Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1362 Filed November 4, 2026 _______________ Steve Veysey, Kathy Carter, and Mary Powell, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. Iowa Department of Natural Resources, Iowa Utilities Commission, and Governor Kim Reynolds, in her official capacity, Defendants–Appellees. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Michael Huppert, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Wallace L. Taylor (argued) of Law Offices of Wallace L. Taylor, Cedar Rapids, attorney for appellants. Breana Bird, Attorney General, Eric Wessan, Solicitor General, Patrick C. Valencia, Deputy Solicitor General, and Ankit Pal (argued), and Halle Kissell (until withdrawal), Assistant Solicitors General, attorneys for appellees. W. Charles Smithson, West Des Moines, attorney for Amicus Curiae Four Iowa State Senators. _______________ 1 Heard at oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., Sandy, J., and Telleen, S.J. Opinion by Sandy, J. 2 SANDY, Judge. In 2023, Governor Kim Reynolds issued Executive Order 10 (EO10), which required in part for “all departments, agencies, boards, or commissions” to review administrative rules and initiate rulemakings. Steve Veysey, Kathy Carter, and Mary Powell (collectively, and as context requires, “Veysey”) then sued the Iowa Department of Natural Resources (DNR), Iowa Utilities Commission (IUC), and Governor Reynolds (collectively, the “agencies”) as residents of Iowa who “have interests in Iowa land and water that are affected by administrative rules adopted by [the DNR] and [IUC],”—agencies subject to EO10’s requirements. Veysey requested a declaratory judgment declaring EO10 illegal, invalid, and void. The agencies then moved to dismiss Veysey’s amended petition, arguing Veysey and his co-plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their suit and failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The district court agreed and dismissed Veysey’s petition. Veysey now appeals, arguing his petition should not have been dismissed on either ground. Because Veysey and each of his co-plaintiffs lack standing,1 we affirm. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS EO10 was issued in January 2023. The order contemplates that “the proliferation of administrative rules and regulations at all levels of government has imposed high costs on employers, inhibited job growth, impeded private sector investment, and increased the complexity and expense of economic life.” EO10 thus seeks to “reduc[e] this regulatory 1 Because we can affirm the district court on standing, we need not determine if Versey has stated claims on which relief could be granted. 3 burden on Iowans” which “will promote citizens’ freedom to engage in individual, family, and business pursuits.” With the aim of accomplishing that goal, EO10 requires that each administrative agency, board, or commission review all of its respective Iowa Administrative Code chapter through “a comprehensive evaluation and rigorous cost-benefit analysis” by December 31, 2026. Following such review, each agency, board, or commission must publish notice of its intended action and either repeal the existing chapter or renew the chapter through a new rulemaking consistent with the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act. Agencies are not permitted to initiate new rulemakings prior to the agency’s EO10 rule-chapter review.2 Under EO10, “[e]ach new rule chapter finalized by the agency must reduce the overall regulatory burden, or remain neutral, as compared to the previous rule chapter,” and “[a]ll proposed amendments to an existing chapter must be contained within a single rulemaking.” In March 2025, Veysey petitioned for entry of a declaratory judgment finding “that Executive Order 10 is beyond the Governor’s authority and that any agency rules adopted in compliance with Executive Order 10 are illegal and invalid.” Veysey, individually, alleged that, as “an avid fly fisherman” and “advocate for clean water,” EO10 diminishes the effectiveness of Chapter 65 of the DNR rules, which are supposed to control pollution from animal feeding operations. In addition, Executive Order 10 diminishes the effectiveness of Chapters 50–55 of the DNR rules, which pertain to water 2 EO10 makes certain exceptions, including for promulgation of “emergency rules” compliant with the process for new and amended rules and for rulemaking that is directed by the Administrative Rules Coordinator. 