Full Opinion

Case: 24-10386 Document: 342 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit ____________ FILED November 20, 2026 No. 24-10386 Thomas B. Plunkett, III ____________ Clerk State of Texas, Plaintiff—Appellee, versus Todd Wallace Blanche, U.S. Attorney General, in his official capacity as United States Attorney General; Andrea R. Lucas, in her official capacity as Chair of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; Vice Chair of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; Kalpana Kotagal, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; Brittany Bull Panuccio, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; Catherine Eschbach, in her official capacity as Acting General Counsel of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; United States Department of Justice, Defendants—Appellants. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 5:23-CV-34 ______________________________ Case: 24-10386 Document: 342 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Before Elrod, Chief Judge, and Jones, Smith, Stewart, Richman, Southwick, Haynes, Graves, Higginson, Willett, Ho, Duncan, Engelhardt, Oldham, Wilson, Douglas, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges. Cory T. Wilson, Circuit Judge, joined by Elrod, Chief Judge, and Jones, Smith, Willett, Ho, Duncan, Engelhardt, and Oldham, Circuit Judges: During the COVID-19 pandemic, the House of Representatives adopted a rule allowing Members to record their presence by proxy for purposes of establishing a quorum. The House used this rule when passing the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023 (the Act), having mustered a quorum by counting hundreds of otherwise absent Members as present by proxy. The Senate then passed the bill, and the President signed it into law. The State of Texas argues that the House’s proxy-presence rule is inconsistent with the Constitution’s Quorum Clause, which would mean that the House did not validly pass the Act. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. Based on that proposition, Texas seeks injunctive relief against just one portion of the Act: The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA). The federal Government responds that the enrolled-bill rule, which instructs that a bill’s passage through the legislature is conclusive proof of its authenticity, precludes judicial review of whether the Act’s passage complied with the Quorum Clause. Alternatively, the Government argues that the Quorum Clause permits proxy presence. The district court held that the enrolled-bill rule did not apply and that the House’s passage of the Act—through use of the proxy-presence rule _____________________  Judge Haynes states that she does not think it is appropriate to throw out the Federal House of Representatives in this arena, so she dissents. She also appreciates Judge Graves’s dissent. Case: 24-10386 Document: 342 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 24-10386 —violated the Quorum Clause. Accordingly, the district court enjoined the Government from enforcing the PWFA against Texas. We conclude that the enrolled-bill rule does not bar our review because Texas’s constitutional challenge does not implicate a dispute of fact regarding the Act’s passage. We further conclude that the Act’s passage was unconstitutional because the Quorum Clause does not allow proxies to be included when establishing a quorum. The Clause’s text, context, original understanding, and unbroken historical application all indicate that Members of Congress must be present for quorum purposes—as the Supreme Court expressly held over 125 years ago, and as Congress has done ever since the Founding. “Proxy presence” does not count. While the chambers of the legislature have much discretion regarding their rules of procedure, the Quorum Clause’s constraints on congressional power cannot be circumvented by congressional fiat. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. I. A. In the early days of the global COVID pandemic, the House of Representatives adopted House Resolution 965: [A]t any time after the Speaker . . . is notified . . . that a public health emergency due to a novel coronavirus is in effect, the Speaker . . . may designate a period . . . during which a Member who is designated by another Member as a proxy . . . may cast the vote of such other Member or record the presence of such other Member in the House. H.R. Res. 965 § 1(a), 116th Cong. (2020). To assign a proxy, the designating Member had to submit a signed letter specifying the designated Member. Id. § 2. The rule further stated: 3 Case: 24-10386 Document: 342 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 24-10386 Any Member . . . whose presence is recorded by a designated proxy under this resolution shall be counted for the purpose of establishing a quorum under the rules of the House. Id. § 3(b). Plainly put, the rule allowed an otherwise absent Member to record his or her presence by proxy for purposes of a quorum. The House employed the proxy-presence rule when it passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023.1 See 168 Cong. Rec. H10529 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2022). The final vote tally