Ellingson v. State

10/06/2026 DA 25-0142 Case Number: DA 25-0142 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2026 MT 233 MAE NAN ELLINGSON; JEROME LOENDORF; ARLYNE REICHERT; HAL HARPER; BOB BROWN; EVAN BARRETT; C.B. PEARSON; CAROLE MACKIN; MARK MACKIN; JONATHAN MOTL; Plaintiffs, Appellees, and Cross-Appellants, v. STATE OF MONTANA; GREG GIANFORTE, Governor of the State of Montana; AUSTIN KNUDSEN, Montana Attorney General; CHRISTI JACOBSEN; Secretary of State, Defendants, Appellants, and Cross-Appellees. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. ADV-2023-388 Honorable Mike Menahan, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellants: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Brent Mead (argued), Deputy Solicitor General, Michael D. Russell, Michael Noonan, Assistant Attorneys General, Helena, Montana For Appellees: John Meyer (argued), Cottonwood Environmental Law Center, Bozeman, Montana  For Amici Curiae Montana Chamber of Commerce, Montana Farm Bureau Federation, Montana Wood Products Association, Montana Bankers Association, and Montana Association of Realtors: Dale Schowengerdt (argued), Landmark Law PLLC, Helena, Montana For Amici Curiae Planned Parenthood Advocates of Montana and Montana Public Interest Research Group: Robert Farris-Olsen (argued), Morrison, Sherwood, Wilson & Deola, PLLP, Helena, Montana Argued: April 10, 2026 Submitted: April 14, 2026 Decided: October 6, 2026 Filed: __________________________________________ Clerk 2 Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Mae Nan Ellingson, Jerome Leondorf, Arlyne Reichert, Hal Harper, Bob Brown, Evan Barrett, C.B. Pearson, Carole Mackin, Mark Mackin, and Jonathan Motl (collectively, “Ellingson” or “the Ellingson Plaintiffs”) sued the State of Montana, Governor Greg Gianforte, Attorney General Austin Knudsen, and Secretary of State Christi Jacobsen (collectively, “State”) in the First Judicial District Court to invalidate new laws governing the statewide initiative process. Ellingson alleged that several provisions of Senate Bill 93, 2023 Mont. Laws ch. 647 (“SB 93”), unconstitutionally diminished the people’s reserved power of direct democracy by imposing qualifications and procedural steps not contemplated by the Montana Constitution. In two rulings on separate motions, the District Court granted the Ellingson Plaintiffs summary judgment on four of their claims and denied relief on seven others. The parties stipulated to dismiss without prejudice all claims not resolved in Ellingson’s favor. Following entry of judgment, the District Court denied Ellingson’s motion for attorney fees. ¶2 The State appeals three of the District Court’s summary judgment rulings. The Ellingson Plaintiffs cross-appeal the denial of their request for fees. Restated, we consider the following issues on appeal: 1. What standard governs a Montana court’s review of a constitutional challenge to laws regulating the initiative and referendum process? 2. Does § 13-27-221, MCA, prohibiting resubmission of a statewide ballot measure for four years after defeat of a substantially similar measure, violate the Montana Constitution? 3  3. Does § 13-27-228, MCA, authorizing legislative interim committees to vote on proposed ballot measures and place the result of the vote on the face of the petition, violate the Montana Constitution? 4. Does § 13-27-215, MCA, imposing a $3,700 filing fee on all proposed ballot measures, violate the Montana Constitution even though it authorizes the Secretary of State to waive the fee for hardship? 5. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it denied Ellingson’s motion for attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine? We affirm on all issues. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶3 The 2023 Montana Legislature’s Senate Bill 93, passed and signed into law, generally revised the laws governing statewide ballot issues and established a host of new procedural requirements. 2023 Mont. Laws ch. 647. Among others that Ellingson challenged in this case were these four provisions, which the District Court declared invalid: (1) a requirement that initiative proponents pay the Secretary of State a $3,700 filing fee unless they qualify for a hardship waiver (§ 13-27-215, MCA); (2) provisions authorizing the Attorney General to review the substantive legality of a proposed initiative or referendum (§§ 13-27-110, -226, MCA)1; (3) a prohibition on refiling initiatives that are “substantially the same” as measures defeated by voters within the past four years (§ 13-27-221, MCA); and (4) provisions permitting an interim legislative committee to 1 The District Court upheld the Attorney General’s authority to review the form of a ballot issue petition for legal sufficiency, authority the Attorney General has had since 1977 and this Court has affirmed. See Meyer v. Knudsen, 2022 MT 109, ¶ 9, 409 Mont. 19, 510 P.3d 1246. This was one of the claims that Ellingson dismissed after the court denied her motion for summary judgment, and it is not at issue on appeal. 