Touchmusic Entertainment LLC v. Apple Inc.
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket25-1733
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Case: 25-1733 Document: 66 Page: 1 Filed: 11/19/2026
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
TOUCHMUSIC ENTERTAINMENT LLC,
Plaintiff
ZIKLAG IP LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
APPLE INC. AND AMAZON WEB SERVICES, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees
______________________
2025-1733, 2025-1734
______________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois in Nos. 1:24-cv-01786, 1:24-cv-
01787, Judge Steven C. Seeger.
______________________
Decided: November 19, 2026
______________________
ANDRES C. PEREIRA, Watts LLP, Austin, TX, for plain-
tiff-appellant.
KEVIN SCOTT PRUSSIA, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale
and Dorr LLP, Boston, MA, for defendant-appellee Apple
Inc. Also represented by MARK CHRISTOPHER FLEMING.
Case: 25-1733 Document: 66 Page: 2 Filed: 11/19/2026
2 TOUCHMUSIC ENTERTAINMENT LLC v. APPLE INC.
ROBERT CRUZEN, Klarquist Sparkman, LLP, Portland,
OR, for defendant-appellee Amazon Web Services, Inc.
Also represented by CAROLINE DESMOND.
______________________
Before LOURIE, STOLL, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
STOLL, Circuit Judge.
Ziklag IP LLC appeals final judgments from the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
I
On March 2, 2024, Touchmusic filed two complaints in
the Northern District of Illinois. One complaint accused
Apple Inc. of infringing U.S. Patent No. 6,182,128, and the
other accused Amazon Web Services, Inc. of infringing the
’128 patent. The district court assigned both cases to the
Honorable Steven C. Seeger.
Notably, the ’128 patent had expired nearly six years
earlier on March 5, 2018. Additionally, when Touchmusic
filed these complaints, its corporate rights were suspended
under California law, thereby prohibiting it from initiating
litigation.
This did not deter Touchmusic. Rather than dismiss-
ing the cases, on April 18, 2024, Touchmusic assigned cer-
tain rights in the ’128 patent to the newly incorporated
Ziklag. Touchmusic and Ziklag thereafter filed amended
complaints that substituted Ziklag for Touchmusic as the
plaintiff.
Apple and Amazon moved to dismiss the amended com-
plaints. Amazon argued in part that Touchmusic did not
assign Ziklag the right to sue for past damages. On
March 31, 2025, the district court granted Amazon’s mo-
tion to dismiss, agreeing that Ziklag did not receive the
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TOUCHMUSIC ENTERTAINMENT LLC v. APPLE INC. 3
right to sue for past damages—which was fatal because the
’128 patent was long expired. Ziklag IP LLC v. Amazon
Web Servs., Inc., 776 F. Supp. 3d 745, 754–55 (N.D. Ill.
2025). The district court also determined that, “[f]or the
same reasons” provided in its order granting Amazon’s mo-
tion, Ziklag’s infringement claim against Apple “fails.”
J.A. 15. The district court therefore dismissed both cases
with prejudice.
II
Amazon and Apple were not the only targets of Touch-
music’s litigation efforts—Touchmusic also accused Net-
flix, Inc. of infringing the ’128 patent in the Northern
District of Illinois. Complaint for Patent Infringement,
Ziklag IP LLC v. Netflix, Inc., No. 1:24-cv-01789, Dkt.
No. 1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2024). The district court assigned
that case to the Honorable Mary M. Rowland.
We discuss the procedural history of Netflix in Ziklag
IP LLC v. Netflix, Inc., No. 25-1960 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 19,
2026), issued concurrently with this opinion. Notably,
while the district court in that case also determined that
Touchmusic did not assign Ziklag the right to sue for past
damages, see Ziklag IP LLC v. Netflix, Inc. (“Netflix Opin-
ion”), No. 24-cv-01789, 2025 WL 904311, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 25, 2025), Ziklag did not challenge that determina-
tion on appeal. Instead, Ziklag raised only a single is-
sue: “Whether the district court abused its discretion in
denying Appellant Ziklag IP LLC the right to amend its
complaint to resubstitute prior plaintiff Touchmusic Enter-
tainment LLC as the proper plaintiff in this matter.” Ap-
pellant’s Corrected Opening Br. & Add. 2, Ziklag IP LLC
v. Netflix, Inc., No. 25-1960 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 16, 2025).
