Councilmember J. Young, Jr. and Strawberry Mansion Community Concern v. City of Philadelphia
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket688 C.D. 2026
JudgeCOHN JUBELIRER
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Councilmember Jeffery Young, Jr. :
on behalf of and as representative :
of Council of the City of Philadelphia :
and Strawberry Mansion Community :
Concern :
:
v. : No. 688 C.D. 2026
: Argued: October 13, 2026
City of Philadelphia, City of :
Philadelphia Zoning Board of :
Adjustment, Pennrose, LLC, :
Strawberry Mansion Housing LLC, :
and Philadelphia Housing Authority :
:
Appeal of: Jeffery Young, Jr. :
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge (P.)
HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: November 17, 2026
Jeffery Young, Jr. (Councilmember Young), a member of the Council of the
City of Philadelphia (Council), appeals, on behalf and as a representative of Council,
from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (common
pleas) that upheld the Decision of the City of Philadelphia Zoning Board of
Adjustment (Board), which approved use and dimensional variances for an
affordable housing development project located at 2500 N. 31st Street (N. 31st Street
Property) being developed by the Philadelphia Housing Authority (Authority),
Pennrose LLC, and Strawberry Mansion Housing, LLC (together, Pennrose)
(collectively, Applicants). After accepting Councilmember Young’s untimely
appeal nunc pro tunc, common pleas concluded that Councilmember Young had
waived two of the three issues he asserted and that the Board did not err or abuse its
discretion in granting the requested variances.
On appeal, Councilmember Young argues common pleas erred in finding that
he waived all but one issue and that the Board erred in granting the variances because
Applicants did not meet their burden of proof for obtaining variances under the
Philadelphia Zoning Code (Code),1 Title 14 of THE PHILADELPHIA CODE (2012). The
Authority and Pennrose reply that the Board’s Decision should be affirmed, either
because Councilmember Young’s issues have been waived or on the merits of the
Board’s Decision. The Authority, joined by Pennrose, also argues that common
pleas abused its discretion in granting Councilmember Young nunc pro tunc relief
thereby allowing him to file his appeal to common pleas after 30 days of the Board’s
Decision. Pennrose separately asserts that Councilmember Young lacked standing
to appeal the Board’s Decision.2
I. BACKGROUND
A. Proceedings Before the Board
This appeal concerns the development of the N. 31st Street Property as part
of a scattered-site affordable housing development project that utilizes multiple
parcels located throughout the Strawberry Mansion neighborhood (the Project),
which would have between 55 and 57 units overall. (Board Decision, Findings of
1
The Code is available at https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/philadelphia/latest/
phildadelphia_pa/0-0-286773 (last visited November 16, 2026).
2
This matter was argued together with Councilmember Jeffery Young, Jr. on behalf of and
as representative of Council of the City of Philadelphia v. City of Philadelphia (Pa. Cmwlth., No.
360 C.D. 2026), as they involve overlapping legal issues, particularly as to Councilmember
Young’s standing.
2
Fact (FOF) ¶¶ 8, 16; Conclusion of Law (COL) ¶ 13.) The Philadelphia Land Bank
conveyed these parcels, which are vacant lots and described as distressed, blighted,
or subject to “short-term dumping,” to the Authority for its use and approved
Applicants’ efforts to obtain building permits for the Project. (FOF ¶¶ 9, 13, 27;
COL ¶ 12.) Thus, the Authority owns the Project, which is being developed by
Pennrose. (FOF ¶ 9; COL ¶ 13.) One goal of the Project was to ensure affordable
quality units in the area. (FOF ¶¶ 13, 16, 29; COL ¶¶ 13, 17.) The N. 31st Street
Property is located within the RSA-5 (Residential Single-Family Attached-5) zoning
district. (FOF ¶ 1.)
