Novotny v. Moore
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket25-1324
JudgeClarence Thomas
StatusRelating-to
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Full Opinion
Cite as: 610 U. S. ____ (2026) 1
Statement of THOMAS, J.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
KATHERINE NOVOTNY, ET AL. v. WES MOORE,
GOVERNOR OF MARYLAND, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25–1324. Decided November 16, 2026
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Statement of JUSTICE THOMAS respecting the denial of
certiorari.
Maryland is one of several States that prohibit law-abid-
ing gun owners from carrying firearms in a wide variety of
public places. Under Maryland law, an individual may not
carry a firearm in public demonstrations, mass transit,
places of amusement, healthcare facilities, locations that
sell alcohol for onsite consumption, and tens of thousands
of acres of state park and forest land. Md. Crim. Law Code
Ann. §§4–111(a)(2)(iii), (a)(9)(i)–(vi), (c), (e), 4–208(b)(2)
(2021 and Supp. 2026); Md. Transp. Code Ann. §7–705(b)(6)
(2015); Code of Md. Regs., tit. 8, §§08.07.01.04(B),
08.07.06.04(B) (2025). The Fourth Circuit upheld these re-
strictions against petitioners’ Second Amendment chal-
lenge because it concluded that each law banned firearms
in a “sensitive place.” Kipke v. Moore, 165 F. 4th 194, 204–
205 (2026).
I am skeptical that each of these laws “is consistent with
this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation” in
“sensitive places.” New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc.
v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1, 17, 30 (2022). Still, I agree with the
Court’s decision not to grant certiorari. Because each Mar-
yland statute implicates a distinct historical tradition of
firearm regulation, the breadth of petitioners’ challenge
would complicate our review. In an appropriate and more
narrowly focused case, however, we should consider the
2 NOVOTNY v. MOORE
Statement of THOMAS, J.
scope of States’ authority to ban firearms in “sensitive
places.”
The Second Amendment recognizes the people’s “inher-
ent” right to keep and bear firearms, a right that admits of
only historically grounded exceptions. See District of Co-
lumbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 628, 634–635 (2008). Before
and after the founding, it was well understood that individ-
uals enjoyed a natural right to keep and bear arms, which
included the right to carry firearms in public spaces for self-
defense. Id., at 593–594, 612; see also Bruen, 597 U. S., at
50. The Constitution “codified [that] pre-existing right.”
Heller, 554 U. S., at 592; accord, Wolford v. Lopez, 609 U. S.
185, 193 (2026). The first generations after the founding
recognized the breadth of the Second Amendment’s
“guarante[e],” and “those who sought to carry firearms pub-
licly and peaceably in antebellum America were generally
free to do so.” Bruen, 597 U. S., at 33, 52. Thus, when a
State seeks to restrict the right to bear arms—including by
limiting the places in which a law-abiding citizen may carry
his firearm—the State must root its law in the Second
Amendment’s “historical understanding” by “demon-
strat[ing] that the regulation is consistent with this Na-
tion’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id., at 17,
26.
This Court has previously acknowledged a limited tradi-
tion of States’ regulating the right to carry firearms in cer-
tain “sensitive places.” Heller, 554 U. S., at 626. In Bruen,
we observed that early American legislatures sometimes
prohibited weapons in “legislative assemblies, polling
places, and courthouses.” 597 U. S., at 30. But, we empha-
sized that this tradition was narrow. “[T]he historical rec-
ord yields relatively few 18th- and 19th-century ‘sensitive
places’ where weapons were altogether prohibited.” Ibid.
While “courts can use analogies to those historical regula-
tions of ‘sensitive places’ to determine that modern regula-
tions . . . are constitutionally permissible,” “expanding the
Cite as: 610 U. S. ____ (2026) 3
Statement of THOMAS, J.
category of ‘sensitive places’ . . . to all places of public con-
gregation . . . would eviscerate the general right to publicly
carry arms for self-defense.” Id., at 30–31.
Nevertheless, States have seized on the idea of “sensitive
places” to prohibit the peaceable carry of firearms in loca-
tions that bear little resemblance to legislatures, polling
places, or courthouses. New Jersey, for example, prohibits
firearms in at least 25 locations, including zoos, public li-
braries, casinos, and state-owned beaches. N. J. Stat. Ann.
§§2C:58–4.6(a)(9), (10), (12), (18) (West 2024). New York
has designated 20 locations as “sensitive,” ranging from
“any place of worship” to “residential settings licensed . . .
by the department of health.” N. Y. Penal Law Ann.
§§265.01–e(2)(c), (l) (West 2025). California’s 29 gun-free
spaces include “athletic facilit[ies],” “financial institu-
tion[s],” and any government-permitted “public gathering
or special event.” Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§26230(a)(10),
(12), (23) (West Cum. Supp. 2026).* These restrictions
stand on questionable historical ground. And, their cumu-
lative effect is to prohibit firearms wherever people gather
for eating, drinking, recreation, amusement, and free
speech—an affront to the right of “law-abiding citizens” to
“carr[y] arms in public for” their “ordinary self-defense.”
Bruen, 597 U. S., at 60.
The lower courts have largely blessed these ahistorical
ventures. The Fourth Circuit below upheld all but one of
Maryland’s locational restrictions. Kipke, 165 F. 4th, at
204–205. A now-vacated decision of the Third Circuit up-
held many of New Jersey’s “sensitive-place” laws. See
Koons v. Attorney Gen. N. J., 156 F. 4th 210, 274 (2025),
reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 162 F. 4th 100.
Courts of Appeals have also rejected challenges to specific
——————
*Several other States ban firearms in many public places. See, e.g.,
Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 430, §66/65 (West 2024); Haw. Rev. Stat. §134–9.1
(2023).
4 NOVOTNY v. MOORE
Statement of THOMAS, J.
locational restrictions in New York, California, and Hawaii.
See, e.g., Antonyuk v. James, 120 F. 4th 941, 1007–1013,
1015–1032 (CA2 2024) (upholding New York laws prohibit-
ing the possession of firearms in treatment centers, urban
parks, zoos, places that serve alcohol, and theatres); Wol-
ford v. Lopez, 116 F. 4th 959, 982–990 (CA9 2024) (uphold-
ing bans on carrying firearms in parks, playgrounds, bars
and restaurants that serve alcohol, places of amusement,
and parking areas connected to “sensitive places”), rev’d on
other grounds, 609 U. S. 185 (2026).
I harbor serious doubts that our Nation’s historical tradi-
tion of firearm regulation supports many of these sweeping
restrictions. In an appropriate case, this Court should con-
sider whether particular sensitive-place laws are consistent
with the right to public carry.