III
In view of Ziklag’s failure to challenge the assignment
determination in Netflix, we ordered the parties in this
case to “file supplemental briefs limited to addressing
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4 TOUCHMUSIC ENTERTAINMENT LLC v. APPLE INC.
whether Touchmusic and Ziklag are collaterally estopped
from arguing that the district court erred in holding that
Touchmusic did not assign Ziklag the right to sue for past
damages.” ECF No. 41 at 2. The parties filed supple-
mental briefs thereafter. ECF Nos. 53–55, 59, 62, 63.
IV
Ziklag appeals the district court’s judgments in the Ap-
ple and Amazon cases. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
DISCUSSION
Ziklag raises one issue on appeal: “Whether the trial
court erred in holding that the assignee of an expired pa-
tent cannot sue for past infringement because the written
assignment from the assignor to the assignee did not ex-
pressly state that the assignee was granted the right to sue
for past infringement.” Appellant’s Br. 1. However, we
must first determine whether collateral estoppel precludes
Ziklag from challenging the district court’s determination.
We hold that collateral estoppel applies.
The “general rule is that ‘[w]hen an issue of fact or law
is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final
judgment, and the determination is essential to the judg-
ment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent ac-
tion between the parties, whether on the same or a
different claim.’” B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus.,
Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 148 (2015) (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1980), then
referring to exceptions stated in § 28). However, collateral
estoppel does not just apply between the parties; rather,
“the loser in the first case [may be] precluded from reliti-
gating an issue even in a later action that does not involve
its first-case adversary.” Papst Licensing GMBH & Co. KG
v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 924 F.3d 1243, 1251 n.2
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (first citing Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc.
v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349–50 (1971); and
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TOUCHMUSIC ENTERTAINMENT LLC v. APPLE INC. 5
then citing XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, 890 F.3d 1282,
1295 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
“Because the application of collateral estoppel is not a
matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of this court, this
court applies the law of the circuit in which the district
court sits,” here, the Seventh Circuit. Bayer AG. v. Biovail
Corp., 279 F.3d 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Pharma-
cia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373,
1381 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Under Seventh Circuit law, col-
lateral estoppel applies where “(1) the issue sought to be
precluded is the same as that involved in a prior action;
(2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the determination
of the issue was essential to the final judgment; and (4) the
party against whom estoppel is invoked was represented in
the prior action.” Adair v. Sherman, 230 F.3d 890, 893
(7th Cir. 2000).
Apple and Amazon argue, and Ziklag does not dispute,
that factors (2)–(4) of the Seventh Circuit’s standard are
satisfied. 1 We agree with Apple and Amazon that each of
1 Ziklag refers to the Netflix Opinion as an “interloc-
utory ruling.” Appellant’s Suppl. Resp. Br. 1–2. To the ex-
tent this may be interpreted as challenging whether the
third collateral estoppel factor—“the determination of the
issue was essential to the final judgment”—is met, we dis-
agree. The Netflix district court would not have reached
the amended complaint issue if it had not first decided that
Touchmusic retained the right to sue for past damages.
Therefore, the ruling was essential to the Netflix final judg-
ment. And because Ziklag failed to challenge the district
court’s determination that Touchmusic retained the right
to sue for past damages in the Netflix appeal, that determi-
nation will be incorporated within this court’s mandate in
Netflix. See Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 166 F.3d
1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Unless remanded by this
court, all issues within the scope of the appealed judgment
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6 TOUCHMUSIC ENTERTAINMENT LLC v. APPLE INC.
these factors are met. Therefore, we consider whether the
first factor—“the issue sought to be precluded is the same
as that involved in a prior action”—has been satisfied.
According to Ziklag, this factor has not been satisfied
and “[t]he question is whether Ziklag’s failure to challenge
[the assignment determination] in the co-pending Netflix
appeal converts that proceeding into ‘prior litigation’ that
precludes this [c]ourt from deciding the issue in these ap-
peals.” Appellant’s Suppl. Opening Br. 2 (italics added).