4 withdrawal permits and the disposition of wastes from industrial, municipal and agricultural operations, including large animal feeding operations. Carter alleged that, as an Iowan who “gets her drinking water from the City of Rockford municipal water source, which draws its water from the Devonian Limestone that was the subject of the water withdrawal permit granted to an entity to capture carbon dioxide from an ethanol plant,” she is also affected by EO10’s diminishing effects on chapter 50 through 55 of the DNR rules, “which are supposed to control the amount of water that can be withdrawn from Iowa’s aquifers.” Powell alleged that, as “an heir to a family farm in Shelby County over which Summit Carbon Solutions has been granted eminent domain by the Iowa Utilities Commission for a hazardous liquid pipeline,” EO10 “diminishes the effectiveness of Chapters 9 and 13 of the IUC rules, which are supposed to protect landowners from the environmental and economic damages caused by a pipeline.” She further claims that “[t]he new Chapter 9 and 13 rules, pursuant to Executive Order 10, will not effectively accomplish [the chapters’] purposes.” The agencies then moved to dismiss Veysey’s petition in April for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to lack of standing and failure to state a claim upon which any relief can be granted. On the issue of standing, the agencies argued that Veysey only offered opinions relating to the executive order’s effects and only presented “conjectural and hypothetical” allegations rather than any injury-in-fact. Veysey resisted, contending his injuries were not merely “conjectural or hypothetical, but . . . concrete and actual or imminent,” such as through the governor’s office’s actions in “delet[ing] protection from manure storage lagoons constructed in karst terrain.” Veysey further restated his petition’s claims that EO10 “minimiz[es] the 5 effectiveness of [IUC] regulations,” which “affects Ms. Powell’[s] interest in the land,” and diminishes the effects of chapters 50 through 55, which negatively affect Carter’s interest in clean drinking water. Veysey then suggested that the standing requirements should be relaxed for a couple reasons. First, he argued his petition raised “issues of great importance” under Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413 (Iowa 2008), as his EO10 “strikes at the heart of the purpose and structure of the [Iowa] Administrative Procedure Act,” and standing requirements can thus be waived. Second, he claimed his action “is akin to a quo warranto action.” In reply, the agencies observed that Veysey’s resistance merely restated the opinions contained within his amended petition, failed to articulate how his claims involved issues of great importance, and failed to describe how his petition qualified as a quo warranto action under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1301. The district court agreed with the agencies and dismissed the petition as lacking standing and failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court found that “none of the plaintiffs have alleged that they have incurred any of the damages they claim could flow from the issuance of EO10” and “do not even allege that injury is likely or possible.” It also declined to apply the issue-of-great-importance exception due to Veysey’s failure to allege that EO10 “was inconsistent with the ordinary process utilized by the executive branch” or presented a constitutional violation. Veysey now appeals. STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for the correction of errors at law,” Mueller v. Wellmark, Inc., 818 N.W.2d 244, 253 6 (Iowa 2012) (citation omitted), including when the petition has been dismissed for lack of standing, LS Power Midcontinent, LLC v. State, 988 N.W.2d 316, 329 (Iowa 2023). We “accept as true the petition’s well-pleaded factual allegations, but not its legal conclusions.” Shumate v. Drake Univ., 846 N.W.2d 503, 507 (Iowa 2014). DISCUSSION Under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.421(1)(a), a “[l]ack of jurisdiction of the subject matter” may be raised in a pre-answer motion to dismiss. Challenges to standing also may be raised in pre-answer motions to dismiss, as standing is a “closely related doctrine[]” to subject matter jurisdiction. Citizens for Responsible Choices v. City of Shenandoah, 686 N.W.2d 470, 473 (Iowa 2004). Under such motions, the petition’s well- pleaded facts are admitted, and any ambiguity or uncertainty is waived. O’Hara v. State, 642 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Iowa 2002). There are two requirements for a plaintiff to have standing, which “must exist at the commencement of the litigation”: the plaintiff must (1) possess “a specific personal or legal interest in the litigation”; and (2) “be injuriously affected.” LS Power, 988 N.W.2d at 329 (citation omitted). A specific or personal interest is one different than a general interest. See id. And to be injuriously affected, the plaintiff must be able to show “an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct and is likely to be remedied by a favorable decision.” Id. at 329–30. This means that “the injury cannot be conjectural or hypothetical, but must be concrete and actual or imminent.” Id. at 330 (cleaned up). In Godfrey, our supreme court crafted an exception to the traditional standing requirement “to resolve certain questions of great public 7 importance and interest in our system of government.” 