Full Opinion

192 November 18, 2026 No. 1136 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON Jennifer Rae GUNTER, an Oregon elector; Christina Lynn Milcarek, an Oregon elector; and Chelsea Anne Weber, an Oregon elector, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Lisa GAMBEE, in her individual capacity; Chrissy Zaugg in her capacity as Wasco County Clerk; Kathy Schwartz, in her individual capacity and as Wasco County Commissioner; Steve Kramer, in his individual capacity; Jeffrey L. Justeen, in his capacity as Wasco County Commissioner; Scott Hege, in his individual capacity and as Wasco County Commissioner; LaVonne Griffin-Valade, in her individual capacity; Tobias Read, in his capacity as Oregon Secretary of State; Ellen F. Rosenblum, in her individual capacity; and Dan Rayfield, in his capacity as Oregon Attorney General, Defendants-Respondents. Wasco County Circuit Court 22CV36776; A187788 Marion T. Weatherford, Judge. Submitted May 6, 2026. Jennifer Rae Gunter, Christina Lynn Milcarek, and Chelsea Anne Weber filed the joint briefs pro se. Matthew E. Malmsheimer, Chris Lundberg, and Haglund, Kelley LLP, filed the brief for respondents Lisa Gambee, Kathy Schwartz, Steve Kramer, and Scott Hege. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 192 (2026) 193 Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Joanna Hershey, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondents Lavonne Griffin-Valade, Ellen F. Rosenblum, and Tobias Read. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Pagán, Judge. EGAN, J. Affirmed. 194 Gunter v. Gambee EGAN, J. In this civil case, plaintiffs, proceeding pro se, appeal from judgments dismissing their complaint seek- ing declaratory and injunctive relief against Wasco County and State of Oregon officials arising out of the use of Clear Ballot “ClearVote” voting systems in the 2020 and 2022 Wasco County elections. Plaintiffs alleged that the systems were unlawfully certified because the Voting System Test Laboratory’s accreditation had expired, allegedly violating ORS 246.550, OAR 165-007-0350, and federal election laws. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ amended complaint with prejudice on the basis that the complaint failed to allege an injury sufficient to state a valid claim, that plain- tiffs lacked standing for the federal claims, and that plain- tiffs’ claims for prospective relief were moot. We conclude that the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint on those grounds and affirm. Background Defendants removed the initial action to federal court, where the case was consolidated with related litiga- tion. The United States District Court dismissed the federal action for lack of standing, concluding that plaintiffs alleged only “conjectural or hypothetical” harms. Gunter v. Fagan, No. 3:22-cv-01252-MO, 2023 WL 1816551 (D Or 2023). The Ninth Circuit affirmed that plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged injury to their individual voting rights or vote tabu- lation, concluding that plaintiffs alleged only a generalized interest in lawful government conduct. Gunter v. Myers, No. 25-35124, 2024 WL 1405387 at *1 (9th Cir 2024). The Ninth Circuit remanded to state court the state law claims against defendants. On October 17, 2024, the Wasco County Circuit Court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice, granting leave to amend, after concluding that plaintiffs had failed to allege “any actual manipulation of the vote, undercounted votes, improperly counted votes, or illegal votes,” and instead alleged only “conjectural or hypotheti- cal” injuries. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 192 (2026) 195 Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint on October 28, 2024, adding the Secretary of State and Attorney General as defendants. The amended complaint— like the original complaint—alleged that the certification defects created disparities among counties, chilled plain- tiffs’ constitutionally protected political expression because “the mere potential” of a fraudulent election “constitutes inherent harm,” and, despite acknowledging that all plain- tiffs “voted and continued to vote in elections since,” that defendants’ allegedly unlawful actions “diminished confi- dence in the validity of election outcomes,” thereby impact- ing plaintiffs’ right to vote. The amended complaint added allegations of emotional distress, reputational damage, and financial burdens arising out of the allegedly negligent con- duct. However, the alleged facts remained largely the same, focusing on an alleged lapse in the certification of the voting machines. Defendants argued that plaintiffs did not demon- strate that their votes had not been counted or in any other way actually compromised. Defendants argued that plain- tiffs’ monetary expenditures, litigation-related economic losses, emotional distress, and reputational damage, if any, were not caused by any negligent or unlawful action of defendants and that plaintiffs therefore had not asserted a legally cognizable claim related to any unlawful actions by defendants. As to claims against defendants in their per- sonal capacity, defendants argued that plaintiffs had not alleged any actions on the part of those individuals that were