In re: Steven Burns v. Meta Platforms, Inc.
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketSC-2026-0255
JudgeStewart, C.J.
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Rel: November 20, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027
_________________________
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_________________________
Ex parte Meta Platforms, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Steven Burns et al.
v.
Meta Platforms, Inc.)
(St. Clair Circuit Court: CV-23-900235)
STEWART, Chief Justice.
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Meta Platforms, Inc. ("Meta"), petitions this Court for a writ of
mandamus directing the St. Clair Circuit Court ("the circuit court") to
dismiss the action commenced against it by Steven Burns, Charmaine
Starnes, Sandra Garrison, David Wang, Monica Wang, Kristi Briggs-
Holley, and Heather Weaver ("the plaintiffs"). Because the circuit court
lacks personal jurisdiction over Meta, we grant the petition and issue the
writ.
Facts and Procedural History
Meta operates the social-media platform known as Facebook. Meta,
which was formerly known as "Facebook, Inc.," is a Delaware corporation
with its principal place of business located in California. In 2018, a
nationwide class action was commenced in the federal District Court for
the Northern District of California alleging that Meta had improperly
permitted Facebook users' private information to be shared with third
parties ("the class action"). See In re Facebook, Inc. Consumer Priv. User
Profile Litig., 655 F. Supp. 3d 899 (N.D. Cal. 2023). Following a proposed
settlement of the class action, the plaintiffs were permitted to opt out of
the class action.
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On October 11, 2023, the plaintiffs commenced an action in the
circuit court asserting various tort theories of recovery against Meta,
including claims of fraud, breach of privacy, conversion, the tort of
outrage, and wantonness. The factual allegations included in the
plaintiffs' complaint were consistent with the facts alleged in the class
action. The plaintiffs' generally allege that, notwithstanding Facebook's
terms of service or Facebook users' privacy settings, Meta permitted
third-party software developers to access users' personal data. The
complaint included the following allegations:
"[Meta] is a corporation organized under the laws of the State
of Delaware and which conducts business in this County and
throughout Alabama. Its principal office is located in Menlo
Park, California. Its registered agent for service in Alabama
is Corporation Service Company Inc. …
"The events giving rise to the claims made the basis of this
lawsuit arise from each Plaintiff's personal use of their
personal internet connected devices, including their cell
phone devices. Each Plaintiff's use of their personal internet
connected devices, including their cell phone devices, have
regularly taken place in St. Clair County, Alabama.
"….
"Plaintiffs are each Facebook users that each have ownership
of their mobile devices, internet-connected devices and/or
other personal internet-connected hardware devices. Each
Plaintiff maintains custody of their internet-connected device
in Alabama. [Meta] relies on Plaintiffs to operate their
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Alabama-based mobile devices and hardware devices to
'download' or otherwise allow [Meta] to place its software onto
the Plaintiff's device; i.e. an 'App'. Without Plaintiffs'
hardware device, [Meta] would have no means of distributing
its software product known as 'Facebook'. In order to convince
the Plaintiffs and other users to download Facebook, Meta has
made representations about the Plaintiff's property/data
contained on their persona devices, and made representations
that the Plaintiffs and other users have the ability to control
access and distribution of property and data when using
'Facebook'. Meta has suppressed many facts related to the
Plaintiffs and users' data. This Complaint contains
allegations that show that Meta's privacy settings were a
misrepresentation and a suppression of facts to the
Plaintiffs."
The plaintiffs alleged that Meta improperly shared the personal
information of approximately 87 million Facebook users, 1,385,169 of
which were from Alabama.
On September 2, 2025, Meta moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' action,
arguing, among other reasons, that the circuit court lacked personal
jurisdiction over Meta. In its motion, Meta argued that the plaintiffs had
not alleged any suit-related conduct by Meta in Alabama. Nor, Meta
argued, had the plaintiffs alleged any facts that could support general
personal jurisdiction in Alabama. In response to Meta's motion, each
plaintiff submitted a similarly worded affidavit stating, in part:
"I use Meta's Facebook platform usually on my personal cell
phone which is primarily located within St. Clair County. My
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data and personal information in Facebook is held in the
'Facebook App' and that App is located on my cell phone here
in Alabama. My data and personal information has been
created by me through my use, and input here in Alabama on
my personal device."
