State v. Adams

                                                                        Office of the Director             New Mexico
                                                                         07:44:20 2022.02.23               Compilation
                                                                                       '00'07-             Commission


              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 

Filing Date: December 16, 2021

No. S-1-SC-37722

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

        Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

BRIAN ADAMS,

        Defendant-Petitioner.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI
Daylene Marsh, District Judge

Released for Publication March 1, 2022.

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Caitlin C.M. Smith, Assistant Appellate Defender
John Charles Bennett, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Petitioner

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
John Kloss, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM

for Respondent

                                              OPINION

VIGIL, Chief Justice.

{1}    This case is one of six cases arising under very similar fact patterns. 1 In each
case, an “emergency department technician,” also licensed as an emergency medical
technician (EMT), performed a blood draw test at San Juan Regional Medical Center in
Farmington for the purpose of a DWI investigation. The defendants in these cases

1The remaining five cases have been held in abeyance pending the outcome of this case. State v.
Garcia, S-1-SC-37719; State v. Riley, S-1-SC-37721; State v. Talk, S-1-SC-37727; State v. Harrison, S-1-
SC-37774; State v. Jaramillo, S-1-SC-37775.
argue that “emergency department technicians” are not qualified to draw blood under
the Implied Consent Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 66-8-105 to -112 (1978, as amended through
2019). Thus, this case presents an issue of statutory construction. Specifically, whether
an emergency department technician, licensed as an EMT, with training and experience
in drawing blood is authorized to perform legal blood draw tests as a “laboratory
technician” under NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-103 (1978), which states, “[o]nly a
physician, licensed professional or practical nurse or laboratory technician or
technologist employed by a hospital or physician shall withdraw blood from any person
in the performance of a blood-alcohol test.” 2 As explained herein, we conclude that such
medical professionals are qualified to draw blood under the statute so long as they were
employed to do so by a hospital or physician and have adequate training and
experience.

I.      BACKGROUND

{2}     After receiving a report of a drunk driver, a Farmington police officer was
dispatched to a local gas station. Upon arriving at the gas station, the police officer
found Defendant inflating his car tires. The officer noticed that Defendant’s legs were
shaking, his eyes were bloodshot, and his speech was slurred. The officer conducted a
number of field sobriety tests with Defendant. In performing the tests, Defendant failed
to follow directions, swayed back and forth, and struggled to maintain balance.
Defendant told the officer that he drank whiskey and took Xanax and Suboxone pills
earlier that day.

{3}     The officer arrested Defendant for DWI. Pursuant to the Implied Consent Act, 3
the officer then drove Defendant to the San Juan Regional Medical Center in
Farmington for a blood test to determine the drug and alcohol content of Defendant’s
blood. When they arrived, the officer unsealed a Scientific Laboratory Division (SLD)
blood draw kit in the presence of emergency department technician and licensed EMT
Danica Atwood. He then requested that Atwood draw Defendant’s blood using the SLD
blood draw kit. An SLD-approved blood draw kit includes

        everything that is needed for a blood draw to ensure continuity and
        standardization, and to avoid compromising the accuracy and integrity of
        blood samples. [It] contain[s] instructions, paperwork, an iodine cleaning




2The Administrative Code additionally states that “[t]he term laboratory technician shall include
phlebotomists.” 7.33.2.15 (A)(1) NMAC.
3The Implied Consent Act states that
    [a]ny person who operates a motor vehicle within this state shall be deemed to have given
    consent, subject to the provisions of the Implied Consent Act . . . to chemical tests of his
    breath or blood or both . . . as determined by a law enforcement officer, or for the purpose of
    determining the drug or alcohol content of his blood if arrested for any offense arising out of
    the acts alleged to have been committed while the person was driving a motor vehicle while
    under the influence of an intoxicating liquor or drug.
Section 66-8-107(A).
       pad, a needle with attached tube, and two gray-topped, sterile vacuum
       tubes containing sodium fluoride—a white powder preservative.”

