Edge Systems LLC v. Cartessa Aesthetics, LLC
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket25-1119
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Case: 25-1119 Document: 62 Page: 1 Filed: 11/18/2026
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
EDGE SYSTEMS LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
CARTESSA AESTHETICS, LLC,
Defendant-Cross-Appellant
______________________
2025-1119, 2025-1190
______________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York in No. 2:20-cv-06082-GRB-
ST, Judge Gary R. Brown.
______________________
Decided: November 18, 2026
______________________
ALI S. RAZAI, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Costa
Mesa, CA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented
by JULIE S. GOLDEMBERG, Philadelphia, PA.
STEVEN P. TEPERA, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman
LLP, Austin, TX, argued for defendant-cross-appellant.
Also represented by MICHAEL H. BOROFSKY, JAMES QUAIL;
ANNE M. VOIGTS, Palo Alto, CA.
______________________
Case: 25-1119 Document: 62 Page: 2 Filed: 11/18/2026
2 EDGE SYSTEMS LLC v. CARTESSA AESTHETICS, LLC
Before PROST, HUGHES, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.
PROST, Circuit Judge.
Edge Systems LLC (“Edge”) sued Cartessa Aesthetics,
LLC (“Cartessa”) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, alleging that Cartessa infringed U.S.
Patent No. 9,550,052 (“the ’052 patent”). As relevant here,
the district court granted two motions for summary judg-
ment—one for noninfringement, the other for no invalidity.
Edge appeals as to noninfringement, and if we were to dis-
turb that judgment, Cartessa cross-appeals as to no inva-
lidity. For the reasons below, we (1) vacate the summary
judgment of noninfringement and remand for further pro-
ceedings; and (2) affirm the summary judgment of no inva-
lidity.
BACKGROUND
I
The ’052 patent concerns a system for skin treatment.
Claim 1, which is representative for present purposes, has
the following relevant elements:
a console including a manifold, the manifold being
in fluid communication with a first fluid container
and at least a second fluid container, the first fluid
container and the at least the second fluid con-
tainer being configured to contain a treatment ma-
terial for a skin treatment procedure, wherein the
treatment material comprises a liquid;
...
wherein the manifold is configured to control a flow
of treatment material from the first fluid container
and at least the second fluid container through the
supply conduit;
...
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EDGE SYSTEMS LLC v. CARTESSA AESTHETICS, LLC 3
wherein the system is configured to permit a user
to select the treatment material from the first fluid
container or the at least second fluid container to be
delivered through the supply conduit to the hand-
piece assembly.
’052 patent claim 1 (emphasis added).
II
Edge sued Cartessa in December 2020, alleging that
Cartessa infringed the ’052 patent via the accused Skin-
wave system. 1
The parties eventually cross-moved for summary judg-
ment regarding infringement. Although the parties had
previously agreed that “manifold” did not require construc-
tion and should instead just be given its plain and ordinary
meaning, their summary-judgment briefing nonetheless
exposed a disagreement over what that meaning was.
Cartessa argued that the claimed manifold must be able to
“combin[e] multiple sources into a single outlet”—that is,
draw fluid from multiple containers simultaneously so that
they are “intermix[ed] during use.” See J.A. 8292–93. Un-
der that view, it is undisputed that the Skinwave system
does not satisfy the elements of claim 1. See, e.g., Appel-
lant’s Reply Br. 12; see also J.A. 5029. Edge, however, ar-
gued that the claimed manifold was simply “a component
with one outlet and several inlets, for connecting with other
pipes.” See J.A. 8173 (cleaned up); see also J.A. 8171. Un-
der that view, Edge maintained that there was no genuine
dispute that the Skinwave system has the required mani-
fold.
1 Edge also brought infringement claims as to other
patents, but those claims were later dismissed in accord-
ance with a joint stipulation of the parties. See J.A. 12–13.
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4 EDGE SYSTEMS LLC v. CARTESSA AESTHETICS, LLC
Edge also moved for summary judgment that the
’052 patent was not invalid. It observed that Cartessa’s
only invalidity defense was anticipation over U.S. Patent
No. 6,162,232 (“Shadduck”). And it argued that no reason-
able jury could find by clear and convincing evidence that
Shadduck discloses either of two elements of claim 1: (1) a
manifold, or (2) the capability of selecting from among mul-
tiple containers of liquid treatment material.