The plaintiffs also submitted documents regarding Meta's operation of a
data center in Huntsville and its plans to construct a data center in
Montgomery.
On February 27, 2026, the circuit court entered an order denying
Meta's motion to dismiss, concluding that it had specific personal
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims against Meta. This petition
followed.
Standard of Review
" ' "A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary
remedy, and is appropriate when the petitioner
can show (1) a clear legal right to the order sought;
(2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the
lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the
properly invoked jurisdiction of the court. Ex
parte Inverness Constr. Co., 775 So. 2d 153, 156
(Ala. 2000)." '
"Ex parte Gulf Health Hosps., Inc., 321 So. 3d 629, 632 (Ala.
2020)(quoting Ex parte BOC Grp., Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272
(Ala. 2001)).
" ' "[A] petition for a writ of mandamus
is the proper device by which to
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challenge the denial of a motion to
dismiss for lack of in personam
jurisdiction. See Ex parte McInnis, 820
So. 2d 795 (Ala. 2001); Ex parte Paul
Maclean Land Servs., Inc., 613 So. 2d
1284, 1286 (Ala. 1993). ' "An appellate
court considers de novo a trial court's
judgment on a party's motion to
dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction." ' Ex parte Lagrone, 839
So. 2d 620, 623 (Ala. 2002)(quoting
Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726, 729
(Ala. 2002)). Moreover, '[t]he plaintiff
bears the burden of proving the court's
personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.' Daynard v. Ness, Motley,
Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A.,
290 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2002)."
" 'Ex parte Dill, Dill, Carr, Stonbraker &
Hutchings, P.C., 866 So. 2d 519, 525 (Ala. 2003).
" ' " 'In considering a Rule 12(b)(2),
Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss for
want of personal jurisdiction, a court
must consider as true the allegations of
the plaintiff's complaint not
controverted by the defendant's
affidavits, Robinson v. Giarmarco &
Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253 (11th Cir. 1996),
and Cable/Home Communication Corp.
v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d
829 (11th Cir. 1990), and "where the
plaintiff's complaint and the
defendant's affidavits conflict, the ...
court must construe all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff."
Robinson, 74 F.3d at 255 (quoting
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Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514
(11th Cir. 1990)).' "
" 'Wenger Tree Serv. v. Royal Truck & Equip., Inc.,
853 So. 2d 888, 894 (Ala. 2002)(quoting Ex parte
McInnis, 820 So. 2d 795, 798 (Ala. 2001)).
However, if the defendant makes a prima facie
evidentiary showing that the Court has no
personal jurisdiction, "the plaintiff is then
required to substantiate the jurisdictional
allegations in the complaint by affidavits or other
competent proof, and he may not merely reiterate
the factual allegations in the complaint."
Mercantile Capital, LP v. Federal Transtel, Inc.,
193 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1247 (N.D. Ala. 2002)(citing
Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys.,
218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000)). See also
Hansen v. Neumueller GmbH, 163 F.R.D. 471,
474-75 (D. Del. 1995)("When a defendant files a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(2), and supports that motion with affidavits,
plaintiff is required to controvert those affidavits
with his own affidavits or other competent
evidence in order to survive the motion.")(citing
Time Share Vacation Club v. Atlantic Resorts,
Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1984)).'
"Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d 226, 229-30
(Ala. 2004)."
Ex parte Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 428 So. 3d 21, 24-25 (Ala.
2025). If the complaint does not allege a factual basis upon which
personal jurisdiction could be based, then there is nothing to "controvert
by affidavit," and the defendant need not make an initial evidentiary
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showing. See Ex parte Northstar Battery Co., 99 So. 3d 1204, 1207-08
(Ala. 2012) (stating that, in order to shift the evidentiary burden as to
personal jurisdiction to the defendant, the complaint must allege facts
upon which personal jurisdiction could be based), and Ex parte McNeese
Title, LLC, 82 So. 3d 670, 673-74 (Ala. 2011) (holding that the failure to
specifically allege the factual basis for the assertion of personal
jurisdiction in the complaint relieves the objecting defendant of the
burden of producing evidence negating jurisdiction).
