Gunter v. Gambee
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketA187788
JudgeEgan
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
192 November 18, 2026 No. 1136
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
Jennifer Rae GUNTER,
an Oregon elector;
Christina Lynn Milcarek, an Oregon elector;
and Chelsea Anne Weber, an Oregon elector,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Lisa GAMBEE,
in her individual capacity;
Chrissy Zaugg in her capacity as Wasco County Clerk;
Kathy Schwartz, in her individual capacity and as
Wasco County Commissioner;
Steve Kramer, in his individual capacity;
Jeffrey L. Justeen, in his capacity as
Wasco County Commissioner;
Scott Hege, in his individual capacity and as
Wasco County Commissioner;
LaVonne Griffin-Valade, in her individual capacity;
Tobias Read, in his capacity as Oregon Secretary of State;
Ellen F. Rosenblum, in her individual capacity;
and Dan Rayfield, in his capacity as
Oregon Attorney General,
Defendants-Respondents.
Wasco County Circuit Court
22CV36776; A187788
Marion T. Weatherford, Judge.
Submitted May 6, 2026.
Jennifer Rae Gunter, Christina Lynn Milcarek, and
Chelsea Anne Weber filed the joint briefs pro se.
Matthew E. Malmsheimer, Chris Lundberg, and
Haglund, Kelley LLP, filed the brief for respondents Lisa
Gambee, Kathy Schwartz, Steve Kramer, and Scott Hege.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 192 (2026) 193
Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor
General, and Joanna Hershey, Assistant Attorney General,
filed the brief for respondents Lavonne Griffin-Valade,
Ellen F. Rosenblum, and Tobias Read.
Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Pagán,
Judge.
EGAN, J.
Affirmed.
194 Gunter v. Gambee
EGAN, J.
In this civil case, plaintiffs, proceeding pro se,
appeal from judgments dismissing their complaint seek-
ing declaratory and injunctive relief against Wasco County
and State of Oregon officials arising out of the use of Clear
Ballot “ClearVote” voting systems in the 2020 and 2022
Wasco County elections. Plaintiffs alleged that the systems
were unlawfully certified because the Voting System Test
Laboratory’s accreditation had expired, allegedly violating
ORS 246.550, OAR 165-007-0350, and federal election laws.
The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ amended complaint
with prejudice on the basis that the complaint failed to
allege an injury sufficient to state a valid claim, that plain-
tiffs lacked standing for the federal claims, and that plain-
tiffs’ claims for prospective relief were moot. We conclude
that the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint
on those grounds and affirm.
Background
Defendants removed the initial action to federal
court, where the case was consolidated with related litiga-
tion. The United States District Court dismissed the federal
action for lack of standing, concluding that plaintiffs alleged
only “conjectural or hypothetical” harms. Gunter v. Fagan,
No. 3:22-cv-01252-MO, 2023 WL 1816551 (D Or 2023). The
Ninth Circuit affirmed that plaintiffs had not plausibly
alleged injury to their individual voting rights or vote tabu-
lation, concluding that plaintiffs alleged only a generalized
interest in lawful government conduct. Gunter v. Myers, No.
25-35124, 2024 WL 1405387 at *1 (9th Cir 2024). The Ninth
Circuit remanded to state court the state law claims against
defendants.
On October 17, 2024, the Wasco County Circuit
Court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice,
granting leave to amend, after concluding that plaintiffs
had failed to allege “any actual manipulation of the vote,
undercounted votes, improperly counted votes, or illegal
votes,” and instead alleged only “conjectural or hypotheti-
cal” injuries.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 192 (2026) 195
Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint on
October 28, 2024, adding the Secretary of State and
Attorney General as defendants. The amended complaint—
like the original complaint—alleged that the certification
defects created disparities among counties, chilled plain-
tiffs’ constitutionally protected political expression because
“the mere potential” of a fraudulent election “constitutes
inherent harm,” and, despite acknowledging that all plain-
tiffs “voted and continued to vote in elections since,” that
defendants’ allegedly unlawful actions “diminished confi-
dence in the validity of election outcomes,” thereby impact-
ing plaintiffs’ right to vote. The amended complaint added
allegations of emotional distress, reputational damage, and
financial burdens arising out of the allegedly negligent con-
duct. However, the alleged facts remained largely the same,
focusing on an alleged lapse in the certification of the voting
machines.
