State ex rel. Nguyen v. Lawson

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Nguyen v. Lawson, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-3814.] NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-3814 THE STATE EX REL . NGUYEN, APPELLANT , ET AL., v. LAWSON ET AL., APPELLEES. [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Nguyen v. Lawson, Slip Opinion No. 2 026-Ohio-3814.] Quo warranto—Court of appeals erred in finding appellant’s claims moot without first deciding whether ordinance validly repealed ballot measure that abolished city charter—Cause remanded to court of appeals to determine whether statutory or charter government is legitimate because case presents issues germane to appellant’s claims that have not been briefed in appeal—Court of appeals’ dismissal of action reversed and cause remanded. (No. 2026-0429—Submitted August 11, 2026—Decided October 1, 2026.) APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Athens County, No. 24CA11. __________________ The per curiam opinion below was joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER,  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO DEWINE, BRUNNER, DETERS, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ. Per Curiam. {¶ 1} For the second time, appellant, Margarita Nguyen, appeals the Fourth District Court of Appeals’ dismissal of her action seeking a writ of quo warranto. Nguyen contends that she is a duly elected council member and the council president of the City of Nelsonville. Nguyen further contends that appellee Opha Lawson was unlawfully appointed to fill her council-member seat and that appellee Gregg Clement unlawfully assumed Nguyen’s position as council president. {¶ 2} In State ex rel. Nguyen v. Lawson, 2025-Ohio-507 (“Nguyen I”), we reversed the Fourth District’s dismissal of Nguyen’s complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings, concluding that the Fourth District had erred in dismissing the case on the basis of laches, id. at ¶ 28. On remand, the Fourth District dismissed the action again, this time determining that it was moot because Nelsonville voters elected a new slate of council members at the November 2025 general election. Nguyen appeals again, contending that the Fourth District could not have made a valid mootness determination without first deciding whether the council members elected at the November 2025 election were elected to valid offices. We agree with Nguyen and again reverse and remand for further proceedings. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Competing Governments in Nelsonville {¶ 3} To understand the issues raised in Nguyen’s appeal, it is necessary to place this case in the context of Nelsonville’s ongoing political tug-of-war, which has resulted in two bodies claiming to be the legitimate city council. We first confronted the issue of Nelsonville’s dueling councils in State ex rel. Nelsonville v. Athens Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2025-Ohio-4363. 2  January Term, 2026 {¶ 4} As recounted in that decision, Nelsonville voters adopted a city charter in 1994. In November 2024, however, Nelsonville voters approved a ballot measure known as Issue 23, which abolished the city’s charter and returned the city to a statutory form of government, effective January 1, 2026. See id. at ¶ 4. Under Issue 23, elections would need to be held for numerous city offices, including seven city-council members and a council president. Id. at ¶ 6. {¶ 5} On August 11, 2025, however, before Issue 23 became effective, the city council passed Ordinance 54-25, which purported to repeal Issue 23. See id. at ¶ 9. Specifically, Ordinance 54-25 provides that “the government structures established under the [city c]harter shall continue uninterrupted” and the charter “remains in full force and effect.” {¶ 6} After passage of Ordinance 54-25, Nelsonville filed an original action in this court, seeking writs of prohibition or mandamus ordering the Athens County Board of Elections to decertify, or otherwise remove, the slate of candidates set to appear on the November 2025 ballot for elected positions in Nelsonville’s statutory government. Id., 2025-Ohio-4363, at ¶ 11. Nelsonville’s position was that Ordinance 54-25 kept the charter government in place and mooted the need for the elections for statutory offices. Id. at ¶ 10. {¶ 7} We denied the writs. We determined that a writ of prohibition was not a proper remedy, because there had been no exercise of quasi-judicial authority by the board of elections. Id. at ¶ 26. And we denied relief in mandamus because the board had no statutory duty to remove the certified candidates from the ballot. Id. at ¶ 30, 35. We had no occasion to reach the issue whether Nelsonville’s city council could validly repeal Issue 23 by passing Ordinance 54-25. Id. at ¶ 30. The election for the statutory-government offices went forward in November 2025. {¶ 8} In February 2026, elected members of the statutory government filed a petition for a writ of quo warranto in the Fourth District Court of Appeals, asserting that they