Analysis
Alabama's long-arm rule, Rule 4.2, Ala. R. Civ. P., "extends the
personal jurisdiction of Alabama courts to the full extent permitted by
the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Alabama
Constitutions." Hiller Invs., Inc. v. Insultech Grp., Inc., 957 So. 2d 1111,
1115 (Ala. 2006). The Due Process Clause "permits a forum state to
subject a nonresident defendant to its courts only when that defendant
has established sufficient 'minimum contacts' with the forum state."
Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726, 730 (Ala. 2002) (quoting
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). "The
critical question … is whether the contacts are such that the nonresident
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defendant ' "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court" ' in the
forum state." Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
473 (1985), quoting in turn World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980)). The United States Supreme Court has
recognized two types of personal jurisdiction: general jurisdiction and
specific jurisdiction.
"Since our seminal decision in International Shoe, our
decisions have recognized two types of personal jurisdiction:
'general' (sometimes called 'all-purpose') jurisdiction and
'specific' (sometimes called 'case-linked') jurisdiction.
Goodyear[ Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown], 564 U.S.
[915,] 919 [(2011)]. 'For an individual, the paradigm forum
for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's
domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in
which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.' Id., at
924. A court with general jurisdiction may hear any claim
against that defendant, even if all the incidents underlying
the claim occurred in a different State. Id., at 919. But 'only
a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a
defendant amenable to' general jurisdiction in that State.
Daimler [AG v. Bauman], 571 U.S. [117,] 137 [(2014)].
"Specific jurisdiction is very different. In order for a
state court to exercise specific jurisdiction, 'the suit' must
'aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant's contacts with the
forum.' Id., at 127 (internal quotation marks omitted;
emphasis added); see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 472-473 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). In other
words, there must be 'an affiliation between the forum and
underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or
occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore
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subject to the State's regulation.' Goodyear, 564 U.S., at 919
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). For this
reason, 'specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of
issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy
that establishes jurisdiction.' Ibid. (internal quotation marks
omitted)."
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco
Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017).
First, the plaintiffs have not alleged facts supporting the exercise
of general personal jurisdiction over Meta in Alabama. This Court has
recognized that "conducting business in a forum -- even a substantial
amount of business -- does not necessarily subject a corporation to
general personal jurisdiction within that forum." In BNSF Railway Co.
v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. 402 (2017), the United States Supreme Court held
that a railway company, BNSF, was not "at home" in the forum state for
the purposes of general jurisdiction despite having over 2,000 miles of
railroad track and more than 2,000 employees working in the forum
state. The Court explained:
"Goodyear[ Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564
U.S. 915 (2011),] and Daimler[ AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117
(2014),] clarified that '[a] court may assert general jurisdiction
over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to
hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations
with the State are so "continuous and systematic" as to render
them essentially at home in the forum State.' Daimler, 571
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U.S., at 127 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S., at 919). The
'paradigm' forums in which a corporate defendant is 'at home,'
we have explained, are the corporation's place of incorporation
and its principal place of business. Daimler, 571 U.S., at 137;
Goodyear, 564 U.S., at 924. The exercise of general
jurisdiction is not limited to these forums; in an 'exceptional
case,' a corporate defendant's operations in another forum
'may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the
corporation at home in that State.' Daimler, 571 U.S., at 139,
n.19. We suggested that Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining
Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), exemplified such a case. Daimler,
571 U.S., at 139, n.19. In Perkins, war had forced the
defendant corporation's owner to temporarily relocate the
enterprise from the Philippines to Ohio. 342 U.S., at 447-448.
Because Ohio then became 'the center of the corporation's
wartime activities,' Daimler, 571 U.S., at 130, n.8, suit was
proper there, Perkins, 342 U.S., at 448.
"….
"BNSF, we repeat, is not incorporated in Montana and
does not maintain its principal place of business there. Nor is
BNSF so heavily engaged in activity in Montana 'as to render
[it] essentially at home' in that State. See Daimler, 571 U.S.,
at 127 (internal quotation marks omitted). As earlier noted,
BNSF has over 2,000 miles of railroad track and more than
2,000 employees in Montana. But, as we observed in Daimler,
'the general jurisdiction inquiry does not focus solely on the
magnitude of the defendant's in-state contacts.' Id., at 139, n.