Defendants argued that plaintiffs did not demon-
strate that their votes had not been counted or in any other
way actually compromised. Defendants argued that plain-
tiffs’ monetary expenditures, litigation-related economic
losses, emotional distress, and reputational damage, if
any, were not caused by any negligent or unlawful action of
defendants and that plaintiffs therefore had not asserted a
legally cognizable claim related to any unlawful actions by
defendants. As to claims against defendants in their per-
sonal capacity, defendants argued that plaintiffs had not
alleged any actions on the part of those individuals that
were unrelated to their official duties and that, therefore,
those claims “must be dismissed under the Oregon Tort
Claims Act” (OTCA).
Ultimately, acknowledging the importance of accu-
rate vote counts and commending plaintiffs for “raising
awareness of the voter machine certification irregularities,”
the trial court concluded that there were “no facts supporting
the contention that these irregularities affected the accuracy
of the vote count.” The trial court entered a separate limited
judgment for each of the groups of defendants. As to the Wasco
County defendants, the trial court determined that plain-
tiffs failed to allege facts showing a legally cognizable injury
196 Gunter v. Gambee
giving rise to a viable claim. As to the Oregon Secretary of
State and the Attorney General, the trial court ruled that
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims,
that the complaint failed to state ultimate facts sufficient to
constitute a valid state claim, and that the claims for pro-
spective relief were moot. Plaintiffs appealed.
Discussion
Before turning to plaintiffs’ specific assignments of
error, we note the broader context in which this appeal arises.
Plaintiffs’ filings raise issues regarding election administra-
tion, public confidence in electoral systems, and the uniform
application of certification standards across Oregon coun-
ties. Concerns of that nature are neither trivial nor beyond
the proper scope of public discourse. Like the trial court, we
acknowledge the indispensable importance of an accurate
vote count and fair election process. At the same time, as
with fair and accurate elections, the role and standards of the
judiciary are also indispensable to a functioning democracy.
Accordingly, the role of this court is necessarily limited.
In this case, our inquiry is not whether plaintiffs’
concerns are genuinely held, emotionally significant, or
shared by others, but whether the pleadings allege legally
cognizable injuries beyond an abstract interest in the cor-
rect application of the law sufficient to invoke judicial relief
under the governing statutes and constitutional standards.
See League of Oregon Cities v. State of Oregon, 334 Or 645,
658, 56 P3d 892 (2002); Eckles v. State of Oregon, 306 Or
380, 385, 760 P2d 846 (1988). Because plaintiffs proceeded
pro se and advanced numerous overlapping statutory, con-
stitutional, procedural, and equitable theories, we address
the assignments of error in greater detail than we would
typically provide for a nonprecedential opinion, both to
explain the basis for our decision and to demonstrate care-
ful consideration of the arguments raised throughout this
lengthy litigation. That said, we are limited to review of
arguments that were raised and developed below as related
to the actual rulings made by the trial court.
Preservation and Reviewability. Defendants concede
that plaintiffs’ arguments are broadly preserved. However,
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 192 (2026) 197
defendants argue that some of the more particularized
arguments raised on appeal—those related to procedural or
discovery-based theories related to pro se status—are not
preserved.
ORAP 5.45(1) provides that “[n]o matter claimed as
error will be considered on appeal unless the claimed error
was preserved in the lower court.” Preservation principles
are rooted in fairness and efficiency and are “prudential in
nature,” giving the trial court “a chance to consider and rule
on a contention” and avoid or correct errors, obviating the
need for appeal; permitting the opposing party to respond to
a contention and avoid surprise arguments; and fostering a
full development of the record, aiding both the trial court in
making its decision and the appellate court in reviewing it.
