Jaffee v. YouTube CA6
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketH054138
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/19/26 Jaffee v. YouTube CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DAVID JAFFEE, H054138
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 25CV464599)
v.
YOUTUBE LLC,
Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff and appellant David Jaffee appeals after the trial court sustained without
leave to amend defendant and respondent YouTube LLC’s (YouTube) demurrer to
Jaffee’s first amended complaint (FAC). Jaffee alleges a competing content creator on
YouTube’s video platform filed baseless copyright takedown notices against Jaffee under
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. § 512; DMCA) and that YouTube failed
to take an appropriate action against that creator, such as terminating his account. Jaffee
argues that YouTube was contractually obligated to undertake remedial measures, and
that section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (47 U.S.C. § 230; CDA)1
does not bar his lawsuit because YouTube’s duty to act arises from contract.
We conclude that section 230 precludes Jaffee’s claims because YouTube made no
specific, individualized promise to Jaffee that it would take the steps he seeks, and
1 Undesignated statutory references are to Title 47 of the United States Code.
because the alleged duty would require YouTube to monitor third-party content. Further,
even if section 230 did not apply, Jaffee has not sufficiently alleged that he is entitled to
enforce a contractual provision that would mandate YouTube’s action, either directly or
as a third-party beneficiary, or that he has suffered any damages as a result of YouTube’s
alleged inaction.2 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND3
“YouTube … is a video-sharing service that enables its users to view, post, and
comment on video content hosted on its platform.” (Wozniak v. YouTube, LLC (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 893, 900 (Wozniak), fn. omitted.) Jaffee owns and operates a YouTube
channel called “BestStockStrategy.” Nikolas “Felix” Prehn also operates or controls
several YouTube channels, including @felixprehn, @felixfriends, Vina Maria SL, and
felixprehnreviews.
Between July 2024 and April 2025, Prehn and an agent initiated a campaign of
submitting copyright takedown notices under the DMCA against Jaffee’s videos on the
“BestStockStrategy” channel, which often contained criticism or reviews of Prehn’s
business practices.4 Each time Prehn or his agent submitted a DMCA notice, he or his
agent were required by YouTube’s submission process to check boxes affirming their
good faith belief in the claim’s validity and the accuracy of the information. They were
2 In light of our conclusions, we do not reach the parties’ additional arguments,
including those regarding standing and “good faith” content moderation.
3 This appeal arises from a demurrer. We therefore take the facts as alleged by
Jaffee from the FAC. (See Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 885
[“Because this matter comes to us on demurrer, we take the facts from plaintiff’s
complaint, the allegations of which are deemed true for the limited purpose of
determining whether [the] plaintiff has stated a viable cause of action. [Citation.]”].)
4 YouTube contends that its copyright policies comply with the DMCA safe
harbor that “protects [i]nternet service providers that terminate repeat infringers ‘in
appropriate circumstances.’ [Citation.]” (Cox Commc’ns, Inc. v. Sony Music Ent. (2026)
607 U.S. 583, 596.)
2
also required to check a box explicitly acknowledging the following statement: “I
understand that abuse of this tool will result in termination of my YouTube channel.”
Jaffee alleges that YouTube repeatedly found the DMCA notices to be baseless,
invalid, or potentially fraudulent. Despite this, YouTube failed to take any meaningful
enforcement action such as suspending filing privileges or terminating accounts. Jaffee
alleges that he and YouTube entered into a contract, YouTube’s Terms of Service (TOS),
but YouTube failed to enforce its own prohibition under the TOS against misuse of the
DMCA complaint process and failed to enforce the “ ‘abuse will result in termination’ ”
rule. Jaffee alleges the TOS “contractually obligates users not to ‘misuse any reporting,
flagging, complaint, dispute, or appeals process, including by making groundless,
vexatious, or frivolous submissions’ ”; that it “prohibits users from ‘fraudulently
[engaging]’ with the service”; and that “YouTube’s policies, incorporated into the T[O]S,
also provide for termination of users ‘in appropriate circumstances’ who are ‘repeat
infringers,’[] and state that repeated violations of Community Guidelines or Terms of
Service, or severe abuse, can lead to channel termination.”
