Mills v. New York City

24-3308 Mills v. New York City In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit AUGUST TERM 2025 No. 24-3308-cv CHARLES MILLS, CRAIG SOTOMAYOR, AND BRADEN HOLLIDAY, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, Defendant-Appellee. __________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York __________ ARGUED: NOVEMBER 18, 2025 DECIDED: NOVEMBER 10, 2026 ________________ Before: RAGGI, LIVINGSTON, and PARK, Circuit Judges. ________________ Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Rakoff, J.) dismissing their complaint raising Second Amendment challenges to various New York City rules governing the acquisition, sale, registration, and carry of handguns. Plaintiffs submit that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint (1) in part for failure plausibly to allege the injury-in-fact element of standing necessary for the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); and (2) in part for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted based on a determination that the rules and regulations at issue did not regulate conduct covered by the plain language of the Second Amendment as necessary to satisfy the first step of analysis under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 20 (2022); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We identify no error in the dismissal of certain claims for lack of jurisdiction. As to dismissal for failure to state a claim, plaintiffs’ fees challenge was correctly dismissed in light of Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 165–69 (2d Cir. 2013). Certain of plaintiffs’ other claims, however, should not have been dismissed at step one of the Bruen analysis. AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART. _________________ AMY L. BELLANTONI, The Bellantoni Law Firm, PLLC, Scarsdale, NY, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. JEREMY W. SHWEDER, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for Muriel Goode-Trufant, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY (Richard Dearing, Devin Slack, Geoffrey E. Curfman, on the brief), for Defendant- Appellee. Janet Carter, William J. Taylor, Jr., Priyanka Gupta Sen, Everytown Law, New York, NY, Sana S. Mesiya, Everytown Law, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae Everytown for Gun Safety, in support of Defendant-Appellee. Paul D. Clement, Erin E. Murphy, Matthew D. Rowen, Kevin Wynosky, Clement & Murphy, PLLC, Alexandria, 2  VA, for Amicus Curiae The National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc., in support of Plaintiffs-Appellants. _________________ REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judge: Plaintiffs are New York State residents who appeal from a judgment entered on December 5, 2024, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Jed S. Rakoff, Judge) dismissing their complaint raising Second Amendment challenges to certain New York City (“City”) rules governing the acquisition, sale, registration, and carry of handguns. See U.S. Const. amend. II; Mills v. New York City, 758 F. Supp. 3d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2024). Plaintiffs submit that insofar as the district court dismissed certain of their claims for lack of jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), the court erred in concluding that they failed plausibly to allege the injury-in-fact necessary to satisfy the standing requirement for jurisdiction. Plaintiffs further submit that insofar as the district court dismissed other claims—whether considered as facial or as-applied challenges—for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court erred in concluding that the challenged rules regulated conduct not covered by the plain language of the Second Amendment as necessary to satisfy the first step of analysis under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen (“Bruen”), 597 U.S. 1, 20 (2022). We identify no error in the dismissal of certain claims for lack of jurisdiction. As to those dismissed for failure to state a claim, plaintiffs’ fees challenge was correctly dismissed in light of Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 165–69 (2d Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs’ other challenges—to rules (1) limiting to one the number of handguns that a person can carry at any particular time, (2) mandating a 90-day waiting period between handgun purchases, and (3) limiting to two the number 3 of handguns that a person can register on a carry license—should not have been dismissed at the first step of the Bruen analysis. At that step a court properly asks whether the activities being regulated fall within “the normal and ordinary meaning of the Second Amendment’s language,” i.e., the right “to keep and bear Arms,” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted). Each of the activities at issue warrants an affirmative answer to that question. This is not to conclude that the challenged rules are necessarily unconstitutional. We hold simply that the constitutionality of these rules must be determined at the second step of the Bruen analysis, which requires the government to show that a challenged rule is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at 24. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in part, vacate the judgment in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. BACKGROUND In recounting the background to this case, we follow the standard applicable to judicial review of motions to dismiss, i.e., we accept all allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint as true, and we consider those pleadings, as well as all matters of proper judicial notice and public record, in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. See Melendez v. City of New York, 16 F.4th 992, 996 (2d Cir. 2021). I. The Challenged Rules The rules subject to Second Amendment challenge in this case are as follows: 4  (1) Authorization requirements for the lawful acquisition of a handgun. See 38 R.C.N.Y. §§ 5-22(a)(9), 5-25(a), (c). 1 (2) A rule authorizing persons “to own only the handgun(s) that are listed on their license.” Id. § 5-22(a)(8). 2 (3) A rule authorizing at most two handguns to be listed on a carry license. See id. § 5-25(d)(4) (repealed 2024). 3 (4) A rule limiting to one the number of handguns that licensees can “carr[y] on their person at any time.” Id. § 5-22(a)(7). (5) A rule limiting to one the number of handguns that licensees can purchase, acquire, or transfer within a 90-day period, and the reporting 1 Former 38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-25(a)—in effect at the time plaintiffs initiated this action and recodified in 2024 as § 5-25(c)—required a person with a gun license to obtain “prior written authorization from the Division Head, License Division” to acquire a handgun. Section 5-22(a)(9) states that a “licensee shall not purchase or replace a handgun prior to obtaining” such authorization. Current § 5-25(a) states that a licensee “who acquire[s] and attempt[s] to register more than one (1) firearm in a ninety (90) day period, shall not be granted an authorization form to take possession of an additional firearm until the ninety (90) day period has elapsed.” 2 Title 38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-22(a)(8) requires a person to register every handgun that he owns on one of his licenses. 3 Challenged § 5-25(d)(4)—in effect at the time plaintiffs initiated this action—permitted holders of carry licenses to register no more than two handguns to those licenses, with the Division Head of the License Division afforded discretion to “limit to one the number of handguns that appear on the carry handgun license when the licensee’s needs do not require possession of two handguns.” See id. § 5-25(d)(4)(i). 5  requirements imposed on firearms dealers to ensure compliance with that limitation. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 10-302.1(a)–(e). 4 (6) Fees charged to apply for and to renew a handgun license. See id. § 10-131(a)(2). 5 II. Plaintiffs’ Claims Plaintiff Braden Holliday, a Bronx resident, alleges that he has been unable to obtain the licenses necessary for him to possess and carry a handgun in the City because he cannot afford to pay the mandatory $340 application fee and attendant $88.50 fingerprinting fee. Nor can he afford the $340 renewal fee that comes due every third year after licensing. He asserts that, but for these fees, he would have submitted a satisfactory application and been granted a handgun license. Plaintiff Charles Mills, a Queens resident, holds two City handgun licenses, one allowing him to keep handguns in his home (“premises license”), the other 4N.Y.C. Admin Code § 10-302.1(a) imposes a 90-day waiting period on firearms dealers in selling or transferring a handgun to the same person. Section 10-302.1(b) imposes the same 90-day waiting period on a handgun customer. Sections 10-302.1(c)–(e) require dealers to ensure compliance with this limitation by contacting the police department or other relevant licensing authority prior to selling or transferring a handgun and by keeping records of “the efforts made by such dealer to ensure compliance with the requirements of this section, any exception or exemption set forth in this section that such dealer reasonably believes would authorize the disposal of such [handgun], and the grounds for such dealer’s belief that such exception or exemption applies.” 5 N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(14) authorizes the New York City Council to set handgun license fees. Since 2004, the fee to secure and (every three years) to renew such a license has been $340. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 10-131(a)(2). License applicants must also pay for fingerprinting, for which the New York City Police Department charges a fee of $88.50. NYPD License Division, New Application Instructions, https://perma.cc/W56H-CAW5 (last visited Sep. 29, 2026). Elsewhere in New York State, other than Nassau and Westchester Counties, such license fees are capped at ten dollars. N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(14). 