McVAY v. LEPAK and DRUMMOND

OSCN Found Document:McVAY et al., v. LEPAK and DRUMMOND McVAY et al., v. LEPAK and DRUMMOND 2026 OK 81 Case Number: 123179 Decided: 11/10/2026 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA Cite as: 2026 OK 81 , __ P.3d __ NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. STEVEN CRAIG MCVAY, AMY CERATO, KENNETH RAY SETTER and ANTHONY STOBBE Petitioners, vs. BENJAMIN LEPAK, in his official capacity as Oklahoma Secretary of State, and GENTNER DRUMMOND, Attorney General, Respondents. APPLICATION TO ASSUME ORIGINAL JURISIDICTION ¶ 0 Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Senate Bill 1027, an act relating to initiative and referendum petitions, which introduces several additional controls on the petition process. On November 18, 2025, the Court assumed original jurisdiction. We now hold that several key sections of S.B. 1027 violate the Oklahoma Constitution, are legally void, and lack enforceability. Because we conclude the unconstitutional provisions of the Act are not severable, the Act as a whole is deemed unconstitutional. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION PREVIOUSLY ASSUMED; PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF GRANTED Randall J. Yates and Melanie Wilson Rughani, Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C., for Petitioners Steven Craig McVay, Amy Cerato, Kenneth Ray Setter and Anthony Stobbe. Gary M. Gaskins, II, Zach West, Cullen D. Sweeney, and Will Flanagan, Office of Attorney General, for Respondents Ben Lepak and Gentner Drummond. Bob Burke for Amicus Curiae the Hon. Robert Henry. Whitney N. Humphrey, GableGotwals for Amicus Curiae the League of Women Voters of Oklahoma. Colleen L. McCarty for Amicus Curiae Oklahoma Appleseed Center for Law and Justice. Robert G. McCampbell and Amelia A. Fogleman, GableGotwals for Amicus Curiae Oklahoma Academy for State Goals. Ryan Haynie, OCPA Center for Law & Liberty, and Cheryl Plaxico and Austin Moseley for Amici Curiae the Hon. Frank Keating, the Hon. E. Scott Pruitt, and the Hon. John M. O'Connor. Trevor Pemberton, Pemberton Law Group, and Jordan Sekulow, Stuart J Roth, Andrew J. Ekonomou, Benjamin P. Sisney, and Nathan Moelker, American Center for Law and Justice, for Amici Curiae Sixty-Five Members of the Oklahoma Senate and House of Representatives. GURICH, J. ¶ 1 In Oklahoma, "[a]ll political power is inherent in the people." Okla. Const. art. II, § 1. As such, Oklahomans have a constitutional right and "power to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution and to enact or reject the same at the polls independent of the Legislature ...." Okla. Const. art. V, § 1 (emphasis added). "The first power reserved by the people is the initiative...." Okla. Const. art. V, § 2. Petition circulation has been held to be "core political speech" because it involves "interactive communication concerning political change." Buckley v. Am. Const. L. Found., Inc. (ACLF) , 525 U.S. 182, 186 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). "'[T]he right to petition for a vote of the people by Initiative... is a sacred right to be carefully preserved.'" In re Initiative Petition No. 348 , 1991 OK 110 820 P.2d 772 In re Referendum Petition No. 18, State Question No. 437 , 1966 OK 152 417 P.2d 295 ¶2 Senate Bill 1027 (S.B. 1027 or the Act), effective May 23, 2025, contains seven sections, and the Title of the Act indicates that it, among other things, relates to signatures for petitions and ballot title; ... establishing requirements for gist of proposition; requiring inclusion of certain statement on petition; requiring Secretary of State to make affirmation about certain language; authorizing certain removal for violation; adding qualification for persons circulating petition for signatures; requiring certain notice; providing that signature serves as certain attestation; requiring Secretary of State to establish procedures for removal of certain signatures; requiring certain disclosures; establishing requirements for certain contributions or compensation; requiring report of certain expenditures; requiring publication of certain reports on Secretary of State website; modifying requirements for certain signatures; updating certain vote requirement; ... adding requirement for ballot title; .... Act of May 23, 2025, Ch. 275, 2025 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 987 , 987 (West). The Act amended 34 O.S. §§ 3 ¶3 On June 12, 2025, Petitioners filed an Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and Petition for Declaratory Judgment, Writ of Prohibition or Other Appropriate Relief ("AAOJ"). ¶4 On July 3, 2025, Josh Cockroft, in his official capacity as the Oklahoma Secretary of State, ¶5 Several Amicus Curiae Statements have been filed. The Honorable Robert Henry, the League of Women Voters of Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Appleseed Center for Law and Justice, and the Oklahoma Academy