Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00462-CV ___________________________ BOB WILLOUGHBY, Appellant V. CITY OF FORT WORTH, Appellee On Appeal from the 348th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 348-365274-25 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Wallach and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Bob Willoughby complains of the trial court’s granting of Appellee City of Fort Worth’s motion to dismiss. We affirm. Willoughby’s brief on appeal gives new meaning to the word “brief,” as it consists, in total, of a mere 57 words, not including his signature:1 We will likewise keep our opinion brief. Based upon the record, including Willoughby’s Notice of Appeal, his reply brief, and City of Fort Worth’s brief,2 it appears that Willoughby takes issue with the 1 Willoughby’s brief contains no Identity of Parties and Counsel, see Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(a), no Table of Contents, see Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(b), no Index of Authorities, see Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(c), no Statement of the Case, see Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(d), no Issues Presented, see Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f), no Statement of Facts, see Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g), no Summary of the Argument, see Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h), no Argument, see Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i), and, finally, no Prayer, see Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(j). But rather than decide this case based upon briefing waiver, we attempt to reach what we perceive to be the merits of his complaint. We note that City of Fort Worth’s brief, although also quite brief—18 pages in 2 total—was helpful to us in discerning the issues presented. 2 trial court’s granting of City of Fort Worth’s Rule 91a Motion to Dismiss what appeared to be an election contest suit.3 See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.1. The election took place on May 3, 2025, and Willoughby was on the ballot as a candidate for City Council Member for District 5. He lost that election. Indeed, according to Willloughby, he has lost that same race every two years since 2017. Willoughby contested the results of the 2025 election by filing suit. In his one- page original petition—although it was not titled as such—Willoughby identified “irregular numbers” that he claimed “indicate fraud,” speculated that the number of votes should have been higher, and pointed to the number of votes he had received in prior elections. But as the contestant of an election in the underlying lawsuit, Willoughby was required to prove more than a mere suspicion that something was wrong with the vote count. He bore the burden of proving that the outcome of the election was “not true” by showing that “(1) illegal votes were counted; or (2) an election officer or other person officially involved in the administration of the election: (A) prevented eligible voters from voting; (B) failed to count legal votes; or (C) engaged in other fraud or illegal conduct or made a mistake.” Tex. Elec. Code § 221.003(a); see Denny v. Doss, No. 02-20-00113-CV, 2020 WL 2071949, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth April 30, 2020) (mem. op.). And, in an election contest related to 3 The standard of review for a Rule 91a motion to dismiss is de novo. In re Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 621 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re Goodman, No. 02-26-00061-CV, 2026 WL 547521, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 26, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). 3 a city council position, with certain exceptions that do not apply here, the proper defendant is the opposing candidate who won the city council seat being challenged. Tex. Elec. Code § 232.003(a)(1) (providing that “the contestee” in an election contest is “the opposing candidate who is officially determined to be nominated or elected”). In other words, there is no statutory authority for a contestant of a city council race to sue the city itself. Rule of Civil Procedure 91a provides that a trial court may grant a motion to dismiss if the case “has no basis in law or fact.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.1. As City of Fort Worth explains in its brief, its Rule 91a Motion to Dismiss was properly granted because Willoughby’s lawsuit had no basis in law for two reasons. First, Willoughby’s petition had no basis in law because his pleadings alleged too few facts to show a viable claim for relief. See id. (a cause of action has no basis in law if the allegations contained therein, along with reasonable inferences, taken to be true, do not entitle the plaintiff to the relief sought). To defeat a Rule 91a challenge, a plaintiff’s pleadings must include “the essential factual allegations” that support the claims alleged. In re First Rsrv. Mgmt., L.P., 671 S.W.3d 653, 662 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding); Martinez v. ACA Team, LLC, No. 02-25-00365-CV, 2026 WL 120063, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 15, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Johnson v. Bearfoot Cos., No. 02-23-00366-CV, 2024 WL 2202033, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 16, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.), for the proposition that pleadings must contain sufficient facts to apprise a defendant of “the type of evidence that could be relevant” 4 and the “basic issues” related to the controversy). Here, Willoughby’s pleadings contained no facts alleging that illegal votes were counted nor any facts suggesting that any person involved in the administration of the election either prevented eligible voters from voting, failed to count legal votes, engaged in fraud or illegal conduct, or made a mistake. Furthermore, even assuming that Willoughby’s sparce and conclusory allegations gave rise to a reasonable inference that illegal votes were counted, eligible voters were denied the right to vote, votes were not counted or other fraud, illegal conduct or mistake, there were no facts alleged to support an implication that City of Fort Worth was involved in any of those misdeeds. Second, as City of Fort Worth argues, Willoughby’s petition had no basis in law because it was barred by statute. See Tex. Elec. Code § 232.003(a)(1) (providing that, with certain exceptions, the winning candidate in the election is the proper “contestee” in an election contest). Willoughby’s pleadings did not demonstrate any entitlement to relief against City of Fort Worth because under the statute governing election contests, City of Fort Worth was not a proper defendant. For these two reasons, the trial court did not err by granting City of Fort Worth’s Rule 91a Motion to Dismiss. 5 We affirm the judgment of the trial court. /s/ Bonnie Sudderth Bonnie Sudderth Chief Justice Delivered: August 13, 2026 6