on the Act was 225 yeas and 201 nays, with one Member voting present and four not voting. Id. at H10528.2 Of the 427 Members who recorded a vote on the Act, the Congressional Record indicates that 226 Members—a majority of the House—had recorded their presence and their vote by proxy. Id. at H10529. Thus, when the House voted on the Act, less than a majority of Members were physically present. During the vote, Representative Chip Roy commented that the Act was “moving off the floor without a physical quorum present” and reserved the right to object. Id. He asked whether there was any recourse to challenge the quorum determination, but the Speaker Pro Tempore (Representative G.K. Butterfield) told him that “a quorum was, indeed, present.” Id. Representative Roy then asked how that was so, given that “there were 226 votes cast by proxy, i.e., not physically present in the Chamber.” Id. The Speaker Pro Tempore answered: “Members casting their vote or recording their presence by proxy [were] counted for the purpose of establishing a _____________________ 1 The House of Representatives for the 117th Congress maintained the rule. See H.R. Res. 8 § 3(s), 117th Cong. (2021). 2 The House had four vacancies when the House approved the Act on December 23, 2022, so there were only 431 Members serving at the time. See The United States House of Representatives: History, Art & Archives: Vacancies and Successors, https://history.house.gov/dropdowntemplate?id=36507224009&htmlContentID=36507 224028 [https://perma.cc/JVB5-AJ3F]. 4 Case: 24-10386 Document: 342 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 24-10386 quorum.” Id. When Representative Roy again inquired as to whether there was a recourse to ask the Speaker to count the Members physically present, the Speaker Pro Tempore replied that “under the rules of the House, a quorum was, indeed, present.” Id. It is uncontested that a quorum was established only because the House included proxies in the quorum count. After the House passed the Act, the Senate followed suit, and the presiding officers of both chambers of Congress printed and signed the bill. At that point, it became an “enrolled bill.” See 1 U.S.C. § 106. The bill was transmitted to the President, who signed it into law. See Pub. L. No. 117-328, 136 Stat. 4459 (2022). B. The State of Texas sued a variety of federal entities and officials3 (collectively, “the Government”), arguing that the House’s passage of the Act violated the Quorum Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. Texas sought injunctive relief barring the Government from enforcing two parts of the Act against Texas: (1) the PWFA, and (2) a $20 million appropriation to the Department of Homeland Security’s Alternatives to Detention Case Management Pilot Program. Texas also requested a declaratory judgment that those parts of the Act were passed in violation of the Quorum Clause. In response, the Government argued that Texas lacked Article III standing to bring its challenge, that the enrolled-bill rule prohibited judicial review of the Act’s passage, and that the House’s passage of the Act was consistent with the Quorum Clause. _____________________ 3 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), all successors-in-office have been automatically substituted as defendants in this matter. 5 Case: 24-10386 Document: 342 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 24-10386 After a bench trial, the district court concluded that Texas had Article III standing to challenge the PWFA but not the Pilot Program. See Texas v. Garland, 719 F. Supp. 3d 521, 552–66 (N.D. Tex. 2024). The court then concluded that the enrolled-bill rule did not preclude it from reaching the merits, for two reasons. Id. at 567. First, “when the dispute turns on a clear constitutional limitation on Congress’s power that does not devolve into battles over conflicting legislative records, the mere act of enrollment cannot thwart a court’s ordinary power to resolve constitutional challenges.” Id. And second, “to the extent that quorum-based challenges can implicate the principles of the enrolled bill doctrine, the Court must first resolve any challenge to the constitutionality of the procedural rule at issue that was used . . . to determine the existence of a quorum.” Id. The district court next proceeded to the merits of Texas’s challenge under the Quorum Clause. The court concluded that “[g]iven the Constitution’s text, original public meaning, and historical practice, . . . the House cannot count members voting by proxy to constitute a constitutionally compliant quorum.” Id. at 582. As the district court put it, “[t]he Quorum Clause is not a majority-participation requirement, but a majority-presence requirement.” Id. (citing United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 6 (1892)). As to the remedy, the district court stated that “Texas [was] entitled to a permanent injunction of the PWFA’s enforcement against it,” but denied Texas’s request for a declaratory judgment because that “would be redundant and provide no further relief.” Id. at 597, 599. The court also emphasized the “limited scope” of the injunctive relief that it awarded: The district court did not grant—and Texas did not seek—an injunction of the entire Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023. Id. at 537. Rather, the court enjoined “only the application of the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act against Texas.” Id. 6 Case: 24-10386 Document: 342 Page: 7 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 24-10386 A divided panel of our court reversed the district court’s judgment and vacated the injunction, concluding that although the enrolled-bill rule did not preclude judicial review of Texas’s challenge on the merits, the “Quorum Clause does not require physical presence for a house of Congress to conduct business.” Texas v. Bondi, 149 F.4th 529, 545–46 (5th Cir. 2025). We granted rehearing en banc and vacated the panel opinion. 