4 vote on proposed initiatives and directing the Secretary of State to place the results of that vote on the face of the ballot (§§ 13-27-228, -238(1)(d), MCA). ¶4 The Ellingson Plaintiffs were the citizen sponsors of three ballot initiatives for the 2024 election cycle. Motl prepared draft language for each of the initiatives and submitted them to the Secretary of State’s Office. That office directed Motl to pay the $3,700 filing fee or, alternatively, to obtain a waiver by demonstrating financial hardship. Motl responded that the proponents were ineligible for a waiver but would nevertheless withhold payment. The Secretary of State’s Office rejected the proposed initiatives. ¶5 In May 2023, the Ellingson Plaintiffs filed this suit for declaratory and injunctive relief. Ellingson claimed that eleven of SB 93’s provisions were facially unconstitutional because they “impair[ed] the initiative and referendum power of the people by imposing requirements and obstacles that are not found within the Montana Constitution.” Ellingson prayed for judgment declaring the challenged provisions unconstitutional, an order enjoining the State from enforcing SB 93, and an award of attorney fees. ¶6 In October 2023, Ellingson moved for partial summary judgment with respect to the filing fee and the Attorney General’s authority to conduct substantive legal review of initiatives. The District Court granted Ellingson’s motion, concluding that both provisions were facially unconstitutional.2 In March 2024, Ellingson filed a second summary 2 The District Court concluded that the Attorney General does not have the authority to make determinations on the substantive legality of issues proposed by initiative, citing Hoffman v. State, 2014 MT 90, ¶ 9, 374 Mont. 405, 328 P.3d 604 (“As an executive officer of the State of Montana, the Attorney General does not have the authority to make a declaration regarding the constitutionality of [a proposed ballot issue]. ‘Constitutional questions are properly decided by a judicial body, not an administrative official, under the constitutional principle of separation of 5 judgment motion on their nine remaining claims. The District Court granted Ellingson’s motion with respect to the four-year refiling prohibition and the legislative committee vote. The court ruled against Ellingson on their remaining claims, holding that they had not met their burden to prove the statutes facially unconstitutional. The parties stipulated to dismiss all claims not resolved in Ellingson’s favor in September 2024, and the court entered judgment for Ellingson on their four successful claims shortly thereafter. ¶7 Ellingson moved to recover their costs and for an award of attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine. The State opposed an award of fees. The District Court ruled that the Ellingson Plaintiffs failed to prove that their burden in bringing the litigation was of sufficient magnitude to warrant a fee award and denied their motion. STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶8 This Court exercises plenary review of constitutional questions. Cottonwood Env’t Law Cntr. v. State, 2024 MT 313, ¶ 7, 419 Mont. 457, 560 P.3d 1227 [hereinafter Cottonwood II] (citation omitted). The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law. Cottonwood II, ¶ 7. “The Framers’ intent controls our interpretation of a constitutional provision.” Mont. Dem. Party v. Jacobsen, 2024 MT 66, ¶ 18, 416 Mont. 44, 545 P.3d 1074 [hereinafter MDP] (citation omitted). We generally look to the plain meaning of the Constitution’s language to determine the Framers’ intent. Nelson v. City of Billings, powers.’” (citations omitted)); See also Cottonwood Env’t Law Cntr. v. Knudsen, 2022 MT 49, ¶¶ 28-36, 408 Mont. 57, 505 P.3d 837 [hereinafter Cottonwood I] (McGrath, C.J., with Sandefur, J., concurring). The State does not challenge the District Court’s conclusions on this issue. We therefore affirm the District Court’s order voiding § 13-27-110(7), MCA, to the extent that it defines “legal sufficiency” to include a determination of “the substantive legality of the proposed issue if approved by the voters.” 