In Re Ollnova Technologies Ltd.
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-1512
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Case: 25-1512 Document: 53 Page: 1 Filed: 11/20/2026
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD.,
Appellant
______________________
2025-1512
______________________
Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2023-
00626, IPR2024-00131.
______________________
Decided: November 20, 2026
______________________
LUCAS M. WALKER, MoloLamken LLP, Washington,
DC, argued for appellant. Also represented by ROBERT
AUCHTER, Auchter PLLC, Washington, DC; BRETT E.
COOPER, BC Law Group, PC, New York, NY.
______________________
Before CHEN, CUNNINGHAM, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge
CUNNINGHAM.
Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge STARK.
CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judge.
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2 IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD.
Ollnova Technologies Ltd. (“Ollnova”) appeals a final
written decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board in
an inter partes review (“IPR”) brought by Copeland Com-
fort Control LP (“Copeland”) and ecobee Technologies ULC
(“ecobee”). The Board determined that claims 1, 3–8, 14,
15, and 18 of U.S. Patent No. 7,746,887 (“the ’887 patent”)
are unpatentable as obvious. Copeland Comfort Control
LP v. Ollnova Techs. Ltd., No. IPR2023-00626, 2024 WL
4362279, at *21 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 1, 2024) (“Decision”);
J.A. 47–48. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The ’887 patent is titled “Dynamic Value Reporting for
Wireless Automated Systems.” ’887 patent, at [54]. Claim
1 is illustrative and recites:
1. A wireless automation device, comprising:
a transceiver operable to wirelessly com-
municate packets of information over a
wireless network;
a sensor operable to generate a indicator
for a sensed condition;
a controller configured to poll the sensor at
a polling interval to read the indicator dur-
ing a current period of the polling interval
and to selectively operate the transceiver to
communicate information associated with
the reading of the indicator; and
a memory, the controller storing a reading
of the indicator during the current period
in the memory, where the memory stores at
least one prior reading of the indicator, the
prior reading of the indicator made during
a prior period of the polling interval,
wherein the transceiver is configured to
transmit a most recent reading of the indi-
cator stored in the memory during a period
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IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. 3
of a transmission interval in response to
detecting a change in the sensed condition
outside a predetermined range and
wherein transmission of the most recent
reading of the indicator stored in the
memory during the period of the transmis-
sion interval is suspended in response to
detecting a change in the sensed condition
within the predetermined range.
Id. col. 14 l. 48 to col. 15 l. 4; J.A. 125–26 (certificates of
correction).
The Board first construed part of the last clause of
claim 1’s final limitation, which begins “wherein the trans-
ceiver is configured to transmit.” Decision at *2, *4–6; ’887
patent col. 14 l. 63 to col. 15 l. 4 (“limitation [1.e]”). Re-
garding the second “wherein” statement of limitation [1.e],
“wherein transmission of the most recent reading of the in-
dicator stored in the memory during the period of the trans-
mission interval is suspended in response to detecting a
change in the sensed condition within the predetermined
range,” see limitation [1.e] (emphases added), the Board ob-
served that the district court in a parallel litigation had al-
ready construed that limitation as “wherein the
transmission of the most recent reading of the indicator
that would otherwise occur is stopped for the remainder of
the transmission interval in response to detecting a change
in the sensed condition within the predetermined range,”
Decision at *4 & n.8. 1 However, the Board did not adopt
1 The parallel district court case was brought by
Ollnova against ecobee, and Copeland was not a party to
that litigation. See J.A. 1920 (listing only Ollnova and
ecobee as parties in the district court’s April 10, 2023 claim
construction order). After we issued our opinion in a re-
lated appeal from the district court’s judgment, see Ollnova
Techs. Ltd. v. ecobee Techs. ULC, 177 F.4th 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2026), on remand, Ollnova and ecobee settled. See Ollnova
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4 IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD.
the district court’s construction, stating that neither party
asserted the district court’s construction. Id. at *4 n.8.
Ollnova proposed a similar, but immaterially different con-
struction from the district court’s construction, 2 and
Copeland asserted plain and ordinary meaning. Id.
at *4 n.8, *5. The Board rejected Ollnova’s proposed limi-
tation [1.e] construction, which reads, in part, “transmis-
sion of the most recent reading of the indicator that would
otherwise occur is stopped.” Decision at *4 (first emphasis
added and second emphasis modified); see id. at *5–6. The
Board instead determined that the meaning of “sus-
pended,” in the context of the ’887 patent, “encompasses
both where a transmission that would otherwise occur is
suspended by an action such as overriding a flag and where
a transmission is not made because there is no change in
an indicator or a change does not exceed a limit.” Id. at *6.
