State of Texas v. Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket24-10386
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
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United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
November 20, 2026
No. 24-10386
Thomas B. Plunkett, III
____________
Clerk
State of Texas,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Todd Wallace Blanche, U.S. Attorney General, in his official capacity
as United States Attorney General; Andrea R. Lucas, in her official
capacity as Chair of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission;
Vice Chair of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission; Kalpana Kotagal, in her official capacity as
Commissioner of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission;
Brittany Bull Panuccio, in her official capacity as Commissioner of
the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; Catherine
Eschbach, in her official capacity as Acting General Counsel of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission; Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission; United States Department of
Justice,
Defendants—Appellants.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 5:23-CV-34
______________________________
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Before Elrod, Chief Judge, and Jones, Smith, Stewart,
Richman, Southwick, Haynes, Graves, Higginson,
Willett, Ho, Duncan, Engelhardt, Oldham, Wilson,
Douglas, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.
Cory T. Wilson, Circuit Judge, joined by Elrod, Chief Judge, and
Jones, Smith, Willett, Ho, Duncan, Engelhardt, and
Oldham, Circuit Judges:
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the House of Representatives
adopted a rule allowing Members to record their presence by proxy for
purposes of establishing a quorum. The House used this rule when passing
the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023 (the Act), having mustered a
quorum by counting hundreds of otherwise absent Members as present by
proxy. The Senate then passed the bill, and the President signed it into law.
The State of Texas argues that the House’s proxy-presence rule is
inconsistent with the Constitution’s Quorum Clause, which would mean that
the House did not validly pass the Act. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
Based on that proposition, Texas seeks injunctive relief against just one
portion of the Act: The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA). The
federal Government responds that the enrolled-bill rule, which instructs that
a bill’s passage through the legislature is conclusive proof of its authenticity,
precludes judicial review of whether the Act’s passage complied with the
Quorum Clause. Alternatively, the Government argues that the Quorum
Clause permits proxy presence.
The district court held that the enrolled-bill rule did not apply and that
the House’s passage of the Act—through use of the proxy-presence rule
_____________________
Judge Haynes states that she does not think it is appropriate to throw out the
Federal House of Representatives in this arena, so she dissents. She also appreciates
Judge Graves’s dissent.
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—violated the Quorum Clause. Accordingly, the district court enjoined the
Government from enforcing the PWFA against Texas.
We conclude that the enrolled-bill rule does not bar our review
because Texas’s constitutional challenge does not implicate a dispute of fact
regarding the Act’s passage. We further conclude that the Act’s passage was
unconstitutional because the Quorum Clause does not allow proxies to be
included when establishing a quorum. The Clause’s text, context, original
understanding, and unbroken historical application all indicate that Members
of Congress must be present for quorum purposes—as the Supreme Court
expressly held over 125 years ago, and as Congress has done ever since the
Founding. “Proxy presence” does not count. While the chambers of the
legislature have much discretion regarding their rules of procedure, the
Quorum Clause’s constraints on congressional power cannot be
circumvented by congressional fiat. We therefore affirm the judgment of the
district court.
I.
A.
In the early days of the global COVID pandemic, the House of
Representatives adopted House Resolution 965:
[A]t any time after the Speaker . . . is notified . . . that a public
health emergency due to a novel coronavirus is in effect, the
Speaker . . . may designate a period . . . during which a
Member who is designated by another Member as a proxy
. . . may cast the vote of such other Member or record the
presence of such other Member in the House.
H.R. Res. 965 § 1(a), 116th Cong. (2020). To assign a proxy, the designating
Member had to submit a signed letter specifying the designated Member. Id.
§ 2. The rule further stated:
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Any Member . . . whose presence is recorded by a designated
proxy under this resolution shall be counted for the purpose of
establishing a quorum under the rules of the House.
Id. § 3(b). Plainly put, the rule allowed an otherwise absent Member to
record his or her presence by proxy for purposes of a quorum.