164 F.4th 446 (5th Cir. 2026) (mem.).4 II. We review a trial court’s grant of a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion. Valentine v. Collier, 993 F.3d 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2021). “The district court abuses its discretion if it ‘(1) relies on clearly erroneous factual findings when deciding to grant or deny the permanent injunction, (2) relies on erroneous conclusions of law when deciding to grant or deny the permanent injunction, or (3) misapplies the factual or legal conclusions when fashioning its injunctive relief.’” BNSF Ry. Co. v. Int’l Ass’n of Sheet Metal, _____________________ 4 The parties do not appeal the district court’s rulings on standing (i.e., that Texas has it to challenge the PWFA, but lacks it to challenge the Pilot Program). Nevertheless, federal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that subject-matter jurisdiction is met. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 337–38 (2016) (explaining that the power of the federal judiciary extends only to “[c]ases” and “[c]ontroversies”); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (illustrating the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing”). The district court held that Texas has standing to challenge the PWFA because the law injures the State in three ways: through unrecoverable compliance costs it bears as a regulated employer, the burden of defending administrative investigations and litigation, and the abrogation of its sovereign immunity, all of which are fairly traceable to the federal government’s enforcement authority and redressable through injunctive relief. In this instance, the requirements of Art. III standing continue to be satisfied. Texas does not contest the district court’s denial of declaratory relief or dismissal of the State’s challenge to the Pilot Program. Accordingly, those issues are abandoned on appeal. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 56 n.4 (2002); United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 346 (5th Cir. 2009). 7 Case: 24-10386 Document: 342 Page: 8 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 24-10386 Air, Rail, & Transp. Workers, 973 F.3d 326, 333–34 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Abbott, 907 F.3d 237, 248 (5th Cir. 2018)). We review de novo any questions of law underlying the district court’s order. Scott v. Schedler, 826 F.3d 207, 211 (5th Cir. 2016). III. At issue is (A) whether the enrolled-bill rule precludes judicial review of Texas’s claim that the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023 passed the House without a constitutionally required quorum; and, if not, (B) whether the district court erred in holding that the Quorum Clause does not permit proxies to be counted toward a quorum. A. The parties agree that the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023 is an enrolled bill, i.e., that it was signed by the presiding officers of both houses of Congress. See 1 U.S.C. § 106. The parties disagree as to what that means for Texas’s constitutional challenge. The Government contends that judicial review of Texas’s challenge is foreclosed by the enrolled-bill rule articulated in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). Texas counters that the enrolled-bill rule is inapplicable, so review is appropriate. As we explain, the enrolled-bill doctrine does not bar review of Texas’s challenge. Texas does not dispute facts regarding the Act’s enrollment; rather, Texas asserts that the Act’s passage did not legally comply with the Quorum Clause. 1. In Marshall Field, a bill had been signed by the Speaker of the House and the president of the Senate. Id. at 668. The appellants argued that the enrolled bill should be “deemed an absolute nullity, in all its parts, because . . . it [was] shown by the congressional records . . . that a section of the bill, as it finally passed, was not in the bill authenticated by the signatures of the 8 Case: 24-10386 Document: 342 Page: 9 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 24-10386 presiding officers of the respective houses of [C]ongress.” Id. at 668–69. Put otherwise, their position was that an enrolled bill “cannot be regarded as a law of the United States if the journal of either house fails to show that it passed in the precise form in which it was signed.” Id. at 672. The Supreme Court disagreed, instead concluding that it was “not competent for the appellants to show, from the journals