State v. Garcia, 

, 

. Defendant then signed the proper
paperwork consenting to the procedure, and Atwood drew two vials of blood. The officer
placed the vials into the SLD blood draw kit and sealed it in front of Atwood. The officer
then submitted Defendant’s blood samples for testing by the SLD of the New Mexico
Department of Health. The test results revealed that Defendant’s blood was negative for
alcohol but positive for marijuana-related metabolites, benzodiazepines, and synthetic
opioids.

{4}    The State charged Defendant with one count of DWI contrary to NMSA 1978,
Section 66-8-102 (2016). In magistrate court, Defendant moved to suppress the blood
test results on the basis that Atwood was not qualified to draw blood under Section 66-
8-103. The magistrate judge denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. Defendant
pleaded no contest, reserving his right to appeal the magistrate court’s decision.

{5}    Defendant then appealed to the district court, which held an evidentiary hearing
to determine the issue. After the hearing, the district court granted Defendant’s motion
to suppress the blood test results because it concluded that Atwood was not qualified to
draw blood under the statute. The district court explained that it was bound by the New
Mexico Court of Appeals holding in Garcia, 

, “that a person’s
‘license as an EMT does not qualify her to draw blood to determine its alcohol or drug
content under the Implied Consent Act.’”

{6}      Following the district court’s ruling, the State appealed the issue to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order and held that the blood
test should not have been excluded. State v. Adams, 

, ¶¶ 1, 29, 

. The Court of Appeals explained that Garcia stands for the proposition that
an EMT license alone does not qualify an employee like Atwood to draw blood for legal
blood tests. Id. ¶ 20. Here, however, the Court of Appeals clarified that Atwood was
qualified as a laboratory technician under Section 66-8-103 because she held an EMT
license in addition to having experience and training in drawing blood. Id. ¶¶ 21, 29. The
Court of Appeals held “that an individual qualifies as a laboratory technician, despite her
official title, if she has sufficient skills, training, and experience to assure a hospital or
physician that she is qualified to perform blood draws in accordance with approved
medical practice.” Id. ¶ 28. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that even
though “Atwood did not have the title ‘laboratory technician,’ or work in a laboratory,”
she was a laboratory technician under the statute because of her “assigned duties,
skills, training, and experience.” Id. ¶¶ 28, 29

{7}    Defendant appealed the Court of Appeals ruling, and we granted certiorari to
resolve the issue of which medical professionals qualify to draw blood as a “laboratory
technician” under Section 66-8-103. With this opinion, we affirm the Court of Appeals
but write to clarify that, in order for a medical professional to qualify as a laboratory
technician for the purposes of performing legal blood draws, the person must be
employed by a hospital or physician to perform blood draws, trained to perform legal
blood draws, and have on-the-job experience in doing so.

II.    DISCUSSION

{8}    We begin by addressing the statutory construction issue and then turn to the
issue of whether the district court abused its discretion in suppressing the blood test
results.

A.     Statutory Construction

{9}     We must first determine the statutory interpretation of the words “laboratory
technician” in Section 66-8-103. Statutory construction is a matter of law that is
reviewed de novo. State v. Almanzar, 

, 

. In engaging
in statutory construction, our “primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of
the Legislature.” State v. Nick R., 

, 

, 

.

{10} In conducting a statutory construction analysis, we begin by considering the plain
meaning of the statute. We “look to the plain language of the statute to determine if the
statute can be enforced as written.” State v. Padilla, 

, 

, 

. When words are not otherwise defined in a statute, we “giv[e] those
words their ordinary meaning absent clear and express legislative intention to the
contrary.” State v. Johnson, 

, 

, 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To do so, we consult common dictionary
definitions. See State v. Boyse, 

, 

. “A statute must be
construed so that no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous.” Katz v.
N.M. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 

, ¶ 18, 

, 

. “Unless
ambiguity exists, this Court must adhere to the plain meaning of the language.” State v.
Maestas, 

, 

, 

. “A statute is ambiguous
when it can be understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different
senses.” Maestas v. Zager, 

, 

, 

 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).