The N. 31st Street Property consists of a 6,325 square-foot vacant lot located
at the northwest corner of North 31st and West Cumberland Streets. (FOF ¶ 19;
COL ¶ 12.) This parcel appears to have been used as a “pocket park, although no
evidence was submitted by any party that the site was formally established for this
use.” (FOF ¶¶ 22, 23, 25, 27; COL ¶ 12.) As proposed, this part of the Project
consists of
11 dwelling units consisting of one-, two-, and three-bedroom units,
each with its own entrance from the sidewalk. Ten of the entrances
would be on the Cumberland Street side of the property and the
remaining one would be on 31st Street. Six of the units (all [5] of the
[1]-bedroom flats as well as the [3]-bedroom flat) would be [Americans
with Disabilities Act of 19903] accessible to meet the [10] percent
accessibility requirement for the entire project. The electrical meters
for all of the units appeared to be clustered on 31st Street side of the
property past the entrance to the 11th unit. See [(R.R. at 82a, 85a, 94a-
95a, 168a-69a, 211a, 379a-83a, 407a-08a.)]
(COL ¶ 13.)
3
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
3
The Philadelphia Department of Licenses and Inspections (L&I) denied a
permit for the N. 31st Street Property because Applicants needed a use variance due
to the RSA-5 designation and the multi-family use proposed and a dimensional
variance due to the proposed placement of the utility meters not meeting the
screening requirements. (FOF ¶ 1.) Applicants appealed L&I’s denial of the permit
to the Board, asserting that the dimensional variance needed is de minimis and that
granting the use variance would not increase congestion, impair light and air, burden
public utilities, or harm neighboring properties. (Id. ¶ 2.) The Board held hearings
on April 22 and June 4, 2025.
The parties presented statements to the Board, and the Board received letters
of support for the Project from State Senators Sharif Street and Vincent Hughes,
State Representative Keith Harris, and Ryan Boyer of the Philadelphia Building and
Construction Trades Council. (Id. ¶ 10.) Representative Harris also testified about
his support, explaining that the affordable rentals created by the Project would be
occupied by members of this community who want to stay in the area, but who may
not be able to purchase homes at this time. (Id. ¶ 28.)
Representatives from the Authority, Strawberry Mansion Community
Development Corporation (Strawberry Mansion CDC), and members of the
community testified in support of the Project, including about the N. 31st Street
development, and about the pocket park not being maintained, having broken
benches, and being used to dump trash, and that the development would reduce the
presence of blight in the community and increase needed affordable housing
opportunities. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 15-16, 25, 27, 45, 46.) An Authority witness testified that
new green spaces, including a new full park, were being added nearby. (Id. ¶¶ 24-
25.) Representatives from Applicants and the Philadelphia City Planning
4
Commission (Commission) testified about the development plans for the whole
Project, the specific development plans for the N. 31st Street Property, the large size
of that property, the characteristics of the surrounding neighborhood, the requested
variances, how screening could be incorporated for the utility meters, and the
funding of the Project, particularly its eligibility for a federal Low Income Housing
Tax Credit. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 19-21, 29-30.)
Pennrose’s representatives adopted counsel’s statements regarding the details
of the N. 31st Street Property part of the Project, and testified about why the design
had no steps, the changes made to the design to meet the neighborhood’s
characteristics, and how many of the units were being designed to be accessible to
those with disabilities. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 30-33.) Photographs of the N. 31st Street Property
and its immediate surrounds were introduced. (COL ¶ 12; R.R. at 977a-85a.) The
Commission representative indicated that the N. 31st Street Property development
and the Project was consistent with the Comprehensive Plan recommendation to
promote affordable housing, that the screening for the utility meters was not
absolutely necessary, and that the Commission recommended granting the variances.
(Id. ¶ 29.)
Bonita Cummings, a Strawberry Mansion resident and representative of the
coordinating Registered Community Organization (RCO) Strawberry Mansion
Community Concern (SMCC), testified in opposition to the Project as a whole and
to the development of the N. 31st Street Property in particular. (FOF ¶¶ 3, 11, 23.)
Cummings objected to the Project primarily because it was creating rental units, not
units available for home ownership opportunities, and to the N. 31st Street Property
development because it was removing the pocket park, which some members of the
community used as green space. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 23.) Another resident, Gwendolyn
5
Fields, testified about her use of the pocket park, which had recently been “cleaned
up,” and that as an elderly person with disabilities, she would not walk multiple
blocks to the new greenspaces. (Id. ¶ 26.)
