Full Opinion

Cite as: 610 U. S. ____ (2026) 1 Statement of THOMAS, J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES KATHERINE NOVOTNY, ET AL. v. WES MOORE, GOVERNOR OF MARYLAND, ET AL. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 25–1324. Decided November 16, 2026 The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Statement of JUSTICE THOMAS respecting the denial of certiorari. Maryland is one of several States that prohibit law-abid- ing gun owners from carrying firearms in a wide variety of public places. Under Maryland law, an individual may not carry a firearm in public demonstrations, mass transit, places of amusement, healthcare facilities, locations that sell alcohol for onsite consumption, and tens of thousands of acres of state park and forest land. Md. Crim. Law Code Ann. §§4–111(a)(2)(iii), (a)(9)(i)–(vi), (c), (e), 4–208(b)(2) (2021 and Supp. 2026); Md. Transp. Code Ann. §7–705(b)(6) (2015); Code of Md. Regs., tit. 8, §§08.07.01.04(B), 08.07.06.04(B) (2025). The Fourth Circuit upheld these re- strictions against petitioners’ Second Amendment chal- lenge because it concluded that each law banned firearms in a “sensitive place.” Kipke v. Moore, 165 F. 4th 194, 204– 205 (2026). I am skeptical that each of these laws “is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation” in “sensitive places.” New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1, 17, 30 (2022). Still, I agree with the Court’s decision not to grant certiorari. Because each Mar- yland statute implicates a distinct historical tradition of firearm regulation, the breadth of petitioners’ challenge would complicate our review. In an appropriate and more narrowly focused case, however, we should consider the 2 NOVOTNY v. MOORE Statement of THOMAS, J. scope of States’ authority to ban firearms in “sensitive places.” The Second Amendment recognizes the people’s “inher- ent” right to keep and bear firearms, a right that admits of only historically grounded exceptions. See District of Co- lumbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 628, 634–635 (2008). Before and after the founding, it was well understood that individ- uals enjoyed a natural right to keep and bear arms, which included the right to carry firearms in public spaces for self- defense. Id., at 593–594, 612; see also Bruen, 597 U. S., at 50. The Constitution “codified [that] pre-existing right.” Heller, 554 U. S., at 592; accord, Wolford v. Lopez, 609 U. S. 185, 193 (2026). The first generations after the founding recognized the breadth of the Second Amendment’s “guarante[e],” and “those who sought to carry firearms pub- licly and peaceably in antebellum America were generally free to do so.” Bruen, 597 U. S., at 33, 52. Thus, when a State seeks to restrict the right to bear arms—including by limiting the places in which a law-abiding citizen may carry his firearm—the State must root its law in the Second Amendment’s “historical understanding” by “demon- strat[ing] that the regulation is consistent with this Na- tion’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id., at 17, 26. This Court has previously acknowledged a limited tradi- tion of States’ regulating the right to carry firearms in cer- tain “sensitive places.” Heller, 554 U. S., at 626. In Bruen, we observed that early American legislatures sometimes prohibited weapons in “legislative assemblies, polling places, and courthouses.” 597 U. S., at 30. But, we empha- sized that this tradition was narrow. “[T]he historical rec- ord yields relatively few 18th- and 19th-century ‘sensitive places’ where weapons were altogether prohibited.” Ibid. While “courts can use analogies to those historical regula- tions of ‘sensitive places’ to determine that modern regula- tions . . . are constitutionally permissible,” “expanding the Cite as: 610 U. S. ____ (2026) 3 Statement of THOMAS, J. category of ‘sensitive places’ . . . to all places of public con- gregation . . . would eviscerate the general right to publicly carry arms for self-defense.” Id., at 30–31. Nevertheless, States have seized on the idea of “sensitive places” to prohibit the peaceable carry of firearms in loca- tions that bear little resemblance to legislatures, polling places, or courthouses. New Jersey, for example, prohibits firearms in at least 25 locations, including zoos, public li- braries, casinos, and state-owned beaches. N. J. Stat. Ann. §§2C:58–4.6(a)(9), (10), (12), (18) (West 2024). New York has designated 20 locations as “sensitive,” ranging from “any place of worship” to “residential settings licensed . . . by the department of health.” N. Y. Penal Law Ann. §§265.01–e(2)(c), (l) (West 2025). California’s 29 gun-free spaces include “athletic facilit[ies],” “financial institu- tion[s],” and any government-permitted “public gathering or special event.” Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§26230(a)(10), (12), (23) (West Cum. Supp. 2026).* These restrictions stand on questionable historical ground. And, their cumu- lative effect is to prohibit firearms wherever people gather for eating, drinking, recreation, amusement, and free speech—an affront to the right of “law-abiding citizens” to “carr[y] arms in public for” their “ordinary self-defense.” Bruen, 597 U. S., at 60. The lower courts have largely blessed these ahistorical ventures. The Fourth Circuit below upheld all but one of Maryland’s locational restrictions. Kipke, 165 F. 4th, at 204–205. A now-vacated decision of the Third Circuit up- held many of New Jersey’s “sensitive-place” laws. See Koons v. Attorney Gen. N. J., 156 F. 4th 210, 274 (2025), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 162 F. 4th 100. Courts of Appeals have also rejected challenges to specific —————— *Several other States ban firearms in many public places. See, e.g., Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 430, §66/65 (West 2024); Haw. Rev. Stat. §134–9.1 (2023). 4 NOVOTNY v. MOORE Statement of THOMAS, J. locational restrictions in New York, California, and Hawaii. See, e.g., Antonyuk v. James, 120 F. 4th 941, 1007–1013, 1015–1032 (CA2 2024) (upholding New York laws prohibit- ing the possession of firearms in treatment centers, urban parks, zoos, places that serve alcohol, and theatres); Wol- ford v. Lopez, 116 F. 4th 959, 982–990 (CA9 2024) (uphold- ing bans on carrying firearms in parks, playgrounds, bars and restaurants that serve alcohol, places of amusement, and parking areas connected to “sensitive places”), rev’d on other grounds, 609 U. S. 185 (2026). I harbor serious doubts that our Nation’s historical tradi- tion of firearm regulation supports many of these sweeping restrictions. In an appropriate case, this Court should con- sider whether particular sensitive-place laws are consistent with the right to public carry.