Full Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA VLSI TECHNOLOGY LLC, Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24-cv-2244 (BAH) v. Judge Beryl A. Howell U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION Pending before the Court are partial cross-motions for summary judgment challenging extensive withholdings made to a 40-page report released, in May 2026, by defendants, the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) and its component U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) (collectively, “defendants”), in response to the record request submitted nearly three years earlier, under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, by plaintiff VLSI Technology, LLC (“VLSI”). See Pl.’s Mot. Partial Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 39; Defs.’ Cross-Mot. Partial Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Cross-Mot.”), ECF No. 47; see also Pl.’s Errata to Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 9 (“USPTO May 7, 2026 Disputed Production (the Whistleblower Report)”) (the 1 “Report”) at Bates-stamp Nos. 44USPTO000728-767, ECF No. 49-10. 1 The processing of the remaining responsive records to the FOIA request is ongoing. 2 VLSI’s request for bifurcated partial summary judgment briefing on this single, fairly short Report was permitted, despite the general practice of eschewing motions for bifurcated, piecemeal summary judgment in FOIA cases, given the “troubling allegations” raised in the Report “of significant public concern” that “call into question the Patent Office’s handling of the [inter partes review (“IPR”)] proceedings, whether the rules of IPR are being applied consistently and fairly, and whether bad actors have been able to abuse the current system,” with “ramifications for all patent owners and the very integrity of the IPR system.” JSR ¶ 4 (Pl.’s Position Statement), ECF No. 38. As PTO’s declarant succinctly summarizes the Report, “[i]t alleges that Intel set up a ‘sham corporation’ called Patent Quality Assurance LLC (PQA), to file an inter partes review (IPR) before the USPTO’s Patent Trial and Appeals Board (“PTAB”), which Intel was unable to do itself, in order ‘to undermine a verdict rendered against it by a jury . . . . wherein it was ordered . . . to pay VLSI Technology $2.18 billion.’” Defs.’ Cross-Mot., Ex. B, Decl. of Caitlin Trujillo, PTO Associate Counsel for the Office of General Law (“PTO 1 The Report at issue is submitted by both VLSI and defendants. See Defs.’ Cross-Mot., Ex. 5, ECF No. 47- 5; Pl.’s Errata to Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 9, ECF No. 49-10. In addition to the Report, VLSI’s Exhibit 9 includes: (1) two- pages of transmittal emails from a Senator’s office, on January 26, 2023, to PTO’s Patents Ombuds Office, which then forwarded the Report the next day to Commerce’s Office of Inspector General. Pl.’s Errata to Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 9 (“Report Transmittal Emails”) at Bates-stamp Nos. 44USPTO000724-725, ECF No. 49-10; and (2) a two-page cover letter, dated Jan. 20, 2023, from “Anonymous” to the Chairman and Ranking Member of a committee of the House of Representatives, and a page marked “Enclosure A” for the Report, id. (“Report’s Cover Letter”) at Bates- stamp Nos. 44USPTO000726-27. Citations to Exhibit 9 will use the last three digits in the Bates-stamp number affixed to each page. 2 This case was randomly reassigned to the undersigned Judge on August 6, 2026, at which time Commerce had processed only 252 pages over eight months and had failed to conduct a supplemental search agreed to a year earlier. See Minute Order (Aug. 21, 2026); Parties’ Joint Status Report (“JSR”) ¶¶ 11, 14, ECF No. 38. Defendants are now processing records responsive to plaintiff’s FOIA request at a rate of 500 pages per month, and report that, as of October 19, 2026, PTO has 1,341 pages and Commerce has 27,334 pages remaining for processing, see JSR ¶¶ 3-5, ECF No. 56, and thus, at the current processing rate, absent further narrowing of the request, completing the processing may take up to 57 months, nearly 5 years, and be done in about 2031. 