Touchmusic Entertainment LLC v. Netflix, Inc.
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket25-1960
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Case: 25-1960 Document: 49 Page: 1 Filed: 11/19/2026
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
TOUCHMUSIC ENTERTAINMENT LLC,
Plaintiff
ZIKLAG IP LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
NETFLIX, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2025-1960
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois in No. 1:24-cv-01789, Judge
Mary M. Rowland.
______________________
Decided: November 19, 2026
______________________
ANDRES C. PEREIRA, Watts LLP, Austin, TX, for plain-
tiff-appellant.
RACHAEL D. LAMKIN, Baker Botts LLP, San Francisco,
CA, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by KIRA GILL,
Palo Alto, CA.
______________________
Case: 25-1960 Document: 49 Page: 2 Filed: 11/19/2026
2 TOUCHMUSIC ENTERTAINMENT LLC v. NETFLIX, INC.
Before LOURIE, STOLL, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
STOLL, Circuit Judge.
Ziklag IP LLC appeals a final order from the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
that denied Ziklag’s request to amend its complaint to re-
substitute Touchmusic Entertainment LLC as the plain-
tiff. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On March 3, 2024, Touchmusic accused Netflix, Inc. of
infringing U.S. Patent No. 6,182,128, which had expired
nearly six years earlier on March 5, 2018. However, when
Touchmusic filed the complaint, its corporate rights were
suspended under California law, thereby prohibiting it
from initiating litigation.
This did not deter Touchmusic. Rather than dismiss-
ing the case, on April 18, 2024, Touchmusic assigned cer-
tain rights in the ’128 patent to the newly incorporated
Ziklag. Touchmusic and Ziklag thereafter filed an
amended complaint that substituted Ziklag for Touchmu-
sic as the plaintiff.
Netflix moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing in part
that Touchmusic did not assign Ziklag the right to sue for
past damages. On March 25, 2025, the district court
granted the motion to dismiss, agreeing that Ziklag did not
receive the right to sue for past damages—which was fatal
because the ’128 patent was long expired. Ziklag IP LLC
v. Netflix, Inc. (“Dismissal Op.”), No. 24-cv-01789,
2025 WL 904311, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2025). How-
ever, the district court declined to dismiss the case with
prejudice. Instead, the district court set a hearing to “dis-
cuss the propriety of any attempt to file an amended com-
plaint and further briefing on Illinois law and
[Touchmusic’s] ability to initiate litigation.” J.A. 60.
Case: 25-1960 Document: 49 Page: 3 Filed: 11/19/2026
TOUCHMUSIC ENTERTAINMENT LLC v. NETFLIX, INC. 3
At the hearing, the district court stated that its pur-
pose was to hear what Ziklag had “to say in light of the
order about filing an amended complaint.” J.A. 22 ll. 14–
15. During the hearing, Ziklag argued that any issues
could be cured by re-substituting Touchmusic as the named
plaintiff because it retained the right to sue for past dam-
ages and its corporate status issue had been resolved. At
the same time, Ziklag represented that it need not amend
its complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 15(a) or Rule 17 because under Illinois law, Ziklag
could be the proper plaintiff under certain circumstances. 1
Approximately two weeks after the hearing, the dis-
trict court denied Ziklag’s request for leave to amend its
complaint to re-substitute Touchmusic. Ziklag IP LLC
v. Netflix, Inc. (“Amendment Op.”), No. 24-cv-01789,
2025 WL 1725136 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2025). The district
court explained that Ziklag and Touchmusic did not make
an “honest mistake” that required the requested substitu-
tion under Rule 17:
It is clear that the reason Touchmusic assigned the
patent to Ziklag was to avoid the lack of capacity
and relation back issues under California law
caused by Touchmusic’s suspended status. Touch-
music was suspended in California when it filed the
original complaint in this action on March 3, 2024.
California did not lift the suspension and restore
1 Relevant to this case, Rule 15(a)(2) provides that “a
party may amend its pleading only with the opposing
party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court
should freely give leave when justice so requires.”
Rule 17(a)(3) provides in relevant part that “[t]he court
may not dismiss an action for failure to prosecute in the
name of the real party in interest until, after an objection,
a reasonable time has been allowed for the real party in
interest to ratify, join, or be substituted into the action.”
Case: 25-1960 Document: 49 Page: 4 Filed: 11/19/2026
4 TOUCHMUSIC ENTERTAINMENT LLC v. NETFLIX, INC.
Touchmusic’s good standing until April 19, 2024.