6 2018 MT 36, ¶ 14, 390 Mont. 290, 412 P.3d 1058 (citations omitted). But even in the context of clear and unambiguous language, a court considers “the historical and surrounding circumstances under which the framers drafted the Constitution, the nature of the subject matter they faced, and the objective they sought to achieve.” Nelson, ¶ 14 (citations omitted). The Constitution further informs a court’s interpretation. State ex rel. Livingstone v. Murray, 137 Mont. 557, 564-65, 354 P.2d 552, 555-56 (1960), cited in MDP II, ¶ 18. ¶9 We review summary judgment rulings de novo. Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State, 2016 MT 44, ¶ 11, 382 Mont. 256, 368 P.3d 1131 [hereinafter MCIA]. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). When no genuine dispute of material fact exists, the Court reviews for correctness a district court’s conclusion that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. MCIA, ¶ 11. ¶10 Whether legal authority exists to support an award of attorney fees is a legal conclusion that this Court reviews de novo. Forward Mont. v. State, 2024 MT 75, ¶ 12, 416 Mont. 175, 546 P.3d 778. If authority exists, we review for abuse of discretion a district court’s order awarding or denying fees. Forward Mont., ¶ 12. A court abuses its discretion if “it acts arbitrarily, without employment of conscientious judgment, or in excess of the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice.” Bitterroot River Protective Ass’n v. Bitterroot Conservation Dist., 2011 MT 51, ¶ 11, 359 Mont. 393, 251 P.3d 131 (citations omitted). 7  DISCUSSION ¶11 1. What standard governs a Montana court’s review of a constitutional challenge to laws regulating the initiative and referendum process? ¶12 The parties first ask us to consider whether the District Court properly interpreted and construed Article V, Section 1, and Article III, Sections 4 and 5, of the Montana Constitution. Article V establishes the Legislative Branch of state government. It opens with the following language in Section 1: Power and Structure. The legislative power is vested in a legislature consisting of a senate and a house of representatives. The people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum. Article III, entitled “General Government,” includes two separate sections giving life to those reserved powers. Section 4 provides: Initiative. (1) The people may enact laws by initiative on all matters except appropriations of money and local or special laws. (2) Initiative petitions must contain the full text of the proposed measure, shall be signed by at least five percent of the qualified electors in each of at least one-third of the legislative representative districts and the total number of signers must be at least five percent of the total qualified electors of the state. Petitions shall be filed with the secretary of state at least three months prior to the election at which the measure will be voted upon. (3) The sufficiency of the initiative petition shall not be questioned after the election is held. Section 5 governs the referendum process and provides in similar fashion that “[t]he people may approve or reject by referendum any act of the legislature except an appropriation of money.” It prescribes how a referendum may qualify for the ballot and when, upon the requisite number of signatures, an act referred for the ballot may be suspended pending the election. Mont. Const. art. III, § 5. 8 ¶13 Ellingson’s first contention—with which the State does not substantively disagree—is that the people’s ability to pass or reject laws by initiative and referendum is a power the people reserved to themselves, not a right the Constitution bestowed. The parties also generally agree that the test for constitutionality of a legislative regulation of that power ultimately entails determining whether a regulation facilitates or impairs the initiative process. ¶14 The District Court likewise conducted its analysis by reviewing whether each of the challenged laws facilitated or impaired the initiative process. To determine impairment, the court considered (1) whether the Legislature subjected itself to the same regulation; (2) whether the regulation unreasonably inserted legislative power into the initiative process; or (3) whether the regulation created arbitrary obstacles to discourage participation. ¶15 The parties offer divergent views on what “facilitate or impair” means. The State contends that a regulation is not unconstitutional merely because the Legislature did not subject itself to the same. On appeal, the parties refer to this as the “equal footing test.” The State