In Re Powered by People and Robert Francis O'Rourke v. the State of Texas

Petition for Writ of Mandamus Denied and Majority and Concurring and Dissenting Opinions filed September 8, 2026. In The Fifteenth Court of Appeals NO. 15-25-00140-CV IN RE POWERED BY PEOPLE AND ROBERT FRANCIS O’ROURKE, Relators ORIGINAL PROCEEDING WRIT OF MANDAMUS 348th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 348-367652-2025 OPINION In August of 2025, a substantial minority of the members of the Texas House of Representatives briefly left the state, thwarting a quorum and impeding the chamber from conducting business for two weeks. On August 8th, the State sued Relators, Powered by People (“PxP”) and Robert Francis “Beto” O’Rourke, in Tarrant County district court, claiming they violated the DTPA by soliciting political contributions to support allegedly personal expenses of the quorum-breaking members. On that same day but 39 minutes later, Relator PxP sued the Attorney General in El Paso County district court for a protective order arising from the same dispute between the same parties. A swarm of filings, hearings, and orders ensued in both district courts, including two appeals from conflicting orders by the two district courts, each filed in this Court one day apart. In this petition for writ of mandamus from the Tarrant County district court, Relators challenged four orders issued by that court within days of each other. We initially granted an administrative stay pending further review, and 17 days later granted temporary relief staying the trial court’s temporary restraining order (“TRO”) against the Relators’ political fundraising activities as a prior restraint of speech.1 Final disposition was delayed by evolving facts and arguments as the parties filed new pleadings, new briefs, and sought postponement of oral argument. For purposes of this proceeding, the principal evolution was the State’s decision to nonsuit all claims for any injunctive relief on October 22, 2025. For the reasons stated below, that nonsuit rendered moot our review of three of the four orders Relators challenge: (1) granting the State’s TRO—a claim it has now nonsuited (see part I); (2) denying expedited discovery that Relators sought for a hearing on a temporary injunction—also nonsuited (see part II); and (3) denying Relators’ motion to transfer venue to El Paso County because the State primarily sought injunctive relief—also nonsuited (see part III). On the fourth order, we affirm as modified the Tarrant County court’s anti-suit TRO barring Relators from prosecuting this same dispute with the same parties in El Paso because the Tarrant County court obtained dominant jurisdiction by exactly 39 minutes (see part IV). 1 In re Powered by People, No. 15-25-00140-CV, slip at *23 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. Sept. 12, 2025, order) (available at https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID= 21eb09d1-5ce7-4e9a-8a9f-7d1ac8ddb0b4&coa=coa15&DT=Order&MediaID=5054af02-cb93- 4439-81bd-1302c841da7f); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10. 2  BACKGROUND On July 9, 2025, Governor Abbott called a special session of the Texas Legislature to consider several matters, including “a revised congressional redistricting plan in light of constitutional concerns raised by the U.S. Department of Justice.” A group of 54 Democratic members of the Texas House of Representatives who opposed the plan left the State on August 3, 2025, depriving the chamber of a quorum.2 Undaunted, on August 15th, Governor Abbott called a second special session immediately following the first.3 Throughout this stalemate, former congressman O’Rourke publicly opposed the redistricting plan and conducted fundraising appeals and rallies to “have the backs” of the absent lawmakers by donating to PxP, a Texas nonprofit corporation he founded operating as a political organization under 26 U.S.C. § 527(e)(1). Trial court proceedings The State filed the underlying lawsuit against Relators in Tarrant County on August 8, 2025. It alleged that Relators violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) by claiming to solicit donations for lawful political purposes when they were actually to be used to illegally fund the absent legislators’ personal expenses.4 The DTPA permits the Attorney General’s consumer protection division to file suit to enjoin any person violating the DTPA,5 but it is hotly disputed whether this 2 Kayla Guo, Texas House Democrats Flee the State in Bid to Block GOP’s Proposed Congressional Map, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, (Aug. 3, 2025), https://www.texastribune.org/ 2025/08/03/texas-democrats-quorum-break-redistricting-map/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2026). 3 The Governor of the State of Texas, Proclamation No. 41-4224, 50 Tex. Reg. 5503, 5509 (2025). 