Ziklag argues that our decisions in Innovad Inc. v. Mi-
crosoft Corp., 260 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2001) and In re Cyg-
nus Telecommunications Technology, LLC, Patent
Litigation, 536 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008) compel us to de-
termine that collateral estoppel does not apply. We disa-
gree.
In Innovad, we declined to apply collateral estoppel
where the plaintiff failed to appeal a judgment of non-in-
fringement as to one of several co-defendants sued in the
same district court case. 260 F.3d at 1334. There was “no
‘first’ or ‘second’ action for the purpose of issue preclusion,”
as appellees were only characterizing “other components of
the decision below [in the case against all defendants] as
prior litigation.” Id. Similarly, in Cygnus, the plaintiff did
not appeal a judgment against one defendant in a consoli-
dated multidistrict litigation. 536 F.3d at 1349. We de-
clined to find that the plaintiff’s claims against other
defendants in that same consolidated district court action
were precluded: “Because the multiple actions filed
against various defendants were all consolidated in a sin-
gle MDL proceeding, we believe that for purposes of analy-
sis of preclusion doctrines, the proceeding is most logically
viewed as a single, multi-defendant lawsuit.” Id.
are deemed incorporated within the mandate and thus are
precluded from further adjudication.”).
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TOUCHMUSIC ENTERTAINMENT LLC v. APPLE INC. 7
This appeal is distinguishable from Innovad and Cyg-
nus. First, the cases against Apple, Amazon, and Netflix
are not “a single, multi-defendant lawsuit.” Id. To the con-
trary, Touchmusic filed separate complaints against Apple,
Amazon, and Netflix—none of which were consolidated by
the district court. See Papst, 924 F.3d at 1251 (distinguish-
ing Cygnus on the basis that the agency proceedings were
not consolidated, but rather “were distinct ‘cases’ sepa-
rately resolved”). Second, not only were the cases not con-
solidated, but Netflix proceeded before a different judge.
Third, the Netflix district court determined the assignment
issue and dismissed Ziklag’s complaint prior to the Amazon
and Apple district court dismissals. While the Netflix dis-
trict court did not enter a final judgment until June 24,
2025, after the district court dismissed Amazon and Apple,
the Netflix assignment determination will still be incorpo-
rated within our mandate in that appeal. See supra,
note 1. 2 Fourth, while Ziklag argues that applying collat-
eral estoppel would create “the precise inefficiency Innovad
and Cygnus rejected,” Appellant’s Suppl. Resp. Br. 2,
Ziklag has not asserted that it “ask[ed] its adversaries to
waive reliance on preclusion,” thereby undermining its ef-
ficiency arguments. Papst, 924 F.3d at 1252. Thus, this
case is closer to the hypothetical discussed in Cygnus, in
which we “recognize[d] that the result would be different if
the various actions had not been consolidated in an MDL
proceeding and one of the actions had gone to judgment be-
fore the others, resulting in a judgment adverse to the
plaintiff.” Cygnus, 536 F.3d at 1350 n.1 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, all collateral estoppel factors are satisfied.
Finally, were we to decline to apply collateral estoppel
and reverse on the merits, there would be an untenable in-
consistency between this appeal and Netflix. In Netflix, the
2 Moreover, the Netflix district court entered final
judgment before Ziklag filed its opening brief here.
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8 TOUCHMUSIC ENTERTAINMENT LLC v. APPLE INC.
district court’s determination that Touchmusic retained
the right to sue for past damages is undisturbed. However,
if we consider the merits, reverse, and remand in this ap-
peal, then Ziklag would necessarily have the right to sue
for past damages. That means two entities would simulta-
neously own an undivided right to sue for past damages,
which cannot be correct and is precisely the type of incon-
sistency collateral estoppel is meant to prevent. See Allen
v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (“[R]es judicata and col-
lateral estoppel relieve parties of the cost and vexation of
multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by pre-
venting inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adju-
dication.”).
CONCLUSION
We have considered Ziklag’s remaining arguments and
find them unpersuasive. Because Ziklag is collaterally es-
topped from challenging the district court’s holding that it
cannot sue for past damages, we affirm.
AFFIRMED