Full Opinion

Case: 25-1512 Document: 53 Page: 1 Filed: 11/20/2026 NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________ IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD., Appellant ______________________ 2025-1512 ______________________ Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2023- 00626, IPR2024-00131. ______________________ Decided: November 20, 2026 ______________________ LUCAS M. WALKER, MoloLamken LLP, Washington, DC, argued for appellant. Also represented by ROBERT AUCHTER, Auchter PLLC, Washington, DC; BRETT E. COOPER, BC Law Group, PC, New York, NY. ______________________ Before CHEN, CUNNINGHAM, and STARK, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge CUNNINGHAM. Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge STARK. CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judge. Case: 25-1512 Document: 53 Page: 2 Filed: 11/20/2026 2 IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. Ollnova Technologies Ltd. (“Ollnova”) appeals a final written decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board in an inter partes review (“IPR”) brought by Copeland Com- fort Control LP (“Copeland”) and ecobee Technologies ULC (“ecobee”). The Board determined that claims 1, 3–8, 14, 15, and 18 of U.S. Patent No. 7,746,887 (“the ’887 patent”) are unpatentable as obvious. Copeland Comfort Control LP v. Ollnova Techs. Ltd., No. IPR2023-00626, 2024 WL 4362279, at *21 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 1, 2024) (“Decision”); J.A. 47–48. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND The ’887 patent is titled “Dynamic Value Reporting for Wireless Automated Systems.” ’887 patent, at [54]. Claim 1 is illustrative and recites: 1. A wireless automation device, comprising: a transceiver operable to wirelessly com- municate packets of information over a wireless network; a sensor operable to generate a indicator for a sensed condition; a controller configured to poll the sensor at a polling interval to read the indicator dur- ing a current period of the polling interval and to selectively operate the transceiver to communicate information associated with the reading of the indicator; and a memory, the controller storing a reading of the indicator during the current period in the memory, where the memory stores at least one prior reading of the indicator, the prior reading of the indicator made during a prior period of the polling interval, wherein the transceiver is configured to transmit a most recent reading of the indi- cator stored in the memory during a period Case: 25-1512 Document: 53 Page: 3 Filed: 11/20/2026 IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. 3 of a transmission interval in response to detecting a change in the sensed condition outside a predetermined range and wherein transmission of the most recent reading of the indicator stored in the memory during the period of the transmis- sion interval is suspended in response to detecting a change in the sensed condition within the predetermined range. Id. col. 14 l. 48 to col. 15 l. 4; J.A. 125–26 (certificates of correction). The Board first construed part of the last clause of claim 1’s final limitation, which begins “wherein the trans- ceiver is configured to transmit.” Decision at *2, *4–6; ’887 patent col. 14 l. 63 to col. 15 l. 4 (“limitation [1.e]”). Re- garding the second “wherein” statement of limitation [1.e], “wherein transmission of the most recent reading of the in- dicator stored in the memory during the period of the trans- mission interval is suspended in response to detecting a change in the sensed condition within the predetermined range,” see limitation [1.e] (emphases added), the Board ob- served that the district court in a parallel litigation had al- ready construed that limitation as “wherein the transmission of the most recent reading of the indicator that would otherwise occur is stopped for the remainder of the transmission interval in response to detecting a change in the sensed condition within the predetermined range,” Decision at *4 & n.8. 1 However, the Board did not adopt 1 The parallel district court case was brought by Ollnova against ecobee, and Copeland was not a party to that litigation. See J.A. 1920 (listing only Ollnova and ecobee as parties in the district court’s April 10, 2023 claim construction order). After we issued our opinion in a re- lated appeal from the district court’s judgment, see Ollnova Techs. Ltd. v. ecobee Techs. ULC, 177 F.4th 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2026), on remand, Ollnova and ecobee settled. See Ollnova Case: 25-1512 Document: 53 Page: 4 Filed: 11/20/2026 4 IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. the district court’s construction, stating that neither party asserted the district court’s construction. Id. at *4 n.8. Ollnova proposed a similar, but immaterially different con- struction from the district court’s construction, 2 and Copeland asserted plain and ordinary meaning. Id. at *4 n.8, *5. The Board rejected Ollnova’s proposed limi- tation [1.e] construction, which reads, in part, “transmis- sion of the most recent reading of the indicator that would otherwise occur is stopped.” Decision at *4 (first emphasis added and second emphasis modified); see id. at *5–6. The Board instead determined that the meaning of “sus- pended,” in the context of the ’887 patent, “encompasses both where a transmission that would otherwise occur is suspended by an action such as overriding a flag and where a transmission is not made because there is no change in an indicator or a change does not exceed a limit.” Id. at *6. Techs. Ltd. v. ecobee Techs. ULC, 2:22-cv-00072-JRG (E.D. Tex. filed July 14, 2026). 