4 See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.46(a), (b); TEX. ELEC. CODE § 253.035(a) (“A person who accepts a political contribution as a candidate or officeholder may not convert the contribution to personal use.”); TEX. PENAL CODE § 36.08(f) (gifts accepted by member of legislature prohibited). 5 See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.47(a) (“Whenever the consumer protection division has 3 consumer-oriented statute does or could cover deceptive political speech or fundraising.6 Noting that Relators had scheduled a fundraising rally to take place in Fort Worth in the near future, the State asserted that a TRO was needed to prevent deceptive acts and to avoid “irreparable injury, loss, or damage.” The trial court issued a TRO later that same day based on the pleadings, affidavits, and arguments of counsel, finding that Relators’ “fundraising conduct constitutes false, misleading, or deceptive acts under the [DTPA] because [they] are raising and utilizing political contributions from Texas consumers to pay for the personal expenses of Texas legislators in violation of Texas law.”7 The TRO (originally and as modified a week later) restrained Relators and those in active concert or participation with them from (i) using political funds to pay for out-of- state travel, hotel, or dining expenses, or any fines under legislative rules on unexcused absences; (ii) raising funds for the same purposes; (iii) providing such travel services in-kind; and (iv) removing property or funds from the state pending the lawsuit. The modified TRO set a hearing on the State’s request for a temporary injunction for September 2, 2025. Between those two events on August 8th in Tarrant County, PxP filed suit in El Paso County seeking a protective order against enforcement of a Request to Examine documents (RTE) from the Attorney General dated two days earlier.8 The reason to believe that any person is engaging in, has engaged in, or is about to engage in any act or practice declared to be unlawful by this subchapter, and that proceedings would be in the public interest, the division may bring an action in the name of the state against the person to restrain by temporary restraining order, temporary injunction, or permanent injunction the use of such method, act, or practice.”). 6 Cf. Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 678 (Tex. 1996) (holding fraud claim arising from religious fundraising could not be based on alleged statements of religious doctrine or belief, but could be based on alleged promises to perform particular acts). 7 In particular, “(1) TEXAS PENAL CODE, § 36.01(3); (2) TEXAS ELECTIONS CODE, § 253.035; (3) Rule 5, § 3 of the House Rules of Procedure; and (4) TEX. PEN. CODE §§ 36.08, 36.10.” 8 See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 12.152; see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 176.6(e) (providing that 4 RTE sought communications to or from PxP regarding the quorum break and the “planned or actual travel arrangements, accommodations, or meals outside of Texas” of the absent legislators; it threatened that failure to comply could result in penalties and revocation of PxP’s charter.9 A flurry of filings and orders too numerous to list ensued in the competing district courts, but the orders relevant for this proceeding are the following: • On August 11, 2025, Relators filed in Tarrant County a motion to transfer venue to El Paso County, alleging that venue was mandatory there under § 65.023 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code; the Tarrant County court denied that motion on August 15th. • On August 13, 2025, Relators filed in Tarrant County a motion to dissolve the TRO as a prior restraint on speech; after an oral hearing, the Tarrant County court denied that motion on August 19th. • On August 20, 2025, Relators filed in Tarrant County an emergency motion for expedited reciprocal discovery needed for the upcoming September 2nd TI hearing; the Tarrant County court denied that motion five days later. • On August 19, 2025, the trial court in El Paso County signed an anti-suit TRO barring the Attorney General from “initiating, filing, or prosecuting any quo warranto proceeding against [PxP] without leave of this Court.” • On August 25, 2025, the Tarrant County court responded by signing an anti- suit TRO barring Relators from “seek[ing] to restrain or enjoin the State from initiating, filing, or prosecuting the quo warranto claims alleged by the State in this proceeding [in Tarrant County].” Meanwhile, the State informed the trial court at an August 19th hearing that the quorum break had ended the day before and the missing legislators had returned to the state. A few days later, the mid-decade redistricting bill that precipitated the crisis persons affected by a subpoena may move for a protective order “either in the court in which the action is pending or in a district court in the county where the subpoena was served”). 