2 Decl.”) ¶ 8, ECF No. 47-3. Not included in PTO’s abbreviated summary are the Report’s further pointed critiques about shortcomings in PTO’s handling of IPR proceedings involving VLSI and Intel Corporation’s (“Intel”) patent dispute, Report at 730, 738, 765-767, and a “lack of legal oversight [that] has allowed Intel and its agents to subvert the US patent system in this way to unfairly profit on the intellectual property of others and avoid facing any consequences of infringement,” id. at 730. VLSI’s FOIA request was filed in November 2023, in the wake of four years of litigation VLSI brought against Intel for infringement of two patents that began in federal court and continued in administrative IPR proceedings before PTO. In the midst of those administrative proceedings, certain members of the U.S. Congress received the Report, titled Report – How Intel Corporation’s Legal Department Intentionally Subverts the US Patent System, accompanied by the Cover Letter, dated January 20, 2023, and signed only as “Anonymous.” Report’s Cover Letter at 726. A few days after receipt, a member of Congress forwarded this Report to PTO’s Patents Ombuds Office, describing the document as a “whistleblower complaint regarding ‘potential misconduct in an inter partes review case’” and disclaiming any knowledge about the identity of the author or “the allegations raised.” Report Transmittal Emails at 725. The Report was referred the next day to Commerce’s Office of Inspector General (“OIG”), id. at 724; PTO Decl. ¶ 16. The Report was also placed under seal on the record in the IPR proceedings, with copies sent to the parties in that administrative proceeding, including VLSI and Intel. Without consideration of the Report, PTO granted the petitions in the IPR proceedings, determining that VLSI’s patents were unpatentable, a decision that VLSI has appealed to the Federal Circuit, where the Report also remains under seal, and VLSI’s motion to that court to unseal the Report has been pending since May 2026. 3 In May 2026, defendants produced to VLSI in response to the FOIA request submitted in 2023, a heavily redacted version of the Report, with about half of the text blacked out. The parties have now cross-moved for partial summary judgment to focus on whether defendants’ redactions to the Report, pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 4, 6, and 7(C), are proper. See Pl.’s Mot.; Defs.’ Cross-Mot. A peculiar circumstance in this dispute over the withholdings under Exemptions 4, 6, and 7(C)—which protect from disclosure responsive records implicating confidential financial information or individuals’ personal privacy interests—is that the information is purportedly about Intel and another company, PQA, but those companies vociferously label this information “false,” Intel’s Amicus Curiae Brief (“Intel’s Mem.”) at 1, 2, 4, 9, 10, 12, ECF No. 44-1, and “a work of fiction,” Defs.’ Cross-Mot., Ex. C, Decl. of Truman Fenton, PQA Counsel (“PQA Decl.”) ¶ 5, ECF No. 47-4; see also PTO Decl. ¶ 9 (“Both PQA and Intel contest the validity of the allegations in this document.”). Both Intel and PQA decline to verify that any of the withheld information is correct, or even relates to their employees, members, banking activity, transactions or other financial information. Notwithstanding these disclaimers, the companies vigorously support PTO’s withholdings to the Report and accuse VLSI of “likely prepar[ing]” this document “for the purpose of forming the basis of seeking termination of the IPR proceeding,” PQA Decl. ¶ 5, “to use the court system to publish the Report so that VLSI can refer to it without incurring liability for defamation,” id., and to “mount a collateral attack on sealing decisions currently being considered by a federal court of appeals,” Intel’s Mem. at 11. For its part, VLSI does not directly address, let alone expressly deny, these accusations. See generally Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Mem.”), ECF No. 39-1; Pl.’s Reply 4 Supp. Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n Defs.’ Cross-Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 11, ECF No. 51 (“VLSI does not concede to the accuracy of any of [the PQA declarant]’s claims . . .”). Putting aside the mudslinging between VLSI and Intel/PQA, this Court agrees with defendants that, despite PQA’s and Intel’s refusal to verify the redacted information as anything other than “fiction,” PQA Decl. ¶ 5, the nature of some of the withheld information implicates confidential financial and privacy interests under FOIA Exemptions 4, 6, and 7(C). Pressing the point that “PQA’s sworn position [] that the information is false…is fatal” to defendants’ withholdings based on the exemptions invoked, Pl.’s Opp’n at 11, VLSI nonetheless raises no objection to “properly tailored redactions of bank account numbers, telephone numbers, citizenship status, or social security numbers,” id. at 3. At the same time, contrary to defendants’ view that no or only “limited public interest” can be found in releasing the withheld information, Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Partial Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) at 8, ECF No. 47-1, the Court agrees with VLSI that “the public interest is significant,” because the “Report describes allegations of misconduct that go directly to the integrity of IPR proceedings and actions by USPTO affecting public trust and confidence in the agency—and in particular an economically significant and popular adjudicative process within the agency.