New York Charter Schools Ass'n v. DiNapoli
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
OPINION OF THE COURT
In this appeal, we are called upon to determine whether the
Background
In 1998, the Legislature enacted the New York Charter Schools Act (Act) thereby authorizing a system of charter schools to be created in New York State to provide âopportunities for teachers, parents, and community members to establish and maintain schools that operate independently of existing schools and school districtsâ (Mem in Support of 1998 NY Senate-Assembly Bill S7881, A11466, Bill Jacket, L 1998, ch 4). The Legislature found that creating a charter schools system would have no fiscal impact on the State because the â[flunds are provided for within [the] annual appropriation for school aidâ (id).
Charter schools are âwithin the public school systemâ (Education Law § 2850 [2] [e]). Any child who is eligible for admission to a public school is qualified for admission to a charter school, and the charter school âshall enroll each eligible student who submits a timely application . . . unless the number of applications exceeds the capacity of the grade level or buildingâ (Education Law § 2854 [2] [b]). A charter school cannot charge tuition or fees, except to the extent that fees are charged by other public schools, and shall be nonsectarian in its programs, admission policies and employment practices and is forbidden from engaging in any form of discrimination (see Education Law § 2854 [2] [a]).
Under this Act, teachers, parents, school administrators, community residents or any combination thereof may submit an application to establish a charter school (see Education Law § 2851
Education Law § 2851 (2) states that the application must specify information, such as its mission statement, a description of an educational program and a description of student achievement goals that meet or exceed the student performance standards adopted by the Board of Regents for other public schools. Further, the application must provide a proposed budget and fiscal plan for the school, including supporting evidence that the fiscal plan is sound and that sufficient start-up funds will be available to the charter school (id.). Education Law § 2851 (2) also provides that the charter school application disclose its requirements and procedures for conducting at a minimum annual programmatic and independent fiscal audits, that are comparable in scope to audits of other public schools.
Once the application of the proposed charter school has been approved by the charter entity, the Act requires that the organizers of the proposed charter school and the charter entity enter into a proposed written agreementâthe âcharter.â The charter allows an applicant to organize and operate a charter school (see Education Law § 2852 [5]). Further, the charter must âinclude the specific commitments of the charter entity relating to its obligations to oversee and supervise the charter schoolâ (id.). The Board of Regents, if not the charter entity, is required to give its final approval to all proposed charters before issuance (see Education Law § 2851 [3]; § 2852 [5], [5-a], [5-b]).
Once approved, the Board of Regents incorporates the charter school as an âeducation corporationâ (see Education Law
Indeed, a charter school has been deemed by the Legislature to be âan independent and autonomous public schoolâ (Education Law § 2853 [1] [c])
The Act imposes additional layers of oversight designed to ensure the charter school meets its educational responsibilities by giving the school district in which the charter school is located the right to visit, examine and inspect the charter school for the purpose of ensuring that the school is in compliance with all applicable laws, regulations and charter provisions (see Education Law § 2853 [2-a]). Any evidence of noncompliance uncovered by the school district during its inspection of the charter school may be forwarded to the Board of Regents and the charter entity for action, which can include revocation of the schoolâs charter (see id.) see also Education Law § 2855).
In addition to being subject to inspection by the Board of Regents, the charter entity and the local school district, a charter school must submit an annual report to both the Board of Regents and to its charter entity. These reports include a charter school report card that outlines the measures of the comparative academic and fiscal performance of the school (see Education Law § 2857 [2] [a]). These
âmeasures shall include, but not be limited to, graduation rates, dropout rates, performance of students on standardized tests, college entry rates, total spending per pupil and administrative spending per pupil. Such measures shall be presented in a format that is easily comparable to similar public schoolsâ (Education Law § 2857 [2] [a]).
A charter schoolâs annual report also must include âa certified financial statement setting forth . . . the revenues and expenditures for the preceding school year, including a copy of the most recent independent fiscal audit of the schoolâ (Education Law § 2857 [2] [c]).
Charter schools are funded primarily with public monies.