for State Goals filed statements in support of Petitioners. Sixty-Five Members of the Oklahoma Senate and House of Representatives and the Honorable Frank Keating, the Honorable E. Scott Pruitt, and the Honorable John M. O'Connor filed statements in support of Respondents. Petitioners and Respondents filed responses accordingly. ¶6 On November 18, 2025, the Court heard oral arguments from Petitioners and Respondents. That same day the Court assumed original jurisdiction. I. Standing ¶ 7 Standing is a preliminary issue that must be adjudicated prior to an examination of the merits. "Standing refers to a person's legal right to seek relief in a judicial forum . " Fent v. Contingency Rev. Bd. , 2007 OK 27 163 P.3d 512 Id. Petitioners assert that they have standing as registered Oklahoma voters who have participated in the initiative petition process in the past and plan to do so in the future. Petitioners Stobbe and Setter are named proponents of State Question 836. All Petitioners assert that the statutory amendments enacted through S.B. 1027 make the petition process prohibitively expensive and violate their fundamental rights to propose and sign petitions. Respondents do not challenge Petitioners' standing. We hold that Petitioners have sufficient standing to challenge the constitutionality of these provisions. II. Original Jurisdiction ¶ 8 The Supreme Court's general "superintending control," see Okla. Const. art. VII, § 4, gives it original "jurisdiction to provide declaratory relief so as to afford a party a means to vindicate a judicially cognizable interest." Ethics Comm'n v. Cullison , 1993 OK 37 850 P.2d 1069 see Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12 of Okla. Cnty. v. State ex rel. State Bd. of Educ. , 2024 OK 39 565 P.3d 23 Edmondson v. Pearce , 2004 OK 23 91 P.3d 605 rare case that will be entertained on original jurisdiction that requests declaratory relief." Id. ¶ 11, 91 P.3d at 614 (emphasis in original). ¶9 "A fairly consistent theme running through most of our cases where original jurisdiction has been assumed has been that the matter must be affected with the public interest and there must be some urgency or pressing need for an early determination of the matter." Keating v. Johnson , 1996 OK 61 918 P.2d 51 See, e.g., Tobacco Settlement Endowment Tr. Fund v. Stitt , 2026 OK 1 583 P.3d 280 ¶10 This case presents one of those rare circumstances appropriate for the assumption of original jurisdiction. Petitioners ask us to assess a matter of first impression: do the statutory amendments enacted via S.B. 1027 violate the First Amendment or other constitutional provisions establishing the right of petition? The Act itself underscores the urgency of the Court's determination: S.B. 1027 applies to all initiative and referendum petitions, even those that were pending during the adoption of the Act if the Secretary of State had not previously set the date for circulation of the petition for signatures. At the time of oral argument, there were two III. Constitutionality of S.B. 1027 ¶ 11 The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const. Amend. I. "The freedom of speech and of the press, which are secured by the First Amendment against abridgement by the United States, are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State." Thornhill v. Alabama , 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940). Included among First Amendment rights is "the circulation of an initiative petition," which the U.S. Supreme Court has said "necessarily constitutes 'core political speech,' for which First Amendment protection is at its zenith." Meyer v. Grant , 486 U.S. 414, 414 (1988). ¶12 Legislation which limits First Amendment rights poses difficult legal questions. "States allowing ballot initiatives have considerable leeway to protect the integrity and reliability of the initiative process...." ACLF , 525 U.S. at 191 . But there is "'no litmus paper test'" to "separate valid ballot-access provisions from invalid interactive speech restrictions; we have come upon 'no substitute for the hard judgments that must be made.'" Id. at 192 (quoting Storer v. Brown , 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)). "[T]he First Amendment requires us to be vigilant in making those judgments, to guard against undue hindrances to political conversations and the exchange of ideas." Id. "'[S]tatutes that limit the power of the people to initiate legislation are to be closely scrutinized and narrowly construed.'" Meyer , 486 U.S. at 423 (1988) (quoting Urevich v. Woodard , 667 P.2d 760 Id. at 420--21. "Under the strict-scrutiny test, [Oklahoma has] the burden to prove" S.B. 1027 is "(1) narrowly tailored, to serve (2) a compelling state interest." Republican Party of Minn. v. White , 536 U.S. 765 , 774--75 (2002). "Strict scrutiny--which requires a restriction to be the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest--is the most demanding test known to constitutional law." Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Paxton , 606 U.S. 461 , 484 (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶13 Similarly, restrictions on the signature or circulation of petitions invoke several rights inherent in the Oklahoma Constitution. First, "[e]very person may freely speak, write, or publish his sentiments on all subjects...; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." Okla. Const. art. II, § 22. The right to assemble is also a fundamental right in the Oklahoma Constitution. Okla. Const. art. II, § 3 ("The people have the right peaceably to assemble for their own good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government for redress of grievances by petition, address, or remonstrance."). And Oklahomans reserved to themselves a constitutional right to petition for a vote of the people by initiative or referendum. Okla. Const. art. V, §§ 1-2. ¶14 Ordinarily, "[d]emonstrating a statute's unconstitutionality is a heavy burden that requires a showing the statute is clearly, palpably, and plainly inconsistent with the Constitution" and "[e]very presumption is to be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a statute." Kiesel v. Rogers , 2020 OK 65 470 P.3d 294 State ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Pile , 1979 OK 152 603 P.2d 337 any system of prior restraints of expression comes to the bar for judicial review bearing a heavy presumption against its Constitutional validity. Accordingly, any attempt to restrict [First Amendment] liberties must be justified by a clear public interest clearly and presently threatened by the activity sought to be regulated. The freedoms of speech and of... assembly... may only be encroached upon after it is shown the restriction is necessary to prevent a grave and immediate danger to interests the state may lawfully protect. These rights rest on firmer ground than, for instance, due process, which mandates a rational connection between the remedy provided legislatively and the evil to be forestalled. Accordingly, whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at an appropriate time and place, must have clear support in public danger. Only the gravest of abuses engendering paramount interests give occasion for limiting legislation. It is therefore our tradition to allow the widest latitude for discussion and the narrowest range for its restriction. This court has stated that in order for prior restraints to withstand constitutional attack they must be narrowly drafted so as to suppress only that speech presenting a clear and present danger of serious and substantial evil. Id. ¶ 9, 603 P.2d at 340 --41 (internal citations omitted). ¶15 Because the right of initiative and referendum petitions is sacred, "[i]t is the duty of the courts to construe and preserve this right as intended by the people in adopting the Constitution, and thereby reserve unto the people this power." Ruth v. Peshek , 1931 OK 674 5 P.2d 108 See , e.g. , Gentges v. State Election Bd. , 2018 OK 39 419 P.3d 224 A. Requirement that Circulators Are Registered to Vote in Oklahoma --S.B. 1027, §§ 2, 3. ¶ 16 S.B. 1027 amended 34 O.S. §§ 6 34 O.S.2025, § 6 34 O.S.2025, § 8 Buckley v. ACLF , directly addressed such a requirement and controls. In ACLF , the U.S. Supreme Court determined that a Colorado law requiring petition circulators to be registered to vote in Colorado violated the First Amendment. 525 U.S. at 192 --97. S.B. 1027 seeks to impose the same restriction. As such, S.B. 1027's registered-voter circulator requirements are unconstitutional. B. County-Specific Signature Collection Caps -- S.B. 1027, § 3. ¶ 17 By constitutional mandate, "eight per centum of the legal voters shall have the right to propose any legislative measure, and fifteen per centum of the legal voters shall have the right to propose amendments to the Constitution by petition...." Okla. Const. art. V, § 2. 1. The total number of signatures collected to meet the requirements for an initiative petition or referendum petition, amending the Oklahoma Statutes, from a single county shall not exceed eleven and five-tenths percent (11.5%) of the number of votes cast in that county during the most recent statewide general election for Governor.... 2. The total number of signatures collected to meet the requirements for an initiative petition or referendum petition, amending the Oklahoma Constitution, from a single county shall not exceed twenty and eight-tenths percent (20.8%) of the number of votes cast in that county during the most recent statewide general election for Governor.... 