unrelated to their official duties and that, therefore, those claims “must be dismissed under the Oregon Tort Claims Act” (OTCA). Ultimately, acknowledging the importance of accu- rate vote counts and commending plaintiffs for “raising awareness of the voter machine certification irregularities,” the trial court concluded that there were “no facts supporting the contention that these irregularities affected the accuracy of the vote count.” The trial court entered a separate limited judgment for each of the groups of defendants. As to the Wasco County defendants, the trial court determined that plain- tiffs failed to allege facts showing a legally cognizable injury 196 Gunter v. Gambee giving rise to a viable claim. As to the Oregon Secretary of State and the Attorney General, the trial court ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims, that the complaint failed to state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a valid state claim, and that the claims for pro- spective relief were moot. Plaintiffs appealed. Discussion Before turning to plaintiffs’ specific assignments of error, we note the broader context in which this appeal arises. Plaintiffs’ filings raise issues regarding election administra- tion, public confidence in electoral systems, and the uniform application of certification standards across Oregon coun- ties. Concerns of that nature are neither trivial nor beyond the proper scope of public discourse. Like the trial court, we acknowledge the indispensable importance of an accurate vote count and fair election process. At the same time, as with fair and accurate elections, the role and standards of the judiciary are also indispensable to a functioning democracy. Accordingly, the role of this court is necessarily limited. In this case, our inquiry is not whether plaintiffs’ concerns are genuinely held, emotionally significant, or shared by others, but whether the pleadings allege legally cognizable injuries beyond an abstract interest in the cor- rect application of the law sufficient to invoke judicial relief under the governing statutes and constitutional standards. See League of Oregon Cities v. State of Oregon, 334 Or 645, 658, 56 P3d 892 (2002); Eckles v. State of Oregon, 306 Or 380, 385, 760 P2d 846 (1988). Because plaintiffs proceeded pro se and advanced numerous overlapping statutory, con- stitutional, procedural, and equitable theories, we address the assignments of error in greater detail than we would typically provide for a nonprecedential opinion, both to explain the basis for our decision and to demonstrate care- ful consideration of the arguments raised throughout this lengthy litigation. That said, we are limited to review of arguments that were raised and developed below as related to the actual rulings made by the trial court. Preservation and Reviewability. Defendants concede that plaintiffs’ arguments are broadly preserved. However, Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 192 (2026) 197 defendants argue that some of the more particularized arguments raised on appeal—those related to procedural or discovery-based theories related to pro se status—are not preserved. ORAP 5.45(1) provides that “[n]o matter claimed as error will be considered on appeal unless the claimed error was preserved in the lower court.” Preservation principles are rooted in fairness and efficiency and are “prudential in nature,” giving the trial court “a chance to consider and rule on a contention” and avoid or correct errors, obviating the need for appeal; permitting the opposing party to respond to a contention and avoid surprise arguments; and fostering a full development of the record, aiding both the trial court in making its decision and the appellate court in reviewing it. Peeples v. Lampert, 345 Or 209, 219-20, 191 P3d 637 (2008). Preservation requires a party to “explain its objection clearly enough for the opposing party, and the trial court, to understand the issue” and avoid or correct the error. State v. Skotland, 372 Or 319, 327, 549 P3d 534 (2024). We may review unpreserved arguments for plain error; an error is plain if it is an “error[ ] of law apparent on the face of the record.” ORAP 5.45(2). Therefore, we only review unpreserved arguments that concern an error of law that is “obvious, not reasonably in dispute” and that appears “on the face of the record,” meaning that it does not require us to “go outside of the record to identify the error or choose between competing inferences.” Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 381-82, 823 P2d 956 (1991). If the error meets that test, we must still exercise our discretion to con- sider it or not and articulate our reasons for doing so. Id. at 382. However, even some preserved arguments are not reviewable. We are bound to review only fully developed arguments related to actual rulings made by the trial court. See, e.g., ORAP 5.45(3) (“Each assignment of error must iden- tify precisely the legal, procedural, factual, or other ruling that is being challenged.”); ORAP 5.45(4)(a) (“The court may decline to consider any assignment of error that requires the court to search the record to find the error or to deter- mine if the error properly was raised and preserved.”). None 198 Gunter v. Gambee of those principles are altered by our obligation to liberally construe pro se appeals. See Zyst v. Kelly, 338 Or App 597, 601, 566 P3d 1121, rev den, 374 Or 188 (2025) (identifying all arguments in pro se briefing and declining to address undeveloped and unpreserved arguments). On appeal, plaintiffs’ arguments that the trial court erred by dismissing their complaint and ruling that their complaint failed to state a claim, that the court lacked sub- ject matter jurisdiction, that plaintiffs lacked federal stand- ing, and that their claims seeking prospective relief were moot are all preserved. Particularized arguments regarding emotional distress, financial expenditures, loss of trust in elections, disenfranchisement, and chilled political partici- pation are also preserved. However, plaintiffs’ arguments regarding proper venue, timeliness, and various procedural concerns related to their status as pro se plaintiffs are either unpreserved or are matters on which the trial court did not rule or other- wise decide adversely to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed only for failure to state a claim, lack of federal standing, and mootness. Failure to State a Claim Under Oregon Law and Lack of Article III Standing. For a case to be constitution- ally justiciable, “a plaintiff invoking a court’s jurisdiction to resolve a controversy must demonstrate that the interests of the parties * * * are adverse,” meaning plaintiffs must have standing. Powell v. Bunn, 185 Or App 334, 346, 59 P3d 559 (2002), rev den, 336 Or 60 (2003). Additionally, it must be that “a decision by the court will have a practical effect on the plaintiff’s rights” and that requirement must “remain satisfied throughout the litigation”; that is, the case cannot become moot. Id. When reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim under ORCP 21 A(1)(h), we accept as true all well- pleaded allegations and give plaintiffs the benefit of favor- able inferences. Gafur v. Legacy Good Samaritan Hospital, 344 Or 525, 528-29, 185 P3d 446 (2008). Whether allegations are sufficient to state a claim is a question of law. Rowlett v. Fagan, 358 Or 639, 651, 369 P3d 1132 (2016). Because Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 192 (2026) 199 plaintiffs argue on appeal that the trial court’s ruling pre- vented discovery, additional amendments, and further fac- tual development, we add that, when the legal sufficiency of a claim can be determined from the allegations of the com- plaint, an ORCP 21 A(1)(h) motion is decided on the pleadings; factual development or discovery is unnecessary to resolve the purely legal issue. See Huskey v. Dept. of Corrections, 373 Or 270, 276, 564 P3d 142 (2025) (“A motion to dismiss under ORCP 21 A(1)(h) attacks the sufficiency of the complaint.”). Under ORCP 12 A, the trial court must liberally construe pleadings to determine whether they adequately allege a cognizable claim for relief; liberal construction, how- ever, does not eliminate the requirement that the pleading must allege facts sufficient to state such a claim. See Ogle v. Nooth, 365 Or 771, 784, 453 P3d 1274 (2019) (explaining that statute providing for dismissal of petition for post-conviction relief that, “when liberally construed, fails to state a claim” is in line with ORCP 21 and ORCP 12 A). The pro se status of the litigants may affect how Oregon courts construe what plaintiffs intended to allege, but it does not permit us to supply allegations that are absent from the complaint or to manufacture a legally sufficient cause of action from legally insufficient allegations. Zyst, 338 Or App at 601. In the context of claims for declaratory relief, failure to state a claim intersects with the standing doctrine. Holmes v. Morgan, 135 Or App 617, 624, 899 P2d 738, rev den, 322 Or 193 (1995) (explaining that standing to bring a declaratory judgment proceeding depends on “whether the plaintiff has alleged an effect on some legally recognized interest great enough to assure an adversary proceeding sufficient for adequate presentation of the issues”). Whether a party has standing is likewise a question of law determined by “the statute under which the plaintiff seeks relief,” Foote v. State of Oregon, 364 Or 558, 562, 437 P3d 221 (2019), “because standing is not a matter of common law but is, instead, con- ferred by the legislature,” IBEW Local 89 v. Wallan, 326 Or App 796, 799, 533 P3d 1134, rev den, 371 Or 509 (2023). To establish standing, plaintiffs must allege “some injury or other impact upon a legally recognized interest beyond an abstract interest in the correct application or validity of a 200 Gunter v. Gambee law” and the alleged injury “must not be too speculative.” League of Oregon Cities, 334 Or at 658. The central dispute in this case is whether plain- tiffs adequately alleged a legally cognizable injury sufficient to support claims under ORS 246.910, ORS 28.010, or 42 USC section 1983. ORS 246.910(1) provides: “A person adversely affected by any act or failure to act by the Secretary of State, a county clerk, a city elections officer or any other county, city or district official under any elec- tion law, or by any order, rule, directive or instruction made by the Secretary of State, a county clerk, a city elections officer or any other