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 7-8. For the reasons explained more fully below, VLSI and defendants’ cross-motions for partial summary judgment are each granted in part and denied in part. I. BACKGROUND The factual background and procedural history relevant to resolving the pending cross- motions for summary judgment are set out below. 3 3 Each exhibit and submission from the parties in support of and in opposition to the pending partial summary judgment motions, totaling more than 500 pages, has been reviewed, and only those exhibits necessary to provide context for resolution of the pending motions are cited herein. 5 A. Factual Background The FOIA request at issue is one aspect of a highly contested patent infringement dispute between VSLI and Intel dating back over seven years, beginning in 2019, when VSLI sued Intel for infringement of two patents. Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 1. On March 2, 2021, a federal jury found infringement, and Intel appealed the judgment to the Federal Circuit, which, on December 4, 2023, issued a decision affirming the judgment of infringement of one of the disputed patents, but reversing the judgment of infringement on the other patent, and remanding for a new trial to determine damages for the single patent. Compl. ¶¶ 12-13 (citing VLSI Tech. LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 2022-1096 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 4, 2023)). Within two months of VLSI ’s victory at trial and while the appeal was pending, two companies, OpenSky Industries LLC (“OSI”) and PQA, were formed on April 23, 2021 and June 14, 2021, respectively. Pl.’s Errata to Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 2, PTO Decision Issuing Sanctions in OpenSky v. VLSI (Oct. 4, 2022) (“PTO OSI Decision”) at 6-9, 39, ECF No. 49-3; id., Ex. 1, PTO Decision Issuing Sanctions in PQA v. VLSI (Dec. 22, 2022) (“PTO PQA Decision”) at 50-51, ECF No. 49-2. Within weeks after their formation, each company filed petitions for IPR proceedings before the PTO, with each petition challenging the patentability of one of the two disputed patents. PTO OSI Decision at 59; PTO PQA Decision at 50-51. Intel had previously and unsuccessfully filed three such IPR petitions, challenging the patentability of the same two patents, and PTO had denied all three petitions. Compl. ¶¶ 9-10. Intel was barred from filing any more IPR petitions after a trial and jury verdict had found patentability. Id. ¶ 11. In June 2022, PTO allowed Intel to join the renewed IPR proceedings initiated by PQA’s and OSI’s petitions. See PTO PQA Decision at 13; PTO OSI Decision at 11. PTO subsequently issued, in October 2022, a decision relegating OSI “to the silent understudy role” in the IPR proceeding and sanctioning OSI for “abusive use of the IPR process,” followed, in December 2022, by PTO’s decisions dismissing PQA and OSI from 6 each proceeding and sanctioning PQA for “discovery misconduct” and “abuse of the IPR process.” PTO OSI Decision at 47; PTO PQA Decision at 4-5. PTO explained in these sanctions decisions that these two companies’ petitions had “copied extensively” from Intel’s earlier petitions, and they had refused “to produce documentation and answer interrogatories related to [their] business purpose,” and provided such “evasive” responses to interrogatories about other possible real parties in interest that they were “non-responsive.” PTO OSI Decision at 7, 24-25, 36-39; see also PTO PQA Decision at 10, 33-34, 38. 4 Despite finding uncooperative behavior warranting sanctions by PQA and OSI, PTO allowed Intel to remain as a party to prosecute the proceedings and for the IPR proceedings to continue. See PTO OSI Decision at 47; PTO PQA Decision at 5- 6. While both administrative IPR proceedings and Intel’s appeal of the infringement trial verdict to the Federal Circuit were pending, the House of Representatives’ Committee on Oversight and Accountability received the Cover Letter, dated January 20, 2023, and the Report from “Anonymous.” Pl.’s Errata to Pl.’s Mot, Ex. 9, ECF No. 49-10. The Cover Letter states that Intel sought “to undercut a federal court’s decision through covert, surreptitious, and potentially illegal means,” including “by creating straw companies to invalidate patents rather than abiding by the framework which governs patent infringement litigation passed by Congress and signed into law, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011.” Report’s Cover Letter at 726. The Cover Letter goes on to describe how the “subvert[ing]” of the “patent system” was effectuated, claiming Intel was “likely [making] false statements, misrepresentations, and material omissions 4 VLSI relies on PQA and OSI’s evasive answers to these discovery requests to state that, “[n]either PQA nor OpenSky appeared to own any patents, make any products, or be at risk of any patent lawsuit, and they appear to have been formed for the sole purpose of filing the IPRs against VLSI’s patents.” Pl.’s Mot., Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Pl.’s SUMF”) ¶ 15, ECF No. 39-3. Defendants only response is that this statement is “[i]mmaterial.” Defs.’ Cross-Mot., Ex. E, Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s SUMF (“Defs.’ Resp. SUMF”) ¶ 15, ECF No. 47-6. 7 to” PTO “in response to PTO’s “questions put forth to the company,” and using a “sham corporation [to] file[] an inter partes review before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board to challenge the validity of the patent VLSI had taken Intel to court over.” Id. Senator Thom Tillis, as a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Intellectual Property Subcommittee, forwarded the Report, in full, on January 26, 2023, to PTO’s Patents Ombuds Office, describing the Report as a “whistleblower complaint,” Report Transmittal Emails at 725, and the Report was forwarded promptly to Commerce’s OIG, id. at 724. 5 The PQA- and OSI-initiated IPR proceedings were underway before the PTAB, which indicated that “[a] copy of the [Report] has been provided to the parties, placed on the record under seal,” and that PTO “will not consider the submission.” Pl.’s Errata to Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 10, PTO Order Entering the Report in PQA v. VLSI (Feb. 3, 2023) (“PTO Report Sealing Order”) at 2, ECF No. 49-11. Several months later, in May and June 2023, PTAB issued final written decisions on the IPR petitions, ruling for each patent challenged by OSI and PQA that “the challenged claims are unpatentable.” Pl.’s Errata to Pl.’s Mot, Ex. 7, PTO Final Decision in Intel, OpenSky v. VLSI (May 12, 2023) (“PTAB OSI Final Decision”) at 2, ECF No. 49-8; id., Ex. 6, PTO Final Decision in PQA and Intel v. VLSI (June 13, 2023) (“PTAB PQA Final Decision”) at 2, ECF No. 49-7. VLSI’s appeals of both decisions are pending before the Federal Circuit. See VLSI Technology LLC v. OpenSky Industries, LLC, No. 23-2158 (Fed. Cir.) (appeal filed in July 2023, of PTAB’s decision in OSI IPR); VLSI Technology LLC v. Patent Quality Assurance LLC, No. 23-2298 (Fed. Cir.) (appeal filed in August 2023 of PTAB’s decision in PQA IPR). The Report remains under seal in the Federal Circuit, though VLSI moved, on May 19, 2026, with opposition from Intel and PQA, 5 The parties debate how to refer to the Report, with VLSI borrowing the term “whistleblower report” from the description in the email transmittal from a congressional office to PTO, Pl.’s Opp’n at 3 n.3; Pl.’s Mem. at 1, while defendants, who “take no position on whether the document in fact identifies any actual wrongdoing,” Defs.’ Opp’n at 2 n.1, refer to this document, as does the Court, as “the Report.” 8 to unseal the document after a heavily redacted version of the Report had been disclosed in response to the FOIA request at issue in this case. See VLSI Tech LLC v. Patent Quality Assurance LLC, No. 23-2298 (Fed. Cir.), ECF Nos. 168, 171, 180. B. Procedural Background Within six months of PTAB’s decisions in the IPR proceedings, VLSI submitted, on November 1, 2023, a FOIA request to PTO, including requests for the following records: 1. Memoranda from the last two years, communicated between the Department of Commerce and the USPTO, relating to patent litigation involving actual or potential private-sector recipients of government funds in connection with the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 (“CHIPS Recipients”). 2. Records from the last two years, communicated between the Department of Commerce and the USPTO, relating to USPTO proceedings or policies involving CHIPS Recipients. Compl., Ex. 5, Pl.’s 2023 FOIA Request (“2023 FOIA Request”), ECF No. 1-1. In response, PTO stated that no responsive records were identified and suggested that VLSI “submit a separate FOIA request that specifically identifies the private sector entities of interest.” Compl., Ex. 6, PTO Letter (Jan. 10, 2024) (“PTO January 2024 Letter”), ECF No. 1-1. The following month, VLSI submitted, on February 22, 2024, the operative FOIA request to defendants, which included requests for the following records: 1. Memoranda from September 1, 2022 to present, communicated between the Department of Commerce and the USPTO, relating to Intel Corporation, or generically referencing actual or potential private-sector recipients of government funds in connection with the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 (“CHIPS Recipients”). 2. Records from September 1, 2022 to present communicated between the Department of Commerce and the USPTO, relating to USPTO proceedings or policies involving Intel Corporation or other CHIPS Recipients. Compl. Ex. 7, Pl.’s 2024 FOIA Request (“2024 FOIA Request”), ECF No. 1-1. 