34 O.S.2025, § 8 ¶18 Petitioners take issue with these limitations. "Currently, all 2,470,437 registered Oklahoma voters can exercise their constitutional right to sign petitions." Pet'rs' Br. at 4. Id. Petitioners argue that these caps "violate the First Amendment by prohibiting legal voters from signing the petition--core First Amendment activity--once the caps are reached." Id. at 2. ¶19 We agree with Petitioners that the caps pose broad First Amendment problems. As an initial matter, the caps do not accomplish the stated goal of rural participation. The caps prohibit the collection of any signatures beyond a specified percentage of a county's latest gubernatorial votes. In doing so, the caps prohibit legal voters from signing petitions once their county's signature maximum is met. This restriction will be most severe in the least populated counties. For example, as of January 1, 2026, there were 1,378 registered voters in Harmon County. all of these registered voters were eligible to sign a petition. With the caps, only seventy-five (75) will be allowed to sign a given statutory initiative or referendum petition. Pet'rs' App., Tab B, Decl. of Amber England ¶ 10. Not only does this disenfranchise the 1,303 Harmon County registered voters that will be prohibited from signing, but it also makes it extremely unlikely that signature collection efforts would ever step foot in Harmon County (or any other rural county) when they can only collect seventy-five of the more than ninety-two thousand signatures needed to make it on the ballot. Id. ¶ 8. ¶20 Respondents insist that rural voter involvement-- i.e. "encourag[ing] initiative campaigns to go into suburban and rural Oklahoma counties for signatures"--is a compelling state interest that justifies the restriction. Resp. in Opp'n at 1, 6. But even if that goal was achieved by the caps--which it is not--enhancing rural representation does not justify severely burdening fundamental First Amendment rights. "[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment...." Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U.S. 1 , 48--49 (1976). And even if Respondents believe the laws proposed by past, present or future initiative petitions are not representative of rural Oklahomans, First Amendment freedoms are not conditioned upon the popularity of the opinion being expressed. "The First Amendment is a value-free provision whose protection is not dependent on the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered. The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind. In this field every person must be his own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the false for us." Meyer , 486 U.S. at 419 --20 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The caps of 34 O.S.2025, § 8 ¶21 This disenfranchisement achieved by the caps also contradicts the Oklahoma Constitution's mandate that "legal voters shall have the right to propose" initiatives. See Okla. Const. art. V, § 2. Oklahoma's undue burden test balances regulatory benefits against constitutional burdens. The supposed goal of incorporating more rural voters at the signature gathering stage requiring the exclusion of others. Here, the balance weighs in favor of the constitutional right. By denying qualified legal voters the right to participate in the petition process, the caps violate Oklahomans' constitutional right of petition. ¶22 The caps are also flawed in that they make it facially impossible for proponents to collect enough signatures to reach the 25% signature threshold required by Article 5, Section 6 of the Oklahoma Constitution to propose a measure within three years of its previous rejection. At oral argument, the Respondents conceded this mathematical reality, and, instead, argued that the caps do not apply "to those particular initiative petitions" because they are "distinct" from initiative petitions proposing original ideas. Resp. in Opp'n at 7. But there is nothing in the Act itself that excludes the re-proposal of rejected measures under Article 5, Section 6. The caps eliminate Oklahomans' ability to re-propose a measure within three years of its rejection and plainly violate the Oklahoma Constitution. ¶23 We therefore find 34 O.S.2025, § 8 C. Additional Gist Requirements and Secretary of State Role in Monitoring Gists -- S.B. 1027, § 1. ¶ 24 S.B. 1027 also introduced several new requirements for the gists of propositions. It struck the word "simple" from the requirement that a "simple statement of the gist of the proposition shall be printed on the top margin of each signature sheet" and mandated for the very first time that gists: 1. Explain in basic words, which can be easily found in dictionaries of general usage, the effect of the proposition; 2. Not contain any words which have a special meaning for a particular profession or trade not commonly known to the citizens of this state; 3. Not contain euphemisms, words, or phrases regarded in popular parlance as code words, or an apparent attempt to deceive voters; 4. Not reflect partiality in its composition or contain any argument for or against the measure; and 5. Indicate whether a proposed measure will have a fiscal impact on the state and if so, the potential source of funding including, but not limited to, federal funding or legislative appropriation which may require imposition of a new tax, increase of an existing tax, or elimination of existing services. 