Jaffee feared that Prehn could eventually succeed in lodging fraudulent claims that
might trigger an erroneous automated or semi-automated termination of his channel
before Jaffee could respond. To mitigate against this risk, Jaffee deleted certain
monetized videos critical of Prehn to reduce the available targets for fraudulent claims.
According to Jaffee, this decision resulted in lost advertising revenue and other related
costs of approximately $4,520.
Jaffee filed his original complaint for breach of contract and breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing against YouTube in April 2025. YouTube
demurred to the complaint in June 2025. Jaffee filed the FAC before the demurrer
hearing, again setting forth causes of action for breach of contract and breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In July, YouTube demurred to each
cause of action in the FAC on the ground that they failed to state a cause of action.
3
YouTube asserted several arguments: (1) that Jaffee lacked standing because he did not
suffer any injury caused by YouTube; (2) that the claims were barred by the CDA; (3)
that YouTube owed no duty to Jaffee and breached no provision of the TOS; (4) that
YouTube did not cause Jaffee’s damages; and (5) that any claim for damages was barred
by the Limitation of Liability provision of the TOS.
Neither side contested the trial court’s tentative ruling on the demurrer, and the
court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend in October 2025. The court
principally found that Jaffee’s claims were barred by section 230 of the CDA. The court
also determined in the alternative that Jaffee could not state a breach of contract cause of
action because the alleged contract provisions placed restrictions on users’ behavior
rather than creating affirmative obligations on the part of YouTube, and that the TOS
gave YouTube full discretion to enforce its terms, remove or allow content, and terminate
user accounts for abuse or violation of its policies.
The trial court dismissed the action with prejudice by separate order and Jaffee
timely appealed.5
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“ ‘The purpose of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of a complaint by raising
questions of law.’ [Citation.]” (Candelore v. Tinder, Inc. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1138,
1143.) “We review an order sustaining a demurrer de novo, exercising our independent
judgment as to whether a cause of action has been stated as a matter of law. [Citation.]”
(Thompson v. Ioane (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1180, 1190.) In doing so, “ ‘[w]e assume the
5 The order dismissing the case is appealable as a judgment. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 581d [“All dismissals ordered by the court shall be in the form of a written order signed
by the court and … when so filed shall constitute judgments and be effective for all
purposes”]; Moorer v. Noble L.A. Events, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 736, 741, fn. 3
[“order of dismissal, signed by the trial court and entered by the court clerk, constitutes a
judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 581d”].)
4
truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, [and] facts that reasonably can be
inferred from those expressly pleaded.’ [Citation.] But we do not assume the truth of
‘contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.’ [Citation.] We liberally construe the
complaint ‘with a view to substantial justice between the parties,’ drawing ‘all reasonable
inferences in favor of the asserted claims.’ [Citations.]” (Liapes v. Facebook, Inc.
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 910, 919.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only
allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High
School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) “[B]ecause we are reviewing the trial court’s
ruling and not its reasoning, we may affirm on any ground supported by the record
regardless of whether the trial court relied upon it. [Citation.]” (Doe v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Los Angeles (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 953, 960.)
“When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, ‘we decide whether there
is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the
trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of
discretion and we affirm.’ [Citation.] Plaintiff has the burden to show a reasonable
possibility the complaint can be amended to state a cause of action. [Citation.]”
(Hamilton v. Greenwich Investors XXVI, LLC (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1602, 1609.)
“Where, however, amendment could not correct a deficiency in the complaint or where
the action is barred as a matter of law, the demurrer is properly sustained without leave to
amend. [Citation.]” (State of California Auto. Dismantlers Assn. v. Interinsurance
Exchange (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 735, 742.) “The issue of leave to amend is always
open on appeal, even if not raised by the plaintiff. [Citation.]” (City of Stockton v.
Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 746.)