752 N.W.2d at 425. But this consideration must be balanced with the “delicate and essential judicial responsibility” of “exercis[ing] our power with the greatest of caution.” See id. Thus, even when considering whether to apply an exception to standing, we remain concerned with ensuring that “litigants are true adversaries,” “a real concrete case exits,” and “the people most concerned with an issue are in fact the litigants.” See id. at 425–26. The Godfrey court held “cases involving actions by private persons to enforce public rights may be brought under the personal-interest alternative to the first [standing] element.” Id. at 420. This permits a court to keep primary focus on “the factual-injury element of standing,” which still requires “some type of injury different from the population in general.” Id. In furtherance of his standing argument, Veysey reiterates his claims below which, in turn, restated the factual claims in his amended petition. But as the district court observed, Veysey has not asserted that he or the other plaintiffs suffered any damages from the issuance of EO10. The potential harm they do identify is vague and lacks explanation. For example, Veysey simply states that “[EO10] diminishes the effectiveness of Chapter 50–55 of the DNR rules,” without providing any further information such as specifically which chapters or sections have been amended, how the amendments negatively impact “water withdrawal permits and the disposition of wastes from industrial, municipal and agricultural operations, including large animal feeding operations,” or how those negative impacts injure his ability to fly fish. The most concrete injury Veysey alleges can be found in his claim that “new Chapter 9 and 13 rules, pursuant to [EO10], will not effectively accomplish their purposes” of “requir[ing] a pipeline company to minimize 8 and repair damage to agricultural land resulting from the construction of the pipeline.” But even this claim—that the newly amended chapters “will not effectively accomplish their purposes” lacks any explanation of Veysey’s theory as to how those purposes will not be effectively accomplished. These conclusory statements provide opinions rather than facts. Veysey does not allege any concrete injury has occurred or is imminent. The lack of any concrete injury beyond one which is conjectural or hypothetical presents a standing problem, even if we were to find that Veysey’s petition qualified under Godfrey’s exception to the usual standing requirement. Under Godfrey, a plaintiff must still assert “some type of injury different from the population in general.” 752 N.W.2d at 420. Even if we accept the allegations that EO10 will “diminish the effectiveness” of certain DNR and IUC rule chapters, the question remains: How? Further, Veysey has not articulated how this case falls within the narrow category of cases where the “issue is of utmost importance and the constitutional protections are most needed,” thereby requiring an exception to the normal standing requirements. Id. at 427. When attempting to answer this question in his reply, Veysey simply argued that “an executive order by the Governor, which she has no authority to issue, [which] significantly impacts the [Iowa] Administrative Procedure Act, [and] which affects the rulemaking authority of all state agencies that impacts almost every Iowan, would certainly seem to be an issue of great public importance.” Veysey’s failure to provide further explanation or clarity as to how his claims merit unique treatment is fatal to his great-importance-standing argument when considered against this backdrop: “The simple fact is no Iowa appellate case has ever waived traditional standing requirements because of an issue of great public importance.” See Rush v. Reynolds, No. 19-1109, 2020 WL 825953, at 9 *14 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2020). As the agencies observe, Veysey has not alleged the occurrence of any grave constitutional violation. At worst, he has alleged that an executive order has, in some manner, “diminished the effectiveness” of certain chapters of the DNR and IUC administrative rules. Veysey has not provided any explanation for how that scenario qualifies as an issue of great public importance worthy of waiving standing requirements. The district court did not err in granting the agencies’ pre-answer motion to dismiss due to Veysey’s lack of standing, and it did not err in determining that Veysey’s claims did not qualify under the issue-of-public- importance exception to the traditional standing requirements.3 We affirm. AFFIRMED. 3 We decline to address Veysey’s argument that his action “is akin to a quo warranto action” and thus subject to quo warranto standing requirements. Veysey failed to describe how any defendant is subject to a quo warranto action under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1301, how he is qualified to bring the action under rule 1.1302, or how he complied with the requirements for such petitions under rule 1.1304. We agree with the district court that this claim is waived. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(3). 10