9 See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 12.155. 5 passed and was signed by the Governor on August 29th (effective December 5, 2025).10 Appellate proceedings On August 25, 2025, Relators filed this mandamus petition challenging the Tarrant County court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and four of its orders: (1) denying their motion to dissolve the TRO; (2) denying their motion to transfer venue to El Paso County; (3) denying their request for reciprocal discovery; and (4) granting an anti-suit TRO preventing them from prosecuting related claims elsewhere. The petition noted that “the lawmakers are back, a quorum was established,” and thus “any imminent need to stop fundraising that ostensibly was to support out-of-state Texas Democratic lawmakers is already over.” But the TRO ostensibly barring political fundraising remained in place. Along with their petition, Relators requested emergency temporary relief in this Court. In response, we issued a series of orders on August 26th, September 3rd, and September 12th that denied dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, stayed further proceedings in the trial court, preserved the trial court’s TRO from expiration, and stayed the TRO pending further orders, agreeing as a preliminary matter that it appeared to be an unconstitutional prior restraint of speech.11 At our request, the parties completed expedited briefing on the merits on 10 Act of Aug. 26, 2025, 89th Leg, 2nd C.S., ch. 1, 2025 Tex. Gen. Laws 1, 180. 11 In re Powered by People, No. 15-25-00140-CV, slip op. at *2 (Tex. App.—15th Dist., Aug. 26, 2025, order), (available at https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID =10931b5b-4ce5-474b-afa7-6b384b753c5b&coa=coa15&DT=Order&MediaID=5c71bc79-a779 -44ec-ae51-37f057cbda7f); In re Powered by People, No. 15-25-00140-CV, (Tex. App.—15th Dist., Sept. 3, 2025, order) (available at https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?Media VersionID=6469c62c-dc76-4378-9e88-48566d2262fc&coa=coa15&DT=Order&MediaID= 6d7af280-5b41-402c-8dd2-c840ce76f9f9); In re Powered by People, No. 15-25-00140-CV, slip op. at *23 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. Sept. 12, 2025, order) (available at https://search.txcourts.gov/ SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=21eb09d1-5ce7-4e9a-8a9f-7d1ac8ddb0b4&coa=coa15& DT=Order&MediaID=5054af02-cb93-4439-81bd-1302c841da7f). 6 September 15, 2025. But that was not the end of the briefing. On October 23, 2025, the State filed a letter brief claiming that review of the TRO was moot, as it had nonsuited all claims for injunctive relief the day before, and with the end of the quorum-break “Relators are no longer engaged in (and cannot engage in) the misconduct the State sought to prevent.”12 Relators responded on November 3, 2025, arguing that the TRO issues were not moot since the State’s pending motions for contempt and for leave to file quo warranto in Tarrant County were dependent on them. We set this case for oral argument on December 18, 2025, but postponed it until March 12, 2026, on the State’s unopposed motion due to family leave of its appellate counsel. Both before and after oral argument, the parties continued to file letter briefs adding new objections and arguments on February 27, March 6, March 27, and April 10 of 2026. This opinion addresses what we understand to be the current status of this proceeding. JURISDICTION Relators argue that at the time of filing the trial court had no subject-matter jurisdiction of the State’s suit. The State’s original petition asserted jurisdiction based on § 17.47(a) of the DTPA, which authorizes the Attorney General to “bring an action in the name of the state” to enjoin deceptive acts and practices.13 Relators argue the Attorney General has no “standing” because his suit did not seek “to protect consumers against deceptive practices related to the purchase or sale of goods or services.” (emphasis added).14 “[A] legislature may grant standing to a state attorney general to bring suit for 12 State’s Letter Br. 1 (Oct. 23, 2025). 13 See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.47(a). 14 See id. § 17.45(1), (2), (4). 