Ziklag was formed as a Tennessee limited liability
company on April 18, 2024. On that same day,
Touchmusic assigned the underlying patent to
Ziklag. On May 17, 2024, Ziklag filed an amended
complaint replacing Touchmusic as the plaintiff
but otherwise making no changes to the original
complaint. The substitution of Ziklag as the plain-
tiff in this action was therefore not due to an honest
mistake but was done for tactical advantage to
avoid the issue of Touchmusic’s suspended corpo-
rate status and the impact it could have on pursu-
ing this lawsuit.
Id. at *2 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the district court
dismissed the case with prejudice.
Ziklag appeals the district court’s determination. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
DISCUSSION
There is one issue before us: whether the district court
abused its discretion in denying Ziklag leave to amend its
complaint to re-substitute Touchmusic as the plaintiff. 2
We hold that it did not.
“In review of an order denying a motion to amend, a
subject which is not unique to patent law, we look to the
law of the regional circuit,” here, the Seventh Circuit. Kal-
man v. Berlyn Corp., 914 F.2d 1473, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
The Seventh Circuit “review[s] the district court’s denial of
[a] motion to amend the complaint for abuse of discretion.”
Hall v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 469 F.3d 590, 594 (7th Cir. 2006)
2 Ziklag does not challenge the district court’s deter-
mination that Touchmusic retained the right to sue for past
damages. Dismissal Op., 2025 WL 904311, at *4–5 (dis-
missing Ziklag’s amended complaint because “Ziklag does
not have the right to sue for past infringement”).
Case: 25-1960 Document: 49 Page: 5 Filed: 11/19/2026
TOUCHMUSIC ENTERTAINMENT LLC v. NETFLIX, INC. 5
(citations omitted); see also Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc.,
962 F.2d 1043, 1045 (Fed. Cir. 1992). “Under this standard
of review we will not reverse if we merely conclude that we
would have reached a different decision if asked to consider
the issue in the first instance; rather, ‘the district court’s
decision must strike us as fundamentally wrong.’” Hall,
469 F.3d at 594 (quoting Johnson v. J.B. Hunt Transp.,
Inc., 280 F.3d 1125, 1131 (7th Cir. 2002)).
Here, the district court thoroughly explained that
Touchmusic and Ziklag did not make an “honest mistake”
leading to Ziklag’s request to file an amended complaint.
Amendment Op., 2025 WL 1725136, at *2. Because the dis-
trict court found that the proposed substitution was “not
due to an honest mistake,” i.e., but was done in bad faith,
the district court denied Ziklag leave to amend its com-
plaint. Id.
Ziklag argues that the court abused its discretion in
two ways. First, it argues that “the court did not allow
Touchmusic[3] to brief the issue on which the case was de-
cided.” Appellant’s Br. 9–10. Second, it argues that the
district court erred by “decid[ing] the case under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 17, rather than Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).” Appellant’s
Br. 10. Neither argument is persuasive.
We first reject Ziklag’s argument that it did not have
an opportunity to “brief the issue on which the case was
decided.” Appellant’s Br. 9. As an initial matter, Ziklag
had the opportunity to brief amending the complaint in re-
sponse to Netflix’s argument that no leave to amend should
be granted at the motion to dismiss stage, as the district
court discussed in its March 25, 2025 order. Dismissal Op.,
2025 WL 904311, at *5–6 (addressing Netflix’s argument
“that the amended complaint should be dismissed without
3 In its briefing, Ziklag at times interchangeably re-
fers to itself and Touchmusic.
Case: 25-1960 Document: 49 Page: 6 Filed: 11/19/2026
6 TOUCHMUSIC ENTERTAINMENT LLC v. NETFLIX, INC.
leave to amend”). Moreover, the district court’s order dis-
cussed applying Rule 17 to Ziklag’s request to amend its
complaint, thereby putting Ziklag on notice that Rule 17
was at issue. The district court also set a hearing “to dis-
cuss the propriety of any attempt to file an amended com-
plaint and further briefing on Illinois law and
[Touchmusic’s] ability to initiate litigation.” J.A. 60 (em-
phasis added). Therefore, Ziklag had ample opportunity to
address amending the complaint, and if Ziklag believed ad-
ditional briefing was necessary, it could have requested
leave to file such briefing. The record before us indicates
that it did not. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by
Ziklag’s first argument.
Next, we consider Ziklag’s argument that the district
court erred by applying Rule 17 “rather than considering
the usual factors under Rule 15 when deciding whether to
allow a party to amend a complaint.” Appellant’s Br. 10.