Techs. Ltd. v. ecobee Techs. ULC, 2:22-cv-00072-JRG
(E.D. Tex. filed July 14, 2026).
2 Ollnova’s proposed construction to the Board ex-
cluded “for the remainder of the transmission interval”
from the district court’s construction. Decision at *4 & n.8.
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IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. 5
Additionally, the Board determined that claim 1 was
unpatentable as obvious over Kates-711. 3 Decision at *13,
J.A. 47–48. The Board found that Kates-711 teaches limi-
tation [1.e] because “Kates-711 discloses ‘not transmitting
data that falls within a normal range’ and transmitting
data that is ‘outside the threshold’ such as ‘a high thresh-
old, a low threshold, or a high-low threshold.’” Decision
at *13 (quoting Kates-711 col. 13 ll. 14–23). The Board fur-
ther found that Figure 7 (reproduced below) “transmit re-
port” block 707 (“block 707”) in Kates-711 “corresponds to
the recited ‘a period of the transmission interval’ because
it is a period of time when ‘sensor data is . . . sent to the
monitoring computer.’” Id. at *12 (citing Kates-711 col. 15
l. 61).
The Board also found “block 707 is within an interval
of ‘periodic monitoring’ i.e., the process loop shown in
3 U.S. Patent No. 7,528,711 (“Kates-711”).
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6 IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD.
Figure 7 beginning at block 703 and comprising steps 703,
706, 707, 708, 709, 710 and back to block 703.” Id. The
Board credited expert testimony when finding Kates-711’s
“periodic monitoring” disclosed a “transmission interval”
claimed in limitation [1.e]. Id. The Board also rejected
Ollnova’s argument that block 707 cannot disclose a trans-
mission interval because block 707 does not exist when
transmission is suspended. Id. Instead, the Board found
that “block 707 is part of a loop when transmission may or
may not occur depending on whether the sensed data is
anomalous.” Id. Accordingly, the Board found that Kates-
711 teaches limitation [1.e] and determined that claims 1,
3–8, and 18 are unpatentable as obvious in light of Kates-
711 and in light of Kates-711 in combination with Hitt. 4 Id.
at *21; see also J.A. 46–48 (providing summary chart of
Board’s determinations). The Board also determined that
claims 1, 3–8, 14, 15, and 18 are unpatentable as obvious
in light of Kates-711 in combination with Littrell 5 or in
combination with both Hitt and Littrell. Decision at *21;
J.A. 46–48.
Ollnova timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo and
its fact findings for substantial evidence.” Game &
Tech. Co. v. Wargaming Grp. Ltd., 942 F.3d 1343, 1348
(Fed. Cir. 2019). “We review the Board’s claim construc-
tion de novo and any underlying factual findings for sub-
stantial evidence.” Immunex Corp. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S.
LLC, 977 F.3d 1212, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 2020). “Whether a
claimed invention is unpatentable as obvious is a question
of law that is reviewed de novo, based on underlying
4 U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. 2004/0100394
(“Hitt”).
5 U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. 2005/0246593
(“Littrell”).
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IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. 7
findings of fact reviewed for substantial evidence.” Redline
Detection, LLC v. Star Envirotech, Inc., 811 F.3d 435, 449
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
“Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” FanDuel, Inc. v. Interactive Games LLC,
966 F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “The substantial evidence standard asks
whether a reasonable fact finder could have arrived at the
agency’s decision, and involves examination of the record
as a whole, taking into account evidence that both justifies
and detracts from an agency’s decision.” OSI Pharms.,
LLC v. Apotex Inc., 939 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Ollnova 6 makes three primary arguments: (1) the
Board erred in its construction of “suspended,” Appellant’s
Br. 28–42; (2) Kates-711 does not disclose, teach, or sug-
gest a “transmission interval,” id. at 42–46; and (3) Kates-
711 does not disclose, teach, or suggest a “period of the
transmission interval” during which “transmission . . . is
suspended,” id. at 46–49. We address each argument in
turn. 7
6 We grant ecobee’s unopposed motion to withdraw
from this appeal. See ECF No. 52. Earlier, we granted
Copeland’s similar motion. See ECF Nos. 24, 25. Accord-
ingly, at the time we are deciding this case, the only party
involved is Ollnova. The prior positions of ecobee and
Copeland, as well as the prior agreement between Ollnova
and ecobee that the Board’s construction of the “sus-
pended” term was incorrect, are inoperative and of no con-
sequence for purposes of this appeal.