B. Section 230
Section 230 of the CDA, provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).) It states further that “[n]o
5
cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local
law that is inconsistent with this section.” (Id., subd. (e)(3).)
“Congress enacted section 230 ‘for two basic policy reasons: to promote the free
exchange of information and ideas over the [i]nternet and to encourage voluntary
monitoring for offensive or obscene material.’ [Citations.]” (Hassell v. Bird (2018)
5 Cal.5th 522, 534 (Hassell).) In service of these policies, the statute “ ‘ “immunizes
providers of interactive computer services against liability arising from content created
by third parties.” ’ [Citations.]” (Wozniak, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 907.) “An
‘interactive computer service’ is defined in the statute as ‘any information service,
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple
users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access
to the [i]nternet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational
institutions.’ (§ 230[, subd.] (f)(2).) The statute also defines ‘information content
provider’ as ‘any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation
or development of information provided through the [i]nternet or any other interactive
computer service.’ (§ 230[, subd.] (f)(3).)” (Id. at p. 908.)
Incorporating these two definitions, section 230 “ ‘ “protect[s] from liability (1) a
provider or user of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat,
under a state law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by
another information content provider.” ’ [Citations.]” (Wozniak, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th
at p. 908, fn. omitted.)
Additionally, although not all-encompassing, “section 230 immunity is broad.”
(Hassell, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 539, fn. 11; see also Carafano v. Metrosplash.com,
Inc. (9th Cir. 2003) 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 [“reviewing courts have treated § 230[, subd.]
(c) immunity as quite robust”].) “Courts have routinely rejected a wide variety of civil
claims … that seek to hold interactive computer services liable for removing or blocking
content or suspending or deleting accounts (or failing to do so) on the grounds they are
6
barred by the CDA. [Citations.]” (Murphy v. Twitter, Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 12, 27
(Murphy), fn. omitted; see also Cross v. Facebook, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 190, 207
[“numerous courts have held the CDA bars claims based on a failure to remove content
posted by others”].)
Jaffee does not appear to dispute that section 230 generally bars liability for claims
that inherently require a court to treat a defendant as the publisher or speaker of content
provided by another. Rather, he argues that the trial court erred in its application of
section 230 to his claims because “[s]ection 230 does not bar claims arising from a
platform’s own specific contractual undertakings.” Jaffee alleged in the FAC that Prehn
and his agents filed at least five separate takedown notices under the DMCA against
Jaffee’s videos on YouTube and that YouTube’s submission process included an explicit
acknowledgment: “ ‘I understand that abuse of this tool will result in termination of my
YouTube channel.’ ”6 He alleged that YouTube failed to enforce this rule and its own
TOS prohibition against misuse of the complaint process. Jaffee contends section 230
does not bar “enforcement of a specific, mandatory clickwrap undertaking after the
platform itself confirmed the triggering violation” because the duty arises from an
enforceable promise.
In making this argument, Jaffee relies heavily on Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. (9th Cir.
2009) 570 F.3d 1096 (Barnes).7 In Barnes, the plaintiff’s ex-boyfriend posted profiles of
her on a website run by Yahoo!, Inc. (Id. at p. 1098.) The profiles contained nude
photographs of the plaintiff and her ex-boyfriend, as well as a solicitation to engage in
6 Like Jaffee, we refer to this agreement as the “clickwrap.” “A ‘clickwrap’
agreement is one in which an internet user accepts a website’s terms of use by clicking an
‘I agree’ or ‘I accept’ button, with a link to the agreement readily available.” (Sellers v.
JustAnswer LLC (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 444, 463 (Sellers).)
7 “ ‘While we are not bound by decisions of the lower federal courts, even on
federal questions, they are persuasive and entitled to great weight.’ ” (Barrett v.
Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 58.)