6 allowing him to carry a concealed handgun on his person (“carry license”). Mills alleges that he has registered multiple handguns to his premises license. But, insofar as he can only carry a handgun registered to his carry license, see N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(15) (making it Class A Misdemeanor to carry firearm not registered to carry license), Mills asserts that his right to bear arms is being unconstitutionally limited by City rules prohibiting him from registering more than two of his handguns to his carry license and from carrying more than one of these handguns on his person at a time. Mills submits that but for this regulatory scheme, he would register more of his handguns to his carry license and routinely carry a second, back-up handgun on his person for self-defense. He further asserts that but for the 90-day limitation on handgun acquisitions, he would have purchased a Glock handgun from a Queens gun shop within that time frame. Plaintiff Craig Sotomayor, a resident of Nassau County, holds a New York State concealed carry handgun license as well as a City special license, the latter of which allows non-City residents such as himself with valid out-of-City carry licenses to carry handguns within the City. Like Mills, Sotomayor challenges City rules prohibiting him from registering more than two of his many handguns to his City special license and from carrying more than one handgun at a time for self- defense. He further challenges the 90-day limitation period for handgun acquisitions and the allegedly unduly burdensome prior-authorization process. III. Dismissal Plaintiffs filed this action in the Southern District of New York on August 23, 2022. The City moved to dismiss all claims under either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of the standing necessary to support jurisdiction, or Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. While the motion was pending, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) (clarifying how Bruen test applies to regulations alleged to constrain 7 Second Amendment rights), prompting the district court to order further briefing. In its supplemental filing, the City advised that on August 12, 2024, the version of 38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-25 challenged by plaintiffs had been repealed and replaced with a new version that, inter alia, no longer strictly limits the number of handguns that can be registered to a carry license, see id. § 5-25(g)(3). On December 5, 2024, the district court entered judgment granting the City’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint in its entirety. As to the City’s standing challenges, the district court found that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the requisite injury-in-fact from certain handgun acquisition, registration, and disposal requirements and, accordingly, dismissed those claims for lack of jurisdiction. See Mills v. New York City, 758 F. Supp. 3d at 260–61. At the same time, the district court found that one or more plaintiffs had demonstrated standing to challenge the one-gun-carry rule, the 90-day rule for acquiring a further handgun, the repealed two-gun-carry-license rule (for purposes of retrospective damages), and fees charged to acquire and maintain a handgun license. See id. at 261–63. Nevertheless, it dismissed these claims for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted, concluding, at the first step of the Bruen analysis, that the rules at issue did not regulate activity covered by the plain language of the Second Amendment. See id. at 263–68. This timely appeal followed. DISCUSSION We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss, whether for lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim. See Mosaic Health, Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, 156 F.4th 68, 75 (2d Cir. 2025) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)), petition for cert. filed, No. 25-1070 (Mar. 11, 2026); Bugliotti v. Rep. of Argentina, 67 F.4th 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2023) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)). As earlier noted, on such review, we accept all 8 factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in plaintiffs’ favor. See Melendez v. City of New York, 16 F.4th at 996. Nevertheless, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Further, when, as here, facial claims are asserted, plaintiffs must plausibly allege that the challenged rules are unconstitutional in all applications, making facial claims “the most difficult to mount successfully.” City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 415 (2015) (alteration accepted) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)); see also National Shooting Sports Found., Inc. v. James, 144 F.4th 98, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2025) (defining burden of facial challenge at motion to dismiss stage), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 2724 (2026). I. Dismissal of Claims for Lack of Jurisdiction Plaintiffs submit that the district court erred in dismissing their claims challenging the City’s handgun acquisition and registration requirements for lack of jurisdiction. 6 We are not persuaded. To present a “case” or “controversy” supporting the exercise of federal jurisdiction, U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has standing to sue. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013). Three elements constitute the “irreducible constitutional minimum” for Article III standing: (1) an injury in fact, i.e., “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 6 Insofar as plaintiffs do not appeal the Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal of their claim challenging the City’s handgun disposal requirements, we deem that argument abandoned and “decline to exercise our discretion” to review that claim further in this opinion. United States v. Prawl, 149 F.4th 176, 187 (2d Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1811 (2026). 