34 O.S.2025, § 3 34 O.S.2025, § 3 34 O.S.2025, § 3 ¶25 Petitioners argue these content-based restrictions on core political speech violate both the First Amendment and Article II, Section 22 of the Oklahoma Constitution by both imposing "prior restraint[s] on favorable speech" and "compel[ing] favorable speech." Pet'rs' Br. at 6--7. We agree. As discussed, "the circulation of a petition involves the type of interactive communication concerning political change that is appropriately described as 'core political speech.'" Meyer , 486 U.S. at 421 --22. Petition circulation is "an area in which the importance of First Amendment protections is at its zenith." Id. at 425 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶26 The amendments to 34 O.S.2025, § 3 Brown v. Yost , 133 F.4th 725 (6th Cir. 2025), the Sixth Circuit recently addressed a similar Ohio statute regulating the contents of the "petition summary" Id. at 732 . The Sixth Circuit explained that "[i]ntrusions on petitioners' exercise of 'editorial control and judgment' over the content of those petitions severely infringe First Amendment interests." Id. at 732 (citing Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo , 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)). Id. at 736 ("their First Amendment interests are burdened when the state subjects their participation in the ballot-initiative process to editorial review.") "Because the burden is severe, strict scrutiny applies." Id. at 737 (citing Burdick v. Takushi , 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)); see also Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocs. v. Becerra , 585 U.S. 755, 766 (2018) ("Content-based regulations... 'are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interest." (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert , 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015))). ¶27 We find this analysis persuasive and applicable to the new gist requirements imposed in 34 O.S.2025, § 3 See, e.g. , In re Initiative Petition No. 344 , 1990 OK 75 797 P.2d 326 . Respondents have not provided any justification for further restrictions or requirements, especially at the expense of proponents' First Amendment rights. As such, the amendments to 34 O.S.2025, § 3 ¶ 28 Petitioners also assert 34 O.S.2025, § 3 34 O.S.2025, § 3 D. Incentive-Based Compensation Ban -- S.B. 1027, § 3. ¶ 29 S.B. 1027 prohibits circulation compensation "based on number of signatures collected, number of signature sheets submitted, or any other similar incentives." 34 O.S.2025, § 8 Meyer v. Grant is instructive in analyzing circulator compensation restrictions. ¶30 In Meyer , the Supreme Court struck down a Colorado statute which criminalized any payment of petition circulators. The Court determined that banning circulator payment severely burdened core political speech in two ways: First, it limits the number of voices who will convey appellees' message and the hours they can speak and, therefore, limits the size of the audience they can reach. Second, it makes it less likely that appellees will garner the number of signatures necessary to place the matter on the ballot, thus limiting their ability to make the matter the focus of statewide discussion. 486 U.S. at 422 --23. Because the statute limited political expression, the Court held that a strict, "exacting" scrutiny was applicable. Id. at 420 . Ultimately, Colorado failed to meet the "well-nigh insurmountable" burden to justify the ban: The State's interest in protecting the integrity of the initiative process does not justify the prohibition because the State has failed to demonstrate that it is necessary to burden appellees' ability to communicate their message in order to meet its concerns. The Attorney General has argued that the petition circulator has the duty to verify the authenticity of signatures on the petition and that the compensation might provide the circulator with a temptation to disregard that duty. No evidence has been offered to support that speculation, however, and we are not prepared to assume that a professional circulator--whose qualifications for similar future assignments may well depend on a reputation for competence and integrity--is any more likely to accept false signatures than a volunteer who is motivated entirely by an interest in having the proposition placed on the ballot. Id. at 426 . The Meyer Court rejected arguments that other available means of political speech relieved the burden being placed by the compensation ban: Colorado's prohibition of paid petition circulators restricts access to the most effective, fundamental, and perhaps economical avenue of political discourse, direct one-on-one communication. That it leaves open "more burdensome" avenues of communication does not relieve