We also reject this argument, and Lans v. Digital Equip-
ment Corp., 252 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2001) is instructive.
In that case, the district court denied appellant’s “motion
to amend his complaint to substitute . . . (a company whose
managing director and sole shareholder [was] [appellant])
for himself as plaintiff under Rules 15 and 17 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.” Lans, 252 F.3d at 1324. The
appellant argued that the district court abused its discre-
tion. Id. at 1328. We disagreed, holding that appellant’s
“personal choices occasioned . . . the need to amend. Indeed
the trial court found that [appellant’s] original allegations
were not honest and understandable mistakes. Under these
circumstances, the district court remained well within its
broad discretion in denying [appellant’s] motion for leave
to amend his complaint” under both Rules 17 and 15. Id.
at 1328–29 (emphases added).
Here, Ziklag’s request to re-substitute Touchmusic
similarly resulted from Ziklag’s and Touchmusic’s “per-
sonal choices.” Rule 17(a)(3) “is intended to prevent forfei-
ture when determination of the proper party to sue is
Case: 25-1960 Document: 49 Page: 7 Filed: 11/19/2026
TOUCHMUSIC ENTERTAINMENT LLC v. NETFLIX, INC. 7
difficult or when an understandable mistake has been
made.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 advisory committee’s note to
1966 amendment; see also 6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur
R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1555 (3d ed. 2008) (providing that “when the
determination of the right party to bring the action was not
difficult and when no excusable mistake had been made,
then Rule 17(a)(3) is not applicable and the action should
be dismissed”). 4 We see no abuse of discretion in the dis-
trict court’s finding that Ziklag has not made an “under-
standable mistake.” As the district court found, 5 “[t]he
substitution of Ziklag as the plaintiff in this action was . . .
not due to an honest mistake but was done for tactical ad-
vantage to avoid the issue of Touchmusic’s suspended cor-
porate status and the impact it could have on pursuing this
lawsuit.” Amendment Op., 2025 WL 1725136, at *2. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in applying
Rule 17.
Ziklag’s primary complaint is that the district court
should have expressly applied the “typical Rule 15 require-
ments” for amending a complaint: “undue delay, bad faith
or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated fail-
ure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,
4 Neither party cites binding Seventh Circuit prece-
dent regarding the application of Rule 17(a)(3). However,
several district courts within the Seventh Circuit have de-
termined that Rule 17(a)(3) does not apply when there has
not been an “understandable” or “honest” mistake. See,
e.g., Wilson Pools Plus, LLC v. King, No. 3:26-cv-00169-
GCS, 2026 WL 1361579, at *2 (S.D. Ill. May 15, 2026);
Ricalday v. Bockelmann, No. 08 C 50021, 2009 WL
10859406, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 2009); Metalworking
Lubricants Co. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 460 F. Supp. 2d 897,
902 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
5 Ziklag does not challenge the district court’s fac-
tual findings.
Case: 25-1960 Document: 49 Page: 8 Filed: 11/19/2026
8 TOUCHMUSIC ENTERTAINMENT LLC v. NETFLIX, INC.
undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allow-
ance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.” Ap-
pellant’s Br. 10 (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962)). As an initial matter, Ziklag never argued to the
district court that it must analyze its request within the
framework of Rule 15—to the contrary, Ziklag suggested to
the district court that it did not “need a [Rule] 15(a) or 17
substitution” under certain circumstances. J.A. 34 l. 25–
J.A. 35 l. 1. But even if we consider Rule 15, the district
court already determined that Ziklag’s request to amend is
not the result of “an honest mistake,” but rather an attempt
to gain a “tactical advantage to avoid the issue of Touch-
music’s suspended corporate status.” Amendment Op.,
2025 WL 1725136, at *2. In other words, Ziklag’s request
to amend was made in bad faith. See Chi. Joe’s Tea Room,
LLC v. Vill. of Broadview, 94 F.4th 588, 607–08 (7th Cir.
2024) (holding that a district court “did not abuse [its] dis-
cretion in enforcing the Federal Rules of . . . Civil Proce-
dure to impose consequences” where the appellant “made a
tactical choice”); Vitrano v. United States, 643 F.3d 229,
234 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that if a Rule 15(a)(2) motion
“doesn’t pass the sniff test, i.e., reeks of bad faith or dila-
tory motive, the district court is permitted to deny it and
hold the plaintiff to his original complaint”). Accordingly,
even considering Rule 15(a), the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Ziklag leave to amend its
complaint.
CONCLUSION
We have considered Ziklag’s remaining arguments and
find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we af-
firm.
AFFIRMED