9 hypothetical”; (2) a causal connection, i.e., “the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant”; and (3) redressability, i.e., “it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; alterations accepted); accord Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. at 408–09; Coalition for Competitive Elec., Dynergy Inc. v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d 41, 58 (2d Cir. 2018). In considering these requirements, a court is properly mindful that “standing is not dispensed in gross; rather, plaintiffs must demonstrate standing for each claim that they press and for each form of relief that they seek.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021). Applying these principles here, we identify no error in the district court’s dismissal of certain claims for failure to demonstrate Article III standing. A. The Purchase-Authorization Rules Insofar as plaintiffs challenge the rules requiring licensees to procure official authorization to purchase a handgun, see 38 R.C.N.Y. §§ 5-22(a)(9), 5-25(a), (c), the district court correctly determined that no plaintiff had alleged a cognizable injury traceable to those rules. While the rules impose an administrative obligation on licensees seeking to acquire a handgun, the obligation does not cause constitutional injury because the rules themselves mandate that the NYPD “will provide a handgun authorization form” to qualified licensees when requested. Id. § 5-25(c) (emphasis added). Neither Mills nor Sotomayor, each of whom possesses both premises and carry licenses, alleges that he was unable to purchase a handgun because of the purchase-authorization rules. Rather, as the district court noted, Mills alleges only that he was unable to purchase a handgun while authorization forms were temporarily unavailable on the NYPD website. Any injury from such delay, however, was caused by that administrative failure, not by the purchase-authorization rules themselves. Similarly, to the extent Holliday 10 alleges that he cannot obtain a handgun because of the high cost of the application fee—a point we discuss further infra at section II.F—that too is not an injury caused by the purchase-authorization rules. Thus, the district court correctly determined that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate standing to challenge the purchase- authorization rules and properly dismissed that claim for lack of jurisdiction. B. The Handgun-Registration Rule In a related claim, plaintiffs challenge the requirement that a person authorized to acquire a handgun register that gun to a valid license before he takes possession of the weapon. See 38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-22(a)(8). As the district court observed, the challenge is pleaded in a cursory fashion, with no allegation of specific injury to any plaintiff’s right to keep and bear arms. See Mills v. New York City, 758 F. Supp. 3d at 261. Because a “generalized grievance” is insufficient to demonstrate standing, United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743 (1995), the district court correctly dismissed plaintiffs’ handgun-registration-rule claim for failure to demonstrate the standing necessary for jurisdiction. II. Dismissal for Failure To State a Plausible Second Amendment Claim The district court recognized, and the City does not dispute, plaintiffs’ standing to challenge rules (1) limiting to one the number of handguns that a licensed person can carry at any particular time, (2) prohibiting the acquisition of more than one handgun during any 90-day period, (3) limiting to two the number of handguns that can be registered to a carry license, and (4) imposing fees to acquire and maintain a gun license. At issue on this appeal is the district court’s dismissal of these challenges for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs’ fees challenge, which is foreclosed by this court’s decision in Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d at 165–69, upholding the very 11 fees here at issue. As for the remaining claims, we conclude that they should not have been dismissed at step one of the Bruen analysis and, accordingly, we vacate the challenged judgment in that respect and remand to the district court for further consideration of these claims. To explain, we begin by summarizing relevant principles of Second Amendment analysis. A. Bruen’s Two-Step Analysis for Second Amendment Claims The Second Amendment states that “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. The Supreme Court has construed the Amendment to guarantee individuals the “right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation,” i.e., for potential self-defense, without regard to service in a militia. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008); see id. at 579 (observing that Second Amendment codifies “individual,” not “collective,” right to keep and bear arms); Bruen, 597 U.S. at 8–10 (holding that Second Amendment affords individuals right to carry handguns for self-defense outside home, as well as to possess such weapons inside home); accord United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 690 (citing Bruen in reiterating that Second Amendment “right to keep and bear arms . . . secures for Americans a means of self-defense”). Further, the Court has recognized the Second Amendment to apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010). Mindful that the right protected by the Second Amendment, like other constitutional rights, is “not unlimited,” the Court has set forth a two-step framework for determining when government action infringes that right. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Hemani, 608 U.S. 772, 780 (2026); see New York State Firearms Ass’n v. James, 157 F.4th 232, 244 (2d Cir. 2025). At the first step of the Bruen analysis, a court asks whether “the 12 Second Amendment’s plain text”—i.e., its acknowledgment of “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”—“covers an individual’s conduct” that the government proposes to regulate. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24. If conduct is so covered, then it is “presumptively” protected, in which case a challenged rule is constitutional only if, at the second step of analysis, the government shows the rule to be “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. As the Supreme Court recently stated in clarifying the two-step Bruen framework, “when the Government regulates arms-bearing conduct, . . . it bears the burden to justify its regulation.” United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 691 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). In short, the focus of the Bruen step- one inquiry is on what is being regulated, to determine if it is conduct covered by the text of the Second Amendment. The focus of the Bruen step-two inquiry is on how and why a regulation operates, to determine its consistency with historic firearm regulation. See Wolford v. Lopez, 609 U.S. 185, 196–97 (2026); see also id. at 217–21 (Barrett, J., concurring) (detailing “how” and “why” inquiry at Bruen step two); United States v. Hemani, 608 U.S. at 780. Because we here consider whether the district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs failed to state a claim at Bruen step one, we discuss that step further. The Supreme Court has instructed that the first step of the Bruen analysis is essentially “textual,” i.e., focused on “the normal and ordinary meaning of the Second Amendment’s language” pronouncing “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, mindful that the Second Amendment did not confer a new right but, rather, “codified a pre-existing right,” one known at English law even before the Founding, the Supreme Court has approved looking to history and tradition in 13 determining the meaning of the text. Id. (emphasis in original). 7 Because the Court has itself already done so in construing many of the Second Amendment’s key words, lower courts can simply follow those precedents. Thus, the Court has ruled that “the people” referred to in the Second Amendment means “all members of the political community,” not some subset thereof, such that the referenced “right” is afforded to the people as “individual[s],” not “collective[ly].” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. at 579–80 (rejecting argument that Second Amendment rights pertain only to militia service). As for the substance of the right, i.e., “to keep and bear Arms,” the Court has construed “Arms” to mean “all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.” Id. at 582. It has recognized “the most natural reading of ‘keep Arms’ in the Second Amendment [to be] to ‘have weapons,’” in short, to possess them. Id. As for the word “bear,” the Court has stated that it means simply to “carry.” Id. at 584. Nevertheless, the Court has instructed that “[w]hen used with ‘arms,’” the word “bear” is properly understood to “refer[] to carrying for a particular purpose—confrontation,” i.e., for self-defense. Id. “Putting all of these textual elements together,” the Court has thus construed the text of the Second Amendment to “guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in 7 Looking to history and tradition at step one of Bruen should not be confused with doing so at step two. The former is done to construe constitutional text to determine whether it covers the conduct at issue; the latter is done to determine whether a challenged rule regulating that conduct can be located within “the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24; see Wolford v. Lopez, 609 U.S. at 210–12 (looking to historical tradition at time of enactment of both Second and Fourteenth Amendments when considering challenge to state rule); see also id. at 213–14 (Barrett, J., concurring) (observing that history plays different role at two steps of Bruen analysis, at first step to elucidate how contemporaries understood phrase “keep and bear Arms,” and at second step to identify historical laws that pursued analogous goal in analogous way). 14 case of confrontation.” Id. at 592. Thus, at the first step of the Bruen analysis, the proper inquiry is (1) “does the law apply to ‘the people’—which is to say, all members of the political community”; (2) “does it concern any form of ‘Arms,’ i.e., any weapon customarily used for offensive or defensive purposes”; and (3) “does the law place any restrictions on either the ‘keep[ing]’ (i.e., possession) or the ‘bear[ing]’ (i.e., carrying) of arms?” Wolford v. Lopez, 609 U.S. at 195 (brackets in original; some internal quotation marks omitted). If the answer to these questions is “yes,” then the Second Amendment covers the conduct being regulated, and a presumption of unconstitutionality arises without regard to the regulation’s scope, prevalence, or rationale. Those matters are properly considered as relevant to a historical tradition assessment at step two of the Bruen analysis. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24; accord Wolford v. Lopez, 609 U.S. at 195. 8 In defending the dismissal of some claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the City does not dispute that plaintiffs are among “the people” referenced in the Second Amendment or that the conduct being regulated concerns arms, specifically, handguns, which the Supreme Court has recognized as “the quintessential self- defense weapon” in common use. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 47 (quoting District of 8 The trio of questions identified in Wolford as pertinent to Bruen step one analysis now supplants those articulated by this court in Antonyuk v. James, 120 F.4th 941 (2d Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1900 (2025), i.e., (1) “whether the conduct at issue is protected” by the normal and ordinary meaning of the text of the Second Amendment as construed by the Supreme Court; (2) whether the weapon concerned is “in common use” for self- defense; and (3) “whether the affected individuals are ‘ordinary, law-abiding, adult citizens’ and thus ‘part of “the people” whom the Second Amendment protects,’” id. at 982 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 31–32). To the extent the district court thought a more searching inquiry was necessary lest Bruen step one be satisfied “whenever a regulation has the slightest connection to guns,” Mills v. New York City, 758 F. Supp. 3d at 264 (emphasis added), we understand Wolford to require some restriction on conduct protected by constitutional text, not merely a connection. In any event, we are bound by the Supreme Court’s clarification of the appropriate inquiry at Bruen step one. 15 Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629). Thus, the only Wolford question requiring consideration at step one of the Bruen analysis is whether the rules pertain to the “‘keep[ing]’ (i.e., possession) or ‘bear[ing]’ (i.e., carrying) of arms.” Wolford v. Lopez, 609 U.S. at 195. We note one caveat. As this court has recognized, Second Amendment protection can extend to conduct “ancillary” to the actual possession and carry of firearms—e.g., the acquisition of such weapons or of the ammunition necessary to use them for self-defense. That is because, as this court has observed, “to ‘keep’ and ‘bear’ arms, one must also be able to acquire them and maintain them in operable condition.” United States v. Vereen, 152 F.4th 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1519 (2026); see also Gazzola v. Hochul, 88 F.4th 186, 196 (2d Cir. 2023) (“The right to keep arms, necessarily involves the right to purchase them, to keep them in a state of efficiency for use, and to purchase and provide ammunition suitable for such arms, and to keep them in repair.” (quoting Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 178 (1871))). Nevertheless, mindful that the same conclusion does not apply to all ancillary conduct, we have held the Second Amendment to cover such conduct “only . . . to the extent that it is necessary to the realization of the textually specified right to keep and bear arms.” New York State Firearms Ass’n v. James, 157 F.4th at 244 (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration accepted). Thus, we have held that a challenged rule pertaining to ancillary conduct will be deemed covered by the plain language of the Second Amendment at step one of the Bruen analysis if it “meaningfully constrain[s]” an individual’s ability to possess and carry firearms. United States v. Vereen, 152 F.4th at 95 (holding that criminal prohibition on transportation of firearm into state of residence from outside state did not “meaningfully constrain the right to possess and carry arms” because person could still acquire firearm (presumably more easily) in home state (emphasis in original)). But where a challenged rule proposes to regulate, not ancillary conduct, but the actual keeping or bearing of arms, step one is satisfied 16 without regard to the degree of constraint, and infringement is presumed unless the government carries its burden at Bruen step two. To conclude otherwise would be to import into Bruen’s step-one inquiry the very “means-end” test that the Supreme Court there specifically rejected. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 18–19 (rejecting inquiry focused on “how close [challenged] law comes to the core” of Second Amendment rights as compared to “severity of the law’s burden” on those rights). Mindful of these precedents, we conclude that, with the exception of those pertaining to fees, see infra at section II.F, plaintiffs’ claims should not have been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) at step one of the Bruen analysis. B. General Errors At the outset, we note two errors that appear generally to have informed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims. 1. The Second Amendment Does Not Protect Against Only Permanent Infringement of the Right To Keep and Bear Arms Before undertaking Bruen step-one analysis of plaintiffs’ specific challenges, the district court distinguished this case