were the lawfully elected representatives of the city and that the 3  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO charter-government officeholders were wrongfully holding their offices. Despite finding that the relators had been duly elected to the statutory offices of mayor, president of council, and council members at large and were entitled to hold those offices, State ex rel. Flowers v. Nelsonville, 4th Dist. No. 26CA3, ¶ 35 (June 10, 2026), the Fourth District denied the writs, reasoning that it could not determine whether the charter-government officeholders were unlawfully holding the offices without first determining whether Ordinance 54-25 is invalid, id. at ¶ 35-38. And the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the validity of Ordinance 54- 25 because courts of appeals do not have original jurisdiction over claims for declaratory judgment. Id. at ¶ 36. Accordingly, the issue whether the statutory council or the charter council is Nelsonville’s legitimate city council remains unresolved.1 B. Facts Underlying the Quo Warranto Claim {¶ 9} As noted above, Nguyen claims entitlement to a seat on Nelsonville’s city council and to the office of council president. She was elected to a four-year term on the council on November 7, 2023, and was sworn into office a month later. After Greg Smith resigned as council president, the council elected Nguyen as Smith’s replacement on January 22, 2024. Smith resigned his council seat on February 12, 2024. {¶ 10} Five days later, in the late afternoon on February 17, Nguyen sent the other council members an email stating, “I hereby tender my resignation as council president and as council member altogether.” The following morning, Nguyen sent another email to the council members, stating she had changed her mind and was rescinding her resignation. However, on February 25, three council members replied separately to Nguyen’s rescission email, each of them indicating that they accepted Nguyen’s resignation but not her rescission of the resignation. 1. The Flowers relators appealed the Fourth District’s decision to this court as of right on July 22. That case remains pending before us. 4  January Term, 2026 These communications notwithstanding, Nguyen contends that she continued to preside over council meetings. {¶ 11} At its March 11 meeting, the council, by a three-to-two vote and over Nguyen’s objection, purported to appoint appellee Tony Dunfee to fill the council vacancy created by Smith’s resignation a month earlier. Disputing the validity of Dunfee’s appointment, Nguyen later purported to appoint Carol Sue Powell to the same council seat. In doing so, Nguyen relied on Section 4.03 of the Nelsonville Charter, which allows the council president to appoint a person to fill a council vacancy when the council has failed to do so within 30 days. {¶ 12} At a special meeting convened on March 13, the council purported to appoint Gregg Clement as council president to replace Nguyen. And at another special meeting held on March 21, the council—with Clement acting as council president—purported to appoint Opha Lawson to fill Nguyen’s council seat. C. Quo Warranto Action: Dismissal, Reversal, and Remand {¶ 13} Nguyen and Powell filed a quo warranto complaint in the Fourth District on April 26, 2024, seeking a writ stating that (1) Nguyen was entitled to serve as a council member and as council president and (2) Powell was entitled to serve as a council member. They also asked that Lawson and Dunfee be ousted as council members and that Clement be ousted as council president. Appellees filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, arguing that Nguyen and Powell’s claims were barred by laches. The Fourth District granted the motion to dismiss, agreeing with appellees’ argument that Nguyen and Powell had unduly delayed in bringing their claims in quo warranto. {¶ 14} We reversed and remanded the case to the Fourth District for further proceedings, holding that it was error for the Fourth District to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) on the basis of a laches defense. Nguyen I, 2025-Ohio-507, at ¶ 28. On remand, Nguyen and Powell amended their complaint to add appellee Nic Saul as a respondent after Saul succeeded Dunfee to the council seat that Powell alleged to 5  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO be hers. In the amended complaint, Nguyen and Powell requested writs of quo warranto ordering (1) Lawson ousted and Nguyen installed as a council member, (2) Saul ousted and Powell installed as a council member, and (3) Clement ousted and Nguyen installed as council president. {¶ 15} The parties submitted evidence and merit briefs. In their merit brief, appellees reprised their laches argument and raised two other arguments to defend against the action: (1) that the November 2025 election for Nelsonville’s statutory- government offices under Issue 23 rendered Powell and Nguyen’s quo warranto claims moot and (2) Nguyen was not entitled to the writ in any event, because she resigned from council on February 17, 2024. D. The