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       Under Public Officers Law § 17, the State has the obligation to defend and

indemnify its employees in actions arising out of the scope of their public employment (see

Public Officers Law § 17 [1] [a], [2] [a], [3] [a]). An “employee” is defined as “any person

holding a position by election, appointment or employment in the service of the state, . . .

whether or not compensated” (Public Officers Law § 17 [1] [a]). The statute expressly

excludes independent contractors from coverage (see Public Officers Law § 17 [1] [a]).

       Under Correction Law § 24-a, the provisions of Public Officers Law § 17 are made

applicable to “any person holding a license to practice a profession. . . who is rendering or

has rendered professional services authorized under such license while acting at the request

of the department or a facility of the department in providing health care and treatment or

professional consultation to incarcerated individuals of state correctional facilities”

(emphasis added). The Attorney General has interpreted this language to mean that the

State’s obligation to defend and indemnify applies only where there has been an express

request by DOCCS for the services of a particular provider—i.e., a formal arrangement or

understanding made in advance between DOCCS and the healthcare professional.

       A threshold question arises as to whether the Attorney General’s interpretation of

the statute is entitled to deference. Deference is accorded to an agency’s interpretation of

a statute when the interpretation involves the specialized competence or expertise the

agency has developed in administering the statute (see Matter of Rosen v Public Empl.

Relations Bd.,
72 NY2d 42, 47
 [1988]; Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co.,
49 NY2d 451, 459
 [1980]). More particularly, courts defer to the administrative agency where the issue

“involves knowledge and understanding of underlying operational practices or entails an

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                                            -5-                                       No. 88

evaluation of factual data and inferences to be drawn therefrom” (Kurcsics,
49 NY2d at 459
; see International Union of Painters & Allied Trades, Dist. Council No. 4 v New York

State Dept. of Labor,
32 NY3d 198, 209
 [2018]; Matter of Albano v Board of Trustees of

N.Y. City Fire Dept., Art. II Pension Fund,
98 NY2d 548, 553
 [2002]).1 However, “where

the question is one of pure statutory reading and analysis, dependent only on accurate

apprehension of legislative intent, there is little basis to rely on any special competence or

expertise of the administrative agency . . . [and] the judiciary need not accord any deference

to the agency's determination” (Matter of Belmonte v Snashall,
2 NY3d 560, 566
 [2004]

[internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

       The answer to whether a service was performed “at the request of” DOCCS does

not involve any specialized knowledge or expertise by the Attorney General. Instead,

whether a professional service was performed “at the request of” DOCCS is a question of

pure statutory reading and analysis and thus deference to the Attorney General is not

required.




1
  Although we have also recognized that deference to an agency’s interpretation of statutory
language “is appropriate ‘where the question is one of specific application of a broad
statutory term’ ” (Matter of O’Brien v Spitzer,
7 NY3d 239, 242
 [2006] [citations omitted];
see NLRB v Hearst Publications, Inc.,
322 US 111
 [1944], overruled as stated in
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v Darden,
503 US 318
 [1992]; cf. Matter of Peyton v New York
City Bd. of Stds. & Appeals,
36 NY3d 271
, 280-281 [2020]), we have rarely done so since
we decided Kurcsics. Aside from O’Brien, we have deferred on that basis only in a case
involving the construction of tax statutes (see Matter of American Tel. & Tel. Co. v State
Tax Commn.,
61 NY2d 393, 400
 [1984]), where the Department of Taxation and Finance
“necessarily must apply expertise to the detailed labor of fitting tax filings and other
accounting artifacts into the language of the Tax Law” (Lorillard Tobacco Co. v Roth,
99 NY2d 316, 323
 [2003]).
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       Turning to the statutory language at hand, “[i]t is fundamental that a court, in

interpreting a statute, should attempt to effectuate the intent of the [l]egislature. As the

clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any case of

interpretation must always be the language [of the statute] itself, giving effect to the plain

meaning thereof” (People ex rel. E.S. v Superintendent, Livingston Corr. Facility,
40 NY3d 230
, 235 [2023] [quotation marks and citations omitted]). “ ‘[A]ll parts of a statute are

intended to be given effect’ and ‘a statutory construction which renders one part

meaningless should be avoided’ ” (Matter of Anonymous v Molik,
32 NY3d 30, 37
 [2018],

quoting Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co.,
78 NY2d 509, 515
 [1991]). Additionally,

given that the statute at issue here is in derogation of common law, it should be narrowly

construed (see Morris v Snappy Car Rental,
84 NY2d 21, 28
 [1994]; see also McKinney’s

Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 301).

       Petitioner performed pathology services on the biopsy sample as a result of his

contract with the hospital, not because he was acting at DOCCS’ request or executing any

public responsibility associated with the care or treatment of incarcerated individuals.

Nonetheless, petitioner asserts that the statutory language should be read broadly to

encompass ancillary professional services rendered as a necessary component of a medical

procedure performed at DOCCS’ request, such as the pathology services provided here.

However, to interpret the statute as petitioner suggests would read the operative language—

“at the request of the department”—out of the provision, in contravention of our established

rules of statutory construction. If the legislature intended to require the State to defend and

indemnify all medical services rendered to incarcerated persons in the manner now

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suggested by petitioner, it could have so provided. In light of the above, the Attorney

General’s determination that petitioner was not entitled to defense and indemnification

under the statute was not irrational, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion (see

Matter of Lemma v Nassau County Police Officer Indem. Bd.,
31 NY3d 523, 528
 [2018]).

       The interpretation urged by petitioner would also expose the State to an

undeterminable expansion of financial responsibility for independent professional

contractors, as it would require coverage of healthcare professionals with whom the State

has no connection and without the opportunity for the State to assess the level of risk

presented by these providers. Our interpretation is further supported by language in Public

Officers Law § 17 (7)—incorporated by reference in Correction Law § 24-a—providing

that the State’s duty to defend and indemnify “shall not be construed to impair, alter, limit

or modify the rights and obligations of any insurer under any policy of insurance.” As we

have previously recognized, public policy supports construing the State’s duty in this

respect narrowly, as “[t]he purpose of Public Officers Law § 17 is, in essence, to provide

insurance against litigation” (see O’Brien,
7 NY3d at 243
). It is unlikely that the legislature

intended that the State would be a substitute for a physician’s private malpractice insurance

in the circumstances presented (see id.).2




2
 Indeed, the legislative history suggests that the purpose of Correction Law § 24-a is to
encourage medical professionals to offer services to the State’s incarcerated population by
providing insurance against litigation (see Letter from Off of Mental Health and Off of
Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, June 29, 1978 at 2, Bill Jacket, L 1978,
ch 466; accord 1980 Ops Atty Gen 40). Providing insurance to a person in petitioner’s
position would not further this policy.
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      Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.


Order affirmed, with costs. Opinion by Judge Cannataro. Chief Judge Wilson and Judges
Rivera, Garcia, Singas, Troutman and Halligan concur.

Decided December 14, 2023




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