argues that “this Court has never required a perfect analogue” to exist between regulations governing representative and direct democracy. The State reasons that such a test is unworkable because the distinct processes of the people’s initiative and the legislative process require equally distinct regulations. Supporting Amici—Montana Chamber of Commerce, Montana Farm Bureau Federation, Montana Wood Products Association, Montana Bankers Association, and Montana Association of Realtors (collectively, “Business Amici”)—endorse the State’s argument. They add that if the 9 power of initiative is indeed a power, then the test should not assess a regulation’s constitutionality by its effect on a particular proposal but instead on “the impact of a law on the People’s collective lawmaking power.” ¶16 Ellingson counters that “equal footing” does not require an exact analogue in the legislative process. Instead, a court must determine whether the regulation “imposes [a] substantially greater burde[n] on the people’s legislative power than the [L]egislature imposes on its own . . . .” See Anthony Johnstone, The Separation of Legislative Powers in the Initiative Process, 101 Neb. L. Rev. 125, 151 (2022). Supporting Amici—Planned Parenthood Advocates of Montana and Montana Public Interest Research Group (collectively, “Ellingson Amici”)—agree. They surveyed statutes historically regulating the initiative process and suggest that those unchallenged regulations are constitutional because they provide appropriate deference to the people throughout the initiative process. ¶17 The initiative and referendum have a long history in Montana. Upon invitation from the United States and as part of achieving statehood, the people of Montana drafted and ratified their first constitution in 1889. See Act of February 22, 1889 (Enabling Act), 25 Stat. 676 (1889); see also James J. Lopach et al., We the People of Montana: The Workings of Popular Government, 4-6 (Mountain Press Publ’g Co. 1983). In the 1889 Constitution, the people “delegated to their representatives, the legislative body, the exclusive authority to make laws for the government of the state, subject only to such restrictions as were found in the Constitution and the exercise of the executive veto.” State ex rel. Goodman v. Stewart, 57 Mont. 144, 151, 187 P. 641, 643 (1920); see also Montana Constitutional Convention Commission, Commission Report Number 6: Legislative 10 Council Report on the Montana Constitution, 1 (1971) [hereinafter Conv. Comm’n Report No. 6]; Larry M. Elison & Fritz Snyder, The Montana State Constitution, 117-18 (Oxford Univ. Press 2011). ¶18 Within the first decade of the constitution’s adoption, however, a movement began to “recall that exclusive authority,” Stewart, 57 Mont. at 151, 187 P. at 643, by vesting the people with direct legislative power. “At the turn of the century, concern over corporate control of state legislatures prompted the Progressive Party to crusade for constitutional authorization of initiatives and referenda.” Elison & Snyder, at 101 (discussing the era of “inordinate influence” over the Legislature by Montana mining companies); Ellis Waldron & Paul B. Wilson, Atlas of Montana Elections, 1889-1976, 35-36 (1978); see also Patrick v. State, 2011 MT 169, ¶¶ 18-23, 361 Mont. 204, 257 P.3d 365 (recounting similar attempts at influence over the Montana judiciary during the same time). “After ten years of vigorous crusading,” Elison & Snyder, at 101, the people approved an amendment to the Montana Constitution in the November 1906 general election to secure the initiative and referendum. See Stewart, 57 Mont. at 148, 187 P. at 642; 1905 Mont. Laws ch. 61. The 1906 constitutional amendment reserved to the people “the power to propose laws, and to enact or reject the same at the polls,” excepting local and special laws, laws relating to appropriations of money, and constitutional amendments. See Mont. Const. art. V, § 1 (1889, amended). The 1905 enabling legislation expressly required the Legislature to “enact legislation suitable for carrying [the power of direct democracy] into effect” once the voters approved the constitutional amendment. 