20 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Rather, the inquiry 'calls for an appraisal of a corporation's
activities in their entirety'; '[a] corporation that operates in
many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.'
Id., at 140, n.20. In short, the business BNSF does in
Montana is sufficient to subject the railroad to specific
personal jurisdiction in that State on claims related to the
business it does in Montana. But in-state business, we
clarified in Daimler and Goodyear, does not suffice to permit
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the assertion of general jurisdiction over claims … that are
unrelated to any activity occurring in Montana."
BNSF, 581 U.S. at 413-14.
In this case, the plaintiffs have alleged that Meta is a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business located in California.
Although the plaintiffs allege that Meta "conducts business …
throughout Alabama," and has 1.3 million Alabama-based users, their
complaint further indicates that Meta is a social-media and social-
networking service company with tens of millions of users around the
world. The plaintiffs' allegations and evidentiary submissions do not
indicate the "exceptional case" where Meta's Alabama operations are so
substantial as to render it "at home" in an Alabama forum. Accordingly,
the circuit court does not have general jurisdiction over Meta. See
Facebook, Inc. v. K.G.S., 294 So. 3d 122, 134 (Ala. 2019) (holding that
allegation that Facebook, Inc., was "doing business" in Alabama was
insufficient to permit exercise of general jurisdiction over it).
Turning to specific jurisdiction, the plaintiffs allege that they
downloaded the Facebook app onto their mobile devices located in
Alabama and that they interacted with Facebook through their use of
that app, during which Meta improperly accessed and shared their
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personal data. The plaintiffs argue that those allegations are sufficient
for the circuit court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Meta.
"Specific jurisdiction is different [from general
jurisdiction]: It covers defendants less intimately connected
with a State, but only as to a narrower class of claims. The
contacts needed for this kind of jurisdiction often go by the
name 'purposeful availment.' Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985). The defendant, we have
said, must take 'some act by which [it] purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State.' Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). The
contacts must be the defendant's own choice and not 'random,
isolated, or fortuitous.' Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770, 774 (1984). They must show that the defendant
deliberately 'reached out beyond' its home -- by, for example,
'exploi[ting] a market' in the forum State or entering a
contractual relationship centered there. Walden v. Fiore, 571
U.S. 277, 285 (2014) (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted). Yet even then -- because the defendant
is not 'at home' -- the forum State may exercise jurisdiction in
only certain cases. The plaintiff's claims, we have often
stated, 'must arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts'
with the forum. Bristol-Myers[ Squibb Co. v. Superior Court
of Cal., San Francisco Cnty.], 582 U.S. [255,] 262 [(2017)]
(quoting Daimler[ AG v. Bauman], 571 U.S. [117,] 127
[(2014)]; alterations omitted); see, e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S.,
at 472; Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 414 (1984); International Shoe[ Co. v. State of
Washington], 326 U.S. [310,] 319 [(1945)]. Or put just a bit
differently, 'there must be "an affiliation between the forum
and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or
an occurrence that takes place in the forum state and is
therefore subject to the State's regulation." ' Bristol-Myers,
582 U.S., at 262 (quoting Goodyear[ Dunlop Tire Operations,
S.A. v. Brown], 564 U.S. [915,] 919 [(2011]).
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"These rules derive from and reflect two sets of values
-- treating defendants fairly and protecting 'interstate
federalism.' World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 293 (1980); see id., at 297-298. Our decision in
International Shoe founded specific jurisdiction on an idea of
reciprocity between a defendant and a State: When (but only
when) a company 'exercises the privilege of conducting
activities within a state' -- thus 'enjoy[ing] the benefits and
protection of [its] laws' -- the State may hold the company to
account for related misconduct. 326 U.S., at 319; see Burger
King, 471 U.S., at 475-476. Later decisions have added that
our doctrine similarly provides defendants with 'fair warning'
-- knowledge that 'a particular activity may subject [it] to the
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.' Id., at 472 (internal
quotation marks omitted); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.,
at 297 (likewise referring to 'clear notice'). A defendant can
thus 'structure [its] primary conduct' to lessen or avoid
exposure to a given State's courts. Id., at 297. And this Court
has considered alongside defendants' interests those of the
States in relation to each other. One State's 'sovereign power
to try' a suit, we have recognized, may prevent 'sister States'
from exercising their like authority. Id., at 293. The law of
specific jurisdiction thus seeks to ensure that States with
'little legitimate interest' in a suit do not encroach on States
more affected by the controversy. Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S., at
263."
Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist., 592 U.S. 351, 359-60
(2021). Furthermore,
"the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant
and the forum. Rather, it is the defendant's conduct that must
form the necessary connection with the forum State that is
the basis for its jurisdiction over him. See Burger King[ Corp.
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.], at 478 [(1985)] ('If the question is
whether an individual's contract with an out-of-state party
alone can automatically establish sufficient minimum
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contacts in the other party's home forum, we believe the
answer clearly is that it cannot.'); Kulko v. Superior Court of
Cal., City and County of San Francisco, 436 U.S. 84, 93 (1978)
(declining to 'find personal jurisdiction in a State … merely
because [the plaintiff in a child support action] was residing
there'). To be sure, a defendant's contact with the forum State
may be intertwined with his transactions or interactions with
the plaintiff or other parties. But a defendant's relationship
with a plaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an
insufficient basis for jurisdiction. See Rush[ v. Savchuk, 444
U.S. 320, 332 (1980)] ('Naturally, the parties' relationships
with each other may be significant in evaluating their ties to
the forum. The requirements of International Shoe [Co. v.
State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)], however, must be
met as to each defendant over whom a state court exercises
jurisdiction'). Due process requires that a defendant be haled
into court in a forum State based on his own affiliation with
the State, not based on the 'random, fortuitous, or attenuated'
contacts he makes by interacting with other persons affiliated
with the State. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (internal
quotation marks omitted)."
Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285-86 (2014).
Meta directs our attention to Facebook, Inc. v. K.G.S., 294 So. 3d
122 (Ala. 2019). In K.G.S., an adoptive parent sued Facebook, Inc., under
various tort theories, including negligence, wantonness, and invasion of
privacy, after Facebook, Inc., refused to remove certain "false" and
"malicious" social-media posts made by the adopted child's birth mother
following a contested adoption, even after communicating with the
adoptive parent's attorney regarding the posts. Facebook, Inc., moved to
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dismiss the action on lack-of-personal-jurisdiction grounds, noting that it
was not incorporated or headquartered in Alabama and that its website
and mobile application were available for users to access anywhere in the
world with an available internet connection. This Court held that the
suit-related conduct of Facebook, Inc., did not create a substantial
connection with Alabama sufficient for the trial court to exercise
jurisdiction over the adoptive parent's action. We reasoned:
"[W]e cannot say that K.G.S. demonstrated that Facebook's
suit-related conduct created a 'substantial connection' with
Alabama. To the extent that K.G.S. relies on the contacts
Facebook made with K.G.S. and her attorney in response to
the complaints she and her attorney filed with Facebook and
the Facebook page, those contacts are insufficient to establish
minimum contacts with Alabama. As the Supreme Court
stated in Walden[ v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014)]: '[I]t is the
defendant, not the plaintiff or third parties, who must create
contacts with the forum State.' 571 U.S. at 291, 134 S.Ct.
1115 (emphasis added). Facebook's contacts with Alabama
that were made merely in response to K.G.S.'s or her
attorney's contact with Facebook are 'precisely the sort of
"unilateral activity" of a third party that "cannot satisfy the
requirement of contact with the forum State." ' Id. at 291, 134
S.Ct. 1115 (quoting Hanson[ v. Denckla], 357 U.S. [235,] 253,
78 S.Ct. 1228 [(1958)]). Further, to the extent that Facebook's
failure to act to remove the Facebook page can be analyzed
separately from the responses it sent to K.G.S. and her
attorney, we can only conclude that this intentional conduct
was expressly aimed at K.G.S. herself, and not at Alabama as
a forum. Under Walden, this 'contact' is insufficient to
demonstrate that Facebook created a 'substantial connection'
with Alabama when it failed to act to remove the Facebook
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page. See Walden, 571 U.S. at 289, 134 S.Ct. 1115 (holding
that a defendant's intentional actions outside the forum did
not create sufficient contacts with the forum 'simply because
[the defendant] allegedly directed his conduct at plaintiffs
whom he knew had … connections [to the forum]'). Focusing,
as we must, on the suit-related contacts Facebook itself
created with Alabama -- not Facebook’s contacts with K.G.S.