Conlan Crosley of Councilmember Young’s office, which represents this area
on Council, testified at both hearings, and explained at the June 4, 2025 hearing that
the objection to the N. 31st Street Property development was because of the loss of
the pocket park. (R.R. at 361a-62a.) Councilmember Young testified at the April
22, 2025 hearing, at which evidence regarding the entire Project was given, but his
testimony did not relate to the N. 31st Street Property. Councilmember Young did
not testify or otherwise appear at the June 4, 2025 hearing, but he sent a letter to the
Board regarding the N. 31st Street Property development. (Decision at 28 n.13.) In
that letter, Councilmember Young stated
My office and I would like to express a position of Opposition for 2500
N[.] 31st Street (MI2025 001305) zoning application. It does not match
the character of the neighborhood and places a hardship on the
community. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the above
referenced project. If you have any other questions, please do not
hesitate to reach out to Conlan Crosley on our staff.
(Id.)
At the end of the June 4, 2025 hearing, the Board voted to approve the
variances. (FOF ¶ 34; R.R. at 409a-10a.) On June 16, 2025, the Board sent an email
giving notice of its written Decision. (R.R. at 12a.) Nothing in the email recipient
list reflects that Councilmember Young was sent this notice. (Id.)
In its written decision, the Board made the following relevant findings and
conclusions.
[] In this matter, the Board found that [] Applicant[s] met the criteria
under the [] Code for an unnecessary hardship not created by []
Applicant[s] that justified the requested use variances.
6
[] The subject property is a 6,325 square foot vacant lot at the corner of
North 31st and West Cumberland Streets in the Strawberry Mansion
neighborhood of Philadelphia. Aside from a small vacant lot adjacent
to North Napa Street, the subject property nearly spans the width of
Cumberland Street between 31st and Napa Streets . . . . Based on the
photos and testimony presented at the hearing, the property is blighted
with overgrowth, trash, and broken park furniture. The Board also
observed that the park was surrounded by a brick wall topped by a
chain-link fence. There are two gated access points, one on
Cumberland Street and one on 31st Street. It was not clear to the Board
from the evidence and testimony provided who is permitted to access
this parcel and who established and maintains its “park-like”
conditions. The adjacent properties appear to be mainly residential in
nature, improved with attached structures, and located in the RSA-5
zoning district like the subject property. See [(R.R. at 379a-80a, 383a-
86a, 392a-95a, 406a-09a.)]
....
[] On the issue of hardship, the Board found that the development of a
single-family home on the subject property would be out of character
with the neighborhood given the nearly exclusive presence of attached
rowhouses in the area. Not only would one single-family home be out
of context on this substantial lot, but it would be unlikely to be
economically viable given the substantially smaller size of the existing
residential structures and lots in this area. Indeed, the immediately
adjacent vacant parcel at Cumberland and Napa Streets appears to more
closely comport with the average lot size for this neighborhood. To
address the hardship presented by this unique, oversized lot,[] []
Applicant[s] proposed 11 dwelling units with separate entrances that
resemble the attached rowhomes located throughout the neighborhood
and are therefore consistent with the spirit of the RSA-5 zoning district.
Moreover, there was no testimony or evidence presented that a
dimensional variance (or variances) could address the hardship at this
site. In fact, no dimensional variances were requested for this project.
See [(R.R. at 379a-83a, 407a-08a.)]
[] By providing a separate entrance for each unit, [] Applicant[s]
effectively limited the . . . units that could be constructed at the subject
property. The Applicant[s] also limited the number of dwellings by
proposing a combination of one-, two-, and three-bedroom units. If []
Applicant[s] had sought to construct only one-bedroom dwellings, the
number of requested units could have been notably higher . . . .
7
Therefore, the Board found that [] Applicant[s] demonstrated that the
proposed 11 units represented the minimum relief necessary to
overcome the established hardship. See [(R.R. at 379a-83a, 407a-08a.)]