from those in which the Supreme Court recently discussed the right to keep and bear arms on the ground that none of the rules here at issue “operates to permanently deprive applicants of their right to own and carry firearms.” Mills v. New York City, 758 F. Supp. 3d at 264 (collecting cases from Heller to Rahimi). To the extent this suggests that the Second Amendment protects against only permanent or complete deprivations of the right to keep and bear arms, that is mistaken. To explain, as indicated supra at 13–15, the focus of the step-one inquiry is on what is being regulated. If the conduct at issue is covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment, how the challenged rule regulates that conduct—e.g., whether permanently or temporarily—is a matter for consideration at step two of 17 the Bruen analysis by reference to the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, i.e., whether tradition supports regulation to the degree at issue. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 19–20. Certainly, none of the Supreme Court cases cited by the district court references the permanent/temporary distinction drawn by the district court, much less does any do so in identifying conduct covered by the Second Amendment. Rather, the Supreme Court having identified the Bruen step-one analysis as textual, it has rejected atextual distinctions in identifying what conduct is covered by the Second Amendment. Thus, just as the Court has observed that “[n]othing in the Second Amendment’s text draws a home/public distinction with respect to the right to keep and bear arms,” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 32, we are obliged to recognize that nothing in the text draws a temporary/permanent distinction with respect to the right to keep and bear arms. Further, to the extent history and tradition can inform text, see supra at 13–14 & n.7, the district court did not cite, and the City does not point, to anything supporting a conclusion that the right to keep and bear arms was historically understood to protect against only permanent, not temporary, deprivations of the right. 9 As the Supreme Court has observed, history and tradition show that the right to keep and bear arms, particularly in public, has been “subject to well-defined restrictions governing the intent for which one could carry arms, the manner of carry, or the exceptional circumstances under which one could not carry arms.” Id. at 38 (emphasis added). But whether modern 9 See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24–25 (drawing analogy to First Amendment, where government bears burden to show that regulated expressive conduct “belongs to a historic and traditional category of constitutionally unprotected speech” (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration accepted)). After Heller and before Bruen, several of our sister circuits placed a similar burden on the government at the first step of the then-operative test. While Bruen rejected the second, means-end step of that test, the Court deemed the first step “broadly consistent with Heller.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 18–19. 18 regulations are analogous to such traditional restrictions is a question on which the government bears the burden at step two of the Bruen analysis regardless of whether the challenged limitation effects a permanent or temporary deprivation of the right. No different conclusion about what is covered by the “right of the people to keep and bear arms” can be drawn from the fact that what the Amendment prescribes is that such right “shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II (emphasis added). The two-step inquiry established by Bruen suggests that “infringement,” i.e., a constitutional violation of the Second Amendment, is properly identified at the conclusion of both steps. See supra at 16–17. But neither the presumption of infringement that can arise at step one, nor the conclusive identification of infringement that can be made at step two depend on a complete deprivation of the people’s right to keep or bear arms. At the time the Second Amendment was adopted, the word “infringe” was understood to mean “to violate,” “to destroy,” or “to hinder,” SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (9th ed. 1790), also “to violate, break, transgress,” NOAH WEBSTER, A COMPENDIOUS DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1806), or to “destroy or hinder,” NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828). 10 These definitions make clear that permanent or complete deprivations of a right certainly constitute “infringement,” but they do not limit the word to such circumstances. “Infringe” also reaches temporary or partial deprivations. See, e.g., SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (9th ed. 1790) (defining “hinder” as “[t]o obstruct; to stop; to impede”); NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) (defining “hinder” as “[t]o stop; to interrupt; to obstruct; to impede or prevent 10 The City points us to no different definitions from the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. 19 from moving forward by any means”). Indeed, writings contemporary to the Founding demonstrate particular concern with rights being infringed incrementally or by degree, even when not permanently or completely destroyed. 11 Finally, constr