or K.G.S.'s contacts with Alabama -- we must conclude that
there is an absence of suit-related conduct that creates a
substantial connection with Alabama. Thus, we must
conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment does not allow for
the exercise of specific jurisdiction over Facebook under the
particular facts of this case."
294 So. 3d at 140.
The plaintiffs argue that K.G.S. is distinguishable on its facts. They
instead point us to Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eight Jud. Dist. Ct., 592
U.S. 351 (2021). Ford involved two separate product-liability lawsuits
against Ford Motor Company ("Ford") arising from auto accidents in the
forum states. Ford moved to dismiss both actions, arguing that it had
not designed, manufactured, or sold the automobiles in the forums.
There was no dispute that Ford had purposefully availed itself of
conducting business in the forums. Indeed, it had conducted extensive
business in both forum states -- advertising, selling, and servicing the
same model vehicles that the suits claimed had been defective. Rather,
the question was whether those contacts were sufficiently related to the
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claims at issue to permit the exercise of specific jurisdiction by the
forums. The United State Supreme Court held that they did. The Court
reasoned that Ford's forum activities had created a demand for Ford
vehicles in the forum states and had fostered an active resale market for
its older models.
"In other words, Ford has systematically served a market in
Montana and Minnesota for the very vehicles that the
plaintiffs allege malfunctioned and injured them in those
states. So there is a strong 'relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation' -- the 'essential
foundation' of specific jurisdiction. Helicopteros[ Nacionales
de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall], 466 U.S. [408,] 414 [(1984)]
(internal quotation marks omitted)."
Ford, 592 U.S. at 365-66. Accordingly, the Court in Ford concluded that
"the 'relationship among the defendant, the forum[s], and the litigation'
… is close enough to support specific jurisdiction," Id. at 371 (quoting
Walden, 571 U.S. at 284).
Similarly, in Sawyer v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 412 So. 3d 603
(Ala. 2024), this Court held that a plaintiff's allegations that the
defendant tire manufacturer had marketed, advertised, and distributed
in Alabama the same model tire that had injured the plaintiff in Alabama
was sufficient to defeat the tire manufacturer's motion to dismiss the
plaintiff's product-defect claim for lack of specific personal jurisdiction.
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In this case, the plaintiffs argue that the Facebook app that they
downloaded to their personal devices is analogous to the defective
vehicles in Ford or the tire in Sawyer. Further, they contend that the
1.3+ million affected Alabama users indicate that Meta has "served the
[Alabama] market." Thus, they contend that, applying Ford and Sawyer,
the jurisdictional allegations in this case, taken as true, are sufficient for
the circuit court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction.
The facts in Ford and Sawyer, however, demonstrated a far
stronger set of suit-related contacts with the forums. The defendants in
those cases maintained in-state dealer networks and extensively
marketed, sold, and/or serviced the allegedly defective products in the
forum states for the purpose of generating demand for their products in
the forum. The jurisdictional averments in this case do not allege
similarly strong purposeful connections to Alabama -- for instance, there
are no allegations that Meta marketed or promoted the Facebook app in
Alabama or that it otherwise sought to specifically exploit the Alabama
market. Indeed, there are no allegations in the complaint that Meta
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directed any suit-related conduct specifically at Alabama.1 Rather, as the
plaintiffs' complaint indicates, Meta offered its software application for
download to anyone in the country (or world),2 and it interacted with
those users, wherever they were, through that software. In other words,
Meta's actions appear to have been aimed at its users, not at Alabama as
a forum. See K.G.S., 294 So. 3d at 140 (holding that Facebook's
intentional conduct aimed at individual defendant in Alabama, and not
at Alabama as a forum, was insufficient to support specific jurisdiction);
Walden, 571 U.S. at 285 (holding that "[t]he plaintiff cannot be the only
link between the defendant and the forum"); and Fidrych v. Marriott
Int'l, Inc., 952 F.3d 124 (4th Cir. 2020) ("[E]ven through Marriott's
website is interactive, Marriott does not use it to target South Carolina
residents in particular. The general availability of the website to South
1Meta's placement of data centers in Alabama appears to have
occurred after the events alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint, and the
plaintiffs have not offered any allegations or evidence tying those data
centers to the improper-data-sharing claims.