9 After five months passed without production of any records, VLSI initiated this lawsuit on July 31, 2024. Over the next ten months, PTO advised VLSI that the estimated number of responsive records was 156 pages and, in October 2024, made a single production of seventeen pages with redactions. See JSR ¶ 2, ECF No. 8; JSR ¶ 4, ECF No. 9; JSR ¶ 5, ECF No. 10; Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.’s First Summ. J. Mem.”) at 3, ECF No. 14-1. In May 2025, VLSI moved for summary judgment, see Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 14, but, after the parties’ conferral, defendants agreed to conduct additional searches, and VLSI’s summary judgment motion was struck without prejudice, given the changing contours of issues in the case, see Min. Order (Aug. 14, 2025) (CRC). For the next eight months, between August 2025 and April 2026, PTO made a “small production” to VLSI, JSR ¶ 3, ECF No. 24, and, over VLSI’s objections, revised its search methodology to narrow the search results, JSR ¶ 6, ECF No. 26. Given PTO’s pace of processing only 167 pages of records over the four-month period between December 5, 2025 and April 6, 2026, and correlative slow pace of production, VLSI filed, on April 27, 2026, a motion to compel speedier processing such that all remaining records would be produced by May 27, 2026. Pl.’s Mot. to Compel at 1-2, ECF No. 27. On August 9, 2026, shortly after random reassignment of this case to the undersigned, VLSI’s motion to compel was granted in part and denied in part, directing, inter alia, Commerce “to process potentially responsive pages received for consultation from defendant [PTO] at a rate of at least 500 pages per month.” Min. Order (Aug. 9, 2026). VLSI then requested bifurcated summary judgment briefing, with an initial round focused on “the propriety of Defendants’ numerous redactions on [the Report].” JSR ¶¶ 2, 7, ECF No. 38. This Report had been identified as a responsive record by PTO during a July 30, 2025, supplemental search and produced to VLSI nearly one year later, on May 7, 2026, with significant redactions, including full redaction of 10 eighteen sequential pages numbered from 739 through 756. Defs.’ Cross-Mot., Ex. A, Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Defs.’ SUMF”) ¶¶ 2-4, ECF No. 47-2; see also Report at 739-756. 6 Over defendants’ objection, VLSI’s request for a bifurcated summary judgment briefing to focus on the legality of defendants’ withholdings in the Report was granted. Min. Order (Aug. 21, 2026). The parties’ cross-motions are now ripe for review. See Pl.’s Opp’n; Defs.’ Reply Supp. Cross-Mot. Partial Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Reply”), ECF No. 53. 7 6 The parties’ memoranda filed in support of the pending cross-motions are docketed twice, and to simplify citation, only one of the duplicate memoranda will be cited. For example, the memorandum and exhibits for defendants’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment are docketed at ECF Nos. 47 and 48, and only the memorandum and exhibits docketed at ECF No. 47 will be cited. Likewise, the memorandum and statement of facts for VLSI’s Reply in support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Opposition to defendants’ Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment are also docketed at ECF Nos. 50 and 51, and only the memorandum and statement of facts docketed at ECF No. 50 will be cited. 7 In addition to the pending partial cross-motions for summary judgment, Intel has moved for leave to file an amicus brief, which motion VLSI opposes and defendants consent. See Intel’s Mot. for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae Opposing VLSI’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1, ECF No. 44; Pl.’s Resp. to Intel’s Mot. for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae (“Pl.’s Amicus Opp’n”) at 1, ECF No. 52. Courts have broad discretion to permit a submission from a third-party as amici curiae, particularly where, as here, the third-party has both “relevant expertise and a stated concern for the issues at stake in this case.” District of Columbia v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 826 F. Supp. 2d 227, 237 (D.D.C. 2011) (BAH). Intel indicates the Report at issue contains “allegations against Intel…that risk reputational harm if made public,” Intel’s Mem. at 2, and though VLSI argues that “Intel is not a proper amicus curiae in this case because its interests are already fully represented by its largest owner, the Federal Government,” Pl.’s Amicus Opp’n at 1, VLSI acknowledges that Intel presents additional arguments, see id. at 4 (stating that “Intel’s brief is almost entirely redundant”). To highlight the alignment of interests between Intel and defendants, VLSI states that “[t]he Government is far and away Intel’s largest shareholder, recently having purchased $8.9 billion, or 9.9%, of Intel’s