The House employed the proxy-presence rule when it passed the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023.1 See 168 Cong. Rec. H10529 (daily
ed. Dec. 23, 2022). The final vote tally on the Act was 225 yeas and 201 nays,
with one Member voting present and four not voting. Id. at H10528.2 Of the
427 Members who recorded a vote on the Act, the Congressional Record
indicates that 226 Members—a majority of the House—had recorded their
presence and their vote by proxy. Id. at H10529. Thus, when the House
voted on the Act, less than a majority of Members were physically present.
During the vote, Representative Chip Roy commented that the Act
was “moving off the floor without a physical quorum present” and reserved
the right to object. Id. He asked whether there was any recourse to challenge
the quorum determination, but the Speaker Pro Tempore (Representative
G.K. Butterfield) told him that “a quorum was, indeed, present.” Id.
Representative Roy then asked how that was so, given that “there were 226
votes cast by proxy, i.e., not physically present in the Chamber.” Id. The
Speaker Pro Tempore answered: “Members casting their vote or recording
their presence by proxy [were] counted for the purpose of establishing a
_____________________
1
The House of Representatives for the 117th Congress maintained the rule. See
H.R. Res. 8 § 3(s), 117th Cong. (2021).
2
The House had four vacancies when the House approved the Act on December
23, 2022, so there were only 431 Members serving at the time. See The United States
House of Representatives: History, Art & Archives: Vacancies and Successors,
https://history.house.gov/dropdowntemplate?id=36507224009&htmlContentID=36507
224028 [https://perma.cc/JVB5-AJ3F].
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quorum.” Id. When Representative Roy again inquired as to whether there
was a recourse to ask the Speaker to count the Members physically present,
the Speaker Pro Tempore replied that “under the rules of the House, a
quorum was, indeed, present.” Id. It is uncontested that a quorum was
established only because the House included proxies in the quorum count.
After the House passed the Act, the Senate followed suit, and the
presiding officers of both chambers of Congress printed and signed the bill.
At that point, it became an “enrolled bill.” See 1 U.S.C. § 106. The bill was
transmitted to the President, who signed it into law. See Pub. L. No. 117-328,
136 Stat. 4459 (2022).
B.
The State of Texas sued a variety of federal entities and officials3
(collectively, “the Government”), arguing that the House’s passage of the
Act violated the Quorum Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S.
Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. Texas sought injunctive relief barring the
Government from enforcing two parts of the Act against Texas: (1) the
PWFA, and (2) a $20 million appropriation to the Department of Homeland
Security’s Alternatives to Detention Case Management Pilot Program.
Texas also requested a declaratory judgment that those parts of the Act were
passed in violation of the Quorum Clause.
In response, the Government argued that Texas lacked Article III
standing to bring its challenge, that the enrolled-bill rule prohibited judicial
review of the Act’s passage, and that the House’s passage of the Act was
consistent with the Quorum Clause.
_____________________
3
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) and Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 43(c)(2), all successors-in-office have been automatically substituted as
defendants in this matter.
5
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After a bench trial, the district court concluded that Texas had Article
III standing to challenge the PWFA but not the Pilot Program. See Texas v.
Garland, 719 F. Supp. 3d 521, 552–66 (N.D. Tex. 2024). The court then
concluded that the enrolled-bill rule did not preclude it from reaching the
merits, for two reasons. Id. at 567. First, “when the dispute turns on a clear
constitutional limitation on Congress’s power that does not devolve into
battles over conflicting legislative records, the mere act of enrollment cannot
thwart a court’s ordinary power to resolve constitutional challenges.” Id.
And second, “to the extent that quorum-based challenges can implicate the
principles of the enrolled bill doctrine, the Court must first resolve any
challenge to the constitutionality of the procedural rule at issue that was used
. . . to determine the existence of a quorum.” Id.
The district court next proceeded to the merits of Texas’s challenge
under the Quorum Clause. The court concluded that “[g]iven the
Constitution’s text, original public meaning, and historical practice, . . . the
House cannot count members voting by proxy to constitute a constitutionally
compliant quorum.” Id. at 582. As the district court put it, “[t]he Quorum
Clause is not a majority-participation requirement, but a majority-presence
requirement.” Id. (citing United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 6 (1892)).