7 injury done to its citizens,” as “the Texas Legislature has done in many contexts.”15 The DTPA is one of those contexts, and in such cases the Attorney General does not have to personally be deceived by the very acts of which he complains; requirements like standing and alleging a concrete injury are applied to the “claims asserted by an attorney general, rather than to that official personally.”16 The State’s DTPA petition alleges a concrete injury on behalf of unnamed citizens, whether or not that claim might prove invalid. As we explained in our September 12th order, “failure to establish the elements of a DTPA claim does not strip the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief, although such relief could be erroneous.”17 “[A] plaintiff does not lack standing in its proper, jurisdictional sense simply because he cannot prevail on the merits of his claim; he lacks standing when his claim of injury is too slight for a court to afford redress.”18 Then on February 27, 2026, Relators asserted that the State’s nonsuit of all injunctive relief “introduced a jurisdictional defect into the proceeding below,” because the DTPA “does not permit, and therefore courts have no jurisdiction to hear, a standalone request for civil penalties.”19 Section 17.47 is titled “Restraining Orders,” and authorizes the Attorney General to file suit on behalf of the State for 15 Farmers Grp., Inc. v. Lubin, 222 S.W.3d 417, 426–27 (Tex. 2007). 16 Id. at 426 (emphasis added). 17 In re Powered by People, No. 15-25-00140-CV, slip at *11 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. Sept. 12, 2025, order) (available at https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID= 21eb09d1-5ce7-4e9a-8a9f-7d1ac8ddb0b4&coa=coa15&DT=Order&MediaID=5054af02-cb93- 4439-81bd-1302c841da7f; see also Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 774 (Tex. 2020) (“Whether a plaintiff has established his right ‘to go forward with his suit’ or ‘satisfied the requisites of a particular statute’ pertains ‘in reality to the right of the plaintiff to relief rather than to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court to afford it.’” (cleaned up) (quoting Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 76–77 (Tex. 2000)); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127–28 & n.4 (2014); Evolution Fast Food One, LP v. HVFG, LLC, 720 F.Supp.3d 251, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2024). 18 Pike, 610 S.W.3d at 774. 19 Relators’ Letter Br. 1 (Feb. 27, 2026). 8 various remedies, including specifically a “temporary restraining order” in § 17.47(a), and “[i]n addition to the request for a temporary restraining order, or permanent injunction,” civil penalties in § 17.47(c). Relators construe these provisions to authorize civil penalties only in conjunction with injunctive relief, not as a standalone suit.20 Relators point to the title of § 17.47 (“Restraining Orders”) and to the “in addition to the request” for injunctive relief phrase that introduces the provision for civil penalties. Relators point to no court that has adopted this construction, and we are aware of none. We do not read the text of § 17.47 as limiting civil penalties to cases where injunctive relief is requested. That construction would restrict the remedies available to the State, contrary to the Act’s direction that it be “liberally construed … to protect consumers.”21 Notably, the DTPA uses “in addition to” not only in § 17.47, but also in § 17.43 for the very purpose of making the various remedies in the Act independent rather than contingent and conditional: Sec. 17.43. Cumulative Remedies. The provisions of this subchapter are not exclusive. The remedies provided in this subchapter are in addition to any other procedures or remedies provided for in any other law; provided, however, that no recovery shall be permitted under both this subchapter and another law of both damages and penalties for the same act or practice.22 Read in context, “in addition to” in § 17.47 is intended to add independent remedies, not limit them by making them mere supplements that must be tied to other remedies as mere adjuncts.23 For example, § 17.47(d) provides for “such additional orders or 20 Id. 21 See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.44(a). 22 Id. § 17.43 (emphasis added). 23 Cf. Ditech Servicing, LLC v. Perez, 669 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. 2023); AIC Mgmt. v. Crews, 246 S.W.3d 640, 644 (Tex. 2008). 9 judgments as are necessary to compensate … or to restore money or property” to claimants, indicating an intent to cover shortfalls in the Act rather than merely bolster other remedies. The civil penalties remedy itself provides for a base civil penalty up to $10,000 and “an additional amount of not more than $250,000” for deceiving persons older than 65.24 Nothing in either provision indicates that the “additional” remedies have no effect unless accompanied by injunctive relief.25 We reject these jurisdictional challenges. THE CHALLENGED ORDERS I. The TRO issues are moot The State argues, and we agree, that the TRO and other injunctive relief pleaded by the State are moot. Three days after the trial court signed the modified TRO here on August 15, 2025, the quorum-breaking legislators returned to Texas and to their legislative duties.26 The redistricting bill passed soon thereafter, and was signed by Governor Abbott on August 29th, effective December 5, 2025.27 By letter dated October 23, 2025, the State informed us that because “Relators are no longer engaged in (and cannot engage in) the misconduct the State sought to prevent,” “the State no longer has any need or basis to seek prospective injunctive relief—either permanent or temporary.”28 Attached to the letter was the State’s 24 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.47(c). 