Fourth District Dismisses the Action on Mootness Grounds {¶ 16} After the parties completed their merit briefing in the case, the Fourth District ordered supplemental briefing on the issue of mootness. Specifically, the court ordered the parties to brief the questions whether the case had become moot in light of (1) Nelsonville voters’ approval in November 2024 of Issue 23, which abolished the city’s charter, effective January 2026 and (2) the November 2025 city-council elections having taken place. {¶ 17} In their supplemental briefs, the parties agreed that Powell’s quo warranto claim was moot because the council term to which she had been appointed expired on November 30, 2025. The parties also appeared to agree that the mootness of Nguyen’s claims could not be determined without the Fourth District first deciding whether Ordinance 54-25 had validly repealed Issue 23. {¶ 18} Nguyen argued that she had been elected to a four-year term on the city council as established under the Nelsonville Charter and that her term does not expire until December 2027. Thus, Nguyen framed the mootness question as whether her seat had been extinguished by the passage of Issue 23 or whether Ordinance 54-25 had effectively repealed Issue 23. And on that question, Nguyen argued that nothing in the Nelsonville Charter prohibited the council from repealing 6  January Term, 2026 Issue 23 by way of Ordinance 54-25. Accordingly, Nguyen argued that her claims were not moot, because her council seat remained in existence due to the repeal of Issue 23. {¶ 19} For their part, appellees did not take a position on whether Nguyen’s claim was moot due to the November 2025 election. Rather, appellees agreed with Nguyen that the resolution of the mootness issue depended on which of the competing councils in Nelsonville is the legitimate one. That is, appellees contended that Nguyen’s claims could not be deemed moot until whether Ordinance 54-25 validly repealed Issue 23 has been determined. {¶ 20} The Fourth District agreed with the parties that Powell’s claim was moot because the city-council term she was seeking had expired.2 4th Dist. No. 24CA11, ¶ 12. But despite the parties’ agreement that the mootness of Nguyen’s claims could be resolved only by determining which of the competing councils is Nelsonville’s legitimate city council, the court dismissed the quo warranto claim as moot without reaching that question. Id. at ¶ 10-12 and fn. 2. The court found that the legitimacy of the Ordinance 54-25 repeal of Issue 23 was “irrelevant to the issue of mootness” because the elections for the statutory offices had gone forward, resulting in the election of new statutory officers. Id. at fn. 2. In the Fourth District’s view, regardless of the resolution of the competing-councils issue, the November 2025 election mooted the quo warranto claims. Id. at ¶ 10-12. The court therefore dismissed the case on mootness grounds. Id. at ¶ 13-14. {¶ 21} Nguyen appealed to this court as of right. Powell is not a party to this appeal. II. ANALYSIS {¶ 22} We review de novo a dismissal of an extraordinary-writ action on mootness grounds. See State ex rel. S.Y.C. v. Floyd, 2024-Ohio-1387, ¶ 12. A case 2. In addition, the court noted that Powell was elected to one of the statutory city-council offices in November 2025. 7  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO becomes moot “[w]hen something happens that makes it impossible for a court to grant the requested relief.” State ex rel. Citizens for Community Values, Inc. v. DeWine, 2020-Ohio-4547, ¶ 7. {¶ 23} A writ of quo warranto is the exclusive remedy to litigate a person’s right to hold a public office. State ex rel. Deiter v. McGuire, 2008-Ohio-4536, ¶ 20. To be entitled to a writ of quo warranto, Nguyen must establish that the offices she seeks are being unlawfully held and that she is entitled to those offices. State ex rel. Ziegler v. Zumbar, 2011-Ohio-2939, ¶ 23. “A quo warranto claim must be timely directed to challenge a current term of office rather than an expired one.” State ex rel. Varnau v. Wenninger, 2012-Ohio-224, ¶ 15. A. The Fourth District’s Mootness Analysis Is Flawed {¶ 24} In this case, it is undisputed that Nguyen was elected in 2023 to a four-year term on the Nelsonville City Council under the Nelsonville Charter and that her term in that office was not to expire until December 2027. Nevertheless, the Fourth District found Nguyen’s quo warranto claims moot, reasoning that her seat “was extinguished by the November 2025 election.” 