of either house, from the reports of committees, or from other documents printed by the authority of [C]ongress, that the enrolled bill, . . . as finally passed, contained a section that does not appear in the enrolled act.” Id. at 680. If the presiding officers of both legislative houses sign the bill, that is “an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed [C]ongress.” Id. at 672. And when the President signs that bill, “its authentication as a bill that has passed [C]ongress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable.” Id. A few years later, the Supreme Court faced a nearly identical question in the context of territorial legislatures: Whether “evidence derived from the journals of the council and house of representatives” may be employed to show that an enrolled bill “contained, at the time of its final passage, provisions that were omitted from it without authority of the council or the house, before it was presented to the governor.” Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U.S. 547, 557–58 (1896). The Court found that “[u]pon the authority of Field . . . this question must be answered in the negative.” Id. at 558. The Court saw “no reason to modify the principles announced in Field” when it came to territorial legislatures rather than the federal one. Id. at 562. The Supreme Court more recently addressed the reach of Marshall Field in United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990). The Munoz-Flores appellants argued that Congress had unconstitutionally passed a statute in violation of the Origination Clause, which requires that “All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives.” Id. at 387; see 9 Case: 24-10386 Document: 342 Page: 10 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 24-10386 U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. Before deciding the merits of that issue, the Court dropped a footnote rejecting the notion that Marshall Field’s enrolled- bill rule prevented judicial review of the appellants’ challenge: That case concerned “the nature of the evidence” the Court would consider in determining whether a bill had actually passed Congress. [Marshall Field, 143 U.S.] at 670. . . . The Court . . . held that the Constitution left it to Congress to determine how a bill is to be authenticated as having passed. Id. at 670–71. In the absence of any constitutional requirement binding Congress, [the Court] stated that “[t]he respect due to coequal and independent departments” demands that the courts accept as passed all bills authenticated in the manner provided by Congress. Id. at 672. Where, as here, a constitutional provision is implicated, Field does not apply. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 391 n.4. This characterization of Marshall Field underscores that the enrolled-bill doctrine concerns what evidence can be considered for authenticating the fact of a bill’s passage.5 If this language in Munoz-Flores is not sufficiently telling, additional context clarifies its meaning. The Court’s brief explication of Marshall Field addressed an alternative interpretation offered by Justice Scalia. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia posited that Marshall Field dictated that the challenged statute’s accompanying “H.J. Res.” designation authoritatively “attests that the legislation originated in the House.” Id. at 409 (Scalia, J., concurring). He thought the Court “should no more gainsay Congress’ _____________________ 5 On the merits, the Court held that the challenged statute’s passage did not violate the Origination Clause because that statute was not a “Bill for raising Revenue” within the meaning of that Clause. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 401 (brackets omitted). The Court therefore did not consider “whether the Origination Clause would require its invalidating if it were a revenue bill.” Id. 10 Case: 24-10386 Document: 342 Page: 11 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 24-10386 official assertion of the origin of a bill than . . . gainsay its official assertion that the bill was passed by the requisite quorum.” Id. at 410. But the Munoz-Flores majority interpreted Marshall Field’s enrolled- bill rule differently: “Where, as here, a constitutional provision is implicated, Field does not apply.” Id. at 391 n.4. So, although Congress’s “H.J. Res.” designation suggested that the bill originated in the House, “congressional consideration of the constitutional questions [did] not foreclose subsequent judicial scrutiny of the law’s constitutionality.” Id. at 391. In another case shortly after Munoz-Flores, the Supreme Court reiterated that Marshall Field’s enrolled-bill rule concerns the nature of the evidence that courts may consider in assessing whether a bill passed Congress. U.S. Nat. Bank of Ore. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455 n.7 (1993). The enrolled-bill rule was “irrelevant to th[e] case . . . [because] there is no doubt . . . that the [challenged] Act as printed in the Statutes at Large is identical to the enrolled bill.” Id. At bottom, the enrolled-bill doctrine instructs that a bill’s enrollment is proof that the bill is indeed the one that passed Congress. Extrinsic, or even intrinsic, evidence cannot be used to demonstrate otherwise. This understanding is consistent not only with Supreme Court precedent, but also the opinions of our sister circuits. See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 486 F.3d 1342, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“The Court crafted a clear rule: ‘It is not competent for a party raising a bicameralism challenge to show, from the journals of either house, from the reports of committees or from other documents printed by authority of Congress, that an enrolled bill’ differs from that actually passed by Congress.” (cleaned up) (quoting Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 680)); OneSimpleLoan v. U.S. Sec’y of Educ., 496 F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Permitting litigants to impeach the text of an enrolled bill 11 Case: 24-10386 Document: 342 Page: 12 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 24-10386 by other congressional documents would likewise create ‘uncertainty in the statute laws.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 675)). 2. The foregoing reveals why the enrolled-bill doctrine is inapplicable to Texas’s Quorum Clause challenge: There are no disputed facts regarding the enrollment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023. Everyone agrees on the underlying facts of the Act’s passage—relevantly, that the House established a purported quorum only by including proxies in the quorum count. But judicial review is not obviated by the mere fact that the House asserted that it had a quorum when it passed the Act. As the Court explained in Munoz-Flores, “[a] law passed in violation of the Origination Clause would . . . be no more immune from judicial scrutiny because it was passed by both Houses and signed by the President than would be a law passed in violation of the First Amendment.” 495 U.S. at 397. The same holds true for a law passed in violation of the Quorum Clause. Bolstering this conclusion is the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892), decided the same day as Marshall Field. In Ballin, the House had adopted a rule allowing the quorum count to include non-voting Members who were nonetheless in attendance at the legislative session. Id. at 5. The House then used the rule in passing a bill. Id. at 4. The Court began by observing that “[t]he enrolled bill is found in the proper office, that of the secretary of state, authenticated and approved in the customary and legal form. There is nothing on the face of it to suggest any invalidity.” Id. at 3. The Court also noted that “if reference may be had to [the House’s] journal, it must be assumed to speak the truth.” Id. at 4. And the House’s journal denoted that the House had established a quorum only 12 Case: 24-10386 Document: 342 Page: 13 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 24-10386 by counting as present the attending-but-not-voting Members. Id.6 There was thus no dispute as to the bill’s authenticity, and no dispute as to how the House had established a quorum. The House’s action on the bill “was taken in direct compliance with [the House’s] rule.” Id. at 5. “The question, therefore, [was] as to the validity of this rule”—a question that the Court then proceeded to answer. Id. This discussion in Ballin exemplifies when judicial review of a Quorum Clause challenge is appropriate. The record indisputably showed that the House had reached a quorum only by counting non-voting Members as present, and with that determined, the Court proceeded to the merits of the Quorum Clause challenge. The House’s mere assertion that it had a quorum did not cordon off the House’s quorum-counting rule from scrutiny. As the Court explained, Congress “may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints.” Id. Texas’s challenge is much like the one in Ballin: The parties agree on the underlying facts, but they disagree on the proper meaning of the Quorum Clause. Our assessment gains additional support from the enrolled-bill rule’s brief appearance in NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014). There, the Supreme Court noted that under the enrolled-bill rule, courts “generally take at face value the Senate’s own report of its actions.” Id. at 551. So “when the Journal of the Senate indicates that a quorum was present, under a valid Senate rule, at the time the Senate passed a bill, [courts] will not consider an argument that a quorum was not, in fact, present.” Id. (emphasis added). _____________________ 6 See Ballin, 144 U.S. at 2–3 (There were “212 members present, constituting a quorum present to do business,” but 74 of those Members were “present and refus[ed] to vote.”). 13 Case: 24-10386 Document: 342 Page: 14 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 24-10386 Here, Texas challenges the validity of the House’s proxy-presence rule, through which the House ostensibly established a quorum. Unlike Noel Canning, Texas’s argument does not require us to “determine such matters as who is, and who is not, in fact present on the floor during a particular [House] session.” Id. at 555. Instead, we “take at face value the [House]’s own report of its actions.” Id. at 551. And that (undisputed) report shows that the House’s determination that it had a quorum relied on the inclusion of proxies. Therefore, the enrolled-bill rule is inapplicable to Texas’s claim that the House’s passage of the Act violated the Quorum Clause. 