The district court granted summary judgment of non-
infringement and of no invalidity. Edge Sys. LLC v.
Cartessa Aesthetics, LLC, No. 20-CV-6082, 2023 WL
3847138 (E.D.N.Y. June 6, 2023) (“SJ Order”).
As to noninfringement, the district court began by re-
producing Edge’s annotated image of the Skinwave system,
with the white box labeled as the manifold:
Id. at *3 (citing J.A. 1067 ¶ 23). The court further observed
that Edge did not meaningfully dispute Cartessa’s argu-
ment that Edge’s expert “remained unaware of [the white
box’s] internal structure and composition, did not detach
[it] from the console, did no destructive testing and could
not remember even touching [it].” Id.
When turning to its infringement analysis, the district
court noted the parties’ competing views on the meaning of
“manifold,” but it deemed those views irrelevant. Instead,
it concluded that Edge’s evidentiary shortcomings meant
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EDGE SYSTEMS LLC v. CARTESSA AESTHETICS, LLC 5
that, “however one might construe the functions of a man-
ifold, Edge cannot prove that the Skinwave device contains
one.” See id. at *5.
As to no invalidity, the district court concluded that no
reasonable jury could find by clear and convincing evidence
that Shadduck discloses either the “manifold” or “the mul-
tiple liquid container” elements of claim 1 of the ’052 pa-
tent. See id. at *4.
The district court entered its final judgment in accord-
ance with a stipulation of the parties. Edge timely ap-
pealed, and Cartessa timely cross-appealed. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
DISCUSSION
We review a district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment under the law of the regional circuit—here, the Sec-
ond Circuit, which reviews such grants de novo. Focus
Prods. Grp. Int’l, LLC v. Kartri Sales Co., 156 F.4th 1259,
1271 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (citing and applying Second Circuit
law). “Summary judgment is properly granted only when,
drawing all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s fa-
vor, there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.; see
also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252–55
(1986) (holding that the evidentiary standard of proof that
would apply at trial is incorporated into the summary-judg-
ment inquiry).
Infringement and anticipation are both questions of
fact. E.g., ATEN Int’l Co. v. Uniclass Tech. Co., 932 F.3d
1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2019). At trial, infringement must be
proven by a preponderance of evidence, while anticipation
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g.,
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Hospira, Inc., 933 F.3d 1320, 1328
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (infringement); Bd. of Regents of the Univ.
of Tex. Sys. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 184 F.4th 618, 624 (Fed. Cir.
2026) (anticipation).
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6 EDGE SYSTEMS LLC v. CARTESSA AESTHETICS, LLC
I
We begin with the summary judgment of noninfringe-
ment. The district court acknowledged the parties’ dispute
over the meaning of “manifold” but did not resolve that dis-
pute. Instead, the court concluded that, “however one
might construe” the term, Edge’s evidence did not create a
triable issue of infringement. See SJ Order, 2023 WL
3847138, at *5.
We disagree that construing “manifold” was unneces-
sary. Under Edge’s construction of the term—“a closed
space with several inlet pipes and one outlet,” 2 Appellant’s
Reply Br. 3–4—we believe that a reasonable jury could find
the relevant claim element(s) satisfied, at least with refer-
ence to the below image from the district court’s order:
SJ Order, 2023 WL 3847138, at *3. And as we noted above,
if instead Cartessa’s construction is adopted, Edge con-
2 Although the precise phrasing of Edge’s proposed
construction has not been entirely uniform throughout this
litigation, compare, e.g., J.A. 8171 (“a pipe or closed space
in a machine that has several openings, allowing liquids
and gases to enter and leave”), with Appellant’s Br. 25 (“a
closed space with one inlet and several outlets or one outlet
and several inlets”), we deem any differences among its rel-
evant proposals immaterial for purposes of resolving this
appeal.
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EDGE SYSTEMS LLC v. CARTESSA AESTHETICS, LLC 7
cedes that the Skinwave system does not satisfy the ele-
ments of claim 1. See, e.g., Appellant’s Reply Br. 12 (“Un-
der Cartessa’s construction the accused Skinwave device
does not have a manifold . . . .”).