2The complaint contained a chart providing a state-by-state count
of Facebook users whose personal data was alleged to have been
improperly shared with a third party. That chart indicated a substantial
number of affected users in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.
Another chart in the complaint listed the number of affected users by
country.
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Carolina residents thus does not create a substantial connection to South
Carolina necessary to support the exercise of jurisdiction." (citation
modified)). In short, the plaintiffs have not alleged a "strong 'relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation' -- the 'essential
foundation' of specific jurisdiction." Ford, 592 U.S. at 365. Accordingly,
the plaintiffs' allegations do not support the circuit court's exercise of
specific jurisdiction over Meta. See also Pete v. Facebook Data Breach,
1:25-CV-00245-MAC-CLS, Sept. 15, 2025 (E.D. Tex 2025) (not reported
in Federal Supplement) (holding that Texas court did not have specific
jurisdiction in case alleging private-data-sharing claims against
Facebook because its "collection and monetization of its users' data … is
not 'targeted specifically to Texas' " (citation modified)); Hasson v.
FullStory, Inc., 114 F.4th 181 (3d Cir. 2024) (finding no specific
jurisdiction over claims that defendant's website improperly mined user
data when defendant did not expressly aim website at Pennsylvania);
Rosenthal v. Bloomingdales.com, LLC, 101 F.4th 90, 97 (1st Cir. 2024)
(finding no specific jurisdiction when plaintiff failed to provide proof that
defendant purposefully targeted its data-tracking website toward users
in Massachusetts); but see State of Vermont v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 221
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Vt. 493, 346 A.3d 489 (2025) (finding specific personal jurisdiction existed
in Vermont when state alleged that Meta purposefully cultivated the
Vermont market for its Instagram social-media application, including
conducting studies directed at the Vermont market, selling advertising
to Vermont businesses intended to reach Vermont users, and tracking
online engagement with Vermont users for purpose of selling
advertising).
Conclusion
The plaintiffs' jurisdictional allegations in this case do not support
the exercise of general or specific personal jurisdiction over Meta.
Therefore, the plaintiffs' action against Meta is due to be dismissed.
Because we conclude that the claims against Meta are due to be
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, we do not address Meta's
alternative argument that dismissal was also warranted on the basis of
an outbound forum-selection clause.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Wise, Mendheim, McCool, and Parker, JJ., concur.
Shaw and Bryan, JJ., concur in the result.
Sellers, J., concurs in the result, with opinion.
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Cook, J., recuses himself.
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SELLERS, Justice (concurring in the result).
To the extent that the main opinion distinguishes the facts in the
present case from those involved in Sawyer v. Cooper Tire & Rubber
Company, 412 So. 3d 603 (Ala. 2024), I agree with that distinction. I do,
however, maintain that Cooper Tire was wrongfully decided, and I
adhere to my dissent in that case.
Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 592 U.S.
351 (2021), did not eliminate the condition, necessary for establishing
specific personal jurisdiction, that a plaintiff's claim arise out of or relate
to the defendant's purposeful contacts with the forum. Nor did it
authorize the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction merely because a
defendant conducts substantial business nationwide and its products or
services are used by the forum's residents. The existence of historical or
generalized commercial activity cannot serve as a substitute for a
meaningful relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation. The constitutional limitations recognized in the main opinion
demonstrate why we must continue to give independent meaning to
specific personal jurisdiction's relatedness requirement after Ford Motor.
Otherwise, the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction
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becomes increasingly difficult to discern. That is the principle to which I
believe this Court failed to adhere in Cooper Tire.
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