Peeples v. Lampert, 345 Or 209, 219-20, 191 P3d 637 (2008).
Preservation requires a party to “explain its objection
clearly enough for the opposing party, and the trial court, to
understand the issue” and avoid or correct the error. State v.
Skotland, 372 Or 319, 327, 549 P3d 534 (2024).
We may review unpreserved arguments for plain
error; an error is plain if it is an “error[ ] of law apparent
on the face of the record.” ORAP 5.45(2). Therefore, we only
review unpreserved arguments that concern an error of law
that is “obvious, not reasonably in dispute” and that appears
“on the face of the record,” meaning that it does not require
us to “go outside of the record to identify the error or choose
between competing inferences.” Ailes v. Portland Meadows,
Inc., 312 Or 376, 381-82, 823 P2d 956 (1991). If the error
meets that test, we must still exercise our discretion to con-
sider it or not and articulate our reasons for doing so. Id. at
382.
However, even some preserved arguments are not
reviewable. We are bound to review only fully developed
arguments related to actual rulings made by the trial court.
See, e.g., ORAP 5.45(3) (“Each assignment of error must iden-
tify precisely the legal, procedural, factual, or other ruling
that is being challenged.”); ORAP 5.45(4)(a) (“The court may
decline to consider any assignment of error that requires
the court to search the record to find the error or to deter-
mine if the error properly was raised and preserved.”). None
198 Gunter v. Gambee
of those principles are altered by our obligation to liberally
construe pro se appeals. See Zyst v. Kelly, 338 Or App 597,
601, 566 P3d 1121, rev den, 374 Or 188 (2025) (identifying
all arguments in pro se briefing and declining to address
undeveloped and unpreserved arguments).
On appeal, plaintiffs’ arguments that the trial court
erred by dismissing their complaint and ruling that their
complaint failed to state a claim, that the court lacked sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, that plaintiffs lacked federal stand-
ing, and that their claims seeking prospective relief were
moot are all preserved. Particularized arguments regarding
emotional distress, financial expenditures, loss of trust in
elections, disenfranchisement, and chilled political partici-
pation are also preserved.
However, plaintiffs’ arguments regarding proper
venue, timeliness, and various procedural concerns related
to their status as pro se plaintiffs are either unpreserved or
are matters on which the trial court did not rule or other-
wise decide adversely to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ claims were
dismissed only for failure to state a claim, lack of federal
standing, and mootness.
Failure to State a Claim Under Oregon Law and
Lack of Article III Standing. For a case to be constitution-
ally justiciable, “a plaintiff invoking a court’s jurisdiction to
resolve a controversy must demonstrate that the interests of
the parties * * * are adverse,” meaning plaintiffs must have
standing. Powell v. Bunn, 185 Or App 334, 346, 59 P3d 559
(2002), rev den, 336 Or 60 (2003). Additionally, it must be
that “a decision by the court will have a practical effect on
the plaintiff’s rights” and that requirement must “remain
satisfied throughout the litigation”; that is, the case cannot
become moot. Id.
When reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a
claim under ORCP 21 A(1)(h), we accept as true all well-
pleaded allegations and give plaintiffs the benefit of favor-
able inferences. Gafur v. Legacy Good Samaritan Hospital,
344 Or 525, 528-29, 185 P3d 446 (2008). Whether allegations
are sufficient to state a claim is a question of law. Rowlett
v. Fagan, 358 Or 639, 651, 369 P3d 1132 (2016). Because
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 192 (2026) 199
plaintiffs argue on appeal that the trial court’s ruling pre-
vented discovery, additional amendments, and further fac-
tual development, we add that, when the legal sufficiency of
a claim can be determined from the allegations of the com-
plaint, an ORCP 21 A(1)(h) motion is decided on the pleadings;
factual development or discovery is unnecessary to resolve
the purely legal issue. See Huskey v. Dept. of Corrections, 373
Or 270, 276, 564 P3d 142 (2025) (“A motion to dismiss under
ORCP 21 A(1)(h) attacks the sufficiency of the complaint.”).