7
sexual intercourse. (Ibid.) As a result of these actions, men whom the plaintiff did not
know contacted her at her place of employment with emails, phone calls, and personal
visits in the expectation of sex. (Ibid.) The plaintiff contacted Yahoo! in accordance
with its policy for removal of the profiles but received no response for more than a
month. (Ibid.) In anticipation of a news broadcast about the incident, however, Yahoo!’s
Director of Communications called the plaintiff and said that “she would ‘personally
walk the statements over to the division responsible for stopping unauthorized profiles
and they would take care of it.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1098–1099.) The plaintiff relied on this
statement and took no further action, but after two months passed with no follow-up, the
plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Yahoo!. (Id. at p. 1099.) She asserted a negligence-based
tort claim and a promissory estoppel claim. (Ibid.)
Discussing section 230, subdivision (c)(1), the Barnes court observed that the
statute “ensures that in certain cases an internet service provider will not be ‘treated’ as
the ‘publisher or speaker’ of third-party content for the purposes of another cause of
action.” (Barnes, supra, 570 F.3d at p. 1101, fn. omitted.) Noting that the most
frequently associated cause of action with section 230 is defamation, the court
emphasized that it is not the name of the cause of action that matters, but “whether the
cause of action inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the ‘publisher or
speaker’ of content provided by another. To put it another way, courts must ask whether
the duty that the plaintiff alleges the defendant violated derives from the defendant’s
status or conduct as a ‘publisher or speaker.’ If it does, section 230[, subdivision] (c)(1)
precludes liability.” (Id. at p. 1102.) The court stated that “publication involves
reviewing, editing, and deciding whether to publish or to withdraw from publication
third-party content.” (Ibid.)
With regard to the plaintiff’s negligence claim, which sought to impose liability on
Yahoo! for taking on a responsibility to act and therefore acquiring a duty to do so
reasonably, the Barnes court stated that the duty Yahoo! allegedly violated derived from
8
its “conduct as a publisher—the steps it allegedly took, but later supposedly abandoned,
to de-publish the offensive profiles.” (Barnes, supra, 570 F.3d at p. 1103.) This
publishing conduct mandated the application of section 230 to the negligence claim.
(Ibid.)
But the Barnes court reached a different conclusion as to the promissory estoppel
claim. The court stated that “[i]n a promissory estoppel case, as in any other contract
case, the duty the defendant allegedly violated springs from a contract—an enforceable
promise—not from any non-contractual conduct or capacity of the defendant.” (Barnes,
supra, 570 F.3d at p. 1107.) Contract liability would therefore arise not from publishing
conduct, but from an intention to be legally obligated to do something, which could
include removal of material from publication. (Id. at p. 1108.)
Barnes provided a caveat, however: “as a matter of contract law, the promise must
‘be as clear and well defined as a promise that could serve as an offer, or that otherwise
might be sufficient to give rise to a traditional contract supported by consideration.’
[Citation.]” (Barnes, supra, 570 F.3d at p. 1108.) “Thus a general monitoring policy, or
even an attempt to help a particular person, on the part of an interactive computer service
such as Yahoo[!] does not suffice for contract liability. This makes it easy for Yahoo[!]
to avoid liability: it need only disclaim any intention to be bound. [Citation.].” (Ibid.)
Courts have continued to follow the framework established by Barnes when
approaching the application of section 230 immunity to civil claims, through which the
genesis of the defendant’s duty as it relates to its status as a “publisher or speaker” must
be examined. (See Calise v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (9th Cir. 2024) 103 F.4th 732, 740
(Calise) [discussing Barnes and confirming that a court must look at both the source of a
defendant’s duty and what the duty requires the defendant to do].) For example, in Doe
v. Internet Brands, Inc. (9th Cir. 2016) 824 F.3d 846, the court analyzed “whether it
would be inconsistent with section 230[, subdivision] (c)(1) for the State of California to
require an interactive computer service provider to warn its users about the threat of a
9
known sexual predator.” (Id., at pp. 850–851.) The court concluded that the CDA did
not bar the plaintiff’s claim because she did not seek to hold the defendant liable as the
“ ‘publisher or speaker of information provided by another information content provider’
[citation],” but rather “for failing to warn her about information it obtained from an
outside source about how third parties targeted and lured victims” on a website. (Id. at
p. 851.)