25 See Texas v. Google LLC, 787 F. Supp.3d 357, 427 (E.D. Tex. 2025) (“Texas’s statutory scheme [in the DTPA] separately provides for equitable relief and legal relief, and the authorization to seek civil penalties does not require that the State obtain injunctive or other equitable relief.” (footnote omitted)). 26 Blaise Gainey, Texas House Democrats return to Capitol after two-week walkout, will have DPS escorts, August 18, 2025, https://www.kut.org/politics/2025-08-18/texas-democrats-return- to-austin-redistricting-california-congressional-maps (last visited Aug. 31, 2026). 27 Act of Aug. 26, 2025, 89th Leg, 2nd C.S., ch. 1, 2025 Tex. Gen. Laws 1, 180. 28 State’s Letter Br. 1 (Oct. 23, 2025). 10 Second Amended Petition filed the day before in the trial court deleting all claims for “Temporary and Permanent Injunctive Relief Pursuant to the DTPA.” The only substantive claims remaining in the current petition are (1) civil penalties under the DTPA; and (2) leave to seek forfeiture of PxP’s charter in quo warranto. “In civil causes generally, filing an amended petition that does not include a cause of action effectively nonsuits or voluntarily dismisses the omitted claims as of the time the pleading is filed. No hearing is necessary to effect the nonsuit.”29 The plaintiff’s right to nonsuit its claims “is unqualified and absolute” and “does not disappear when trial court proceedings are stayed pending interlocutory appeal.”30 “When a case becomes moot on appeal, a court must vacate any previously issued order or judgment associated with it.”31 This rule applies even if only part of an order or judgment is moot.32 Relators agree that the State’s claims for prospective injunctive relief are moot, but argue that validity of the TRO itself remains a live controversy, reminding us that “mootness is difficult to establish” unless “intervening events make it impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief.”33 But we cannot grant injunctive relief the State no longer seeks, nor can we grant Relators more or better relief from 29 FKM P’ship, Ltd. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Houston Sys., 255 S.W.3d 619, 632 (Tex. 2008). 30 Morath v. Lewis, 601 S.W.3d 785, 787–88 (Tex. 2020) (emphasis in original); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 162. 31 Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs. v. N.J., 644 S.W.3d 189, 192 (Tex. 2022). 32 See id. (vacating moot portion of trial court’s judgment but leaving remainder in place); Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys. v. Ferrell, 248 S.W.3d 151, 153–54 (Tex. 2007) (vacating trial court’s order as to nonsuiting plaintiff as moot, but reversing and dismissing remaining plaintiffs’ claims on other grounds); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 56.2 (“If a case is moot, the Supreme Court may, after notice to the parties, grant the petition and, without hearing argument, dismiss the case or the appealable portion of it without addressing the merits of the appeal.”) (emphasis added). 33 Relators’ Post-Submission Br. 1 (Apr. 10, 2026) (quoting Abbott v. Mexican Am. Legis. Caucus, 647 S.W.3d 681, 689 (Tex. 2022)). 11 a TRO we stayed nine months ago and now vacate. Relators urge us to address the TRO under the two primary “exceptions” to mootness: (1) capable of repetition, and (2) collateral consequences.34 We decline for the following reasons. First, we agree mootness may not apply to a party’s voluntary abandonment of injunctive pleadings if the change “‘provides no assurance’ that the action will not recur.”35 But the capable-of-repetition limit applies only if “a reasonable expectation exists that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again.”36 Having pleaded a claim relating only to funding quorum-breaking lawmakers, the Attorney General could not simply change his mind here;37 a repeat would require another quorum break by specific lawmakers that Relators would choose to financially support. Quorum-breaks in the Texas Legislature are not unprecedented,38 but fortunately for the viability of popular elections they are rare, and have generally proved ineffective in the end.39 Constitutional law governing re- districting litigation has been unsettled and evolving in recent years, but no one argues another quorum-break is expected in the near future. Second, Relators argue that the State’s remaining claims for civil penalties, quo warranto, and contempt are collateral consequences that prevent mootness. “But a dispute remains live under the collateral-consequences exception only if the 34 Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs. v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., 717 S.W.3d 854, 883 (Tex. 2025). 