Should a school district fail to make the mandatory payments outlined in Education Law § 2856, the Comptroller must deduct from any state funds that become due to such school district an amount equal to the unpaid obligation to the charter school (see Education Law § 2856 [2]).
The Act, however, makes clear that a charter school does ânot have the power to levy taxes or to acquire property by eminent domainâ (Education Law § 2853 [1] [e]). The Act also makes it clear that no civil liability may attach to a charter entity, the Board of Regents, or to any of their members or employees, individually or collectively, for any acts or omissions of the charter school (see Education Law § 2853 [1] [g]). Also, it exempts the local school district, the charter entity and the State from liability for any debts or financial obligations of a charter school or any person and/or corporate entity that operates a charter school (id.).
The 2005 Legislation and This Lawsuit
In 2005, the Legislature adopted the school audit bill which directs the State Comptroller to audit all school districts, boards of cooperative educational services (BOCES) and charter schools operating within this state by March 31, 2010 (see L 2005, ch 267; see also Education Law § 2854 [1] [c]; General Municipal Law § 33 [2]). The Legislature determined that additional audits should be conducted by the State Comptroller because
â[sjchool districts, BOCES and charter schools are all public entities that use taxpayer funds. As such, the taxpayers who support these enterprises have a*128 right to know that they are managed effectively and that proper measures are in place to protect against fraud and waste. The recent school district financial scandals and the failure of the independent auditor in those districts have made it clear that these additional safeguards are not merely appropriate; they are a good investment that will protect State and local taxpayers from financial practices that do not meet State standardsâ (Budget Report on Bills, Bill Jacket, L 2005, ch 267, at 5).
As amended, Education Law § 2854 (1) (c) requires that charter schools be subject to the State Comptrollerâs audit just like other public schools. The Legislature also amended General Municipal Law § 33 to require that the Comptroller âcause the accounts of every school district, BOCES and charter school in the state to be examinedâ no later than March 31, 2010 (General Municipal Law § 33 [2]).
As a result of the 2005 amendments, respondents, by letter dated July 1, 2007, notified 31 charter schools located in New York City that the Office of the State Comptroller had scheduled a performance audit of charter schools authorized by the New York City Department of Education. The State Comptroller cited General Municipal Law § 33 as his authority to conduct the performance audits of the charter schools pursuant to article Y § 1 of the New York State Constitution. The audits were to include an assessment as to the extent that New York City charter schools met quantitative academic achievement goals and complied with student selection procedures and criteria, as set forth in their charters.
Upon receiving notice of the State Comptrollerâs intent to audit them, several charter schools, by letter dated August 3, 2007, questioned whether the Comptroller had the authority to conduct academic performance audits. The Comptroller responded by letter dated September 27, 2007, reiterating that his authority derived from the 2005 amendments to General Municipal Law § 33, and that this Courtâs decision in Matter of McCall v Barrios-Paoli (93 NY2d 99 [1999]) had clarified that the State Comptrollerâs audit authority includes the power to conduct both financial and performance audits. The Comptroller concluded that the audits were proper because the matters to be examined âhave clear fiscal implications for the public as well as the governmental entities that
In December 2007, petitioners
Supreme Court denied respondentsâ motion for summary judgment, holding that insofar as General Municipal Law § 33 (2) and Education Law § 2854 (1) (c) authorize or direct the Comptroller to audit charter schools, they violate article V, § 1 of the New York State Constitution (20 Misc 3d 235 [2008]).
A divided Appellate Division reversed, holding that the Legislature did not violate NY Constitution, article Y § 1 when it directed audits of charter schools by the Comptroller (60 AD3d 119 [2009]). The majority found that given the Legislatureâs broad delegatory authority regarding the Comptrollerâs authority and the significant public funding involved, the Comptrollerâs fundamental duty to supervise state fiscal matters was implicated. Therefore, the task of auditing charter schools was an administrative duty incidental to the Comptrollerâs constitutionally prescribed functions. Petitioners appeal as of right, pursuant to CPLR 5601 (b) (1), and we now reverse.