Under ORCP 12 A, the trial court must liberally
construe pleadings to determine whether they adequately
allege a cognizable claim for relief; liberal construction, how-
ever, does not eliminate the requirement that the pleading
must allege facts sufficient to state such a claim. See Ogle v.
Nooth, 365 Or 771, 784, 453 P3d 1274 (2019) (explaining that
statute providing for dismissal of petition for post-conviction
relief that, “when liberally construed, fails to state a claim”
is in line with ORCP 21 and ORCP 12 A). The pro se status
of the litigants may affect how Oregon courts construe what
plaintiffs intended to allege, but it does not permit us to
supply allegations that are absent from the complaint or to
manufacture a legally sufficient cause of action from legally
insufficient allegations. Zyst, 338 Or App at 601.
In the context of claims for declaratory relief, failure
to state a claim intersects with the standing doctrine. Holmes
v. Morgan, 135 Or App 617, 624, 899 P2d 738, rev den, 322 Or
193 (1995) (explaining that standing to bring a declaratory
judgment proceeding depends on “whether the plaintiff has
alleged an effect on some legally recognized interest great
enough to assure an adversary proceeding sufficient for
adequate presentation of the issues”). Whether a party has
standing is likewise a question of law determined by “the
statute under which the plaintiff seeks relief,” Foote v. State
of Oregon, 364 Or 558, 562, 437 P3d 221 (2019), “because
standing is not a matter of common law but is, instead, con-
ferred by the legislature,” IBEW Local 89 v. Wallan, 326 Or
App 796, 799, 533 P3d 1134, rev den, 371 Or 509 (2023). To
establish standing, plaintiffs must allege “some injury or
other impact upon a legally recognized interest beyond an
abstract interest in the correct application or validity of a
200 Gunter v. Gambee
law” and the alleged injury “must not be too speculative.”
League of Oregon Cities, 334 Or at 658.
The central dispute in this case is whether plain-
tiffs adequately alleged a legally cognizable injury sufficient
to support claims under ORS 246.910, ORS 28.010, or 42
USC section 1983.
ORS 246.910(1) provides:
“A person adversely affected by any act or failure to act by
the Secretary of State, a county clerk, a city elections officer
or any other county, city or district official under any elec-
tion law, or by any order, rule, directive or instruction made
by the Secretary of State, a county clerk, a city elections
officer or any other county, city or district official under any
election law, may appeal therefrom to the circuit court for
the county in which the act or failure to act occurred or in
which the order, rule, directive or instruction was made.”
Under the statute, any alleged act or failure to act by a listed
official must “adversely affect” the person seeking redress.
Id.; Couey v. Atkins, 357 Or 460, 476, 355 P3d 866 (2015)
(“ORS 246.910 provides for such judicial review only if a
person has been ‘adversely affected’ by such an act or omis-
sion.”). ORS 28.010 provides for declaratory judgments but
does not alter the standing requirement. Powell, 185 Or at
346; see also Webb v. Clatsop Co. School Dist. 3, 188 Or 324,
331, 215 P2d 368 (1950) (the plaintiffs, relying on the declar-
atory judgment statute, had standing because they alleged
facts that, if true, were sufficient to show that results of elec-
tion were actually affected).