In Calise, the Ninth Circuit applied the reasoning of Barnes to two contract-related
claims and three non-contract claims against Meta Platforms, Inc. arising out of
fraudulent online advertisements. (Calise, supra, 103 F.4th at pp. 740, 742–743.) The
court held that, because the two contract claims relied on “the same ‘enforceable
promises’ allegedly made by Meta to Plaintiffs,” the same duty controlled, and “Meta’s
‘[c]ontract liability’ would ‘come not from [its] publishing conduct, but from [its]
manifest intention to be legally obligated to do something.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 743.)
The court therefore concluded that “Meta’s duty arising from its promise to moderate
third-party advertisements is unrelated to Meta’s publisher status, and [section] 230[,
subdivision] (c)(1) does not apply to Plaintiffs’ contract claims.” (Ibid.) In looking at
“duty,” however, the court noted that there are two steps to the duty inquiry. (Id. at
p. 742.) In the first step, if the duty springs from “something separate from the
defendant’s status as a publisher, such as from an agreement,” then section 230 does not
apply. (Ibid.) But a court must ask a second question about what the duty requires the
defendant to do. (Ibid.) If it would require the defendant to monitor third-party content,
that too would be barred by section 230. (Ibid.)
At the same time, courts have recognized limits on the holding from Barnes that
can be implicated when a party attempts to rely on a breach of contract cause of action to
bypass the restrictions of section 230. As one court has noted, “Barnes never
suggested … that all contract or promissory estoppel claims survive CDA immunity.
[Citations.]” (Murphy, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th 12, 29.)
10
Different panels of our own court have also discussed these limits on the reach of
Barnes. In Prager University v. Google LLC (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1022 (Prager), the
plaintiff asserted that YouTube had prevented the plaintiff from “monetizing or obtaining
sponsors for over 50 of its videos by imposing advertising restrictions or by preventing
the videos from being accessed in Restricted Mode.” (Id. at p. 1029.) Among the
arguments raised, the plaintiff argued that “its contractual claim is beyond the scope of
section 230[, subdivision] (c)(1) because defendants are bound by a contractual promise
to filter content neutrally.” (Id. at p. 1037.) The plaintiff argued on appeal that
YouTube’s terms of service “impose[d] binding limitations on defendants’ activities as
publishers of information via ‘express’ ‘contractual promises.’ ” (Ibid.) In addition to
disagreeing with the plaintiff’s interpretation of the terms of service, the Prager court
stated that although “the CDA may permit a state law claim concerning publishing
activity based on a specific contractual promise, section 230 notwithstanding[,] this does
not mean that the CDA requires an express contractual reservation of publishing
discretion as condition precedent to section 230 immunity from state law claims.” (Id. at
p. 1038.)
In Wozniak, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th the plaintiffs were individuals whose names
and likenesses were used in fake videos on YouTube as part of a cryptocurrency scam, in
addition to 17 individuals who fell victim to the scam. The plaintiffs relied on Barnes,
arguing that their promissory estoppel cause of action was “based on defendants’ ‘public
and widely publicized promises about providing excellent security, protecting against
scams, ensuring the accuracy of video metrics and other video and channel information,
and using Plaintiffs’ personal non-public information and data in a responsible way.’
According to plaintiffs, their ‘quasi-contractual claims are based on breaches of duties
and promises that have nothing to do with content moderation, such as implied duties and
promises to protect Plaintiffs from known security flaws and to protect Plaintiffs’
[personal information] from misuse and wrongful disclosure.’ ” (Id. at pp. 918–919.)
11
The Wozniak court found the defendants’ alleged promises were “more akin to general
policies or statements,” rather than the type of personalized, clear, and well-defined offer
discussed in Barnes. (Id. at p. 920.) Because the court viewed the “statements as general
policies made by defendants in their capacity as publisher, rather than as specific
promises,” it concluded that “plaintiffs’ claim for promissory estoppel does not survive
section 230 immunity.” (Ibid.)