its burden on First Amendment expression. The First Amendment protects appellees' right not only to advocate their cause but also to select what they believe to be the most effective means for doing so. Id. at 424 . ¶31 Here, Respondents primarily argue that there is no evidence Section 8(G)'s incentive-based compensation ban "burdens the initiative petition process in any meaningful manner." Resp. in Opp'n at 19. Respondents cite federal and other state courts Id. Respondents also suggest "the prohibition on per-signature compensation reduces the incentives for circulators to rush, commit fraud, or browbeat Oklahomans into signing." Resp. to Amicus Curiae League of Women Voters at 1. ¶ 32 Although Section 8(G) does not ban paid circulators outright, Petitioners maintain that it bans common and cost-effective means of payment used in initiative campaigns. Id. at ¶¶ 23, 28. We disagree. Per Meyer , that S.B. 1027 leaves open more costly, and potentially less-effective, avenues of communication does not relieve its burden on First Amendment expression. And notably, Section 8(G) bans compensation based not only on the number of signatures collected, but also the "number of signature sheets submitted, or any other similar incentives ." 34 O.S.2025, § 8 verified signatures collected--is any more likely to accept false signatures than a circulator paid by the hour. In the absence of any indication of fraud, Respondents have failed to justify the burden Section 8(G) places on protected speech, particularly in view of the protections against fraud already in place through Oklahoma's criminalization of false signatures See 34 O.S.2024, § 2 see also Nichols v. Ziriax , 2022 OK 76 518 P.3d 883 E. Out-of-State Contribution Ban -- S.B. 1027, § 3. ¶ 33 S.B. 1027 also bans any "person or entity who does not reside or do business in this state" from "contribut[ing] to or compensate[ing] a person for circulation of a petition." 34 O.S.2025, § 8 34 O.S.2025, § 8 ¶34 Respondents argue that this out-of-state ban "protect[s] the integrity of the initiative-petition process" by "minimiz[ing] the risk that in-state voices and advocates will be drowned out by a large volume of purely out-of-state participants." Resp. in Opp'n at 14, 17. Respondents argue that the ban is not overly burdensome because it (1) only prohibits out-of-state participation if the person or entity does not "do business in" Oklahoma, which Respondents assert is a broad, easily-met standard; funding of circulation and not "supporting the petition through advertisements or" other forms of "advocacy." Id. at 16--17. ¶35 Respondents arguments are flawed in several respects, many of which are addressed in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission , where the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a federal law prohibiting corporations and unions from making independent expenditures for speech advocating for or against a candidate. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). In Citizens United , the Court reasoned that banning financial contributions towards political communication bans speech. Id. at 339 . The Court then went on to indicate "restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others" are prohibited. Id. at 340--41 ("We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers."). e.g. , through a PAC) negated the burden being placed on freedom of speech. Id. at 337 . Ultimately, the Court determined that the law burdened political speech and could not withstand strict scrutiny "which requires the Government to prove that the restriction 'furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.'" Id. at 340 (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. , 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007) (opinion of ROBERTS, C.J.)). ¶36 We find the analysis in Citizens United applicable to the out-of-state contribution ban in Section 8(G). Petition circulation is political speech. Preventing out-of-state persons and entities from financially contributing is a restriction on political speech that distinguishes between different speakers. And the availability of other forms of advocacy, such as advertising, or the ability to "do business" in Oklahoma does not alleviate the burden being placed on First Amendment rights. Prohibiting all persons and entities out-of-state from contributing any money to help fund the circulation of a petition is not a narrowly tailored means to minimize the risk that in-state voices will be drowned out by out-of-state voices, even if we assume, arguendo , that it is a compelling state interest. As such, the out-of-state contribution ban is unconstitutional. F. Disclosure Requirements -- S.B. 1027, § 3. ¶ 37 S.B. 1027 also amended several statutes to add new disclosure requirements. Petitioners argue that these disclosure requirements will unconstitutionally chill First Amendment rights to free speech and association by infringing on