[] Furthermore, the Board concluded that [] Applicant[s] satisfied the
remaining criteria under Section 14-303(8)(.1)(.c)-(.h) [of the Code],
thereby demonstrating that the proposal at the subject property would
not have a negative effect on the public safety, health, and general
welfare of the surrounding community. The primary opposition to the
development at this property (and the project as a whole) was the
coordinating RCO . . . . It appeared to the Board that SMCC’s main
concern about the overall development was the lack of homeownership
opportunities. While the Board certainly understands SMCC’s desire
to build equity for families in its community, it is the role of the [Board]
to determine whether the variance criteria have been satisfied by []
Applicant[s] in the proposal before the Board. Whether dwelling units
will ultimately be leased or owned is not distinguished in the use
definitions under the Household Living subcategory in the [] Code.[]
See [(R.R. at 98a-105a, 197a.)]
[] SMCC’s primary objection to the proposal at the subject property
was the removal of the existing pocket park. However, as mentioned
previously, the establishment, maintenance, and permitted access to
this property as a park was unclear. While the Board does not dispute
the importance of green space in a neighborhood, [] Applicant[s were]
not seeking relief from any landscaping or tree removal provisions in
the [] Code. Furthermore, [] Applicant[s] . . . both spoke to past and
future efforts to provide green space in projects . . . where it could be
accommodated. As noted by the [] Commission, the proposal at the
subject property aligns with the recommendation in the Comprehensive
Plan to promote affordable housing. In addition, the proposal at this
property allows [] Applicant[s] to create accessible units to address
community needs as well as to satisfy overall project requirements. See
[(R.R. at 383a-95a, 400a.)]
[] Lastly, regarding the placement of the utility meters, the Board did
not observe any interior basement location on the plans where the
meters could be situated. Thus, by necessity, they would need to be
placed on the exterior of the building. The plans submitted by []
Applicant[s] show that all of the meters are situated in one location on
the 31st Street side of the building. [] Applicant[s] did state at the
hearing that they would do their best to comply with the screening
requirements in the aforementioned overlay, subject to any restrictions
8
instituted by the electric company. If [] Applicant[s are] not able to
completely screen the meters as required by the [] Code, the Board
considered the variance sought in this case to be de minimis.
(COL ¶¶ 11-12, 14-18 (footnotes omitted).) Accordingly, the Board concluded that
Applicants had met their burdens of “production and persuasion through credible
testimony and evidence, which warranted the requested minimum relief for the
proven hardship at the subject property.” (Id. ¶ 19.)
B. Appeal to Common Pleas
On June 12, 2025, Council adopted Resolution 250621 (Resolution), which
“[a]uthoriz[ed] Councilmember Young’s appeal, on behalf of and as representative
of [] Council of the decision of the [] Board . . . with respect to [the] N. 31st Street
[Property].” (R.R. at 947a-48a.) The Resolution further authorized the designated
councilmember to obtain counsel to appeal a Board decision and to litigate the appeal
on Council’s behalf and as Council’s representative. (Id.) The Resolution
additionally authorized Councilmember Young “to file the appeal on behalf of and
as representative of [] Council.” (Id.) Councilmember Young was provided with
the “full authority” to “prosecute and defend, on behalf of and as representative of
[] Council” any appeal of the Board’s Decision on the N. 31st Street Property. (Id.)
Through the Resolution, Council ratified the steps Councilmember Young had taken
on its behalf and as its representative in preparing for this appeal and “authorize[d]
[him] to take all further steps on behalf of and as representative of [] Council with
respect to [this] appeal” that he concludes are appropriate for successfully
prosecuting and defending this appeal, including filing further appeals if necessary.
(Id.)
Councilmember Young filed an appeal with common pleas on July 17, 2025,
which was rejected as untimely. Councilmember Young then filed a verified
9
Petition for Allowance to file an Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc (nunc pro tunc petition).
Therein, Councilmember Young verified that he and Crosley appeared and
participated at the Board’s hearing, the Board served written notice of its Decision
by an email to “interested parties” on June 16, 2025, neither Councilmember Young
nor Crosley were served with that notice when they should have been under the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, Councilmember Young first learned of the Board’s
Decision on July 17, 2025, he filed an appeal the same day, the appeal was rejected
as untimely, and Councilmember Young sought nunc pro tunc relief because he
would have timely filed an appeal had he been timely served the Board’s Decision.
(See Young’s Reply Brief (Br.) Ex. B; Authority’s Br. Ex. 1.) Common pleas
granted nunc pro tunc relief on or about August 21, 2025, and Councilmember
Young filed his appeal on or about August 25, 2025.