1905 Mont. Laws ch. 61, § 2; 11 see also 1907 Mont. Laws ch. 62; Sawyer Stores v. Mitchell, 103 Mont. 148, 154, 62 P.2d 342, 345-46 (1936). ¶19 The delegates to the 1971 Montana Constitutional Convention were reminded of this history that—serving as both an immediate check on and a means to bypass an unresponsive Legislature—the powers of initiative and referendum were adopted as “[d]evice[s] . . . that would bring state government back under the control of the people” from that of “political machines or corporations.” Montana Constitutional Convention, Commission Report Number 12: The Legislature, p. 22 (1971) [hereinafter Conv. Comm’n Rep. No. 12]; Montana Constitutional Convention, Commission Report Number 11: Suffrage and Elections, p. 87 (1971) [hereinafter Conv. Comm’n Rep. No. 11]. The 1972 Montana Constitution was drafted and adopted with this tradition in place, making clear in its plain language that it reserved to the people the power to legislate directly and concurrently with the grant of authority to the representative legislative body. ¶20 Cementing that the Constitution’s force “obtains life [only] by the direct power of the people,” State ex rel. Mont. Citizens for Preservation of Citizens’ Rights v. Waltermire, 227 Mont. 85, 96, 738 P.2d 1255, 1262 (1987) [hereinafter Mont. Citizens], Article II, Sections 1 and 2, of the 1972 Montana Constitution provide: Popular Sovereignty. All political power is vested in and derived from the people. All government of right originates with the people, is founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for the good of the whole. Self-government. The people have the exclusive right of governing themselves as a free, sovereign, and independent state. They may alter or abolish the constitution and form of government whenever they deem it necessary. 12 As the Stewart Court described more than 100 years ago, “In this country the power once vested in the king vests in the people . . . .” Stewart, 57 Mont. at 166, 187 P. at 648. Through the people’s declaration, the Constitution thus functions as not only the direct and basic expression of the sovereign will, [but] also the absolute rule of action and decision for all departments and offices of government with respect to all matters covered by it . . . . The state constitution is the mandate of a sovereign people to its servants and representatives. General Agric. Corp. v. Moore, 166 Mont. 510, 515-16, 534 P.2d 859, 862-63 (1975) (citations omitted). Because the inherent power and authority reside with the people, “[n]o other authority can be put above them,” and “from the people, as a source, alone flows the delegated power of the [L]egislature” to represent the people’s will. Mont. Citizens, 227 Mont. at 96-97, 738 P.2d at 1262 (citations omitted) (discussing constitutional requirement for publication of constitutional amendment proposed by initiative). By the express terms of the new Constitution, legislative power is, in part, “vested in a legislature,” but the people expressly “reserved to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum.” Mont. Const. art. V, § 1. ¶21 Article III, Section 4, of the Montana Constitution prescribes the specific conditions and circumstances under which the power of initiative may be exercised, excluding only “appropriations of money and local or special laws” from that authority. It provides the particulars by which such measures will qualify for the ballot, including signatures from “at least five percent of the qualified electors in each of at least one-third of the legislative representative districts,” with a “total number of signers . . . at least five percent of the total qualified electors of the state.” Similar prescriptions are included in Article III, Section 5, 13 for the power of referendum. Unlike the 1906 constitutional amendment, the 1972 Montana Constitution does not expressly authorize the Legislature to enact regulations to carry forward the initiative and referendum process. Compare Mont. Const. art. V, § 1, art. III, § 4, with 1905 Mont. Laws ch. 61 § 2. ¶22 Constitutional law scholar and now Ninth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Judge Anthony Johnstone has described the unique relationship between the Legislature’s and the people’s lawmaking powers: The initiative [power] . . . stands apart from other separated or shared powers in state constitutions because its lawmaking function operates independently but in the same manner as its legislative rival, while also depending on that rival for enabling legislation. Johnstone, at 149. So long as legislative regulations do not contravene express constitutional provisions, we do not read the Constitution’s silence on enabling legislation “to disable the legislature from enacting statutes to facilitate the initiative process, which would disable the initiative process itself.” Johnstone, at 136-37. “As with other relationships between and within branches, the initiative power requires the legislature to provide the support necessary for a functioning initiative