Full Opinion

Cite as: 610 U. S. ____ (2026) 1 Per Curiam SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 26A476 _________________ FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION v. SHERROD BROWN, ET AL. ON APPLICATION FOR STAY _________________ No. 26A477 _________________ NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE, ET AL. v. SHERROD BROWN, ET AL. ON APPLICATION FOR STAY [October 14, 2026] PER CURIAM. On March 30, 2026, the Media Bureau of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued a “public no- tice” about the FCC’s lowest unit charge (LUC) require- ments. Those requirements, which are outlined in 47 U. S. C. §315(b)(1)(A), concern favorable rates that broad- casters must charge for campaign advertisements in the weeks leading up to elections. The notice stated that polit- ical candidates, joint fundraising committees with noncan- didate members, and political parties engaged in coordi- nated political activity are entitled to the LUC. Four candidates for Congress filed an application for re- view with the FCC, arguing that only political candidates are entitled to the LUC and asking the full Commission to set aside the public notice as unlawful. Two months later, while their application was still pending before the Com- mission, the candidates filed a petition for review against 2 FCC v. BROWN Per Curiam the FCC and the United States in the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit seeking the same relief. A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit determined that it had jurisdiction to consider the candidates’ challenge, granted their petition, and set aside the public notice. In doing so, the majority reasoned that the plain text and legislative history of §315(b)(1)(A) limits the availability of the LUC to political candidates. On September 4, 2026, we granted an application to stay the Fourth Circuit’s decision. In our per curiam opinion, we explained that the Communications Act “makes clear” that the Commission must resolve an application for review by order “before an aggrieved party may petition for further review in federal court.” National Republican Congres- sional Committee v. Brown, 609 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2026) (slip op., at 2–3). “Because the candidates’ application for review was pending when they filed their petition for re- view,” we continued, “the Fourth Circuit likely lacked stat- utory jurisdiction to address their challenge.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 3). Indeed, the Fourth Circuit’s holding to the contrary “split[ ] with every other Circuit to have considered the issue.” Ibid. (citing Council Tree Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 503 F. 3d 284, 287 (CA3 2007); Alabama Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F. 3d 1357, 1366 (CA11 2002); International Telecard Assn. v. FCC, 166 F. 3d 387, 388 (CADC 1999) (per curiam)). Just one month later, on October 7, 2026, the same Fourth Circuit panel ordered the Commission to resolve the candidates’ application by October 9, 2026. The Commis- sion thus had 48 hours from the entry of the Fourth Cir- cuit’s mandamus order to issue its final decision. That, the Fourth Circuit believed, was “the only means to finally move forward with . . . judicial review.” App. to Emergency Application for Stay in No. 26A476 (CA4), ECF Doc. 30, p. 18a, n. 2. The mandamus order came just one week after the Commission’s comment period on the candidates’ Cite as: 610 U. S. ____ (2026) 3 Per Curiam application had closed, and in the midst of another com- ment period for a parallel application the Commission was considering in tandem. The FCC moved before this Court to stay the Fourth Cir- cuit’s mandamus order. On October 8, 2026, the order was administratively stayed so that the Court could resolve the FCC’s application before the 48-hour deadline expired. To obtain a stay, the FCC must demonstrate “(1) a rea- sonable probability that four Justices will consider the is- sue sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari; (2) a fair prospect that a majority of the Court will vote to reverse the judgment below; and (3) a likelihood that irreparable harm will result from the denial of a stay.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U. S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam). In “close cases” we “balance the equities and weigh the relative harms to the applicant and to the respondent.” Ibid. Each of these factors favors the FCC, so we grant the stay. A writ of mandamus is a “ ‘drastic and extraordinary’ remedy ‘reserved for really extraordinary causes.’ ” Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for D. C., 542 U. S. 367, 380 (2004) (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U. S. 258, 259–260 (1947)). To obtain a writ of mandamus, a litigant must demonstrate that he has “no other adequate means to at- tain the relief he desires” and that his right to the writ is “clear and indisputable.” 542 U. S., at 380–381 (internal quotation marks omitted). Together, these prerequisites ensure that mandamus, one of “the most potent weapons in the judicial arsenal,” Will v. United States, 389 U. S. 90, 107 (1967), is used only to correct a clear “ ‘usurpation of power’ ” by a lower court, id., at 95 (quoting De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U. S. 212, 217 (1945)), or to com- pel an agency to “perform a ministerial or non-discretionary act” over which the agency has “no discretion whatever.” Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U. S. 55, 63–64 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 FCC v. BROWN Per Curiam The Fourth Circuit’s decision to issue an “extraordinary” writ was inappropriate under the circumstances. The Com- munications Act requires the Commission to act on every application it receives, but it does not obligate the Commis- sion to act within a particular timeframe. 47 U. S. C. §155(c)(4). The Commission may exercise its discretion to set its own procedures and schedule for resolving such ap- plications. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Na- tional Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 524 (1978). Undeterred, the Fourth Circuit issued a mandamus order requiring the Commission to issue a final decision on the candidates’ application just five months after it was filed and within just 48 hours—all while the Commission’s deliberation process was still ongoing. Our system of sepa- ration of powers does not allow the Judiciary to meddle in “the workings of a coordinate branch of the Government” in this manner. INS v. Legalization Assistance Project of Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, 510 U. S. 1301, 1306 (1993). Finally, the FCC will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay. As discussed above, the Fourth Circuit’s mandamus order requires the FCC to issue a final order within just 48 hours of its entry. To comply with the mandamus order, the FCC must triage its ongoing deliberation process and pre- pare a final order on an extremely expedited timeline. That the mandamus order requires the FCC to abandon its de- liberation process is itself an injury that cannot be reme- died after the fact. The FCC thus satisfies the stay factors. For the foregoing reasons, the Fourth Circuit’s order di- recting the Commission to abort its deliberative process and issue a final decision on the candidates’ application for re- view in two days is stayed. * * * The application for stay presented to THE CHIEF JUSTICE and by him referred to the Court is granted. The October Cite as: 610 U. S. ____ (2026) 5 Per Curiam 7, 2026 judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, case No. 26–2230, is stayed pending the filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such a writ is timely sought. Should certiorari be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically. In the event that certiorari is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court. The related application for stay in NRCC v. Brown, case No. 26A477, presented to THE CHIEF JUSTICE and by him referred to the Court is denied as moot. It is so ordered. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and JUSTICE JACKSON would deny the applications.