As to the remedy, the district court stated that “Texas [was] entitled
to a permanent injunction of the PWFA’s enforcement against it,” but
denied Texas’s request for a declaratory judgment because that “would be
redundant and provide no further relief.” Id. at 597, 599. The court also
emphasized the “limited scope” of the injunctive relief that it awarded: The
district court did not grant—and Texas did not seek—an injunction of the
entire Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023. Id. at 537. Rather, the court
enjoined “only the application of the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act against
Texas.” Id.
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A divided panel of our court reversed the district court’s judgment
and vacated the injunction, concluding that although the enrolled-bill rule did
not preclude judicial review of Texas’s challenge on the merits, the
“Quorum Clause does not require physical presence for a house of Congress
to conduct business.” Texas v. Bondi, 149 F.4th 529, 545–46 (5th Cir. 2025).
We granted rehearing en banc and vacated the panel opinion. 164 F.4th 446
(5th Cir. 2026) (mem.).4
II.
We review a trial court’s grant of a permanent injunction for abuse of
discretion. Valentine v. Collier, 993 F.3d 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2021). “The
district court abuses its discretion if it ‘(1) relies on clearly erroneous factual
findings when deciding to grant or deny the permanent injunction, (2) relies
on erroneous conclusions of law when deciding to grant or deny the
permanent injunction, or (3) misapplies the factual or legal conclusions when
fashioning its injunctive relief.’” BNSF Ry. Co. v. Int’l Ass’n of Sheet Metal,
_____________________
4
The parties do not appeal the district court’s rulings on standing (i.e., that Texas
has it to challenge the PWFA, but lacks it to challenge the Pilot Program). Nevertheless,
federal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that subject-matter jurisdiction is
met. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 337–38 (2016)
(explaining that the power of the federal judiciary extends only to “[c]ases” and
“[c]ontroversies”); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (illustrating
the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing”). The district court held that Texas
has standing to challenge the PWFA because the law injures the State in three ways:
through unrecoverable compliance costs it bears as a regulated employer, the burden of
defending administrative investigations and litigation, and the abrogation of its sovereign
immunity, all of which are fairly traceable to the federal government’s enforcement
authority and redressable through injunctive relief. In this instance, the requirements of
Art. III standing continue to be satisfied.
Texas does not contest the district court’s denial of declaratory relief or dismissal
of the State’s challenge to the Pilot Program. Accordingly, those issues are abandoned on
appeal. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 56 n.4 (2002); United States v. Whitfield,
590 F.3d 325, 346 (5th Cir. 2009).
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Air, Rail, & Transp. Workers, 973 F.3d 326, 333–34 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting
M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Abbott, 907 F.3d 237, 248 (5th Cir. 2018)). We
review de novo any questions of law underlying the district court’s order.
Scott v. Schedler, 826 F.3d 207, 211 (5th Cir. 2016).
III.
At issue is (A) whether the enrolled-bill rule precludes judicial review
of Texas’s claim that the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023 passed
the House without a constitutionally required quorum; and, if not,
(B) whether the district court erred in holding that the Quorum Clause does
not permit proxies to be counted toward a quorum.
A.
The parties agree that the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023 is
an enrolled bill, i.e., that it was signed by the presiding officers of both houses
of Congress. See 1 U.S.C. § 106. The parties disagree as to what that means
for Texas’s constitutional challenge. The Government contends that judicial
review of Texas’s challenge is foreclosed by the enrolled-bill rule articulated
in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). Texas counters that
the enrolled-bill rule is inapplicable, so review is appropriate. As we explain,
the enrolled-bill doctrine does not bar review of Texas’s challenge. Texas
does not dispute facts regarding the Act’s enrollment; rather, Texas asserts
that the Act’s passage did not legally comply with the Quorum Clause.
1.