Prager and Wozniak illustrate that, when it comes to determining whether
section 230 will apply to bar a civil cause of action, a court must look not only at whether
the duty a plaintiff alleges a defendant violated derives from the defendant’s status or
conduct as a “publisher or speaker” but, to the extent a plaintiff asserts a contract-based
cause of action or an equitable cause of action based on an allegedly enforceable promise,
a court must also determine whether the defendant made a personalized and well-defined
offer (i.e., an enforceable promise). This would be in contrast to traditional editorial
decisions made by a defendant based on general statements regarding content
moderation, where there is indication that the defendant intended to maintain discretion
over decisions regarding users’ accounts and their content.
Jaffee contends that YouTube made a well-defined, enforceable promise in this
case. He argues that none of the cases discussed ante involve the same combination of
facts he alleges here: “(1) a specific, mandatory clickwrap term, (2) the platform’s own
identification of the triggering condition as met, and (3) the platform’s refusal to enforce
the mandatory consequence.” He argues further that the use of the word “ ‘will’ ” in the
DMCA clickwrap controls over more general terms in the TOS. In doing so, he
references language in the TOS stating that “ ‘YouTube reserves the right to suspend or
terminate your Google account or your access to all or part of the [s]ervice if (a) you
materially or repeatedly breach this [a]greement’ ” and that “ ‘YouTube’s policies
provide for the termination, in appropriate circumstances, of repeat infringers’ access to
the [s]ervice’ ” and that “ ‘[m]issue of the removal request … may result in the
12
suspension of your account.’ ” Jaffee contends that YouTube’s use of the word “ ‘will’ ”
in the DMCA clickwrap was a deliberate choice since it used the permissive word
“ ‘may’ ” in the TOS.
We are not persuaded. The word “will” in the clickwrap does not make
YouTube’s statement—that abuse of the DMCA tool will result in termination of a
YouTube channel—a personalized and well-defined offer. While the statement in the
clickwrap is undoubtedly more definite than the representations made in Prager or
Wozniak, it still does not rise to the level of a specific, individualized promise like the one
at issue in Barnes. Unlike the Yahoo! director’s statement made directly to the plaintiff
that she would personally notify the responsible division about the offensive content and
“ ‘they would take care of it’ ” (Barnes, supra, 570 F.3d at p. 1099), which statement the
Barnes court determined was a “manifest intention to be legally obligated to do
something” (Id. at p. 1107), the clickwrap statement was not tailored to or directed at
Jaffee or at any particular individual, but was merely part of a general form for use in the
DMCA violation reporting process. Absent a binding promise made to Jaffee directly,
YouTube’s decisions regarding whether to remove Prehn’s account or any of his videos
are more akin to traditional editorial judgments based on general statements regarding
content moderation and subject to section 230.
Further, to enforce the provision that “abuse” will result in termination, YouTube
would need to decide in each instance whether the conduct did, in fact, constitute
“abuse,” which requires an evaluation of the content of the videos to which the DMCA
notices are directed. Jaffee contends that even if Prehn had never posted a single video
on YouTube, Jaffee’s position would be unchanged; he would still assert that YouTube
must terminate accounts of users who abuse the DMCA notice process. But this position
fails to take into account that, under the facts alleged here, an investigation of abuse
requires YouTube to review and assess content posted by Jaffee and other targets of
13
DMCA notices in addition to the original source content that was purportedly
copyrighted.
Jaffee acknowledges that the TOS includes a “[n]o [w]aiver” provision, which
states: “If you fail to comply with this [a]greement and we do not take immediate action,
this does not mean that we are giving up any rights that we may have (such as the right to
take action in the future).” He argues, however, that such a clause protects a party’s right
to enforce, but does not extinguish a party’s duty to enforce. We disagree with that
interpretation. The “[n]o [w]aiver” provision is essentially a reservation of YouTube’s
right to act in the future and is evidence of YouTube’s intention to retain discretion
whether to take action or not. Although the DMCA clickwrap provision states that abuse
of the DMCA tool “will” result in account termination, such a provision inures to the
benefit of YouTube. Indeed, in the context of deciding whether a user has submitted an
improper DMCA notice after consenting to the clickwrap, only YouTube would want to
rely on and enforce the provision. By its own terms, it does not bestow a benefit to the
other party to the clickwrap, in this case Prehn (and not Jaffee), and the language does not
support the conclusion that the parties intended for YouTube to be bound by a mandatory
duty with no discretion regarding the termination of Prehn’s account. (See Santisas v.
Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 608 [when interpreting a contract, the intent of the parties
“is to be inferred, if possible, solely from the written provisions of the contract”].)
Rather, this type of statement places restrictions on users’ behavior instead of imposing
an affirmative and binding obligation on YouTube. (See Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc.
(N.D. Cal. 2016) 167 F.Supp.3d 1056, 1064 [stating that “Facebook’s Terms of Service
‘place restrictions on users’ behavior,’ they ‘do not create affirmative obligations’ ”],
affd. (9th Cir. 2017) 700 Fed.Appx. 588.)
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit itself, which authored Barnes, has stated that “[i]f
the legal duty that the defendant allegedly violated ‘obliges the defendant to “monitor
third-party content”—or else face liability—then that ... is barred’ by section 230[,
14
subdivision] (c)(1).” (California v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (9th Cir. 2026) 186 F.4th 663,
676–677; see also Calise, supra, 103 F.4th 732, 742; see also Doe v. Meta Platforms, Inc.
(9th Cir. 2026) 174 F.4th 1159, 1167 [“Asking a platform to monitor and review third-
party content goes to [s]ection 230’s core.”].) This is a separate question from the origin
of the defendant’s duty and can independently result in the application of section 230.
(Calise, at p. 742.) As we have discussed, imposing a mandatory contractual duty on
YouTube to terminate accounts in connection with the DMCA notice process would
oblige YouTube to both monitor the content of its third-party creators and take specific
action based on that monitoring or face liability. This is squarely barred by section 230
and would penalize YouTube for voluntarily monitoring content to prevent abuse of the
DMCA. (See id., at p. 739 [“Congress expressly designed [section 230] … to encourage
internet companies to monitor and remove offensive content without fear that they would
‘thereby becom[e] liable for all defamatory or otherwise unlawful messages that they
didn’t edit or delete,’ [citation].”].)
Thus, for the reasons discussed, we conclude that section 230 bars Jaffee’s breach
of contract cause of action and that the trial court correctly sustained the demurrer to that
claim.
C. Breach of Contract
Even if we were to conclude that YouTube had a duty in this case arising from its
TOS and the clickwrap (i.e. a contractual duty), and that section 230 did not apply,
Jaffee’s allegations do not state a cause of action for breach of contract. “To be entitled
to damages for breach of contract, a plaintiff must plead and prove (1) a contract,
(2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and
(4) damage to plaintiff. [Citations.]” (Walsh v. West Valley Mission Community College
Dist. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1545.)
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1. Existence of Enforceable Contract
The only mandatory contractual provision that Jaffee contends was breached is the
language in the clickwrap regarding abuse of the DMCA process. This provision does
not support a breach of contract claim both because it was not a promise made to Jaffee
and because Jaffee has not sufficiently alleged facts showing that the provision was part
of any contract between Jaffee and YouTube. (See Sellers, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 460 [“Mutual assent, or consent, of the parties ‘is essential to the existence of a
contract’ [citations], and ‘[c]onsent is not mutual, unless the parties all agree upon the
same thing in the same sense’ [citation].”)
Jaffee contends the clickwrap is part of the TOS and the TOS is a contract
between Jaffee and YouTube. In other words, Jaffee asserts he is seeking to enforce a
term of his own agreement with YouTube, not a separate contract between YouTube and
Prehn. Both the allegations of the FAC and Jaffee’s arguments on appeal explain that the
clickwrap requires users of YouTube’s DMCA notice process to click on a checkbox to
acknowledge that “ ‘abuse of this tool will result in termination of my YouTube
channel.’ ” Jaffee argues that this action of separately consenting to the clickwrap is
irrelevant because the clickwrap “is a term of the integrated [a]greement governing all
users.”