2 Ollnova’s proposed construction to the Board ex- cluded “for the remainder of the transmission interval” from the district court’s construction. Decision at *4 & n.8. Case: 25-1512 Document: 53 Page: 5 Filed: 11/20/2026 IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. 5 Additionally, the Board determined that claim 1 was unpatentable as obvious over Kates-711. 3 Decision at *13, J.A. 47–48. The Board found that Kates-711 teaches limi- tation [1.e] because “Kates-711 discloses ‘not transmitting data that falls within a normal range’ and transmitting data that is ‘outside the threshold’ such as ‘a high thresh- old, a low threshold, or a high-low threshold.’” Decision at *13 (quoting Kates-711 col. 13 ll. 14–23). The Board fur- ther found that Figure 7 (reproduced below) “transmit re- port” block 707 (“block 707”) in Kates-711 “corresponds to the recited ‘a period of the transmission interval’ because it is a period of time when ‘sensor data is . . . sent to the monitoring computer.’” Id. at *12 (citing Kates-711 col. 15 l. 61). The Board also found “block 707 is within an interval of ‘periodic monitoring’ i.e., the process loop shown in 3 U.S. Patent No. 7,528,711 (“Kates-711”). Case: 25-1512 Document: 53 Page: 6 Filed: 11/20/2026 6 IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. Figure 7 beginning at block 703 and comprising steps 703, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710 and back to block 703.” Id. The Board credited expert testimony when finding Kates-711’s “periodic monitoring” disclosed a “transmission interval” claimed in limitation [1.e]. Id. The Board also rejected Ollnova’s argument that block 707 cannot disclose a trans- mission interval because block 707 does not exist when transmission is suspended. Id. Instead, the Board found that “block 707 is part of a loop when transmission may or may not occur depending on whether the sensed data is anomalous.” Id. Accordingly, the Board found that Kates- 711 teaches limitation [1.e] and determined that claims 1, 3–8, and 18 are unpatentable as obvious in light of Kates- 711 and in light of Kates-711 in combination with Hitt. 4 Id. at *21; see also J.A. 46–48 (providing summary chart of Board’s determinations). The Board also determined that claims 1, 3–8, 14, 15, and 18 are unpatentable as obvious in light of Kates-711 in combination with Littrell 5 or in combination with both Hitt and Littrell. Decision at *21; J.A. 46–48. Ollnova timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A). II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo and its fact findings for substantial evidence.” Game & Tech. Co. v. Wargaming Grp. Ltd., 942 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2019). “We review the Board’s claim construc- tion de novo and any underlying factual findings for sub- stantial evidence.” Immunex Corp. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, 977 F.3d 1212, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 2020). “Whether a claimed invention is unpatentable as obvious is a question of law that is reviewed de novo, based on underlying 4 U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. 2004/0100394 (“Hitt”). 5 U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. 2005/0246593 (“Littrell”). Case: 25-1512 Document: 53 Page: 7 Filed: 11/20/2026 IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. 7 findings of fact reviewed for substantial evidence.” Redline Detection, LLC v. Star Envirotech, Inc., 811 F.3d 435, 449 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” FanDuel, Inc. v. Interactive Games LLC, 966 F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The substantial evidence standard asks whether a reasonable fact finder could have arrived at the agency’s decision, and involves examination of the record as a whole, taking into account evidence that both justifies and detracts from an agency’s decision.” OSI Pharms., LLC v. Apotex Inc., 939 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). III. DISCUSSION Ollnova 6 makes three primary arguments: (1) the Board erred in its construction of “suspended,” Appellant’s Br. 28–42; (2) Kates-711 does not disclose, teach, or sug- gest a “transmission interval,” id. at 42–46; and (3) Kates- 711 does not disclose, teach, or suggest a “period of the transmission interval” during which “transmission . . . is suspended,” id. at 46–49. We address each argument in turn. 7 6 We grant ecobee’s unopposed motion to withdraw from this appeal. See ECF No. 52. Earlier, we granted Copeland’s similar motion. See ECF Nos. 24, 25. Accord- ingly, at the time we are deciding this case, the only party involved is Ollnova. The prior positions of ecobee and Copeland, as well as the prior agreement between Ollnova and ecobee that the Board’s construction of the “sus- pended” term was incorrect, are inoperative and of no con- sequence for purposes of this appeal. 