{11} Section 66-8-103 requires that “[o]nly a physician, licensed professional or
practical nurse or laboratory technician or technologist employed by a hospital or
physician shall withdraw blood from any person in the performance of a blood-alcohol
test.” We must interpret the Legislature’s intended definition of a “laboratory technician”
as it is used in this statute. As the Court of Appeals correctly stated, “[t]here is no
statutory or regulatory definition of ‘laboratory technician’” and “New Mexico courts have
not previously addressed the requirements for qualification as a laboratory technician
under Section 66-8-103.” Adams, 

, ¶¶ 26-27. Turning to dictionary
definitions, the Court of Appeals noted that Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary
defines a technician as “‘one who has acquired the technique of an . . . area of
specialization.’ Technician, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2003).”
Id. ¶ 26 (omission in original). Finding no clear meaning from the plain language of the
statute, the Court of Appeals proceeded to consider the legislative purpose in its
construal of the term “laboratory technician.” See id. ¶ 28.
1.     The plain meaning of Section 66-8-103 is ambiguous

{12} Defendant argues that the Court of Appeals should have adhered more closely to
the plain meaning of the statute before consulting other sources of statutory
interpretation. According to Defendant, the Court of Appeals improperly strayed from the
plain meaning of the statute by holding that medical professionals without laboratory
experience can be “laboratory technicians” under the statute. See id. ¶ 29. Citing to a
number of sources defining “laboratory technician,” Defendant insists that the ordinary
definition of the term “laboratory technician” requires actual laboratory experience, a
background in laboratory science, or laboratory skills beyond the skill of drawing blood
itself. Defendant asserts that the use of the term “laboratory technician” in the statute
means that the Legislature intended the employee drawing blood to have had laboratory
experience. To hold otherwise, Defendant argues, would be to render the word
“laboratory” superfluous.

{13} The State, quoting City of Eunice v. N.M. Tax’n & Revenue Dept., 2014-NMCA-
085, ¶ 14, 

, agrees with Defendant that “[i]n the absence of a statutory
definition, [the Court] rel[ies] on a dictionary definition to determine the meaning of the
language used.” However, the State focuses on the word “technician,” rather than
“laboratory,” emphasizing that, in order to be a technician, a person must have acquired
a certain technique around an area of specialization. Specifically, the State cites
literature from the Department of Labor, which says, “technicians and technologists
perform tests and procedures that physicians and surgeons or other healthcare
personnel order.”

{14} The State argues that Atwood meets this definition of a “technician” because she
was trained and employed to perform specialized tasks for which she utilized technical
processes and methods that involved the practical application of specified knowledge.
For that reason, the State concludes Atwood was qualified to draw blood under the
statute as a phlebotomist, a laboratory technician, or a technologist employed by a
hospital. We note that Atwood herself refuted the contention that she was a
phlebotomist and that the evidence does not support an inference that she was a
technologist employed by the hospital. We therefore limit our analysis to the plain
meaning of “laboratory technician.”

{15} We agree with the State that the term “laboratory technician” is ambiguous on its
face. This term can be reasonably understood to have more than one meaning, as is
evident from the parties’ conflicting but reasonable interpretations of the word
“technician.” Because the Court of Appeals proceeded to address the legislative
purpose of the statute, it must have similarly concluded that the plain language does not
answer the question presented. Like the Court of Appeals, we turn to address the
legislative purpose of the statute’s requirement that a person qualified to perform a legal
blood draw must be a “laboratory technician.”
2.     Allowing EMTs with adequate training and experience in drawing blood to
       perform legal blood draws is consistent with the legislative purpose of the
       statute

{16} Though looking at the plain language of the statute is the first step in statutory
construction analysis, this Court has made clear that we “will not be bound by a literal
interpretation of the words if such strict interpretation would defeat the intended object
of the [L]egislature.” Padilla, 

 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). If statutory language “is doubtful, ambiguous, or an adherence to the
literal use of the words would lead to injustice, absurdity, or contradiction, the court
should reject the plain meaning rule in favor of construing the statute according to its
obvious spirit or reason.” Id. ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“[L]egislative intent is [this Court’s] touchstone when interpreting a statute.” Id. ¶ 10.