privacy of association and making both the donation and circulation process more burdensome. Although all of the following can be described as "disclosure requirements," we will analyze the subsection compelling contemporaneous, public speech separately from those subsections mandating new disclosure or reporting to the State of Oklahoma. i. Circulator Payment Public Notice ¶ 38 S.B. 1027 amended 34 O.S. § 8 See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). Respondents' main justification for the new disclosure requirements is to keep citizens informed as to which persons and special interest groups are funding and promoting an initiative petition. We are not convinced this notice requirement is narrowly tailored to meet that end. Both parties suggest that most initiative petition circulators are paid through professional signature gathering firms--in which case, disclosure of whether a circulator is paid and by whom ( i.e. , their employer) will provide little to no insight into who stands to benefit from the initiative. We therefore conclude that the Section 8(E) public notice requirement is not narrowly tailored to serve the stated interest and therefore unconstitutionally violates First Amendment rights. ii. Circulator Payment Disclosure to the Secretary of State and Weekly Expense Reports ¶ 39 S.B. 1027 amended 34 O.S. § 8 34 O.S. § 8 34 O.S.2025, § 8 Valeo , 424 U.S. at 64 . Here, there is no qualifying dollar threshold to these reporting requirements. A circulator paid $7.25 to circulate a petition for one hour must disclose their payor to the Secretary of State. And if a petition proponent spends even $1 a week on circulation for the ninety days of circulation--they are required to submit thirteen expense reports. The burden of these reports is severe and, as stated by Justice Brennan for a plurality in Massachusetts Citizens for Life, may "create a disincentive... to engage in political speech," especially from grassroot and volunteer supporters. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 254 (1986) (plurality opinion). "Detailed recordkeeping and disclosure obligations, along with the duty to appoint a treasurer and custodian of records, impose administrative costs that many small entities" or individuals "may be unable to bear." Id. ¶40 But not all disclosure burdens are unconstitutional. Disclosure requirements can pass constitutional muster if there is "a 'substantial relation' between the disclosure requirement and a 'sufficiently important' governmental interest." Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 366 --67 (quoting Valeo , 424 U.S. at 64, 66 ). To withstand this scrutiny, "the strength of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment rights." Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n , 554 U.S. 724, 744 (2008). We must therefore look at the governmental interest in disclosure and weigh it against the burden being placed on First Amendment rights. ¶41 Generally, the Supreme Court has recognized three potential categories of sufficiently important governmental interests which justify reporting and disclosure requirements. First, when disclosure requirements "are an essential means of gathering the data necessary to detect violations of... contribution limitations...." Valeo , 424 U.S. at 68 . Second, when disclosure will "deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures"--"[a] public armed with information about a candidate's most generous supporters is better able to detect any post-election special favors that may be given in return." Id. at 67--68. Third, when disclosure will allow "voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches." Id. at 67 . ¶42 Here, the first and second justifications quickly fail. First, Oklahoma does not have contribution limitations for state question campaigns, so there's no need to detect limitation violations. Ethics Comm'n Rule 2.36, 74 O.S.2025, Ch. 62, App. 1. See, e.g. , ACLF , 525 U.S. at 203 ("ballot initiatives do not involve the risk of ' quid pro quo ' corruption present when money is paid to, or for, candidates"); Meyer , 486 U.S. at 427 ("the risk of fraud or corruption, or the appearance thereof, is more remote at the petition stage of an initiative than at the time of balloting"); First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978) ("The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections ... simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue."). Respondents therefore rely on the third justification, providing context to help inform the public of the potential motives of a petition, to support both of Section 8(G)'s disclosure requirements. ¶43 Before we begin analyzing Section 8(G), we must address the U.S. Supreme Court's precedent regarding petition circulation disclosures. In ACLF , the U.S. Supreme Court seemingly endorsed requiring "sponsors of ballot initiatives to disclose who pays petition circulators, and