Pennrose, asserting it had not been served with Councilmember Young’s nunc
pro tunc petition, sought to vacate the August 21, 2025 order, which common pleas
granted. Pennrose filed an answer to Councilmember Young’s nunc pro tunc
petition, and common pleas subsequently granted Councilmember Young nunc pro
tunc relief again on or about November 4, 2025. The Authority sought
reconsideration, which common pleas denied on December 8, 2025.
In his appeal to common pleas, Councilmember Young argued that Applicants
did not present substantial evidence of unnecessary hardship, failed to show that the
requested relief was the minimum required, or that the proposal would not adversely
affect the public interest. The Authority and Pennrose argued that the issues
Councilmember Young raised in his appeal had not been preserved before the Board
and, in any event, the Board’s Decision was supported by substantial evidence and
10
contained no errors of law or abuses of discretion. Pennrose also challenged
Councilmember Young’s standing to appeal the Board’s Decision.4
Following briefing and oral argument, common pleas denied the appeal and
affirmed the Board’s Decision via a footnoted Order dated April 24, 2026. Therein,
common pleas concluded that the Board’s “[c]onclusions of [l]aw cited substantial
evidence to support the variances,” and that Councilmember had preserved the last
issue, whether there would be an adverse effect on the public interest. (Common
pleas’ April 24, 2026 Order at 2.) Common pleas held, on this preserved issue, that
the Board’s finding that there would be no such adverse effect was supported by
substantial evidence, particularly where the focus was on the loss of the pocket park
and the Board had specifically addressed the pocket park in its Decision.
Councilmember Young appealed to this Court and filed a Concise Statement
of Errors Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925(b), Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), to which common pleas filed a responsive
opinion (1925(a) Opinion). In the 1925(a) Opinion, common pleas explained that
Councilmember Young had waived two of his three arguments because he “did not
appear or testify about his opposition to the [N. 31st Street Property] at the [Board]
hearings,” and his submitted letter “complain[ed] in one sentence that the proposal
‘does not match the character of the neighborhood and places a hardship on the
community.’” (1925(a) Opinion (Op.) at 9 (quoting Decision at 26 n.13).) “His one-
sentence complaint did not object” based on the issues he raised before common
pleas, but “only that a variance would impose a ‘hardship on the community.’” (Id.
4
The City of Philadelphia contends that Pennrose’s challenge to Councilmember Young’s
standing before common pleas differs from what it asserts now. (The City’s Br. at 4 n.2 (citing
R.R. at 668a-70a).) A review of the record before common pleas reflects that Pennrose argued
lack of standing based on the Resolution not being a valid means of authorizing Councilmember
Young’s appeal.
11
at 10.) Accordingly, this letter “preserve[d] a challenge to” a determination that the
variance would have “no adverse effect on public health, safety, or general welfare,”
as it “put the Board on notice that he objected to any [such] finding.” (Id.)
Common pleas also held that the Board’s findings on the public interest of the
Project and the development of the N. 31st Street Property was supported by
substantial evidence, pointing to credited evidence supporting the Board’s findings
in that regard, and that the Board had addressed SMCC’s concerns regarding the
pocket park “at length.” (Id. at 10.) It concluded that “[t]he Board, as factfinder,
was entitled to credit the testimony of [Strawberry Mansion CDC’s and the
Authority’s witnesses] over the contrary testimony of [] Cummings and [] Fields,”
and common pleas “was not authorized by law to reweigh that evidence or substitute
its judgment for the Board’s.” (Id. at 11 (citing Marshall v. City of Philadelphia, 97
A.3d 323, 329 (Pa. 2014)).)
Following briefing and oral argument, this matter is now ready for disposition.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Whether common pleas abused its discretion in granting
Councilmember Young nunc pro tunc relief.
1. Parties’ Arguments
The Authority initially argues that Councilmember Young’s appeal from the
Board was filed 31 days after the Board’s Decision, making the appeal untimely, and
common pleas abused its discretion in granting him nunc pro tunc relief.5 According
to the Authority, Councilmember Young did not establish the extraordinary
circumstances necessary to obtain nunc pro tunc relief. The Authority asserts that
Councilmember Young’s reason for requesting relief was that he did not receive
5
Pennrose initially filed an appeal of common pleas’ grant of nunc pro tunc with this Court
at docket number 1602 C.D. 2025, but this Court quashed that appeal without prejudice on April
8, 2026, because common pleas’ order was not a final one.