4th Dist. No. 24CA11 at ¶ 12. Noting that the voters had not elected Nguyen to a seat on the new statutory city council, the court determined that she could not use her quo warranto action to challenge the results of the November 2025 election. Id., citing State ex rel. Byrd v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections, 65 Ohio St.2d 40 (1981), paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶ 25} The Fourth District erred in its analysis. It could not decide the mootness issue without first resolving the issue whether the statutory council or the charter council is Nelsonville’s legitimate city council. If Issue 23 is operative, then Nguyen’s council seat was extinguished by the election of members to the statutory council in November 2025. In that instance, Nguyen’s quo warranto action would be moot because her charter-council seat was eliminated by Issue 23’s repeal of the city charter in favor of a statutory government. On the other hand, if 8  January Term, 2026 Ordinance 54-25 validly repealed Issue 23, then the council seat to which Nguyen was elected in November 2023 still exists because Nelsonville’s charter government would remain operative. Indeed, Nguyen is not claiming entitlement to a seat on the statutory council created by Issue 23; rather, she argues that she is entitled to the council seat to which she was elected—i.e., her seat on the city council established under the charter government. If the charter council is still operative in Nelsonville, then the four-year term to which Nguyen was elected in November 2023 has not expired. {¶ 26} Although the Fourth District stated that it was not deciding whether Ordinance 54-25 had validly repealed Issue 23, the court held that the November 2025 election of the statutory council extinguished Nguyen’s council seat. But the court could not find Nguyen’s quo warranto action moot without first deciding whether Issue 23 is operative or Ordinance 54-25 validly repealed it. {¶ 27} A case becomes moot if an intervening event makes it impossible for a court to grant the requested relief. Citizens for Community Values, 2020-Ohio- 4547, at ¶ 7. To be sure, it would be impossible to grant the quo warranto relief Nguyen requested if Issue 23 is operative because that would mean her seat was extinguished. But if Ordinance 54-25 validly repealed Issue 23, then the Fourth District could have granted the requested relief (if Nguyen established her entitlement to it) because that would mean that the charter council still exists. The Fourth District therefore erred in finding Nguyen’s quo warranto claims moot without first deciding whether Ordinance 54-25 validly repealed Issue 23. B. Reversal and Remand {¶ 28} Rather than ask that we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings, the parties ask us to decide in the first instance whether Ordinance 54- 25 validly repealed Issue 23. “In an appeal involving an extraordinary writ, once the appellant has established some error in the decision of the court of appeals, this court has plenary power to consider the case de novo.” State ex rel. Yost v. Omar 9  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Ibn El Khattab Mosque, Inc., 2019-Ohio-195, ¶ 25, citing State ex rel. Miller v. Brady, 2009-Ohio-4942, ¶ 14; see also State ex rel. Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assn., Ohio Conference v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs., 2000-Ohio-431, ¶ 10 (“The court’s plenary authority generally refers to our ability to address the merits of a writ case without the necessity of a remand if the court of appeals erred in some regard.”). {¶ 29} Given the passage of time since Nguyen filed her quo warranto complaint, the Fourth District’s having twice erred in avoiding the merits, and the current governmental uncertainty in Nelsonville, the parties would prefer that we exercise our plenary authority to definitively determine whether the statutory government or the charter government has authority rather than return the case to the Fourth District. We decline the parties’ invitation. {¶ 30} Our plenary authority is discretionary and exercised when the record is sufficient for us to decide the case on the merits. State ex rel. Natl. Lime & Stone Co. v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2017-Ohio-8348, ¶ 27. Here, the parties assume that our resolution of whether Ordinance 54-25 validly repealed Issue 23 will be dispositive of Nguyen’s quo warranto claims. That is a faulty assumption, however, because the case presents additional issues that are germane to Nguyen’s claims that have not been briefed in this appeal. For example, appellees argued in the Fourth District that Nguyen could not obtain a writ of quo warranto because she resigned her council seat on February 17, 2024, and her attempted rescission of the resignation was ineffective under the facts and law applicable to this case. Because the court erroneously found the quo warranto claims moot, it did not reach the issue whether Nguyen resigned in February 2024. If Nguyen resigned, however, then she necessarily is not entitled to relief in quo warranto. The factual question whether Nguyen resigned should be determined by the Fourth District in the first instance. 10  January Term, 2026 III. CONCLUSION {¶ 31} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Fourth District Court of Appeals and remand the cause to that court for further proceedings. Judgment reversed and cause remanded. __________________ Josh Brown Law, L.L.C., and Joshua J. Brown, for appellant. Reminger Co., L.P.A., Thomas N. Spyker, and Chloe E. Schelhaas, for appellees. __________________ 11