how much." See ACLF , 525 U.S. at 205 . were at issue--(1) requiring circulators to wear name badges and (2) requiring initiative proponents to report the names and addresses of paid circulators and the amounts paid to each--were deemed unconstitutional burdens on First Amendment rights. Id. at 197--206. ¶44 While we acknowledge that there is a legitimate interest in keeping citizens informed as to who is financially supporting and promoting an initiative, we are not convinced Section 8(G)'s disclosure requirements meet this end. First, the informational benefit of these disclosure requirements becomes attenuated when the contributions and expenditures are slight. Disclosure of minor circulation payments and expenses are not likely to help inform potential voters about who influenced the legislation. Second, even with respect to larger expenses, Respondents indicate "the vast majority of applications of SB 1027's provisions will consist of initiative campaigns reporting how much they are spending on signature collection firms." Resp. to Amicus Curiae League of Women Voters at 3. Respondents are adamant that these "disclosure provisions do not require the disclosure of individual donors to the campaign." Id. As such, these disclosures do not actually help the public identify the forces behind the initiative or assess the merits of the initiative. Not only does the burden of these disclosure requirements vastly outweigh the limited informational benefit gained, but we also conclude that Section 8(G)'s disclosures are not substantially related to Oklahoma's interest in an informed electorate. The disclosure requirements in Section 8(G) therefore unconstitutionally violate First Amendment rights. IV. Severability of S.B. 1027 ¶ 45 The Act contains a severability clause. This clause and 75 O.S. § 11a 34 O.S.2025, § 3 34 O.S.2025, § 8 34 O.S.2025, § 8 34 O.S.2025, § 8 34 O.S.2025, § 9 34 O.S.2025, §§ 3 supra in ¶ 2 . ¶46 Upon review, we are not prepared to presume the Legislature would have enacted the remaining provisions without those already deemed void. None of the remaining provisions relate to rural inclusion in the petition process. Although it could be argued that the extra ballot title requirement would help ensure that the state question is accurate and easily understood, ballot titles were already governed by a series of restrictions to ensure their clarity and were already reviewed in full and heavily scrutinized by the Attorney General--and this Court when challenged--to ensure that they are clear and not deceptive. See 34 O.S.2021, § 9 V. Conclusion ¶ 47 The Court concludes Petitioners have standing. Several key aspects of Senate Bill 1027 violate the U.S. and Oklahoma Constitutions, and non-offending sections are incapable of being severed. We therefore conclude S.B. 1027 is unconstitutional and void in its entirety and lacks legal enforceability. Once a statute that amends or repeals an earlier statute is deemed unconstitutional (and thus void), it is as if it had never been passed. The earlier statute, as it stood prior to the invalid enactment, is unaffected. As such, the versions of 34 O.S. §§ 3 ¶48 Should the parties choose to file a petition for rehearing, it must be done within ten days of the day this opinion is filed. Five additional days will be allowed for a response. This time limitation will not be extended. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION PREVIOUSLY ASSUMED; PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF GRANTED CONCUR: WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, COMBS, GURICH, and DARBY, JJ. DISSENT: ROWE, C.J., KUEHN (by separate writing), V.C.J., KANE (by separate writing), J. and HUBER (by separate writing), S.J. FOOTNOTES A related original action, Case No. 123,180, challenges the retroactivity clause of S.B. 1027 and, in particular, its application to pending State Question 836. As such, on September 15, the Court entered a temporary stay in Case No. 123,180 which stayed "the effectiveness of S.B. 1027 as to State Question No. 836." During this stay, "S.B. 1027 shall not be enforced as to State Question No. 836." The next day the Court issued an opinion in In re INITIATIVE PETITION NO. 448, STATE QUESTION NO. 836 , 2025 OK 56 577 P.3d 276 See supra note 2. Meyer , 486 U.S. at 425 . not the number of signatures that can be collected. See Resp. in Opp'n at 7. We find this argument inconsistent with the plain language of 34 O.S.2025, §8 collected ... shall not exceed" the designated cap. See also Oklahoma State Election Board, Annual Voter Registration Statistics, Archived 2025 Oklahoma Voter Registration Statistics by County, https://oklahoma.gov/content/dam/ok/en/elections/voter-registration-statistics/2025-vr-statistics/vrstats-county-jan15-2025.pdf. See OK Election Results, https://results.okelections.gov/OKER/?elecDate=20221108 (last visited November 9, 2026). For petitions amending the Constitution, a maxim