Samsung Electronics America Inc v.
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-1895
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 25-1895
In re: SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA INC.
JOSHUA FRITZ, TODD BINGHAM, FRANK APPLEGATE, BRIAN HEINZ,
RAFFI KELECHIAN, et al.,
Appellants
_____________________________
On Appeal from the U.S. District Court, D.N.J.
Judge Christine P. O’Hearn, No. 1:23-md-03055
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge; RESTREPO, AND MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges
Submitted: June 9, 2026; Filed: Aug. 31, 2026
_____________________________
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION*
MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judge.
Individual consumers from various states (the “Consumers”) claim a data breach
affecting Samsung Electronics America Inc. (“Samsung”) injured them. The District Court
properly dismissed the Consumers’ claims for lack of standing and properly denied their
request for leave to amend. But because the dismissal was for lack of standing, we will
modify the order to make it a dismissal without prejudice, and we will affirm the order as
modified.
I. BACKGROUND
In July 2022, hackers exfiltrated customer data from Samsung (the “Data Breach”).
*
This is not an opinion of the full Court and, under 3d Cir. IOP 5.7, is not binding precedent.
Joint Appendix (hereinafter “App. __”) 621. After Samsung publicly disclosed the Data
Breach, the Consumers brought this putative class action, alleging various tort and
contract-related claims.
The District Court ordered the parties to begin discovery by exchanging fact sheets
(the “Fact Sheets”). Thereafter, the Consumers filed four more complaints. The operative
complaint (the “Complaint”) was filed after a full round of dismissal briefing, the parties’
exchange of the Fact Sheets, numerous status conferences, and the District Court’s
identification of standing deficiencies.
According to the Complaint, the Data Breach was potentially executed by a known
hacker group who stole “one or more of the following”: (1) “full names” and birth dates;
(2) “Samsung account data and . . . credentials”; (3) “personal identifiers and contact
information such as email addresses, postal addresses, telephone numbers, IP addresses,
country code, and region”; (4) “demographic data”; (5) “product registration information,”
including “IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity)”; and (6) “financial
information, such as method of payment.” App. 617–18. The stolen information did not
include: (1) “social security numbers”; (2) “credit or debit card information”; (3) medical
information; (4) “any other unique identification number issued on a government document
commonly used to verify . . . identity”; (5) any “number or information that can be used to
access a person’s financial resources”; (6) account passwords; (7) “[b]iometric [d]ata”; or
(8) “[g]eolocation [d]ata.” App. 804–05, 811, 813–17.
In relevant part, Samsung moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that the Consumers
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lacked standing. Samsung then produced records from an investigation of the Data Breach.
The parties notified the District Court of the production, but the Consumers did not request
leave to amend. The District Court later dismissed the Consumers’ claims, holding that the
Consumers lacked standing because they failed to allege imminent injuries that are fairly
traceable to the Data Breach. The Consumers then moved for reconsideration and sought
leave to amend, which the District Court denied. The Consumers timely appealed.
II. ANALYSIS
To resolve this appeal, we must address whether the District Court erred in
dismissing the Consumers’ claims for lack of standing, denying their request for leave to
amend, and dismissing their claims with prejudice. We address each argument in turn.
A. Standing
The District Court correctly dismissed the Consumers’ claims for lack of standing.
Article III of the Constitution limits the federal judicial power to the resolution of “Cases
and Controversies,” requiring plaintiffs show “a personal stake in the case—in other words,
standing.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021) (citation modified). To
have standing, a plaintiff must plausibly allege (1) that he or she “suffered an injury in fact
that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent”; (2) “that the injury was likely
caused by the defendant,” i.e. traceability; and (3) “that the injury would likely be redressed
by judicial relief.” Id. (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
Here, the Consumers lack standing because their claims rely on a future risk of
identity theft or fraud that is not sufficiently imminent. To be “actual or imminent,” an
injury must not be “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573
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U.S. 149, 158 (2014) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). “Although imminence is
concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which
is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the
injury is certainly impending.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013)
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2). So allegations “of future injury may suffice if the
threatened injury is certainly impending, or there is a substantial risk[1] that the harm will
occur.” Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 158 (citation modified). On the other hand, “[a]llegations
of possible future injury”—even with an “objectively reasonable likelihood” of
occurring—are not sufficient. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409–10 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas,
495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
We have delineated certain non-exhaustive factors relevant to determining if a data-
breach injury is imminent, including whether the breach was intentional, whether there was
misuse, and whether the nature of the accessed information could lead to a risk of identity
theft. See Clemens v. ExecuPharm Inc., 48 F.4th 146, 153–54 (3d Cir. 2022) (“These non-
exhaustive factors can serve as useful guideposts, with no single factor being dispositive
to our inquiry.”). A quick review of the leading case contextualizes these factors. In
Clemens, a known hacker group acquired sensitive information in a data breach. 48 F.4th
at 156–57. The Court applied these factors and held imminence was adequately alleged.