35 See Paxton v. Annunciation House, Inc., 719 S.W.3d 555, 590 (Tex. 2025) (quoting Matthews ex rel M.M. v. Kountze ISD, 484 S.W.3d 416, 419–20 (Tex. 2016)). 36 Grassroots Leadership, 717 S.W.3d at 884 (emphasis in original). 37 Cf. id. at 880–81. 38 See Hayden Betts, Denying quorum has been a Texas political strategy since 1870, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, August 3, 2025, https://www.texastribune.org/2025/08/03/texas-quorum-breaks- history/ (citing breaks in 1979, 2001, and 2021) (last visited Aug. 31, 2026). 39 Id. 12 otherwise-moot claim itself is the source of a sufficiently concrete collateral consequence. If the consequence would exist regardless, then the case remains moot.”40 Here, the State’s quo warranto pleading seeks to terminate PxP’s charter for “violations of criminal law,” not violations of the TRO.41 Likewise, the State sought civil penalties “per DTPA violation,” not per TRO violation. The validity of those claims is not before us, because in both claims any consequences would be due to alleged violations of the DTPA, not of the TRO. We agree that collateral consequences could include subsequent contempt proceedings if the threat is “sufficiently concrete.” Regarding restraints of speech, Texas courts generally do not follow the “collateral bar rule” requiring obedience to such orders until judicial relief is obtained.42 The general rule is that a party “may not be held guilty of contempt for refusing to obey a void order.”43 In our order of September 12th we noted several potentially fatal defects in the TRO itself, but held only on the limited evidentiary record there (which has not appreciably changed) that it was “far from clear” that the State had overcome the rule that prior restraints of speech are presumptively unconstitutional.44 And since the State conceded the TRO was no longer needed once the quorum-break ended, the TRO was in effect for 40 Grassroots Leadership, 717 S.W.3d at 883 (emphasis in original). 41 The State complained that PxP “persisted” in violating criminal law after the initial TRO but did not allege that violation of the TRO itself was sufficient for forfeiture. 42 See Ex parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. 1993) (plurality opinion); id. at 36–37 (Phillips, C.J., concurring); cf. id. at 64–65 (Hecht, J., dissenting) (holding protesters could not disregard TROs infringing free speech rights “without first exhausting all available efforts to have them set aside”). Relators here made reasonable efforts to exhaust all available efforts. 43 In re Luther, 620 S.W.3d 715, 722 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Ex parte Shaffer, 649 S.W.2d 300, 301–02 (Tex. 1983)). 44 In re Powered by People, No. 15-25-00140-CV, slip op. at *10 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. Sept. 12, 2025, order) (available at https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersion ID=21eb09d1-5ce7-4e9a-8a9f-7d1ac8ddb0b4&coa=coa15&DT=Order&MediaID=5054af02-cb 93-4439-81bd-1302c841da7f). 13 only 10 days. The State’s motion for contempt was neither heard nor decided by the trial court. As always, we hesitate to decide complaints that have yet to be presented to or ruled on by the trial court.45 The same is true for constitutional questions on an unsettled record regarding operations of a separate branch of Texas government.46 As we noted last September, “[i]t is a novel question whether expenses for food, transportation, and lodging outside Texas by officeholders who should be on duty in Texas when the Legislature is in session are legitimate political expenses or illegitimate personal ones.” There is also the question here whether the consumer- oriented DTPA even applies to political campaigns. We did not decide these questions then, and cannot decide them now since the TRO itself is moot. We disagree with today’s dissent that these issues can be easily decided on the record we already have. The Texas Constitution prohibits prior restraints of speech, but holds speakers “responsible for the abuse of that privilege.”47 The terms and validity of the TRO may be one element of the contempt, quo warranto, and civil penalty issues that remain pending below, but those should be addressed in the first instance by the trial court based on a full record. If the State proceeds with criminal contempt on remand,48 and evidence shows the funds raised here were intended to some extent for expenses that were clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt personal in nature, then the TRO may have been overbroad but not necessarily void; but if the 45 See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). 