process, while respecting the constitutional independence of that process from legislative control.” Johnstone, at 150. ¶23 “Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, a presumption that may be overcome only after careful consideration of the purpose and effect of the statute.” State v. Smith, 2021 MT 148, ¶ 56, 404 Mont. 245, 488 P.3d 531 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted; citation omitted). “The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that it is unconstitutional.” Smith, ¶ 56 14 (citation omitted). This principle applies fully to statutes governing initiative and referendum. Our Opinion in Stewart, however, recognized a qualification in this context. We observed that under “the strict rules of constitutional and statutory construction, . . . [e]very intendment should be taken in favor of the propriety of legislative action, and in case of doubt the doubt will be resolved in favor of the propriety of legislative action . . . .” Stewart, 57 Mont. at 164-65, 187 P. at 648 (internal quotations and citation omitted). But we continued: We are not here called upon, however, to determine merely the constitutionality of a legislative Act, or to decide as to whether a legislative body clearly exceeded its authority; but we are to determine a legal controversy between two law-making bodies of the state--on the one hand the people, who are supreme, the creator of the legislature, in whom, originally, all power is vested; and, on the other hand, the legislature, the creature of the people. In the context of the peoples’ co-equal legislative power, therefore, we explained that doubts “should be resolved in favor of the reserved power of the people[.]” Stewart, 57 Mont. at 165, 187 P. at 648.3 ¶24 As we observed in General Agric. Corp., 166 Mont. at 515, 534 P.2d at 862, “[t]he supremacy of constitutional mandates is too well established to require citation.” Thus, as legislative power is divided equally between the representative legislative body and the 3 The Court’s discussion involved its examination of the Legislature’s declaration of an “emergency” that would take away the right of referendum under the 1889 Constitution. Article V, Section 26, reserved to the people the power of referendum except, as applicable, “as to laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety.” Thus, the Court was called upon “to decide whether an admittedly valid and proper Act of the legislature comes within the class of Acts which may, by proper proceedings provided for in the Constitution, be referred to the people, or whether it falls within the exception to the reserved right.” Stewart, 57 Mont. at 163, 187 P. at 647. 15 people, the Legislature may not interfere when the Constitution prescribes the conditions for exercise of the people’s process. Laws that add restrictions, narrow the subject matter amenable to initiative power, or prescribe qualifications or requirements already fixed in Article III, Section 4, of the Montana Constitution, are precluded by the principle that the Legislature may not act contrary to express constitutional provision. “The state constitution is the mandate of a sovereign people to its servants and representatives. No one of them has a right to ignore or disregard its mandates, and the legislature, the executive officers, and the judiciary cannot lawfully act beyond its limitations.” General Agric. Corp., 166 Mont. at 516, 534 P.2d at 862-63. See also Powder River Cnty. v. State, 2002 MT 259, ¶ 40, 312 Mont. 198, 60 P.3d 357 (“The legislature, . . . by the enactment of statute, possesses all powers of law-making in this state except only in so far as those powers are curtailed in the Constitution.”).4 See also 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 148 (explaining that when a state constitution “defines the circumstances under which a right may be exercised, the specification is an implied prohibition against legislative interference to add to the condition”). ¶25 As the State and Business Amici note, though the people’s power to make law is equal in degree to the Legislature’s, it is different in kind. As we discussed in Sawyer Stores, the Legislature shares lawmaking power with the people but has the advantage of a dedicated period to confer and deliberate on proposed policy measures, where voters do 4 The parties focus their attention on Article III, Section 4, of the Montana Constitution, because the dispute hinges on the power of statutory initiative. But the principles we discuss here apply equally to the power of referendum as reserved in Article III, Section 5, of the Montana Constitution. 