12
written notice of the Board’s Decision and this reason is insufficient because
Councilmember Young was not entitled to written notice of the Decision where he
did not register or appear at the Board’s hearing or enter an appearance, which is
what is required by the Board’s Rules and Regulations. Not being entitled to written
notice, the lack of such notice did not establish the extraordinary circumstances
warranting the acceptance of Councilmember Young’s late appeal. It further
observes that nunc pro tunc relief was initially granted because common pleas
believed the requested relief was unopposed, (R.R. at 11a), but the lack of opposition
was due to Councilmember Young’s failure to properly serve the request on the
Authority and Pennrose. When it was served with notice, both the Authority and
Pennrose challenged the grant of that relief. The Authority asserts there is nothing
unique or unusual about Councilmember Young’s failure to follow the Board’s
Rules to be a registered individual so as to be entitled to written notice of the
Decision and, therefore, there are no extraordinary circumstances here.6 Triple
Crown Corp., Inc. v. Lower Allen Township, 327 A.3d 748, 757 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024).
Councilmember Young responds that the Authority’s arguments are
misplaced because he did appear and testify at the Board’s April 22, 2025 hearing,
at which the Board received evidence applicable to the Project as a whole, and sent
the letter opposing the development of the N. 31st Street Property for the June 4,
2025 hearing. He also points out that Crosley, a member of his staff, also appeared
and testified at the April 22, 2025, and June 4, 2025 hearing. As such, they should
have received notice of the Board’s Decision but did not, and Councilmember
Young was unaware of the Decision until the 31st day after the service of the
Decision. Councilmember Young asserts he immediately filed an appeal on behalf
6
Pennrose incorporates the Authority’s arguments on this issue. (Pennrose’s Br. at 29.)
13
of Council, which was rejected as being untimely, at which point he filed the verified
Petition for Allowance to file an Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc.
Common pleas granted him that relief on August 22, 2025, and
Councilmember Young filed his appeal the same day. According to Councilmember
Young, common pleas, acting within its discretionary powers, reviewed this issue
multiple times, and, ultimately, regranted this nunc pro tunc relief on November 4,
2025. There is no basis, Councilmember Young argues, upon which to determine
that common pleas abused that discretion in granting him nunc pro tunc relief in
these circumstances.
2. Analysis
There is no dispute that an appeal to common pleas from the Board’s Decision
had to be filed within 30 days of that decision. Section 914.1(b) of the Pennsylvania
Municipalities Planning Code (MPC) provides that “[a]ll appeals from
determinations . . . shall be filed . . . within 30 days after notice of the determination
is issued.” 53 P.S. § 10914.1(b).7 “The failure to timely appeal an administrative
agency’s action is a jurisdictional defect,” and “[t]he time for taking an appeal cannot
be extended as a matter of grace or mere indulgence.” Martin v. Zoning Hearing
Bd. of W. Vincent Twp., 230 A.3d 540, 546 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (internal citation and
quotation omitted). To obtain appellate review, the appellant must justify the delay
in filing the appeal by seeking nunc pro tunc relief. Id.
“Nunc pro tunc relief may be granted . . . in circumstances in which a party
failed to make a timely filing as a result of a fraud or a breakdown in the court’s
operations . . . .” Triple Crown Corp., Inc., 327 A.3d at 754 (citing, e.g., Criss
7
Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, added by Section 95 of the Act of December
21, 1988, P.L. 1329.