Analysis
It is well settled that â[Legislative enactments enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionalityâ (LaValle v Hayden, 98 NY2d 155, 161 [2002]). A party contesting the constitutionality of a statute must overcome a very heavy initial burden by proving that the invalidity of the law is beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Tichenor, 89 NY2d 769, 773 [1997], citing People v Pagnotta, 25 NY2d 333, 337 [1969])- Here, petitioners assert that the Legislature violated article Y § 1 of the New York State Constitution which provides in pertinent part that
â[t]he comptroller shall be required: (1) to audit all vouchers before payment and all official accounts; (2) to audit the accrual and collection of all revenues and receipts; and (3) to prescribe such methods of accounting as are necessary for the performance of the foregoing duties. The payment of any money , of the state, or of any money under its control, or the refund of any money paid to the state, except upon audit by the comptroller, shall be void ... In such respect the legislature shall define the powers and duties and may also assign to him or her: . . . supervision of the accounts of any political subdivision of the state . . . The legislature shall assign to him or her no administrative duties, excepting such as may be incidental to the performance of these*131 functions, any other provision of this constitution to the contrary notwithstanding.â
Petitioners contend that assignment to the Comptroller of the power and duty to audit charter schools violates the constitutional provision because charter schools are not political subdivisions of the State, nor is the task of auditing charter schools an administrative duty that is incidental to the Comptrollerâs constitutionally prescribed functions. We agree.
Although vigorously contested below, respondents do not now press the argument that a charter school is a âpolitical subdivisionâ of the State. They maintain, however, that the Legislatureâs assignment to the Comptroller of the duty to audit charter schools is permitted by the broad authority conferred by article Y, § 1. They further contend that the Legislatureâs assignment of auditing duties to the Comptroller is constitutional because charter schools have a significant fiscal impact on both the State and school districts and should fall under the Comptrollerâs incidental power to audit school districts.
In 1925, the Legislature determined that a major restructuring of government departments and their responsibilities was necessary. Article Y, § 1 was adopted in order to establish parameters of the Comptrollerâs duties. We noted this legislative history in Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Cent. N.Y. v McCall (89 NY2d 160 [1996]) as support for our determination that the Legislature did not have the constitutional authority to assign to the Comptroller the power to conduct audits of private health insurance companies.
There, we rejected the State Comptrollerâs arguments, which had been based upon practical concerns and public policy. Here, as in Blue Cross, the policy concerns appear to be substantial. However, the legislative enactments of General Municipal Law § 33 (2) and Education Law § 2854 (1) (c), to the extent they grant the Comptroller the power to audit charter schools, violate article Y, § 1. Indeed, in Blue Cross, we observed that it was important that the Insurance Department had long since been established and empowered to conduct audits and examinations of the insurance business (see 89 NY2d at 168-169).
Here, the Legislature has designated the Board of Regents and the charter entities as the public agents authorized to supervise and oversee charter schools. Respondentsâ proposed audits include an assessment as to the extent to which New York City charter schools meet quantitative academic
Indeed, â[a]rticle V, § 1 of the State Constitution is a wellspring of the Comptrollerâs authority . . . [which] broadly empowers the Legislature to delegate to the Comptroller both supervision of the accounts of any political subdivision of the State and administrative duties incidental theretoâ (Matter of McCall v Barrios-Paoli, 93 NY2d 99, 105 [1999]). However, we have noted that âthe objective behind article V, § 1 was to protect the âindependent character of the Comptrollerâs audit function,â a goal that was accomplished by prohibiting the Legislature from assigning to the Comptroller unrelated dutiesâ (Matter of Worth Constr. Co., Inc. v Hevesi, 8 NY3d 548, 552 [2007], quoting Matter of McCall v Barrios-Paoli, 93 NY2d at 107) and is fulfilled by our holding today.