{17} Defendant argues that, by allowing EMTs with training and experience in drawing
blood to perform legal blood draws, the Court of Appeals violated the Legislature’s
intent to authorize blood draws by only limited categories of qualified medical
professionals. Defendant says that under Section 66-8-103, in order to be qualified to
draw blood, a medical professional must fit under one of the five categories outlined in
the statute regardless of how much training or experience the medical professional
might have. An EMT, Defendant concludes, does not fall within any of the five
enumerated categories.

{18} In its opinion, the Court of Appeals stated, “an individual qualifies as a laboratory
technician . . . if she has sufficient skills, training, and experience to assure a hospital or
physician that she is qualified to perform blood draws in accordance with approved
medical practice.” Adams, 

, ¶ 28. Because the Legislature specifically
listed which medical professionals are permitted to draw blood under the statute,
Defendant challenges the deference of the Court of Appeals to the opinion of doctors
and hospitals to determine who is qualified as a laboratory technician. Defendant
asserts that such an interpretation results in the term “laboratory technician” no longer
meaning a skilled analyst working in a laboratory, as the plain language indicates, but
rather any person who draws blood in a hospital.

{19} Defendant states that if the Legislature had wanted to defer to hospitals to make
this decision, it could have so indicated in the statute, but it did not do that. In fact,
Defendant thinks that the Legislature did the opposite and tried “to avoid a case-by-case
determination about who may draw blood from any particular defendant.” Defendant
explains that this is demonstrated by the fact that the five categories laid out in Section
66-8-103 fit into two broader categories: (1) medical professionals who are highly
educated, such as doctors and nurses, and (2) “laboratory personnel who do extensive
work with blood draws and blood analysis.” Defendant states that the Legislature could
have added a catchall category but did not do so; therefore, the Court of Appeals should
not have inserted one.

{20} Defendant further argues, quoting Garcia, that the plain language of the statute
reveals the legislative intent of the statute, which is “‘to insure the safety and protection
of the person whose blood is drawn.’” See Garcia, 

. Defendant
asserts that the Legislature meant to protect patients from having blood drawn by
people with inadequate training. Defendant argues that the distinction the Legislature
drew to protect the safety of patients is one of credentials, not individual skill level.

{21} In response, the State asks us to extend our analysis beyond the plain meaning
of the statutory language to interpret the statute in light of its legislative purpose.
Quoting State v. Wiberg, 

, ¶ 13, 

, 

, the State
argues that rather than focusing on the lack of an exact match between Atwood’s job
title and the categories listed in the statute, we should interpret the statute in a way that
better “‘accomplish[es] the legislative purpose of deterring drunk drivers and aid[s] in
discovering and removing the intoxicated driver from the highways.’”

{22} We agree with the State that a strict plain language interpretation is not
appropriate in this case. We must analyze the statute through the lens of the
Legislature’s intended purpose, which we conclude encompasses two goals: (1) to
protect patients subject to a blood draw and (2) to ensure the collection of a reliable
blood sample for use in DWI prosecutions. Contrary to Defendant’s argument, requiring
a laboratory technician to have explicit laboratory experience does not achieve these
purposes. See Wiberg, 

, ¶ 14 (listing the purpose of Section 66-8-103
as safety of subject and reliability of sample). Experience working in a laboratory, in and
of itself, does not guarantee that a particular medical professional has the necessary
skills and qualifications to draw blood safely and reliably. Therefore, we decline to adopt
a narrow interpretation of “laboratory technician” to refer to only those professionals who
work in a laboratory. Such an interpretation would exclude medical professionals with
extensive training and expertise in routinely drawing blood in a medical setting thus
defeating the legislative purpose of the statute.

{23} We must construe Section 66-8-103 consistent with “its obvious spirit or reason.”
Padilla, 

 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Analysis of
prior Court of Appeals opinions indicates that the statute should be broadly interpreted
to permit blood draws by qualified medical professionals, even if those professionals are
not explicitly identified in the statute. This conclusion is consistent with previous
decisions of the Court of Appeals, where that Court interpreted the statute to broaden,
not narrow, the category of individuals authorized to draw blood. This analytical
approach better meets the goal of the statute.

{24} In State v. Trujillo, the Court of Appeals addressed the issue whether a medical
professional, trained and experienced in drawing blood but lacking a license, was
authorized to draw blood as a “technologist” under the statute. 