14
v. Wise, 781 A.2d 1156, 1159 (Pa. 2001)). It is also available where there is a
breakdown in the administrative process. Smith v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 81
A.3d 1091, 1093 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). “Generally, nunc pro tunc relief may be
afforded only where ‘extraordinary’ circumstances exist to warrant it, and the burden
of establishing the existence of such circumstances is on the party seeking nunc pro
tunc relief.” Triple Crown Corp., Inc., 327 A.2d at 754 (citing, e.g., Harris
v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 247 A.3d 1223, 1229 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021)).8
The Authority relies on Section 7.1 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations to
argue that Councilmember Young was not entitled to written notice of the Board’s
Decision. Section 7.1 provides that: “[t]he [] Board shall give prompt written notice
of its decision to the [a]ppellant and to all Interested Persons.” Board Rules and
Regulations § 7.1.9 “The date on which a decision of the [] Board is emailed to the
[a]ppellant and all Interested Persons shall be conclusively presumed to be the date
of adjudication, and the time for appeal shall run from that date.” Id. The Board
defines an “Interested Person” as the “[a]ppellant and any person or entity who
registered before the [] Board in the manner specified by the [] Board.” Id. § 2.3
(emphasis added). However, Section 14-303(14)(l) of the Code addressing public
hearings before the Board expressly requires that
[a]ll decisions of the [] Board . . . shall be mailed to the applicant, the
applicant’s attorney of record, such other persons or attorneys who have
properly entered an appearance in the case, and any [RCO] or member
8
“The appellant must also establish that (1) the appeal was filed within a short time after
learning of and having an opportunity to address the untimeliness; (2) the elapsed time period is
of very short duration; and (3) the appellee is not prejudiced by the delay.” Martin, 230 A.3d at
546 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). No one argues that these were not met,
focusing instead on the alleged lack of extraordinary circumstances.
9
The Board’s Rules and Regulations are attached to the Authority’s Brief as Exhibit 6 and
are also attached to Councilmember Young’s Reply Brief.
15
of [] Council (or their representative) who has submitted a letter
concerning the matter.
Code § 14-303(14)(l) (emphasis added).
The Authority does not argue that Councilmember Young was provided
written notice, and he failed to timely appeal; it argues Councilmember Young’s
claim of extraordinary circumstances is unsupported because he was not entitled to
written notice. Although the Authority may be correct that Councilmember Young
did not appear at the June 4, 2025 hearing and did not otherwise register with the
Board as to the N. 31st Street Property, he did “submit[] a letter concerning the
matter.” Id. As such, he was entitled to written notice of the Board’s Decision
pursuant to Section 14-303(14)(l) of the Code, id., he did not receive it, and he did
not become aware of the Board’s Decision until after the time for appealing had
passed. It was this lack of notice that resulted in Councilmember Young’s appeal
being untimely filed, and, when he learned of the Board’s Decision, he acted
promptly by filing his nunc pro tunc petition on the same day. Accordingly, we are
not persuaded that common pleas abused its discretion in granting nunc pro tunc
relief under these circumstances.
B. Whether Councilmember Young has standing to appeal the Board’s
Decision.
1. Parties’ Arguments
Pennrose challenges Councilmember Young’s standing to appeal the Board’s
Decision. It argues that it is undisputed that a councilmember does not have
individual standing based on their position alone. Pennrose asserts the Resolution
upon which Councilmember Young relies for standing is either procedurally
ineffective or unconstitutional. Pennrose contends that, pursuant to Section 17.1 of
16
the Home Rule Charter Act10 (Home Rule Act), only “aggrieved persons” and
Council, the legislative body, have standing to appeal from a Board decision. 53
P.S. § 13131.1. It argues that Council does not have the authority to delegate its
appeal authority to a particular councilmember because the General Assembly
granted the authority to appeal to the legislative body in the Home Rule Act, and
that this issue was left open for future consideration in this Court’s recent decision
in Appeal of Clarke, 316 A.3d 1095, 1103 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024). According to
Pennrose, permitting Council to delegate its standing to Councilmember Young to
appeal the Board’s Decision, with no guardrails to limit his discretion, would codify
councilmanic prerogative in contravention of the General Assembly’s determination
that only Council, the body, has standing. Doing so, Pennrose argues, violates article
IX, section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, PA. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (granting
municipalities the right to adopt home rule), because authorizing Councilmember
Young to appeal individually conflicts with the General Assembly’s limitation of
standing to Council itself in Section 17.1 of the Home Rule Act. (Pennrose’s Br. at
7 (citing Spahn v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 977 A.2d 1132, 1143-44 (Pa. 2009)).)