Similarly, 42 USC section 1983 provides redress
for “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the [United States] Constitution and laws”
caused by any person acting under the color of law. Like
ORS 246.910, section 1983 requires that the action of a
government official result in a concrete “deprivation of * * *
rights, privileges, or immunities” provided by law, includ-
ing the United States Constitution. Indeed, federal stand-
ing requires plaintiffs to show (1) an actual injury that is
concrete and particularized, and actual and imminent, as
opposed to hypothetical or conjectural; (2) a causal connec-
tion between the alleged injury and the conduct complained
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 192 (2026) 201
of; and (3) it must be likely that the injury alleged would be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 560-61, 112 S Ct 2130, 119 L Ed 2d
351 (1992).
The First Amended Complaint alleged that defen-
dants’ use of unlawfully certified voting systems caused
“distrust and disenfranchisement among voters,” “emo-
tional distress,” “a pervasive sense of vulnerability,” finan-
cial expenditures, and reputational harm, and that defen-
dants’ actions chilled political engagement. Plaintiffs also
alleged statewide inequities and erosion of electoral integ-
rity resulting from allegedly nonuniform certification stan-
dards. The trial court concluded that plaintiffs failed to
allege “any actual manipulation of the vote, undercounted
votes, improperly counted votes, or illegal votes” and instead
alleged only “conjectural or hypothetical” harms rather than
a legally cognizable injury.
The trial court did not err in making that deter-
mination and dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for failure
to allege facts sufficient to support a valid state law claim
and for lack of Article III standing for the federal claims.
Plaintiffs repeatedly alleged generalized loss of trust, con-
cern regarding electoral legitimacy, and speculative future
harms arising from certification irregularities. However,
those allegations are insufficient to confer standing because
they are not concrete and particularized injuries specific to
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs did not allege that their votes were not
counted, inaccurately tabulated, diluted in a measurable
manner, or that any election outcome was altered or other-
wise actually affected.
Plaintiffs’ claims for emotional distress, reputational
harm, and litigation-related financial expenditures are also
legally insufficient because no facts were alleged that tied
those alleged harms to specific wrongful acts of defendants.
See Chouinard v. Health Ventures, 179 Or App 507, 513, 39
P3d 951 (2002) (discussing elevated causation requirements
to recover for emotional distress). The trial court did not err,
therefore, in its determination that plaintiffs failed to allege
facts sufficient to establish a valid claim under state law.
202 Gunter v. Gambee
Likewise, the trial court did not err in its determi-
nation that plaintiffs lacked standing for their claims under
section 1983. Article III standing requires a concrete and
particularized injury that is actual or imminent. Lujan,
504 US at 560-61. Plaintiffs alleged only generalized dis-
satisfaction with election administration and emotional dis-
tress tied to alleged certification defects. The Ninth Circuit
already concluded that plaintiffs failed to allege injury
affecting their “individual exercise of the [voting] franchise”
or “the tabulation of their votes.” The trial court did not err
in deciding the same.
Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court failed
to construe their pleadings liberally under ORCP 12 A.
However, the record reflects that plaintiffs were given multi-
ple opportunities to amend and supplement their allegations,
and the trial court did not err in its determination that the
amended complaint continued to rely on speculative harms
and generalized grievances without identifying an impact
on their vote tabulation, right to vote, or any other concrete
harm suffered as a result of defendants’ alleged actions.
Finally, plaintiffs contend that the trial court failed
to consider out-of-state supplemental authority that plain-
tiffs believed supported broader elector standing and justi-
ciability principles. However, given that Oregon precedent
supplies governing standards, the trial court was required
to follow that precedent rather than adopt out-of-state
authority. State ex rel Kane v. Goldschmidt, 308 Or 573, 587,
783 P2d 988 (1989) (noting that decisions of other states
are not binding, even if persuasive). The trial court instead
relied on Oregon and federal standing principles requiring
concrete injury rather than generalized dissatisfaction with
governmental conduct.
We affirm the trial court’s dismissal for failure to
state a claim under ORS 246.910 and ORS 28.010, and for
lack of standing under 42 USC section 1983.