46 Cf. In re Abbott, 2026 WL 1354754, at *2 (Tex. May 15, 2026) (declining to resolve disputes in other branches that they can resolve for themselves). 47 TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8. The State’s motion for contempt and the video recording in record of the Fort Worth rally on August 9th suggest that far from being intimidated by the TRO here, O’Rourke reveled in it: “There are no refs in this game; f*** the rules, we are gonna win whatever it takes. We’re gonna take this to em’ in every way that we can.” 48 Civil contempt is “coercive in nature,” so it is no longer available for the nonsuited TRO. See In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 365 (Tex. 2011). 14 funds were intended for what were arguably political expenses then criminal contempt would be improper. Whatever the outcome, an appellate court can then review those issues on a full record by mandamus or a final judgment.49 Taking all these factors into consideration, we hold that the likelihood of contempt is not sufficiently concrete to avoid mootness here. As all claims for injunctive relief are moot, we vacate the trial court’s TRO. II. The Discovery order is moot Relators filed an “Emergency Motion for Reciprocal Expedited Discovery” in the Tarrant County court on August 20th, seeking discovery from the State to prepare for a temporary injunction hearing set for September 2nd. The trial court denied it on August 25th. That injunction hearing was stayed by our order, and the State has now nonsuited that claim. Accordingly, we vacate that order as moot. III. The Venue order denying transfer to El Paso County is moot On August 11, 2025, Relators filed in Tarrant County a motion to transfer venue to El Paso County, alleging that venue was mandatory there under § 65.023 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The Tarrant County court denied that motion four days later. Relators argue this was an abuse of discretion. We generally do not review orders granting or denying a motion to transfer venue until a final appeal.50 But a statutory exception requires us to do so here. Both state law and court rules prohibit interlocutory appeal of venue orders.51 But in 1995 the Legislature added § 15.0642 to the Civil Practice and Remedies 49 See, e.g., In re Janson, 614 S.W.3d 724, 728 (Tex. 2020) (holding mandamus was available to review finding of criminal contempt for violating an ambiguous order). 50 See In re AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 726 S.W.3d 573, 578–79 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. 2025, orig. proceeding). 51 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.064(a); TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(6). 15 Code to authorize mandamus review “to enforce the mandatory venue provisions of this chapter.”52 That chapter includes Subchapter B, listing a dozen or so mandatory venue rules, as well as a catch-all rule extending to “any other statute prescribing mandatory venue.”53 Relators argue that § 65.023 is such a statute, requiring mandatory venue in El Paso County where both Relators are domiciled. We thus have mandamus jurisdiction to review whether the Tarrant County court erred by failing to transfer venue.54 Section 65.023 provides that “a writ of injunction against a party who is a resident of this state shall be tried in a district or county court in the county in which the party is domiciled.”55 The State does not dispute that both Relators are domiciled in El Paso County. But an injunction is a remedy that could be tacked on to a multitude of lawsuits, so Texas courts for at least 60 years have held this mandatory venue provision applies only to suits “in which the relief sought is purely or primarily injunctive.”56 The State claims its lawsuit was not primarily injunctive, but instead “primarily seeks to impose civil penalties under the DTPA.” In reviewing this issue, we employ “a commonsense analysis” that asks whether injunctive relief was “the dominant purpose or central focus of the lawsuit” or was “merely ancillary 52 See Act of May 8, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 138, § 5, 1995 TEX. GEN. LAWS 978, 981 (codified at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.0642). 53 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.016; see id. § 15.001(b) (defining “proper venue” as “the venue required by the mandatory provisions of Subchapter B or another statute prescribing mandatory venue”) (emphasis added). 54 See In re Fox River Real Estate Holdings, Inc., 596 S.W.3d 759, 763, 765 (Tex. 2020) (analyzing applicability of mandatory venue in TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 65.023 in mandamus proceeding pursuant to § 15.0642); Wagner v. Apache Corp., 627 S.W.3d 277, 288 (Tex. 2021) (“[I]nterlocutory review of a trial court’s failure to enforce a mandatory venue provision is available only through a writ of mandamus.”). 