Procedurally, Pennrose argues that there is no evidence that the Resolution was ever
presented to the mayor for approval, which Section 6 of the First Class City
Government Law (First Class City Law), 53 P.S. § 12526,11 requires in order for a
resolution to become effective. Without the mayor’s approval of the Resolution, it
never became effective and the general principle that an individual councilmember
does not have standing to appeal a Board decision based on their position is
implicated.
10
Act of April 21, 1949, P.L. 665, as amended, added by Section 2 of the Act of November
30, 2004, P.L. 1523, 53 P.S. § 13131.1.
11
Act of June 25, 1919, P.L. 581.
17
Councilmember Young responds that he is not seeking to appeal in his
individual capacity and asserts he is appealing on behalf of Council, which has
expressly authorized him to act on its behalf via the Resolution. Councilmember
Young asserts that Council could authorize a councilmember to prosecute a zoning
appeal on its behalf, which Council has validly done here. According to
Councilmember Young, Council collectively made the decision to appeal and
authorized Councilmember Young to perform the administrative and ministerial acts
required to carry out that decision. Council did not delegate any of its legislative
power, it only authorized Councilmember Young to act on Council’s decision to
appeal the Board’s approval of the variances for the N. 31st Street Property. This
non-legislative action, Councilmember Young asserts, is not inconsistent with the
Home Rule Act or the Pennsylvania Constitution, and, therefore, is permissible.
Finally, Councilmember Young asserts Section 6 of the First Class City Law does
not apply here because the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter (Home Rule Charter)12
superseded the First Class City Law’s governance structure, including the need to
present resolutions to the mayor for approval or veto, and now only ordinances must
be presented to the mayor.
The City of Philadelphia13 (City) asserts that Pennrose’s argument based on
the First Class City Law is misplaced because that law was superseded by the City’s
Home Rule Charter in 1951 and is inconsistent with Sections 2-200 and 202 of the
Home Rule Charter. Section 2-200 of the Home Rule Charter abolished the
legislative resolutions, of which Section 6 speaks, and requires legislative acts only
12
The Home Rule Charter is available at https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/
philadelphia/latest/philadelphia_pa/0-0-0-262986 (last visited November 16, 2026).
13
The City, which is an appellee, sought permission to file its brief out-of-time, which this
Court granted. The City supports affirmance and writes only on this standing issue and takes no
position on Pennrose’s other standing argument.
18
by ordinances, which do require mayoral approval per Section 2-202 of the Home
Rule Charter. Philadelphia Home Rule Charter (CHARTER) §§ 2-200, 2-202. Even
if Section 6 was not superseded, the City maintains, Section 6 would not apply to
this Resolution because it was not a legislative resolution, but an expression of
Council’s will to authorize Councilmember Young to proceed with litigating this
appeal. A non-legislative resolution is an “informal enactment of a temporary
nature, providing for the disposition of a particular piece of administrative business
of a municipal corporation,” Blackwell v. City of Philadelphia, 684 A.2d 1068, 1072
(Pa. 1996), and the Resolution here, the City asserts, “simply express[ed] the will of
the legislative body on a particular motion or matter.” (City’s Br. at 9.) According
to the City, this Resolution is akin to the thousands of other non-legislative actions
taken by Council over the past 75 years, none of which were presented to the mayor
for approval. For these reasons, the City argues the Court must reject Pennrose’s
argument based on the First Class City Law.
2. Analysis
The parties here make the same arguments regarding Councilmember
Young’s standing in this matter as they do in Young v. City of Philadelphia, __ A.3d
__, __ (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 360 C.D. 2026, filed November 17, 2026), slip op. at 10-
13 (Young I), which was argued together with this matter. In Young I, we set forth
the legal principles that guide our determination as to a party’s standing and,
applying those principles to the Council resolution at issue, concluded that
Councilmember Young’s appealing the Board’s decision on behalf of and as the
representative of Council, as authorized by Council, did not violate Section 17.1 of
the Home Rule Act. Id. at 13-19. Those same standing principles apply here, and,
upon examination of the Resolution, we reach the same conclusion.
19
Similar to the Council resolution in Young I, the Resolution here, which was
adopted prior to the filing of the appeal, states that it
[a]uthoriz[es] Councilmember Young’s appeal, on behalf of and as
repres