7 Ollnova makes arguments regarding the Board’s
claim construction and obviousness findings with respect
to claim 1 of the ’887 patent and does not make any
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8 IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD.
A.
Ollnova challenges the Board’s construction of claim
limitation [1.e] in three ways: (1) that issue preclusion
(i.e., collateral estoppel) precluded ecobee “from asserting
a claim construction of ‘suspended’ that is inconsistent
with, and cannot be reconciled with, the claim construction
from the prior adjudication,” id. at 31, in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas, id. at 28–31; (2) that the Board “disre-
gard[ed],” id. at 41, the district court’s construction, which
Ollnova insists is a correct construction, id. at 40–42; and
(3) that the Board incorrectly construed “suspended,” id.
at 32–40. As explained below, we are not persuaded.
i.
First, Ollnova argues that collateral estoppel precluded
ecobee from asserting a claim construction of “suspended”
that differs from the construction ecobee pursued in the
district court. Id. at 31. We need not decide if ecobee is
collaterally estopped, for at least two reasons. First, ecobee
is no longer a party to this appeal. Second, when it was a
party, ecobee “agree[d] with Ollnova that the [d]istrict
[c]ourt’s relevant claim construction of the ‘suspended’ lim-
itation was correct, and that the Board’s relevant claim
construction was erroneous.” Appellee’s Br. 1. As ecobee
was never advocating a position before this court that
Ollnova sought to preclude, there was never any need for
us to decide whether ecobee is collaterally estopped.
ii.
Ollnova also argues that the Board erred by disregard-
ing the district court’s construction. Appellant’s Br. 40–42.
We disagree because the Board’s claim-construction analy-
sis necessarily addressed (and rejected) both the district
arguments unique to dependent claims 3–8, 14, 15, or 18 of
the ’887 patent that the Board also found unpatentable.
See generally Appellant’s Br. 27–49; Decision at *21.
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IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. 9
court’s construction and Ollnova’s construction for “sus-
pended.”
Although the Board is not bound by a district court’s
claim construction, and has an independent obligation to
resolve claim construction disputes, the Board is obligated
to consider the district court’s construction if it is presented
by the parties. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (“Any prior
claim construction determination concerning a term of the
claim in a civil action, or a proceeding before the Interna-
tional Trade Commission, that is timely made of record in
the inter partes review proceeding will be considered.”); see
also Ethanol Boosting Sys., LLC v. Ford Motor Co.,
162 F.4th 1151, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (noting that we have
not “impose[d] a blanket rule requiring the Board to always
evaluate the merits of any prior claim constructions”).
Here the Board complied with this obligation.
The Board considered the district court’s construction,
albeit in large part via its consideration of Ollnova’s pro-
posed construction, which is immaterially different from
the district court’s construction. See Decision at *4 (observ-
ing that Ollnova “relies on statements by the district court
in the [e]cobee litigation”); see also supra n.2 (showing im-
material difference between Ollnova’s proposed construc-
tion and the district court’s construction); J.A. 330–31
(Ollnova arguing that the Board should construe “con-
sistent with” the district court’s construction). The Board
also expressly recited the district court’s construction. De-
cision at *4 n.8. To be sure, the Board gave little weight to
the district court’s construction, but, we reiterate, the
Board was not required to give it any particular weight.
We discern no error.
iii.
On the merits, Ollnova argues that the Board’s con-
struction of “suspended” in claim limitation [1.e] is incor-
rect because “suspended” should not encompass “both
(1) where a transmission that would otherwise occur is sus-
pended by an action such as overriding a flag and (2) where
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10 IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD.
a transmission is not made because there is no change in
an indicator or a change does not exceed a limit.” Appel-
lant’s Br. 32 (emphases omitted); see id. at 32–40. Ollnova
contends that the Board improperly broadened the claim
language by including the second half of the construction.
Id. at 40.
While the issue is a somewhat close issue—as illus-
trated by the fact that, at an earlier point in this appeal,
Ollnova and ecobee agreed with the district court’s nar-
rower construction of “suspended”—we ultimately agree
with the Board. Decision at *6. Thus, like the Board, we
conclude that “suspended” encompasses both: (1) “where a
transmission that would otherwise occur is suspended by
an action such as overriding a flag,” and (2) “where a trans-
mission is not made because there is no change in an indi-
cator or a change does not exceed a limit.” Id.
While the plain language of the claim may affirma-
tively support only the first of these two meanings of “sus-
pended,” it also does nothing to preclude inclusion of the
second of these meanings.