The parties dispute whether the clickwrap is actually part of the TOS. YouTube
argues that “the DMCA webforms and the acknowledgements within them are not part of
the TOS.” YouTube states that the relevant DMCA webform is accessible via hyperlink
and the TOS explicitly states that other links and references are for informational use
only and are not part of the agreement. Jaffee asserts that the DMCA webform is part of
YouTube’s copyright policies that are expressly incorporated into the TOS. He points to
YouTube’s request for judicial notice in the trial court of the copyright policies as an
admission that those policies are part of the TOS.
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We need not resolve this conflict, however, because Jaffee does not allege that he
checked the box and he therefore does not show that he ever agreed to the provision
stating that abuse of the DMCA process will result in account termination. Thus, the
allegations of the FAC do not establish the existence of mutual assent, which is essential
to contract formation. (See Herzog v. Superior Court (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1280, 1294
[“ ‘in order to establish mutual assent for the valid formation of an internet contract, a
provider must first establish the contractual terms were presented to the consumer in a
manner that made it apparent the consumer was assenting to those very terms when
checking a box or clicking on a button’ ”].)
2. Third-Party Beneficiary
In the alternative, Jaffee contends that Prehn agreed to the clickwrap and that
Jaffee is a third-party beneficiary of the agreement between YouTube and Prehn.
Assuming for purposes of appeal that the clickwrap is an enforceable contract between
YouTube and Prehn, we conclude Jaffee is not a third-party beneficiary who is entitled to
enforce such a contract.
“A contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by
him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it.” (Civ. Code, § 1559.) “[U]nder
California’s third party beneficiary doctrine, a third party — that is, an individual or
entity that is not a party to a contract — may bring a breach of contract action against a
party to a contract only if the third party establishes not only (1) that it is likely to benefit
from the contract, but also (2) that a motivating purpose of the contracting parties is to
provide a benefit to the third party, and further (3) that permitting the third party to bring
its own breach of contract action against a contracting party is consistent with the
objectives of the contract and the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties.”
(Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 817, 821.)
The second requirement is dispositive here. “The test for determining whether a
contract was made for the benefit of a third person is whether an intent to benefit a third
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person appears from the terms of the contract. [Citation.]” (Johnson v. Holmes Tuttle
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 290, 297.) Although a contract need not
be exclusively for the benefit of the third party, “ ‘[a] third party who is only incidentally
benefited by performance of a contract is not entitled to enforce it. [Citation.]’ ” (Prouty
v. Gores Technology Group (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1233.)
Because a third party can only enforce a contract expressly made for his or her
benefit, “ ‘[a]n intent to make the obligation inure to the benefit of the third party must
have been clearly manifested by the contracting parties.’ [Citation.]” (Sofias v. Bank of
America (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 583, 587.) This means that the promisor must have
understood that the promissee had such intent to benefit the third party. (Schauer v.
Mandarin Gems of Cal., Inc. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 949, 958; see also Souza v.
Westlands Water Dist. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 879, 893, italics omitted [“The point of
the third party beneficiary doctrine is to allow a third party to enforce, against a promisor,
rights running to the third party for which the promisee bargained.”].) In our view, no
language in the clickwrap indicates any intent by the parties to benefit Jaffee.
Jaffee contends that YouTube, as the drafter of the language stating that abuse will
result in account termination, is a “promisor.” That makes Prehn the “promisee” in the
transaction, and it is not logical to conclude that Prehn, as promisee, intended to give
Jaffee the right to enforce a contract that would result in the termination of Prehn’s
account. (See Goddard v. Google, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2009) 640 F.Supp.2d 1193, 1201 [no
third-party beneficiary contract is formed when a promisee obtains a promisor’s
engagement to force the promisee to satisfy its own obligation to a third party].)
Jaffee asserts that he is not suing as a third-party beneficiary of Prehn’s
acknowledgement, but that he can bri