55 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 65.023(a). 56 Ex parte Coffee, 328 S.W.2d 283, 287 (Tex. 1959); see In re Fox River, 596 S.W.3d at 761; In re Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 733, 736 (Tex. 1998). 16 to the primary relief sought.”57 The difficulty here is that a “commonsense analysis” of the facts is different today than it was when the TRO was signed. Back then, the parties hotly disputed whether the primary relief the State sought was the injunctive relief rather than the civil penalties, as the State pleaded both. That was a close question because both are listed as remedies in the same DTPA section,58 and both provide the same base penalty for violating either a DTPA injunction or the DTPA itself.59 But that dispute became moot when the State voluntarily dropped all its claims for injunctive relief. As matters currently stand in the trial court, a “commonsense analysis” could reach only one conclusion: the primary relief sought is not injunctive relief since the State nonsuited all such claims. An appellate court after a final trial would have to “consider the entire record”—including that nonsuit—and a transfer to El Paso County would “in no event be harmless error and shall be reversible error.”60 We would not do anyone any favors by transferring these proceedings to a county for a plenary trial that would be certain to be reversed on final appeal. But we need not ignore the intervening developments under the unusual 57 In re Fox River, 596 S.W.3d at 763 (holding injunctive relief was ancillary to primary goal of removing general partner and recovering monetary damages); see also In re Cont’l Airlines, 988 S.W.2d at 736 (holding suit for declaratory and injunctive relief over flights at Love Field was primarily for declaration of rights rather than injunction); Brown v. Gulf Television Co., 306 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex. 1957) (holding suit to remove television antenna interfering with airport runway and seeking damages as alternative relief was primarily injunctive). 58 See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.47(a), (c). 59 See id. § 17.47(e) (“Any person who violates the terms of an injunction under this section shall forfeit and pay to the state a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 per violation, not to exceed $50,000.”); (c) (providing for “a civil penalty to be paid to the state in an amount of … not more than $10,000 per violation,” plus “an additional amount of not more than $250,000” if the act or practice sought “money or other property from a consumer who was 65 years of age or older”). 60 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.064(b). 17 circumstances here. Courts can do nothing without jurisdiction,61 so they must consider intervening events that raise a question whether a dispute has been rendered moot. “Events taking place subsequent to the issuance of a temporary injunction” are generally not considered “unless such occurrences render the cause for injunctive relief entirely moot or academic.”62 In such cases, they must be considered “for the purpose of determining whether the issue is moot, a jurisdictional question.”63 Viewing the entire record, the Tarrant County court reached the right result even if perhaps for the wrong reason. Relators also argue that mandatory venue lay in El Paso because actions “to stay proceedings in a suit shall be brought in the county in which the suit is pending.”64 But the State did not seek to stay a suit pending in El Paso; it sought to stay Relators from pursuing that suit. Relators’ contrary argument here actually cuts both ways; PxP too would have had to file its anti-suit TRO in Tarrant County, which it failed to do.65 The solution to competing anti-suit orders is not to stymie either court from hearing them. Here, no other basis for enforcing mandatory venue is cited by the parties other than those we have rejected. Accordingly, the State’s nonsuit thus renders moot 61 Kelley v. Homminga, 706 S.W.3d 829, 833 (Tex. 2025) (“When a court lacks jurisdiction over a case, the only correct disposition is dismissal because the court lacks power to do anything else.”). 62 Univ. of Tex. v. Morris, 344 S.W.2d 426, 429 (Tex. 1961); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.220(c) (“Each court of appeals may, on affidavit or otherwise, as the court may determine, ascertain the matters of fact that are necessary to the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.”). 63 Sabine Offshore Serv., Inc. v. City of Port Arthur, 595 S.W.2d 840, 841 (Tex. 1979). 64 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.012. 65 It appears that § 15.012, like its counterpart in § 65.023(b) of the same Code, was directed not at dominant-jurisdiction disputes but “‘to protect the judgments and processes of one court from interference by another by direct attack’ and to ‘prevent[] a