, ¶ 15,

, 

. The Court of Appeals held that “the statute [wa]s
ambiguous” as to whether “the Legislature intend[ed] that a technologist be licensed[.]”
Id. ¶¶ 17-18. The Court then pursued “the legislative intent by applying rules of
construction.” Id. ¶ 17. Reasoning that because (1) the Court presumes that the
Legislature knows the existing law, (2) the Court should not adopt statutory
constructions that lead to absurd results, and (3) the Court should construe statutes
according to the purpose for which they were enacted, the Court held that the
Legislature did not intend to require that a technologist be licensed. Id. ¶¶ 18-22.

{25} In reaching this conclusion, the Court declared the public policy underlying the
statute. “One purpose is to deter driving while intoxicated. Another purpose is to aid in
discovering and removing from the highways the intoxicated driver. . . . To hold that a
technologist must be licensed when there are no provisions for a license, would defeat
the purpose of discovering . . . the intoxicated driver.” Id. ¶ 21 (omissions in original)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{26} In Wiberg, the Court of Appeals considered whether a nurse who was not
employed by a hospital or physician but by an Albuquerque Police Department
contractor was qualified to draw blood for a blood-alcohol test under Section 66-8-103.

, ¶¶ 2, 5. The Court held that the nurse was qualified under the statute
because “[t]he requirement of employment by a hospital or physician applies only to
‘technologists.’” Id. ¶¶ 8, 9. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the last antecedent
doctrine

       provides that relative and qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be
       applied to the words or phrase immediately preceding, and are not to be
       construed as extending to or including others more remote. Here, the
       qualifying words are “employed by a hospital or physician.” We apply that
       phrase to the preceding term “technologist” but not to the more remote
       terms.

Id. ¶ 11 (citation omitted).

{27} The Court of Appeals recognized that its interpretation of this statute should not
“significantly and unnecessarily limit the classes of individuals who could assist in
furthering the statute’s legislative purpose” so as to not “needlessly impose burdens on
the discovery and removal of the intoxicated driver and, thus, thwart the legislative
policy.” Id. ¶¶ 13, 15. The Court stated that its holding was consistent with the “purpose
of Section 66-8-103, that is, the safety of the subject and the reliability of the sample.”
Id. ¶ 14.

{28} The Court of Appeals addressed a similar issue in Garcia. The issue in Garcia
was “whether an [EMT was] authorized to draw blood for the purpose of determining its
alcohol or drug content under the Implied Consent Act.” 

. The facts
were as follows. While in an ambulance on the way to the hospital, a police officer
handed the on-duty EMT an SLD blood draw kit and asked her to draw a blood sample
from the defendant. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. The EMT agreed and drew blood from the defendant;
however, she did not perform the blood draw according to the SLD blood draw
procedures because she used the wrong needle to extract the blood sample. Id. ¶ 5.
The district court suppressed the results of the blood test because the blood draw was
improperly performed and the EMT was not qualified. Id. ¶¶ 7, 25.

{29}   The Court of Appeals reasoned that
       [b]lood draws to determine the content of alcohol or drugs in blood under
       the Implied Consent Act [did] not fall under the scope [of the EMT’s]
       license . . . . Moreover, her training . . . [did] not include the protocols for
       performing blood draws that comply with the Scientific Laboratory Division
       regulations of the Department of Health under the Implied Consent Act.

Id. ¶ 22. The Court of Appeals concluded:

       [The d]efendant’s blood was drawn by a person who was not qualified to
       do so, and in accordance with our analysis, the district court properly
       suppressed the test results on this basis. Section 66-8-103 has a two-fold
       purpose: to insure the safety and protection of the person whose blood is
       drawn; and to insure the reliability of the sample. Compliance with Section
       66-8-103 advances both of these purposes.

Id. ¶ 24 (citation omitted).

{30} In Garcia, the Court of Appeals stated that neither the EMT’s training nor her
“certification . . . authorize[d] her to draw blood for the purpose of determining its alcohol
or drug content.” Id. ¶ 22. In contrast, here, it was Atwood’s EMT certification in addition
to her training and experience that qualified her to draw Defendant’s blood.