county, city or district official under any election law, may appeal therefrom to the circuit court for the county in which the act or failure to act occurred or in which the order, rule, directive or instruction was made.” Under the statute, any alleged act or failure to act by a listed official must “adversely affect” the person seeking redress. Id.; Couey v. Atkins, 357 Or 460, 476, 355 P3d 866 (2015) (“ORS 246.910 provides for such judicial review only if a person has been ‘adversely affected’ by such an act or omis- sion.”). ORS 28.010 provides for declaratory judgments but does not alter the standing requirement. Powell, 185 Or at 346; see also Webb v. Clatsop Co. School Dist. 3, 188 Or 324, 331, 215 P2d 368 (1950) (the plaintiffs, relying on the declar- atory judgment statute, had standing because they alleged facts that, if true, were sufficient to show that results of elec- tion were actually affected). Similarly, 42 USC section 1983 provides redress for “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni- ties secured by the [United States] Constitution and laws” caused by any person acting under the color of law. Like ORS 246.910, section 1983 requires that the action of a government official result in a concrete “deprivation of * * * rights, privileges, or immunities” provided by law, includ- ing the United States Constitution. Indeed, federal stand- ing requires plaintiffs to show (1) an actual injury that is concrete and particularized, and actual and imminent, as opposed to hypothetical or conjectural; (2) a causal connec- tion between the alleged injury and the conduct complained Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 192 (2026) 201 of; and (3) it must be likely that the injury alleged would be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 560-61, 112 S Ct 2130, 119 L Ed 2d 351 (1992). The First Amended Complaint alleged that defen- dants’ use of unlawfully certified voting systems caused “distrust and disenfranchisement among voters,” “emo- tional distress,” “a pervasive sense of vulnerability,” finan- cial expenditures, and reputational harm, and that defen- dants’ actions chilled political engagement. Plaintiffs also alleged statewide inequities and erosion of electoral integ- rity resulting from allegedly nonuniform certification stan- dards. The trial court concluded that plaintiffs failed to allege “any actual manipulation of the vote, undercounted votes, improperly counted votes, or illegal votes” and instead alleged only “conjectural or hypothetical” harms rather than a legally cognizable injury. The trial court did not err in making that deter- mination and dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to allege facts sufficient to support a valid state law claim and for lack of Article III standing for the federal claims. Plaintiffs repeatedly alleged generalized loss of trust, con- cern regarding electoral legitimacy, and speculative future harms arising from certification irregularities. However, those allegations are insufficient to confer standing because they are not concrete and particularized injuries specific to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs did not allege that their votes were not counted, inaccurately tabulated, diluted in a measurable manner, or that any election outcome was altered or other- wise actually affected. Plaintiffs’ claims for emotional distress, reputational harm, and litigation-related financial expenditures are also legally insufficient because no facts were alleged that tied those alleged harms to specific wrongful acts of defendants. See Chouinard v. Health Ventures, 179 Or App 507, 513, 39 P3d 951 (2002) (discussing elevated causation requirements to recover for emotional distress). The trial court did not err, therefore, in its determination that plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to establish a valid claim under state law. 202 Gunter v. Gambee Likewise, the trial court did not err in its determi- nation that plaintiffs lacked standing for their claims under section 1983. Article III standing requires a concrete and particularized injury that is actual or imminent. Lujan, 504 US at 560-61. Plaintiffs alleged only generalized dis- satisfaction with election administration and emotional dis- tress tied to alleged certification defects. The Ninth Circuit already concluded that plaintiffs failed to allege injury affecting their “individual exercise of the [voting] franchise” or “the tabulation of their votes.” The trial court did not err in deciding the same. Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court failed to construe their pleadings liberally under ORCP 12 A. However, the record reflects that plaintiffs were given multi- ple opportunities to amend and supplement their allegations, and the trial court did not err in its determination that the amended complaint continued to rely on speculative harms and generalized grievances without identifying an impact on their vote tabulation, right to vote, or any other concrete harm suffered as a result of defendants’ alleged actions. Finally, plaintiffs contend that the trial court failed to consider out-of-state supplemental authority that plain- tiffs believed supported broader elector standing and justi- ciability principles. However, given that Oregon precedent supplies governing standards, the trial court was required to follow that precedent rather than adopt out-of-state authority. State ex rel Kane v. Goldschmidt, 308 Or 573, 587, 783 P2d 988 (1989) (noting that decisions of other states are not binding, even if persuasive). The trial court instead relied on Oregon and federal standing principles requiring concrete injury rather than generalized dissatisfaction with governmental conduct. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under ORS 246.910 and ORS 28.010, and for lack of standing under 42 USC section 1983. Jurisdiction. We turn next to plaintiffs’ arguments concerning jurisdiction and the asserted statutory duty of the Attorney General under ORS 260.345, the basis of addi- tional claims that were also dismissed for failure to state a claim. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 192 (2026) 203 Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of law reviewed for legal error. Menten and Deatherage, 302 Or App 425, 428, 461 P3d 1075 (2020). Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiffs did not establish jurisdiction or a cause of action against the Attorney General. Plaintiffs rely heavily on the statute’s use of the term “shall” and argue that judicial review is available through mandamus or declaratory relief. Plaintiffs also argue that the Attorney General’s alleged inaction caused harm relating to distrust in the electoral process and chilled political participation. Defendants argue that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under ORS 260.345 because that statute does not require the Attorney General to conduct a particular inves- tigation and because plaintiffs have not identified a review- able agency order or demonstrated that they were “adversely affected or aggrieved” as required by the statute. The trial court correctly concluded that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under ORS 260.345. Plaintiffs failed to identify a statutory basis for their claims against the Attorney General and failed to allege facts demonstrating that the Attorney General violated a mandatory, nondiscre- tionary duty. The statutory language relied upon by plain- tiffs contains discretionary components, and plaintiffs did not identify a reviewable agency order or adequately allege adverse effects sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Mootness. Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred when it dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for prospective relief as moot. Whether a controversy is moot is a question of law. Progressive Party of Oregon v. Atkins, 276 Or App 700, 706-07, 370 P3d 506, rev den, 360 Or 697 (2016). As men- tioned, a justiciable conflict requires a controversy in which judicial relief would have a practical effect on the parties’ rights. Brumnett v. PSRB, 315 Or 402, 405, 848 P2d 1194 (1993). ORS 14.175 makes an exception for actions by public officials that have continuing effect or are capable of repeti- tion yet evading review. See, e.g., State ex rel Smith v. Hitt, 291 Or App 750, 753, 424 P3d 749 (2018) (challenge to ordinance limiting the number of consecutive terms of county commis- sioner remained reviewable because plaintiffs had standing, 204 Gunter v. Gambee harm was ongoing, and the ordinance would likely be applied to future election cycles and would evade review because elec- tion cycles are short and the judicial process long). Plaintiffs argue that harm to them was ongoing because the allegedly unlawful certification practices con- tinue to undermine electoral trust, dilute votes, and create unequal treatment among counties. Plaintiffs also argue that prospective declaratory and injunctive relief remain available because the alleged failure to recertify the voting machines continues to erode trust in the electoral process and risks future dilution of votes. Defendants argue that any alleged accreditation lapse no longer exists because the United States Elections Assistance Commission (EAC) clarified that Pro V&V’s accreditation was never revoked and that a new accredita- tion certificate issued on February 1, 2021. Defendants fur- ther argue that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a controversy capable of repetition yet evading review under ORS 14.175, because plaintiffs had not identified any impact to their vot- ing rights or the actual fairness of the electoral process aris- ing out of the alleged certification violation and therefore cannot show any ongoing adverse effect or controversy. We agree with defendants that the trial court did not err in determining that plaintiffs’ claims for prospective relief were moot and did not meet the criteria for review under ORS 14.175. Plaintiffs’ theory depended heavily on the alleged expiration of Pro V&V’s accreditation. Defendants presented unrebutted legal authority and administra- tive clarification that the accreditation was never revoked and that a new certificate of accreditation issued in 2021. Moreover, plaintiffs did not allege any continuing concrete injury tied to ongoing use of unlawfully uncertified systems. Conclusion The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim, lack of federal stand- ing, and mootness. Affirmed.