As we turn to the specification, we find that it provides
substantial support for the Board’s view that “suspended”
encompasses both meanings. Three examples from the
specification support the first half of the Board’s construc-
tion. First, the specification explains that “information
may be transmitted in response . . . to a sensed condition
being outside a predetermined range or limit. . . . Trans-
mission of information during an interval may be sus-
pended in response to an externally received control
signal.” ’887 patent, col. 2 ll. 20–26. Second, the specifica-
tion explains “[t]he transceiver may communicate the in-
formation during the transmission period in response to a
triggering event such” as detecting whether a flag has been
set, and the flags “may be set in response to detecting or
identifying a change in the sensed condition beyond a
limit.” Id. col. 10 ll. 63–67. Third, the specification de-
scribes the “counter . . . may count[ ] a number of polling
intervals when a change has been detected, such as when
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IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. 11
a flag has been set.” Id. col. 11 ll. 53–55. “When the count
reaches a maximum or a limit[,] [t]he transceiver may be
controlled to suspend the transmission of information [dur-
ing the] transmission period, until the counter reaches a
send limit.” Id. col. 11 ll. 56–59. These examples all con-
template information being suspended based on a signal,
flag, or counter, that may activate upon the detection of a
change. Accordingly, “suspended” can encompass “where a
transmission that would otherwise occur is suspended by
an action such as overriding a flag.”
We also agree with the Board that “suspended” can en-
compass “where a transmission is not made because there
is no change in an indicator or a change does not exceed a
limit.” Decision at *6. In the fourth example cited by the
Board, see id., the specification describes that “a transmis-
sion of information may be suspended for periods of a
transmission interval for which no change in the indicator
has been identified.” ’887 patent col. 3 ll. 35–37 (emphasis
added). This portion of the specification describes a sce-
nario where a transmission is not made, i.e., “suspended,”
because there is “no change in the indicator,” thereby fur-
ther explaining the patent’s understanding of this claim
term. 8
Similarly, the fifth example from the specification ana-
lyzed by the Board, see Decision at *6, states that “trans-
ceiver 216 may transmit information only during a
transmission period in which a current difference Di ex-
ceeds the difference limit Dl, and may not transmit during
intervals in which the current difference Di does not exceed
the difference limit Dl.” ’887 patent col. 11 ll. 37–41. This
example describes an embodiment similar in function to
the fourth example, discussed above, which, again, explic-
itly uses the word “suspend.” The specification further
8 The district court did not consider this passage
from the specification in its claim construction of “sus-
pended.” J.A. 1926–27.
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12 IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD.
discusses how “the processor 214 may control the trans-
ceiver 216 to suspend the transmission of information, not-
withstanding a flag being set identifying a transmission
may be pending.” Id. col. 11 ll. 8–11. “The transceiver may
also transmit information in response to a number of suc-
cessive transmission periods in which information was not
transmitted. The event also may be an absence of a value
for the sensed condition from the sensor 209.” Id. col. 11
ll. 11–15. In context, “suspend” and “may not transmit” are
used more or less interchangeably. Accordingly, “sus-
pended” can also encompass “where a transmission is not
made because there is no change in an indicator or a
change does not exceed a limit.” In sum, the Board
properly read the claim in view of the specification by rely-
ing on the specification’s repeated use of the term “sus-
pended” to inform the meaning of the same term in the
context of the claim.
B.
Ollnova further contends Kates-711 “does not disclose,
teach or suggest the claimed ‘transmission interval.’” Ap-
pellant’s Br. 42; id. at 42–46. Specifically, Ollnova argues
that the Board erroneously relies on the same process loop
in Figure 7 of Kates-711 for disclosure of both “transmis-
sion interval” and the “polling interval” limitation. Appel-
lant’s Br. 44–46. We disagree.
The Board’s finding that Kates-711 discloses the limi-
tations of claim 1, including the “transmission interval”
and “polling interval” limitations, is supported by substan-
tial evidence. Ollnova is incorrect in its assertion that the
Board conflated “polling interval” and “transmission inter-
val.” Appellant’s Br. 44. Instead, the Board found that
Kates-711 teaches the “polling interval” limitation, based
on block 706 disclosing “polling interval,” see Decision
at *8–9, while block 707 discloses the “transmission inter-
val,” id. at *11–12. Kates-711 explains that in Figure 7, if
“no fault occurs during the sleep period, then when the
specified sleep period has expired, the process enters a
block 706 where the sensor unit 102 takes a sensor reading
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IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. 13
from the sensor(s) 201. The sensor data is subsequently
sent to the monitoring computer 113 in a report block 707.”