A proper determination on infringement therefore re-
quires resolving—to at least some extent—the parties’
claim-construction dispute over “manifold.” Because we
conclude that the district court is better positioned to re-
solve that dispute in the first instance, we vacate the sum-
mary judgment of noninfringement and remand for it to do
so. See, e.g., UTTO Inc. v. Metrotech Corp., 119 F.4th 984,
995–96 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (exercising discretion to remand for
further proceedings on a claim-construction issue).
Although Cartessa urges us to affirm anyway, its argu-
ments for that result are unpersuasive.
First, Cartessa argues that Edge waived (or forfeited)
any ability to seek its preferred construction of “manifold”
by failing to raise the issue during claim construction. See
Cross-Appellant’s Br. 46–50. We see no waiver or forfei-
ture under the circumstances here. “[P]arties in patent
cases frequently stipulate to a construction . . . , only to
have their dispute evolve to a point where they realize that
a further construction is necessary.” GE Lighting Sols.,
LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Here, as Edge recounts—and as Cartessa does not mean-
ingfully or persuasively dispute—the divergence between
the parties’ understanding of “manifold” became apparent
only as of the deposition of Cartessa’s expert Dr. Jensen,
which came after claim construction but before summary-
judgment proceedings. See Appellant’s Br. 9–15. Edge
then raised the issue with the district court in its sum-
mary-judgment-related filings. See, e.g., J.A. 5032–33
(“The parties’ primary dispute . . . is therefore not a factual
dispute but, rather, a purely legal dispute on claim con-
struction [regarding ‘manifold’] that the [c]ourt may re-
solve on summary judgment.”); J.A. 8171 (“[T]he [c]ourt
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8 EDGE SYSTEMS LLC v. CARTESSA AESTHETICS, LLC
should reject Cartessa’s improperly narrow construction of
[c]laim 1’s ‘manifold’ limitation.”). Under these circum-
stances, we reject Cartessa’s waiver or forfeiture argu-
ment.
Second, Cartessa asks us to affirm on other alternative
grounds that the district court did not reach. For example,
Cartessa argues that (1) the Skinwave system also lacks
the claimed “fluid communication,” Cross-Appellant’s
Br. 59–64; and (2) Cartessa is not a direct infringer, be-
cause—in its view—the ’052 patent’s claims do not cover
the Skinwave system “as sold by Cartessa; rather, they
claim a system that is only completed and brought into ex-
istence, if at all,” by an end user, id. at 64–65. We decline
to take up these arguments in the first instance. Instead,
on remand, the district court may consider whether and
how to resolve them.
In remanding for further claim-construction and sum-
mary-judgment analysis, we note two principles that may
become relevant. First, a court is not bound to accept ei-
ther party’s preferred construction of a term. See, e.g.,
Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can.
(U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (courts “may
construe the claims in a way that neither party advo-
cates”); cf. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc.,
200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (observing that claim
terms need be construed “only to the extent necessary to
resolve the controversy”). Second, to whatever extent the
proper construction of “manifold” requires knowledge of in-
ternal structure or functionality (as opposed to something
externally observable or provable), Edge’s evidentiary lim-
itations will likely be that much more relevant.
II
We turn now to the summary judgment of no invalidity.
We affirm, because we conclude that no reasonable jury
could find by clear and convincing evidence that Shadduck
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EDGE SYSTEMS LLC v. CARTESSA AESTHETICS, LLC 9
discloses a system configured to let a user “select the treat-
ment material [comprising a liquid] from the first fluid con-
tainer or the at least second fluid container,” as claim 1 of
the ’052 patent requires.
At the outset, we note that it is unclear whether the
district court’s summary-judgment order relied on this “se-
lectable” ground. On the one hand, the order says—under
a heading titled “Relevant Undisputed Facts”—that
(1) Shadduck “clearly . . . does not” disclose a system “that
allows the user to select treatment liquid from multiple con-
tainers”; and (2) Edge “convincingly distinguishes” Shad-
duck as to claim 1’s “requirement of multiple selectable
fluids.” See SJ Order, 2023 WL 3847138, at *2 (emphasis
added) (cleaned up). On the other hand, the “Discussion”
section of the order references the absence of the “multiple
liquid container element,” id. at *4—seemingly conveying
that Shadduck’s problem was not so much the absence of
selectable containers, but rather, the absence of multiple
liquid containers at all. Moreover, Edge itself believes that
the district court did not reach the selectable ground. See
Appellant’s Reply Br. 58.