{31} Atwood’s testimony at the district court evidentiary hearing made clear that she
was qualified to draw blood for purposes of determining drug and alcohol content. An
exhibit detailing Atwood’s official job description stated that one of her duties as an
“EMT-B/ER Tech” was to “perform[] legal blood-alcohol blood draws at the request of
law enforcement personnel.” Atwood testified that she was taught how to perform blood
draws by other nurses and technicians. She said that before she was allowed to
perform blood draws on her own, there was a six-week orientation period during which
another employee supervised her work.

{32} Atwood further testified that she had worked for San Juan Regional Medical
Center for over a year and during that time had performed “hundreds or thousands” of
blood draws. She said that during her most recent hospital shift, she performed twenty-
five blood draws. Atwood explained that most of the blood samples she takes from
patients are sent to the hospital laboratory and a few go to the police for testing. She
then explained the difference between conducting a blood draw for the hospital
laboratory versus for the police. She was able to describe the differences between the
two processes in detail. At the close of the hearing, Defendant’s attorney agreed that, in
Defendant’s case, Atwood did everything in accordance with the instructions from the
sealed blood draw kit and the training that she had received.

{33} Atwood stated during the hearing that she had never worked in a laboratory and
did not have any laboratory experience. However, based on what happened in this
case, it is clear that her lack of laboratory experience did not prevent her from learning
how to properly administer a legal blood draw test under the SLD procedures. Through
her training and actual experience in conducting blood draws at the hospital, she
developed and practiced the proper technique to perform this procedure.

{34} Prohibiting medical professionals who possess such training in this area from
administering blood draws would “needlessly impose burdens on the discovery and
removal of the intoxicated driver and, thus, thwart the legislative policy.” Wiberg, 1988-
NMCA-022, ¶¶ 13, 15. Allowing EMTs who, along with their certification, have the
training and experience in the skill of drawing blood to perform legal blood draw tests
and who are employed by a hospital or physician to do so, furthers the purpose of the
statute to ensure the safety of the patient and the reliability of the blood sample. See
Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. Rogers, 

, ¶ 6, 

, 

(concluding the purpose of Section 66-8-103 is two-fold: (1) to insure the safety and
protection of the person being tested and (2) to insure reliability of the sample). It is the
Court’s responsibility to resolve any ambiguity in Section 66-8-103 in a way that
supports the legislative purpose to “deter driving while intoxicated” and “aid in
discovering and removing from the highways the intoxicated driver.” Trujillo, 1973-
NMCA-076, ¶ 21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, consistent
with the legislative purpose of this statute, we interpret the statute as allowing EMTs
who are employed by a hospital or physician and who possess the proper education
and experience to perform blood draws as “laboratory technician[s].” See § 66-8-103.

B.     Abuse of Discretion

{35} Next, we turn to the question of whether the district court abused its discretion by
suppressing Defendant’s blood test results. “[A] court abuses its discretion if it applies
an incorrect standard, incorrect substantive law, or its discretionary decision is premised
on a misapprehension of the law.” State v. Sena, 

, 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The standard of review for suppression
rulings is whether the law was correctly applied to the facts, viewing them in a manner
most favorable to the prevailing party.” State v. Jason L., 

, ¶ 10, 

, 

 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{36} As we discussed above, Defendant argues that the district court properly
interpreted Garcia, 

, and correctly applied the law to the facts. The
State, on the other hand, argues that the district court misinterpreted Garcia and
misapplied Section 66-8-103 and therefore abused its discretion in excluding the blood
test results.

{37} Based on the foregoing statutory construction analysis, we conclude that the
Court of Appeals and the State are correct in their interpretation of the law. It follows
then that the district court did indeed abuse its discretion by misinterpreting the law
when it suppressed Defendant’s blood test results from evidence. Therefore, the Court
of Appeals, Adams, 

, ¶ 34, correctly remanded the case to the district
court with instructions for it to render a decision consistent with an accurate
interpretation of the law as set forth in its opinion.
III.   CONCLUSION

{38}   We affirm the Court of Appeals.

{39}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

C. SHANNON BACON, Justice

DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice

JULIE J. VARGAS, Justice