The People v. Kelvin Spears
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Kelvin Spears, Appellant
Attorneys
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL, Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester (Janet C. Somes of counsel), for appellant., Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester {Erin Tubbs of counsel), for respondent.
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
OPINION OF THE COURT
Memorandum.
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
Defendant Kelvin Spears was charged by indictment with one count of sexual abuse in the first degree, a class D felony, for sexual contact with a female child under the age of 11. Defendant pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of sexual abuse in the second degree, a misdemeanor, with a sentence of six yearsā probation. Over two months later, defendant appeared at sentencing and requested an adjournment. Defendantās counsel noted that she had spoken with defendant that morning and was requesting an adjournment to discuss with defendant his interest in withdrawing his plea. The People opposed an adjournment, arguing that defendant had been out of custody for two months and thus had more than enough time to bring a motion before the court prior to sentencing. The People further asserted that there was no indication that defendant did not freely know and understand the terms of his plea.
Supreme Court denied the request, informed defendant that the People moved for sentencing, and asked defendant whether there was a reason he should not be sentenced. Defendant
Whether to grant an adjournment is within Supreme Courtās discretion (see Matter of Anthony M., 63 NY2d 270, 283-284 [1984]; People v Singleton, 41 NY2d 402, 405 [1977]). Based upon the colloquy at sentencing, defendant had more than a fair amount of time to speak with counsel regarding his interest in withdrawing his plea. Although defendant was out of custody for two months, having been released on his own recognizance following his plea allocution, the record reflects that he only contacted defense counsel the day before sentencing in order to discuss his plea concerns. Despite defense counselās inability to meet with defendant that day, defense counsel stated during sentencing that she had spoken with defendant that morning.
Defendant argues that Supreme Court abused its discretion by denying his request for an adjournment, claiming there was no compelling reason to deny his request and that his fundamental right to assistance of counsel was at stake. Defendant, however, was able to exercise his right to counsel. It is clear from the colloquy defendant conferred with counsel prior to sentencing. Neither defendant nor his counsel was able to articulate to Supreme Court a ground upon which the plea could be withdrawn. If defendant could have articulated such a ground, it appears that the court would have been willing to grant an adjournment, as evidenced by the judgeās queries about defendantās
The dissent references supposed deficiencies in the plea colloquy; however, defendant has not made such arguments to this Court.