3. The Government’s alternative understanding of the enrolled-bill doctrine is unpersuasive. The Government insists that nothing in the Supreme Court’s precedents limits the doctrine’s application only to fact- intensive disputes as opposed to legal ones. Therefore, the Government essentially argues that our court, out of respect for a coordinate branch of government, should accept as legally conclusive the House’s assertion that it had a quorum when it passed the Act. That asks for too much. The enrolled-bill rule instructs that courts cannot second-guess the fact of a bill’s passage; it does not command that we defer to Congress on constitutional questions. In Munoz-Flores, the Supreme Court explained that “[i]n the absence of any constitutional requirement binding Congress, [the Court] stated [in Marshall Field] that ‘[t]he respect due to coequal and independent departments’ demands that the courts accept as passed all bills authenticated in the manner provided by Congress. Where . . . a constitutional provision is implicated, Field does not apply.” 495 U.S. at 391 n.4 (citation omitted) (quoting Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 672). Here, Texas’s constitutional challenge hinges entirely on the proper meaning of the Quorum Clause. While the House may contend that its proxy- 14 Case: 24-10386 Document: 342 Page: 15 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 24-10386 presence rule is consistent with the Quorum Clause, we cannot merely take the House’s word for it.7 Given the uncontested fact that the House reached a quorum only by including proxies, the House’s assertion that it had a quorum does not itself resolve the legal question of whether that supposed quorum was constitutionally valid.8 The Government next turns to persuasive authority, arguing that several of our sister circuits have held that the enrolled-bill rule precludes review of claims that a statute is invalid because a chamber of the legislature allegedly lacked a quorum at the time of its vote. See United States v. Farmer, 583 F.3d 131, 151–52 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Small, 487 F. App’x 302, 303 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Gonzalez-Arenas, 496 F. App’x 866, 867 (10th Cir. 2012). But rather than supporting the Government’s position, these cases only illustrate the type of Quorum Clause challenges to which the enrolled-bill rule appropriately applies. In Farmer, the defendant argued that the “Congressional Record . . . show[ed] that a quorum was not present” on the date that Congress passed the relevant statute. 583 F.3d at 152. The defendants in Small and Gonzalez- Arenas offered functionally identical arguments. See Small, 487 F. App’x at _____________________ 7 Before the House voted to adopt the proxy-presence rule, some in the House argued that the rule would violate the Quorum Clause. See, e.g., 166 Cong. Rec. H2009; H2021; H2025 (daily ed. May 15, 2020). But given that the House ultimately adopted the rule, we presume that a majority of the House agreed that the rule was constitutional. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) (“[W]e assume [Congress] legislates in the light of constitutional limitations.”). 8 The Government’s position would mean that in Ballin, the Supreme Court itself violated Marshall Field’s enrolled-bill rule: The Ballin Court assumed, albeit without deciding, that it was appropriate to look to the House’s undisputed journal in setting the stage for its Quorum Clause analysis. Ballin, 144 U.S. at 4. By the Government’s reckoning, the Court should have found dispositive the House’s mere pronouncement that it had a quorum. Yet the Ballin Court, on the same day that it decided Marshall Field, did not do so. 15 Case: 24-10386 Document: 342 Page: 16 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 24-10386 303; Gonzalez-Arenas, 496 F. App’x at 867. In all three cases, the courts applied the enrolled-bill doctrine to foreclose what would have turned into factual investigations of Congress’s legislative actions. And in all three cases, the defendants’ challenges did not turn on the Quorum Clause’s proper meaning, but on whether—as a factual matter—the Clause’s agreed-upon requirements had been met. Texas’s Quorum Clause challenge is the opposite. Texas does not contest the facts regarding the House’s passage of the Act, conspicuously including that the House established a quorum only by counting proxies. Instead, Texas argues that the House rule permitting that is inconsistent with the constitutional limitations of the Clause. In short, Texas’s claim implicates only the legal meaning of the Quorum Clause. Resolving that issue requires no investigatory fact-finding proscribed by the enrolled-bill rule. With both Supreme Court precedent and persuasive authority unavailing, the Government points as its redoubt to the principles underlying the enrolled-bill doctrine, namely, veneration of the separation of powers and the Supreme Court’s recognition of the significant