Respondents maintain that our decision in Barrios-Paoli supports their contention that school districts, as recipients of billions of dollars in annual state aid, some passed along to support charter schools, are subject to the Comptrollerâs audit because the Stateâs interest in monies appropriated to these school districts does not cease upon the districtsâ receipt of the funds. Respondents further contend that the authority to supervise the accounts of the Stateâs political subdivisionâthe school districtâleaves ample room for a wider inquiry into the efficiency and effectiveness of the districtâs expenditures of state funds for charter schools. In other words, respondents believe that the Comptroller has the authority to âfollow the money.â
Respondentsâ reliance on Barrios-Paoli, however, is misplaced. The question presented in Barrios-Paoli was whether the Comptroller had the authority to inquire into the management and operations of city agencies that are political subdivisions. In answering that question in the affirmative, we did not indicate that the State Comptroller, as the Stateâs chief fiscal officer, could therefore audit the management and operations of an entityânot a political subdivisionâsolely on the basis that it receives state funds and performs a governmental function.
This does not leave charter schools without fiscal oversight as the fiscal affairs of each charter school are indeed subject to oversight by the Board of Regents, its charter entity, the schoolâs board of trustees and the mandatory independent annual audit. Accountability to the public is thus secured. The ultimate check, of course, is that a school may lose its charter if it is not meeting educational standards, as charters are renewed every five years.
Conclusion
Petitioners have shown, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Legislatureâs delegation of auditing authority over charter schools to the Comptroller violates article Y, § 1 of the New York State Constitution. The provisions of General Municipal Law § 33 (2) and Education Law § 2854 (1) (c), to the extent that these provisions direct the Comptroller to conduct audits of charter schools, are thus declared unconstitutional and the declaratory and injunctive relief, as granted by Supreme Court, is proper.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the order and judgment of Supreme Court should be reinstated.
. However, this section does allow for a âsingle-sex charter school or a charter school designed to provide expanded learning opportunities for students at-risk of academic failureâ (id.).
. An existing private school is not eligible to convert to a charter school (see Education Law § 2852 [3]).
. Education Law § 216-a (1) (a) states the term
â âeducation corporationâ . . . means a corporation (a) chartered or incorporated by the regents or otherwise formed under this chapter, or (b) formed by a special act of this state with its principal purpose an education purpose and which is a member of the university of the state of New York, or (c) formed under laws other than the statutes of this state which, if it were to be formed currently under the laws of this state, might be chartered by the regents, and which has been authorized to conduct its activities in this state by the regents or as an authorized foreign education corporation with the consent of the commissioner.â
. There are certain instances in Education Law § 2853 in which the Legislature has determined a charter school should be considered a private school such as: (1) the power to designate textbooks, to purchase textbooks, to loan textbooks and to purchase supplies; (2) the designation of school library materials; (3) the designation of software programs to be used in conjunction with its computers; (4) local zoning, land use regulation, and building code compliance; and (5) student transportation.
. Respondents assert that petitioners received the majority of their revenue, between 63% and 96%, from the New York City School District, with the average being approximately 82%.
. The Act also encourages â[p]rivate persons and organizations ... to provide funding and other assistance to the establishment or operation of charter schoolsâ (Education Law § 2853 [4] [d]).
. The caption indicates that there are 15 charter school petitioners: The Opportunity Charter School, New Heights Academy Charter School, The Renaissance Charter School, International Leadership Charter School, Hellenic Classical Charter School, Harlem Childrenâs Zone Promise Academy Charter School, Harlem Childrenâs Zone Promise Academy II Charter School, John V Lindsay Wildcat Academy Charter School, Hyde Leadership Academy Charter School, New York Center for Autism Charter School, Brooklyn Charter School, Manhattan Charter School, South Bronx Charter School for International Cultures and the Arts, Community Roots Charter School and Ross Global Academy Charter School. However, respondents assert that there are 16 charter school petitioners because the list did not include the Future Leaders Institute Charter School. Petitioners also include two not-for-profit organizations, The New York Charter Schools Association, Inc., and The New York City Center for Charter School Excellence, Inc. The charter school petitioners are members of The Charter Schools Association, Inc.
. As an initial matter, Supreme Court also rejected respondentsâ argument that charter schools lack the legal capacity to assert a constitutional challenge against the State, finding that petitioners have standing.