16 not. Sawyer Stores, 103 Mont. at 167-69, 623 P.2d at 351-52. Due to the different deliberative conditions under which representative power and direct legislative power operate, the Legislature appropriately may consider these differences when regulating the initiative and referendum process. ¶26 Subject to express constitutional limitations, because of the Legislature’s required role to implement the initiative and referendum process to make it orderly and workable, it plainly has authority to enact procedures to carry that process into effect—for filing, drafting review, signature gathering, verification, and election administration. See Sawyer Stores, 103 Mont. at 154, 168-69, 62 P.2d at 345-46. As such, whether the Legislature acts within its constitutional authority when it regulates the initiative process depends on whether such regulations “facilitate the initiative power” or “impair the initiative power.” Johnstone, at 149. A precise analogue need not be found between regulations governing the Legislature’s and the people’s lawmaking processes if the regulation does not substantially burden or interfere with the exercise of the people’s independent power. Legislative practice may provide useful evidence of whether a requirement serves a genuine facilitative function, but it is not a separate test. ¶27 At bottom, their shared lawmaking authority requires that the people and the Legislature retain “equal, coordinate, and independent” power to legislate. Cf. Powder River Cnty., ¶ 112 (discussing separation of powers among the three branches). If the Legislature substantially interferes with or burdens the people’s exercise of initiative power or inserts its own policy choices into the people’s initiated proposals, it unconstitutionally impairs the people’s independent power. Stewart, 57 Mont. at 171-73, 187 P. at 651; 17 see also Johnstone, at 157. The Legislature’s proper regulation of the initiative and referendum process is limited to implementing and facilitating the process. The Constitution also sets forth the Legislature’s express duty to “guard against abuses of the electoral process.” Mont. Const. art. IV, § 3. Cf. 1905 Mont. Laws ch. 61, § 2 (directing Legislature to “enact Legislation suitable for carrying this amendment into effect” (emphasis added)); see also Chouteau Cnty. v. Grossman, 172 Mont. 373, 378, 563 P.2d 1125, 1128 (1977) (liberally construing statutes that “aid” in the exercise of initiative and referendum power); accord Ford v. Mitchell, 103 Mont. 99, 108, 61 P.2d 815, 819 (1936). ¶28 Regulations governing procedure and form are necessary to carry the initiative process into effect and do not impair the power so long as they do not impose substantial burdens or undermine the foundational principles of popular sovereignty and self-government. The Legislature’s implied powers historically have included prescribing mechanisms to ensure “notice to the voter of the nature and purpose of the initiative measure” so that “the result shall represent the will of a majority of voters.” Sawyer Stores, 103 Mont. at 168-69, 62 P.2d at 352; Ford, 103 Mont. at 109, 61 P.2d at 819 (“The act was passed as a safeguard to the rights of the voters to whom the petition was offered for signature. The requirement was intended to secure the voters, whose interests were to be affected, an opportunity to know what they were signing, and to know that they were not signing something different from those whose signatures appeared on the petition.”); see §§ 106-114, RCM (1907).5 5 Judge Johnstone notes common examples of facilitating regulations found in other states, as well as ours. These examples include: (1) “[l]egislative review of proposals assist[ing] proponents, at 18 ¶29 The Constitution and its history demonstrate that the path for the people’s lawmaking power was intended to have as few obstacles as possible before reaching the ballot and eventually becoming law; the path should be direct. See Mont. Const. art. VI, § 10(1) (excluding initiative and referendum measures from governor’s veto power); State ex rel. Mont. Sch. Bd. Ass’n v. Waltermire, 224 Mont. 296, 299, 729 P.2d 1297, 1299 (1986) (holding Court’s interference with initiative power prior to election appropriate only for “extraordinary cause,” and discretionary review “should not be exercised unless it is absolutely essential”); McDonald v. Jacobsen, 2022 MT 160, ¶ 14, 409 Mont. 405, 515 P.3d 777 (explaining that Court’s pre-election review of initiative and referendum is “rare” and exercised only when the proposed law is “obvious[ly] defec[tive]” or “unquestionably