consequences that would flow from declaring an enrolled bill not properly enacted. In the Government’s view, those concerns are no less implicated by a legal challenge than a factual one. The Government therefore warns that both legal and factual Quorum Clause challenges risk the “uncertainty and disruption that would result if statutes could be invalidated on the basis of an alleged lack of quorum.” We are mindful that the separation of powers entitles a coordinate branch of government to great respect and deference. See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883). But we must remain equally mindful of our own role: It is “the duty of . . . court[s], from the performance of which [they] may not shrink, to give full effect to the provisions of the 16 Case: 24-10386 Document: 342 Page: 17 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 24-10386 [C]onstitution relating to the enactment of laws.” Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 670. “[H]owever disagreeable that duty may be, in cases where [the court’s] own judgment shall differ from that of other high functionaries, it is not at liberty to surrender, or to waive it.” United States v. Dickson, 40 U.S. 141, 162 (1841) (Story, J.). Our deep respect for the national legislature does not enable us to turn a blind eye to potential constitutional problems with one of its enactments. As for the “uncertainty and disruption” that the Government warns may follow if we do not apply the enrolled-bill rule to Texas’s challenge, the Government’s position asks us to exceed the constraints of our judicial role. As has often been repeated, the courts “have neither force nor will but merely judgment.” The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton). Our duty, while unflinching, is therefore a limited one: “[T]o say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). And that duty forbids us from allowing our judgment to be infected by extrajudicial considerations. See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 721 (2014). “Too big to be unconstitutional” is not an accepted canon of constitutional interpretation. In sum, the enrolled-bill doctrine does not foreclose judicial review of whether the House’s passage of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023 was consistent with the Quorum Clause. It is uncontested that the House established a quorum for passage only because hundreds of proxies were included in its quorum count. Texas’s challenge rests on no disputed facts; the issue is a question of law properly brought before the judiciary. B. We now turn to the merits of Texas’s challenge. Pursuant to the House’s proxy-presence rule, the House passed the Act after mustering a quorum only by counting proxies. Texas argues that this is inconsistent with the Constitution’s Quorum Clause. The Government responds that the 17 Case: 24-10386 Document: 342 Page: 18 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 24-10386 Quorum Clause contains no physical-presence requirement that would prohibit the House from adopting its proxy-presence rule. At the outset, we clarify that the question before us is not whether the Quorum Clause necessarily requires physical, bottom-in-a-seat presence. Nor is it whether Congress may employ voting by proxy. Rather, the question is only whether the Quorum Clause allows proxy presence to be included in a quorum count, i.e., whether an absent Member’s assignment of a proxy may render that Member “present” for quorum purposes. The answer is no. 1. The Quorum Clause provides: [A] Majority of each [House] shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. Apart from its decision in United States v. Ballin, the Supreme Court has had little occasion to construe the Clause. At issue in Ballin was a House rule that allowed the Speaker to count, for purposes of establishing a quorum, non-voting Members who were nonetheless in the legislative chamber during the session. 144 U.S. at 5. The House utilized that rule when passing a tariff bill in May 1890. The measure received 138 votes in favor, while another 74 Members in attendance did not vote. Id. at 2–3. In total, 212 Members were in the House chamber during the vote; in 1890, that constituted a majority of the House. Id. at 4. The Court concluded that the Quorum Clause had been satisfied: [W]hen a majority are present the [H]ouse is in a position to do business. Its capacity to transact business is . . . created by the mere presence of a majority, and does not depend upon the 18 Case: 24-10386 Document: 342 Page: 19 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 24-10386 disposition or assent or action of any single member or fraction of the majority present. All that the [C]onstitution requires is the presence of a majority, and when that majority are present the power of the [H]ouse arises. Id. at 5–6. The Court explained that the Constitution “prescribed no method of making th[e] determination” of “the presence of a majority.” Id. at 6. Therefore, the House could “prescribe any method which shall be reasonably certain to ascertain the fact.” Id. The Court then listed a few permissible examples: The House could “prescribe answer to roll-call,” or “require the passage of memb