7 Ollnova makes arguments regarding the Board’s claim construction and obviousness findings with respect to claim 1 of the ’887 patent and does not make any Case: 25-1512 Document: 53 Page: 8 Filed: 11/20/2026 8 IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. A. Ollnova challenges the Board’s construction of claim limitation [1.e] in three ways: (1) that issue preclusion (i.e., collateral estoppel) precluded ecobee “from asserting a claim construction of ‘suspended’ that is inconsistent with, and cannot be reconciled with, the claim construction from the prior adjudication,” id. at 31, in the Eastern Dis- trict of Texas, id. at 28–31; (2) that the Board “disre- gard[ed],” id. at 41, the district court’s construction, which Ollnova insists is a correct construction, id. at 40–42; and (3) that the Board incorrectly construed “suspended,” id. at 32–40. As explained below, we are not persuaded. i. First, Ollnova argues that collateral estoppel precluded ecobee from asserting a claim construction of “suspended” that differs from the construction ecobee pursued in the district court. Id. at 31. We need not decide if ecobee is collaterally estopped, for at least two reasons. First, ecobee is no longer a party to this appeal. Second, when it was a party, ecobee “agree[d] with Ollnova that the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s relevant claim construction of the ‘suspended’ lim- itation was correct, and that the Board’s relevant claim construction was erroneous.” Appellee’s Br. 1. As ecobee was never advocating a position before this court that Ollnova sought to preclude, there was never any need for us to decide whether ecobee is collaterally estopped. ii. Ollnova also argues that the Board erred by disregard- ing the district court’s construction. Appellant’s Br. 40–42. We disagree because the Board’s claim-construction analy- sis necessarily addressed (and rejected) both the district arguments unique to dependent claims 3–8, 14, 15, or 18 of the ’887 patent that the Board also found unpatentable. See generally Appellant’s Br. 27–49; Decision at *21. Case: 25-1512 Document: 53 Page: 9 Filed: 11/20/2026 IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. 9 court’s construction and Ollnova’s construction for “sus- pended.” Although the Board is not bound by a district court’s claim construction, and has an independent obligation to resolve claim construction disputes, the Board is obligated to consider the district court’s construction if it is presented by the parties. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (“Any prior claim construction determination concerning a term of the claim in a civil action, or a proceeding before the Interna- tional Trade Commission, that is timely made of record in the inter partes review proceeding will be considered.”); see also Ethanol Boosting Sys., LLC v. Ford Motor Co., 162 F.4th 1151, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (noting that we have not “impose[d] a blanket rule requiring the Board to always evaluate the merits of any prior claim constructions”). Here the Board complied with this obligation. The Board considered the district court’s construction, albeit in large part via its consideration of Ollnova’s pro- posed construction, which is immaterially different from the district court’s construction. See Decision at *4 (observ- ing that Ollnova “relies on statements by the district court in the [e]cobee litigation”); see also supra n.2 (showing im- material difference between Ollnova’s proposed construc- tion and the district court’s construction); J.A. 330–31 (Ollnova arguing that the Board should construe “con- sistent with” the district court’s construction). The Board also expressly recited the district court’s construction. De- cision at *4 n.8. To be sure, the Board gave little weight to the district court’s construction, but, we reiterate, the Board was not required to give it any particular weight. We discern no error. iii. On the merits, Ollnova argues that the Board’s con- struction of “suspended” in claim limitation [1.e] is incor- rect because “suspended” should not encompass “both (1) where a transmission that would otherwise occur is sus- pended by an action such as overriding a flag and (2) where Case: 25-1512 Document: 53 Page: 10 Filed: 11/20/2026 10 IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. a transmission is not made because there is no change in an indicator or a change does not exceed a limit.” Appel- lant’s Br. 32 (emphases omitted); see id. at 32–40. Ollnova contends that the Board improperly broadened the claim language by including the second half of the construction. Id. at 40. While the issue is a somewhat close issue—as illus- trated by the fact that, at an earlier point in this appeal, Ollnova and ecobee agreed with the district court’s nar- rower construction of “suspended”—we ultimately agree with the Board. Decision at *6. Thus, like the Board, we conclude that “suspended” encompasses both: (1) “where a transmission that would otherwise occur is suspended by an action such as overriding a flag,” and (2) “where a trans- mission is not made because there is no change in an indi- cator or a change does not exceed a limit.” Id. While the plain language of the claim may affirma- tively support only the first of these two meanings of “sus- pended,” it also does nothing to preclude inclusion of the second of these meanings. As we turn to the specification, we find that it provides substantial support for the Board’s view that “suspended” encompasses both meanings. Three examples from the specification support the first half of the Board’s construc- tion. First, the specification explains that “information may be transmitted in response . . . to a sensed condition being outside a predetermined range or limit. . . . Trans- mission of information during an interval may be sus- pended in response to an externally received control signal.” ’887 patent, col. 2 ll. 20–26. Second, the specifica- tion explains “[t]he transceiver may communicate the in- formation during the transmission period in response to a triggering event such” as detecting whether a flag has been set, and the flags “may be set in response to detecting or identifying a change in the sensed condition beyond a limit.” Id. col. 10 ll. 63–67. Third, the specification de- scribes the “counter . . . may count[ ] a number of polling intervals when a change has been detected, such as when Case: 25-1512 Document: 53 Page: 11 Filed: 11/20/2026 IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. 