Regardless, even if the district court’s summary-judg-
ment order did not rely on this ground, we may affirm a
summary judgment “on a ground supported in the record
but not addressed by the district court” if we conclude that
there is no genuine issue as to a material fact. E.g., Aqua-
Tex Indus., Inc. v. Techniche Sols., 479 F.3d 1320, 1328
(Fed. Cir. 2007). And here, the record well supports that
there is no genuine issue as to whether Shadduck discloses
the selectable element.
Cartessa relies primarily on Shadduck’s trigger mech-
anism as disclosing the selectable element. Generally,
Shadduck discloses a system having a handheld device that
does three things: (1) delivers high-pressure gas to a pa-
tient’s skin; (2) delivers a cooling and abrasive fluid (often
described as a liquid with crystals) that intermixes with
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10 EDGE SYSTEMS LLC v. CARTESSA AESTHETICS, LLC
the high-pressure gas before hitting the skin; and (3) uses
negative pressure to aspirate debris from the skin for cap-
ture and removal. See, e.g., Shadduck Abstract, col. 1
ll. 26–35, col. 3 ll. 47–50, col. 4 ll. 6–64, col. 9 ll. 40–45.
Shadduck describes the trigger mechanism as follows:
[T]he trigger mechanism 88 . . . has a repose OFF
position and a 1st ON position and a 2nd ON posi-
tion. The 1st [ON] position actuates the 1st delivery
means 30 and negative pressure source 80 to
thereby jet gases through the interior chamber and
aspirate the gases. The 2nd ON position of the trig-
ger 88 actuates the 2nd delivery means 40 to deliver
cooling fluid . . . and crystal agent . . . into the gas
streams 36A–36B and against the patient’s skin
while still actuating the 1st and 2nd delivery means.
Id. at col. 10 l. 59–col. 11 l. 1 (emphasis added); see also
Cross-Appellant’s Br. 82 (quoting this portion of Shad-
duck). So, according to this disclosure, the trigger mecha-
nism has two “ON” positions. The “1st [ON] position”
actuates both (1) “delivery means 30,” 3 which Shadduck
consistently describes as a “gas positive (+) pressure
source” that “provide[s] gas inflow pressures,” see, e.g.,
Shadduck Figs. 2A–9B, col. 9 ll. 25–39 (capitalization nor-
malized), and (2) “negative pressure source 80,” which is
used for aspirating debris, see, e.g., id. at col. 10 ll. 28–41.
The “2nd ON position” actuates “delivery means 40” to de-
liver the cooling and abrasive fluid into the gas so that the
two are intermixed. See id. at col. 10 l. 64–col. 11 l. 1.
Shadduck’s trigger mechanism thus lets a user select
between gas and gas-plus-liquid. Claim 1’s selectable ele-
3 Shadduck alternatively refers to this component as
“delivery source 30.” See, e.g., Shadduck col. 9 ll. 25–28,
col. 10 ll. 56–58.
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EDGE SYSTEMS LLC v. CARTESSA AESTHETICS, LLC 11
ment, however, requires letting a user select between “liq-
uid” and “liquid” treatment materials. See ’052 patent
claim 1 (reciting “select[ing] the treatment material”—
which “comprises a liquid”—“from the first fluid container
or the at least second fluid container” (emphasis added)).
Although Cartessa maintains that Shadduck’s trigger
mechanism lets a user “activate different delivery sources,”
Cross-Appellant’s Br. 82, that alone does not satisfy claim
1’s selectable element, for the reason just noted. We con-
clude that no reasonable jury could find by clear and con-
vincing evidence that Shadduck discloses claim 1’s
selectable element, and we therefore affirm the district
court’s summary judgment of no invalidity.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we (1) vacate the summary
judgment of noninfringement and remand for further pro-
ceedings; and (2) affirm the summary judgment of no inva-
lidity.
VACATED-IN-PART, AFFIRMED-IN-PART, AND
REMANDED
COSTS
Costs to Edge.