Id. Specifically, the Court held that the hacker group stole “the type of data that could be
1
A substantial risk means a “realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury.” Pennell v. City
of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8 (1988) (quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298
(1979)).
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used to perpetrate identity theft or fraud,” which included “social security numbers, dates
of birth, full names, home addresses, taxpayer identification numbers, banking
information, credit card numbers, driver’s license numbers, sensitive tax forms, and
passport numbers.” Id. at 157; see also id. at 154 (explaining that “disclosure of social
security numbers, birth dates, and names is more likely to create a risk of identity theft or
fraud,” but “the disclosure of financial information alone, without corresponding personal
information, is insufficient” (emphasis added)). And it held that the hacker group
“intentionally gained access to and misused the data” where “it launched a sophisticated
phishing attack to install malware, encrypted the data, held it for ransom, and published
it.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
This case is not Clemens. Although a hacker group stole certain information, the
Complaint does not allege that the information was sold, published, or used in any way.
And nothing in the Complaint suggests misuse of the stolen information is possible because
the information is not the type “that could be used to perpetrate identity theft or fraud.” Id.
Unlike the information at issue in Clemens, the stolen information here did not include
“social security numbers, . . . tax identification numbers, banking information, credit card
numbers, driver’s license numbers, sensitive tax forms, and passport numbers.” Id. In fact,
only one named Consumer alleged that their date of birth and name were stolen, and for
each of the 41 named Consumers, even the “combination” of the stolen information cannot
be used to perpetrate identity theft or fraud. Clemens, 48 F.4th at 158. Instead, to describe
the Consumers’ alleged injuries, we have to start with “if,” not “when,” statements. Reilly
v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining alleged injuries were not
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sufficiently imminent where they required “beginning . . . with the word ‘if’”). And
without particularized allegations that the Consumers face an imminent risk of identity
theft or fraud, the Consumers cannot plausibly allege that they suffered from a decrease in
their information’s value, the lost value of the privacy and confidentiality of the
information, decreased credit scores, or mitigation-related efforts and costs. See Clapper,
568 U.S. at 402 (explaining that plaintiffs “cannot manufacture standing by choosing to
make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending”). So
the District Court correctly concluded that the Consumers lack standing because they failed
to allege a “‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.” Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 158 (quoting
Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414 n.5).2
B. Leave to Amend
The District Court correctly denied the Consumers’ request for leave to amend, which
appeared in their motion for reconsideration. On a motion for reconsideration, a district
court may alter or amend the judgment if the movant shows “the availability of new
evidence that was not available when the court” entered judgment. Howard Hess Dental
Lab’ys Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Max’s Seafood
Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)). In this context,
“new evidence . . . means evidence that a party could not earlier submit to the court because
that evidence was not previously available.” Id. at 252. The Consumers point to Samsung’s
2
Because there are no allegations plausibly alleging harm without reliance on a speculative
chain of hypotheticals, the Consumers also fail to show traceability. See Clapper, 568 U.S.
at 414 (“[A] speculative chain of possibilities does not establish that injury based on
potential future [acts] is certainly impending or fairly traceable . . . .”).
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production of records at least three months before the dismissal order issued. But the
Consumers did not seek leave to amend despite the District Court’s request that the parties
notify it if the production affected the pending dismissal motion.
Even if the Consumers had properly sought to amend, the District Court’s denial of
that request would not have been an abuse of discretion. District courts may deny leave to
amend when amendment would be futile. Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1414 (3d Cir.
1993). “‘Futility’ means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,
1434 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 623 (1st Cir.
1996)). Here, the Consumers already had five bites at the pleading apple. And the District
Court spelled out precisely these pleading deficiencies during the status conferences that
preceded the Consumers’ third and fourth amendments. Moreover, the Consumers “failed
to identify any specific information . . . that would alter any part of the Court’s standing
analysis.” App. 42. So the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to
amend.
C. Dismissal With Prejudice
The District Court erred in dismissing the Consumers’ claims with prejudice. “The
absence of standing leaves the court without subject-matter jurisdiction to reach a decision
on the merits, [so] dismissals with prejudice for lack of standing are generally improper.”
Barclift v. Keystone Credit Servs., LLC, 93 F.4th 136, 148 (3d Cir. 2024) (citation
modified). Because “that general rule applies here,” we will modify the District Court’s
order to dismiss their claims without prejudice and affirm that order as modified. Id.
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*****
The District Court properly concluded that the Consumers do not have standing
because they failed to allege sufficiently imminent injuries for each of their claims. And it
properly rejected the Consumers’ late request for leave to amend because no new evidence
supported that request. But it should have dismissed the Consumers’ claims without
prejudice because it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to say otherwise. For these reasons,
we will MODIFY the District Court’s order to a dismissal without prejudice and AFFIRM the
District Court’s orders as to the motions to dismiss and for reconsideration.
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