Jurisdiction. We turn next to plaintiffs’ arguments
concerning jurisdiction and the asserted statutory duty of
the Attorney General under ORS 260.345, the basis of addi-
tional claims that were also dismissed for failure to state a
claim.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 192 (2026) 203
Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction
presents a question of law reviewed for legal error. Menten
and Deatherage, 302 Or App 425, 428, 461 P3d 1075 (2020).
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in ruling that
plaintiffs did not establish jurisdiction or a cause of action
against the Attorney General. Plaintiffs rely heavily on
the statute’s use of the term “shall” and argue that judicial
review is available through mandamus or declaratory relief.
Plaintiffs also argue that the Attorney General’s alleged
inaction caused harm relating to distrust in the electoral
process and chilled political participation.
Defendants argue that plaintiffs failed to state a
claim under ORS 260.345 because that statute does not
require the Attorney General to conduct a particular inves-
tigation and because plaintiffs have not identified a review-
able agency order or demonstrated that they were “adversely
affected or aggrieved” as required by the statute.
The trial court correctly concluded that plaintiffs
failed to state a claim under ORS 260.345. Plaintiffs failed
to identify a statutory basis for their claims against the
Attorney General and failed to allege facts demonstrating
that the Attorney General violated a mandatory, nondiscre-
tionary duty. The statutory language relied upon by plain-
tiffs contains discretionary components, and plaintiffs did
not identify a reviewable agency order or adequately allege
adverse effects sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
Mootness. Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court
erred when it dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for prospective
relief as moot. Whether a controversy is moot is a question
of law. Progressive Party of Oregon v. Atkins, 276 Or App 700,
706-07, 370 P3d 506, rev den, 360 Or 697 (2016). As men-
tioned, a justiciable conflict requires a controversy in which
judicial relief would have a practical effect on the parties’
rights. Brumnett v. PSRB, 315 Or 402, 405, 848 P2d 1194
(1993). ORS 14.175 makes an exception for actions by public
officials that have continuing effect or are capable of repeti-
tion yet evading review. See, e.g., State ex rel Smith v. Hitt, 291
Or App 750, 753, 424 P3d 749 (2018) (challenge to ordinance
limiting the number of consecutive terms of county commis-
sioner remained reviewable because plaintiffs had standing,
204 Gunter v. Gambee
harm was ongoing, and the ordinance would likely be applied
to future election cycles and would evade review because elec-
tion cycles are short and the judicial process long).
Plaintiffs argue that harm to them was ongoing
because the allegedly unlawful certification practices con-
tinue to undermine electoral trust, dilute votes, and create
unequal treatment among counties. Plaintiffs also argue
that prospective declaratory and injunctive relief remain
available because the alleged failure to recertify the voting
machines continues to erode trust in the electoral process
and risks future dilution of votes.
Defendants argue that any alleged accreditation
lapse no longer exists because the United States Elections
Assistance Commission (EAC) clarified that Pro V&V’s
accreditation was never revoked and that a new accredita-
tion certificate issued on February 1, 2021. Defendants fur-
ther argue that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a controversy
capable of repetition yet evading review under ORS 14.175,
because plaintiffs had not identified any impact to their vot-
ing rights or the actual fairness of the electoral process aris-
ing out of the alleged certification violation and therefore
cannot show any ongoing adverse effect or controversy.
We agree with defendants that the trial court did
not err in determining that plaintiffs’ claims for prospective
relief were moot and did not meet the criteria for review
under ORS 14.175. Plaintiffs’ theory depended heavily on the
alleged expiration of Pro V&V’s accreditation. Defendants
presented unrebutted legal authority and administra-
tive clarification that the accreditation was never revoked
and that a new certificate of accreditation issued in 2021.
Moreover, plaintiffs did not allege any continuing concrete
injury tied to ongoing use of unlawfully uncertified systems.
Conclusion
The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’
complaint for failure to state a claim, lack of federal stand-
ing, and mootness.
Affirmed.