11 a flag has been set.” Id. col. 11 ll. 53–55. “When the count reaches a maximum or a limit[,] [t]he transceiver may be controlled to suspend the transmission of information [dur- ing the] transmission period, until the counter reaches a send limit.” Id. col. 11 ll. 56–59. These examples all con- template information being suspended based on a signal, flag, or counter, that may activate upon the detection of a change. Accordingly, “suspended” can encompass “where a transmission that would otherwise occur is suspended by an action such as overriding a flag.” We also agree with the Board that “suspended” can en- compass “where a transmission is not made because there is no change in an indicator or a change does not exceed a limit.” Decision at *6. In the fourth example cited by the Board, see id., the specification describes that “a transmis- sion of information may be suspended for periods of a transmission interval for which no change in the indicator has been identified.” ’887 patent col. 3 ll. 35–37 (emphasis added). This portion of the specification describes a sce- nario where a transmission is not made, i.e., “suspended,” because there is “no change in the indicator,” thereby fur- ther explaining the patent’s understanding of this claim term. 8 Similarly, the fifth example from the specification ana- lyzed by the Board, see Decision at *6, states that “trans- ceiver 216 may transmit information only during a transmission period in which a current difference Di ex- ceeds the difference limit Dl, and may not transmit during intervals in which the current difference Di does not exceed the difference limit Dl.” ’887 patent col. 11 ll. 37–41. This example describes an embodiment similar in function to the fourth example, discussed above, which, again, explic- itly uses the word “suspend.” The specification further 8 The district court did not consider this passage from the specification in its claim construction of “sus- pended.” J.A. 1926–27. Case: 25-1512 Document: 53 Page: 12 Filed: 11/20/2026 12 IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. discusses how “the processor 214 may control the trans- ceiver 216 to suspend the transmission of information, not- withstanding a flag being set identifying a transmission may be pending.” Id. col. 11 ll. 8–11. “The transceiver may also transmit information in response to a number of suc- cessive transmission periods in which information was not transmitted. The event also may be an absence of a value for the sensed condition from the sensor 209.” Id. col. 11 ll. 11–15. In context, “suspend” and “may not transmit” are used more or less interchangeably. Accordingly, “sus- pended” can also encompass “where a transmission is not made because there is no change in an indicator or a change does not exceed a limit.” In sum, the Board properly read the claim in view of the specification by rely- ing on the specification’s repeated use of the term “sus- pended” to inform the meaning of the same term in the context of the claim. B. Ollnova further contends Kates-711 “does not disclose, teach or suggest the claimed ‘transmission interval.’” Ap- pellant’s Br. 42; id. at 42–46. Specifically, Ollnova argues that the Board erroneously relies on the same process loop in Figure 7 of Kates-711 for disclosure of both “transmis- sion interval” and the “polling interval” limitation. Appel- lant’s Br. 44–46. We disagree. The Board’s finding that Kates-711 discloses the limi- tations of claim 1, including the “transmission interval” and “polling interval” limitations, is supported by substan- tial evidence. Ollnova is incorrect in its assertion that the Board conflated “polling interval” and “transmission inter- val.” Appellant’s Br. 44. Instead, the Board found that Kates-711 teaches the “polling interval” limitation, based on block 706 disclosing “polling interval,” see Decision at *8–9, while block 707 discloses the “transmission inter- val,” id. at *11–12. Kates-711 explains that in Figure 7, if “no fault occurs during the sleep period, then when the specified sleep period has expired, the process enters a block 706 where the sensor unit 102 takes a sensor reading Case: 25-1512 Document: 53 Page: 13 Filed: 11/20/2026 IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. 