common stock,” id. at 2, and that “[p]rior to this investment, Intel engaged in extensive negotiations with the Department of Commerce to receive billions of dollars in taxpayer funding as part of the CHIPS Act, a law that was enacted at the urging of Intel,” id. at 3. Nonetheless, VLSI cannot dispute that Intel’s interest in these proceedings is obvious from just the title of the disputed Report referring to the company, such that defendants sent Intel a formal submitter notice about the Report. See PTO Decl. ¶14 (“USPTO sent PQA and Intel formal submitters notices regarding the anonymous document.”). Intel’s motion, ECF No. 44, is therefore GRANTED. Intel has cluttered the docket unnecessarily, however, with an additional amicus filing. Intel asked for leave to file a brief in reply to VLSI’s opposition, prompting yet another brief from VLSI in response to Intel’s reply, see Intel’s Mot. for Leave to File a Reply in Support of its Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae on Oct. 7, 2026, ECF No. 54; Pl.’s Opp’n to Intel’s Motion for Leave to File a Reply, ECF No. 55. Intel’s motion to file a second amicus filing is DENIED. See D.D.C. LOCAL CIVIL RULE 7 (o)(1)-(o)(2) (permitting prospective amicus to submit a motion for leave to file a brief, and any party to file an opposition to such a motion, but “[t]here shall be no further briefing unless otherwise ordered by the Court.”). 11 II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD A movant is entitled to summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Soundboard Ass’n v. FTC, 888 F.3d 1261, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“A party is entitled to summary judgment only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and judgment in the movant’s favor is proper as a matter of law.” (citation omitted)). “‘The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties’ will not defeat summary judgment; ‘the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.’” Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)). Most FOIA cases “can be resolved on summary judgment.” Brayton v. Off. of U.S. Trade Representative, 641 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 58 F.4th 1255, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (Sentelle, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he vast majority of FOIA cases can be resolved on summary judgment.” (citation omitted)). “Agencies may withhold from disclosure information that falls within one of [FOIA’s] nine enumerated exceptions,” but “[t]hose ‘limited exceptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act.’” Hum. Rts. Def. Ctr. v. U.S. Park Police, 126 F.4th 708, 712-13 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (quoting Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)). “This ‘strong presumption in favor of disclosure places the burden on the agency to justify the withholding of any requested documents.’” Id. at 713 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991)). “The agencies may carry that burden by submitting declarations attesting to the basis for the agency’s decision.” Am. First Legal Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 126 F.4th 691, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Citizens for Resp. 12 & Ethics, 58 F.4th at 1262). “In FOIA cases, ‘summary judgment may be granted on the basis of agency affidavits if they contain reasonable specificity of detail rather than merely conclusory statements, and if they are not called into question by contradictory evidence in the record or by evidence of agency bad faith.’” Aguiar v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 865 F.3d 730, 734-35 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 726 F.3d 208, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). III. DISCUSSION Defendants invoke FOIA Exemptions 4, 6, and 7(C) to justify the withholding of nearly half of the text in the Report, see Defs.’ Opp’n at 5, with almost half of the redactions referencing all three exemptions, three redactions relying only on Exemption 4 and about thirty redactions relying only on Exemptions 6 and 7. Before turning to the application of these three exemptions, two threshold issues disputed by the parties are discussed, namely: whether resolution of the pending partial cross-motions should await the Federal Circuit’s ruling on VLSI’s pending unsealing motion; and whether the unverified nature of the Report’s contents makes a difference in analyzing the application of FOIA exemptions. A. Pending Unsealing Motion In Another Court Defendants and Intel contend that a ruling on the pending cross-motions under the FOIA should await resolution of VLSI’s motion to unseal the Report pending before the Federal Circuit, see Defs.’ Opp’n at 2; Intel’s Mem. at 12-13, particularly since VLSI already has access to the full Report and questionable motives for seeking disclosure, Defs.’ Opp’n at 2. As VLSI correctly points out, however, sealing orders and FOIA disclosure requirements “are separate and distinct inquiries” and the “FOIA request giving rise to this motion has been pending for years before the Federal Circuit briefing regarding sealing.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 15 (emphasis in original). Indeed, FOIA provides federal agencies with “a significantly more lenient standard” for denying disclosure of federal agency records than does the common law standard applied to seal and restrict public 13 access to documents qualifying as judicial records, which are subject to a strong presumption of disclosure. Dhiab v. Obama, 141 F. Supp. 3d 23, 27 n.2 (D.D.C. 2015) (GK), (declining to rely on decision permitting withholding under the FOIA in resolving issue of public access to judicial records, explaining that “FOIA provides the Government with a significantly more lenient standard for denying release of records than the First Amendment.”), rev’d on other grounds by Dhiab v. Trump, 852 F.3d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2017); see CNN, Inc. v. FBI, 984 F.3d 114, 118 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (applying a “strong presumption in favor of disclosing” a “judicial record” (internal quotations and citation omitted)); accord Eil v. U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., 878 F.3d 392, 398-99 (1st Cir. 2017) (describing as “inappropriate” for district court in FOIA case to “cite[] cases that concern the public’s right to access judicial records” and “to invoke a disclosure-favoring standard based on a common law presumption divorced from the FOIA statutory framework,” explaining that “conflat[ing] the public interest in disclosure under FOIA with a public interest in accessing judicial records, [] is erroneous because FOIA does not recognize public interests unrelated to agency functions” (citation omitted)). Given the differing standards and the differing contexts, this FOIA case is on a different track regardless of how another court resolves the issue of what public access is appropriate if the Report qualifies as a judicial record. Moreover, even if VLSI has the full Report through the IPR proceedings, the fact that the Report is under seal in those proceedings means that FOIA’s purpose “to provide transparency” remains unrealized. See Wash. Laws.’ Comm. for C.R. & Urb. Affs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 145 F.4th 63, 71 (D.C. Cir. 2025). 8 As to this point, defendants and the third parties take the offensive, 8 Intel suggests VLSI could have but did not file a motion for further discovery in the IPR proceedings, presumably to verify the contents of the Report, Intel’s Mem. at 5, which suggestion seems almost laughable given the fact that OSI and PQA resisted responding to discovery requests from the PTAB itself, even incurring sanctions. See PTO PQA Decision at 4-5; see also Pl.’s Errata to Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 11, PTO Second Order Regarding the Report in PQA v. VLSI (Feb. 9, 2023) (“PTO Second Report Order”) at 3, ECF No. 49-12. 14 raising accusations about possible motives VLSI may have to seek the Report’s disclosure under the FOIA. Defendants, for example, comment that, “[i]t continues to be remarkable that Plaintiff has still failed to explain its interest in seeking production of this document under the FOIA when Plaintiff’s own filings in the Federal Circuit reveal that the Report was already produced to Plaintiff under seal.” Defs.’ Reply at 3. Yet this very statement makes clear why VLSI has turned to the disclosure requirements of FOIA since the Report remains “under seal,” id., and thereby its contents are inaccessible to the public or to publicize or use in any way. PQA’s declarant goes so far to caution that making the contents of the Report public “would be libel per se,” PQA Decl. ¶ 5, implying the concomitant risk of provoking litigation by PQA and Intel. See also id. (accusing VLSI of responsibility for preparing the Report “for the purpose of forming the basis of seeking termination of the IPR Proceeding” and “to use the court system to publish the Report so that VLSI can refer to it without incurring liability for defamation.”); Intel’s Mem. at 11 (accusing VLSI of “mount[ing] a collateral attack on sealing decisions currently being considered by a federal court of appeals”). All this mudslinging is much ado about nothing relevant here. The law is well-settled that neither the identity of the requesting party nor the intended use of the requested information is relevant in assessing an agency’s compliance with the FOIA’s disclosure obligations. Wash. Laws.’ Comm., 145 F.4th at 71-72 (FOIA “obliges agencies to make records available to ‘any person’ who files a proper FOIA request … and under most circumstances ‘the identity of the requesting party has no bearing on the merits of his or her FOIA request.’” (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 771 (1989)); Consumers’ Checkbook, Ctr. for the Study of Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 554 F.3d 1046, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“The requesting party’s intended use for the information is irrelevant to 15 our analysis.”); North v. Walsh, 881 F.2d 1088, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (summarizing that the “need or intended use for [] documents is irrelevant to [a] FOIA action”); COMPTEL v. FCC, 945 F. Supp. 2d 48, 58 (D.D.C. 2013) (RCL) (“The identity of the requester and the purpose of the request are irrelevant to whether the agency has met its own burden to justify the invocation of a FOIA exemption.”). In short, regardless of VLSI’s motives, the fact that the Report is available to VLSI under a sealing order has no bearing on defendants’ obligation to properly apply exemptions in response to a FOIA request for disclosure of the same document. Accordingly, defendants’ and Intel’s invitation for further delay by issuing a stay pending another court’s ruling on an unsealing motion is declined. B. Unverified Contents of Report At Issue None of the information contained in the Report, including the withheld information, has been verified as true, and defendants, PQA through its outside counsel’s declaration, and Intel as amicus, all take pains to avoid providing any such verification. For example, PTO’s declarant describes the withheld information as “appears to be private third-party information,” PTO Decl. ¶ 9 (emphasis added), and at least 48 times cabins references to this information as “purported,” see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 20, 23, 26 (referring to “purported members and funders of PQA,” “purported bank records,” individual’s “purported call history,” and “purported entities who invested in PQA”). Separately, in response to PTO’s invitation for “PQA to provide written views regarding whether the information withheld from the Report is confidential commercial or financial information properly withheld under [FOIA],” PQA Decl. ¶ 3, PQA’s outside counsel provides a carefully worded declaration refusing to verify any of the information in the Report, or even to separate fact from fiction, writing, “I use the qualifier ‘facially’ in this declaration to avoid inferentially confirming or denying the authenticity or accuracy of the factual statements in the Report” and 16 noting “that harm may flow from dissemination of names, account numbers, social security numbers, etc. even if, and especially if, the allegations are false.” Id. ¶ 8. PQA’s position is that “the Report is a work of fiction with a few immaterial facts sprinkled in,” id. ¶ 5, and that the “Report falsely accuses individuals of criminal activity,” id., in contrast to PTO, which does not dismiss the Report as altogether “false” or “fiction,” see generally PTO Decl., but merely unverified. Finally, Intel apparently declined PTO’s invitation to submit a sworn declaration as to its interests in nondisclosure, PTO Decl. ¶ 14 (noting PTO sent both PQA and Intel formal submitters notices), since this company opted instead to submit an amicus brief, which repeatedly characterizes the Report as “false” and “malicious,” again, like PQA, without any effort to separate facts from fiction, see generally Intel’s Mem. Although both companies with the ability to point out the specifics of what is “false” and “fiction” in the Report about their own and their employees’ actions, interactions and transactions, refuse to do so, defendants nonetheless rely on PQA’s declaration to support the invocation of Exemption 4, 6 and 7(C). Certainly, an agency may properly use declarations from third parties to support determinations about the interests of those third parties in records responsive to a FOIA request. See, e.g., Informed Consent Action Network v. Nat’l Cancer Inst., No. 24-cv-279 (JMC), 2026 WL 820804, at *5 (D.D.C. March 25, 2026) (denying summary judgment, explaining “the Court cannot determine whether the records are commercial absent more information about the basis for the declarant's knowledge of the publisher's practices, or, alternatively, a declaration from the publisher itself attesting to those practices”); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 21-cv- 1408 (APM), 2022 WL 3139003, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2022) (denying summary judgment to agency because agency ‘could have, and probably should have, obtained sworn declarations” from the relevant “third-party” (citation omitted)); Story of Stuff Project v. U.S. Forest Serv., 366 F. 17 Supp. 3d 66, 77 (D.D.C. 2019) (TNM) (government’s use of third-party decla