Kates-711 col. 15 ll. 57–62. Accordingly, the Board’s find-
ing “that Kates[-711]’s report block 707 corresponds to the
recited ‘a period of the transmission interval’ because
[block 707] is a period of time when ‘sensor data is . . . sent
to the monitoring computer’” is supported by substantial
evidence. Decision at *12.
Ollnova also contends Kates-711 does not disclose “the
claimed ‘period of the transmission interval’ during which
‘transmission . . . is suspended’” limitation. Appellant’s
Br. 46; id. at 46–49. We disagree.
The Board’s finding that Kates-711 discloses limitation
[1.e] is supported by substantial evidence. See Decision
at *13. “Figure 7 [of Kates-711] shows steps 708, 709, and
710 subsequent to report block 707,” and Ollnova “conceded
at the oral hearing [before the Board] that the progression
of steps in the loop shown in Figure 7 does not stop if trans-
mission is suspended during report block 707.” Id. at *12.
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the Board’s
finding that Kates-711 discloses “wherein transmission of
the most recent reading of the indicator . . . is suspended in
response to detecting a [change] in the sensed condition
within the predetermined range.” Id. at *13.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have considered Ollnova’s remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED
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NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD.,
Appellant
______________________
2025-1512
______________________
Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2023-
00626, IPR2024-00131.
______________________
STARK, Circuit Judge, concurring.
I agree with Judge Cunningham’s opinion and join it in
full. I write separately to point out that, at the time this
appeal was argued, it appeared to present a difficult proce-
dural question: if an IPR petitioner and patent owner agree
with a district court’s construction of a previously-disputed
term in parallel litigation involving the same patent,
should we nonetheless evaluate the claim construction of
the Board de novo and, potentially, affirm based on a con-
struction that no party to the appeal is advocating? I think
this is an important, and difficult, question, and one we
may need to confront eventually.
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2 IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD.
If there had been no dispute at the Board as to the cor-
rect construction of the “suspend” term, 1 there would have
been no reason for the Board, sua sponte, to have construed
the term. See generally U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon,
Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Claim construc-
tion is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and
technical scope, to clarify and when necessary to explain
what the patentee covered by the claims, for use in the de-
termination of infringement [and invalidity].”) (emphasis
added); see also SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 366
(2018) (explaining that in an IPR the petition “guide[s] the
life” of the proceeding”).
It is not clear to me that the situation should be any
different on appeal. At the time this case was briefed and
argued before us, there was no claim construction dispute.
At that point, ecobee agreed with Ollnova that the district
court’s construction of the “suspend” term is correct and
further agreed that this appeal should be resolved by ap-
plying that construction. With no claim construction dis-
pute before us, the “party presentation” principle would
have then counseled that we not reach a non-issue. See
generally United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371,
375 (2020) (“[W]e rely on the parties to frame the issues for
decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of
matters the parties present.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The reasons for not re-evaluating the undisputed con-
struction would have been stronger here because, at the
1 In this case, there was a dispute at the Board as to
the meaning of “suspend.” Ollnova asked the Board to
adopt a slight variation of the district court’s construction,
see Court Op. at 4 n.2, while the petitioners advocated
“plain and ordinary meaning.” See ecobee Techs. ULC v.
Ollnova Techs. Ltd., No. IPR2024-00131 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 2,
2023), Paper 1 at 13-14.
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IN RE OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. 3
time this case was argued, the parallel district court litiga-
tion was ongoing. And, at that point, both parties also
wanted the district court to apply its construction of the
“suspend” term and not the Board’s broader construction.
Had we nonetheless reviewed and affirmed the Board’s dif-
ferent construction, we would have (i) decided this appeal
on grounds no one was advocating, and (ii) unraveled the
parties’ agreement that the district court case be decided
by application of the district court construction.
I do not mean to suggest that these points would have
been decisive in guiding our decision – had ecobee not sub-
sequently dropped out of this appeal, and had the district
court case not been dismissed. What we should have done
in that circumstance is, to me, a tough question. Claim
construction is a question of law, and there is something
unsettling in the notion that parties to an appeal could
craft their positions in a manner that might prevent us
from determining the correct construction. See generally
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561
U.S. 477, 545-48 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (objecting
to majority’s acceptance of parties’ agreed-upon legal con-
clusion).
In the end, because events following submission of this
case have removed any hint of these issues from this ap-
peal, and because I fully agree with the Court’s resolution
of the matters remaining before us, I join my colleagues in
affirming the Board.