13 from the sensor(s) 201. The sensor data is subsequently sent to the monitoring computer 113 in a report block 707.” Kates-711 col. 15 ll. 57–62. Accordingly, the Board’s find- ing “that Kates[-711]’s report block 707 corresponds to the recited ‘a period of the transmission interval’ because [block 707] is a period of time when ‘sensor data is . . . sent to the monitoring computer’” is supported by substantial evidence. Decision at *12. Ollnova also contends Kates-711 does not disclose “the claimed ‘period of the transmission interval’ during which ‘transmission . . . is suspended’” limitation. Appellant’s Br. 46; id. at 46–49. We disagree. The Board’s finding that Kates-711 discloses limitation [1.e] is supported by substantial evidence. See Decision at *13. “Figure 7 [of Kates-711] shows steps 708, 709, and 710 subsequent to report block 707,” and Ollnova “conceded at the oral hearing [before the Board] that the progression of steps in the loop shown in Figure 7 does not stop if trans- mission is suspended during report block 707.” Id. at *12. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that Kates-711 discloses “wherein transmission of the most recent reading of the indicator . . . is suspended in response to detecting a [change] in the sensed condition within the predetermined range.” Id. at *13. IV. CONCLUSION We have considered Ollnova’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, we affirm. AFFIRMED Case: 25-1512 Document: 53 Page: 14 Filed: 11/20/2026 NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________ IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD., Appellant ______________________ 2025-1512 ______________________ Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2023- 00626, IPR2024-00131. ______________________ STARK, Circuit Judge, concurring. I agree with Judge Cunningham’s opinion and join it in full. I write separately to point out that, at the time this appeal was argued, it appeared to present a difficult proce- dural question: if an IPR petitioner and patent owner agree with a district court’s construction of a previously-disputed term in parallel litigation involving the same patent, should we nonetheless evaluate the claim construction of the Board de novo and, potentially, affirm based on a con- struction that no party to the appeal is advocating? I think this is an important, and difficult, question, and one we may need to confront eventually. Case: 25-1512 Document: 53 Page: 15 Filed: 11/20/2026 2 IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. If there had been no dispute at the Board as to the cor- rect construction of the “suspend” term, 1 there would have been no reason for the Board, sua sponte, to have construed the term. See generally U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Claim construc- tion is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and technical scope, to clarify and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by the claims, for use in the de- termination of infringement [and invalidity].”) (emphasis added); see also SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 366 (2018) (explaining that in an IPR the petition “guide[s] the life” of the proceeding”). It is not clear to me that the situation should be any different on appeal. At the time this case was briefed and argued before us, there was no claim construction dispute. At that point, ecobee agreed with Ollnova that the district court’s construction of the “suspend” term is correct and further agreed that this appeal should be resolved by ap- plying that construction. With no claim construction dis- pute before us, the “party presentation” principle would have then counseled that we not reach a non-issue. See generally United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375 (2020) (“[W]e rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The reasons for not re-evaluating the undisputed con- struction would have been stronger here because, at the 1 In this case, there was a dispute at the Board as to the meaning of “suspend.” Ollnova asked the Board to adopt a slight variation of the district court’s construction, see Court Op. at 4 n.2, while the petitioners advocated “plain and ordinary meaning.” See ecobee Techs. ULC v. Ollnova Techs. Ltd., No. IPR2024-00131 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 2, 2023), Paper 1 at 13-14. Case: 25-1512 Document: 53 Page: 16 Filed: 11/20/2026 IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. 3 time this case was argued, the parallel district court litiga- tion was ongoing. And, at that point, both parties also wanted the district court to apply its construction of the “suspend” term and not the Board’s broader construction. Had we nonetheless reviewed and affirmed the Board’s dif- ferent construction, we would have (i) decided this appeal on grounds no one was advocating, and (ii) unraveled the parties’ agreement that the district court case be decided by application of the district court construction. I do not mean to suggest that these points would have been decisive in guiding our decision – had ecobee not sub- sequently dropped out of this appeal, and had the district court case not been dismissed. What we should have done in that circumstance is, to me, a tough question. Claim construction is a question of law, and there is something unsettling in the notion that parties to an appeal could craft their positions in a manner that might prevent us from determining the correct construction. See generally Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 545-48 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (objecting to majority’s acceptance of parties’ agreed-upon legal con- clusion). In the end, because events following submission of this case have removed any hint of these issues from this ap- peal, and because I fully agree with the Court’s resolution of the matters remaining before us, I join my colleagues in affirming the Board.