and palpably unconstitutional on its face” (citations omitted)); Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcripts, March 18, 1972, Vol. VII, pp. 2696-97 (removing requirements for strict technical language in statutory initiative proposals); see also Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcripts, February 17, 1972, Vol. III, pp. 456, 461-62 (removing legislative commission from constitutional initiative process). This is not to say, however, that every inconvenience is facially unconstitutional. Regulations originating from the Legislature’s implied powers that function to carry the least inexperienced proponents, in drafting an initiative that will bring about their intended policy effects”; (2) “[o]fficial petition forms allow[ing] voters to know what they are signing, assur[ing] proponents their petitions will be accepted, and facilitat[ing] county and state officials’ efficient verification of signatures on the petitions”; (3) “[t]ime, place, and manner regulations of petitioners guard[ing] against fraud, duress, and aggressive tactics that distort the petitioning process and give the initiative process a bad name”; (4) “[b]allot statements and other voter information efforts [that] help proponents explain their purposes and may inform voters of the arguments against the initiative”; (5) “[c]lear procedures, and enforceable penalties for violating them, [that] are essential to the exercise of direct democracy.” Johnstone, at 150. 19 initiative process into effect, cf. Sawyer Stores, 103 Mont. at 160, 168-69, 62 P.2d at 348, 351-52; Ford, 103 Mont. at 109, 61 P.2d at 819; Chouteau Cnty., 172 Mont. at 378, 563 P.2d at 1128, or fall under the Legislative duty to “insure [sic] the purity of elections and guard against abuses of the electoral process,” Mont. Const. art. IV, § 3, may impose some burden—and are permissible if they do not impair the initiative or referendum process. ¶30 In short, because “it is fundamental law that the people may themselves propose legislation,” Stewart, 57 Mont. 171-72, 187 P. at 651, the people did not reserve for themselves the lawmaking power “to place in the hands of the [L]egislature a weapon to defeat and destroy that power” or to “nullify” that which allows them peacefully to accomplish the fundamental goals of popular sovereignty and self-government. Stewart, 57 Mont. at 171-72, 187 P. at 651; Harper v. Greely, 234 Mont. 259, 267-68, 763 P.2d 650, 655 (1988). ¶31 As “arbiters between two equally powerful bodies of the same branch of the government,” it is a court’s duty to determine the constitutionality of regulations governing the initiative and referendum process. Stewart, 57 Mont. 167, 187 P. at 651; MDP, ¶ 30. We have broadly construed the initiative power to “maintain the maximum power in the people.” State ex rel. Harper v. Waltermire, 213 Mont. 425, 429, 691 P.2d 826, 829 (1984); Chouteau Cnty., 172 Mont. at 378, 563 P.2d at 1128; Ford, 103 Mont. at 108, 61 P.2d at 819. In other words, doubts about whether a regulation facilitates or impairs the initiative process “shall be resolved in favor of the people, in whom the power originally vested and 20 who have reserved” to themselves the power to make law independent of and equal to the Legislature. Stewart, 57 Mont. at 165, 187 P. at 649. ¶32 In summary, we hold that the Legislature may not impose requirements for ballot measures that exceed express conditions set forth in the Montana Constitution. We will examine a challenged statute to determine whether it reasonably helps administer the initiative process, supplies neutral information needed to carry it into effect, or protects against abuses in the process without materially burdening the people’s independent lawmaking power or conditioning access to that power on a substantive requirement the Constitution does not impose. The Legislature’s imposition of a regulation on the initiative process that it does not require for its own processes will be taken into account in determining whether the regulation is reasonably necessary to facilitate the process. A regulation will be invalid if it substantially burdens the exercise of the people’s coextensive lawmaking power. Finally, doubts about the regulation’s constitutionality must be resolved in favor of the people’s reserved power. We turn to the challenged statutes to apply these principles. ¶33 2. Does § 13-27-221, MCA, prohibiting resubmission of a statewide ballot measure for four years after defeat of a substantially similar measure, violate the Montana Constitution? ¶34 Section 13-27-221, MCA, prohibits a statewide initiative