In Marshall Field, a bill had been signed by the Speaker of the House
and the president of the Senate. Id. at 668. The appellants argued that the
enrolled bill should be “deemed an absolute nullity, in all its parts, because
. . . it [was] shown by the congressional records . . . that a section of the bill,
as it finally passed, was not in the bill authenticated by the signatures of the
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presiding officers of the respective houses of [C]ongress.” Id. at 668–69. Put
otherwise, their position was that an enrolled bill “cannot be regarded as a
law of the United States if the journal of either house fails to show that it
passed in the precise form in which it was signed.” Id. at 672.
The Supreme Court disagreed, instead concluding that it was “not
competent for the appellants to show, from the journals of either house, from
the reports of committees, or from other documents printed by the authority
of [C]ongress, that the enrolled bill, . . . as finally passed, contained a section
that does not appear in the enrolled act.” Id. at 680. If the presiding officers
of both legislative houses sign the bill, that is “an official attestation by the
two houses of such bill as one that has passed [C]ongress.” Id. at 672. And
when the President signs that bill, “its authentication as a bill that has passed
[C]ongress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable.” Id.
A few years later, the Supreme Court faced a nearly identical question
in the context of territorial legislatures: Whether “evidence derived from the
journals of the council and house of representatives” may be employed to
show that an enrolled bill “contained, at the time of its final passage,
provisions that were omitted from it without authority of the council or the
house, before it was presented to the governor.” Harwood v. Wentworth, 162
U.S. 547, 557–58 (1896). The Court found that “[u]pon the authority of
Field . . . this question must be answered in the negative.” Id. at 558. The
Court saw “no reason to modify the principles announced in Field” when it
came to territorial legislatures rather than the federal one. Id. at 562.
The Supreme Court more recently addressed the reach of Marshall
Field in United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990). The Munoz-Flores
appellants argued that Congress had unconstitutionally passed a statute in
violation of the Origination Clause, which requires that “All Bills for raising
Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives.” Id. at 387; see
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U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. Before deciding the merits of that issue, the
Court dropped a footnote rejecting the notion that Marshall Field’s enrolled-
bill rule prevented judicial review of the appellants’ challenge:
That case concerned “the nature of the evidence” the Court
would consider in determining whether a bill had actually
passed Congress. [Marshall Field, 143 U.S.] at 670. . . . The
Court . . . held that the Constitution left it to Congress to
determine how a bill is to be authenticated as having passed.
Id. at 670–71. In the absence of any constitutional requirement
binding Congress, [the Court] stated that “[t]he respect due to
coequal and independent departments” demands that the
courts accept as passed all bills authenticated in the manner
provided by Congress. Id. at 672. Where, as here, a
constitutional provision is implicated, Field does not apply.
Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 391 n.4. This characterization of Marshall Field
underscores that the enrolled-bill doctrine concerns what evidence can be
considered for authenticating the fact of a bill’s passage.5
If this language in Munoz-Flores is not sufficiently telling, additional
context clarifies its meaning. The Court’s brief explication of Marshall Field
addressed an alternative interpretation offered by Justice Scalia. In his
concurrence, Justice Scalia posited that Marshall Field dictated that the
challenged statute’s accompanying “H.J. Res.” designation authoritatively
“attests that the legislation originated in the House.” Id. at 409 (Scalia,
J., concurring). He thought the Court “should no more gainsay Congress’
_____________________
5
On the merits, the Court held that the challenged statute’s passage did not violate
the Origination Clause because that statute was not a “Bill for raising Revenue” within the
meaning of that Clause. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 401 (brackets omitted). The Court
therefore did not consider “whether the Origination Clause would require its invalidating
if it were a revenue bill.” Id.
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official assertion of the origin of a bill than . . . gainsay its official assertion
that the bill was passed by the requisite quorum.” Id. at 410.
But the Munoz-Flores majority interpreted Marshall Field’s enrolled-
bill rule differently: “Where, as here, a constitutional provision is implicated,
Field does not apply.” Id. at 391 n.4. So, although Congress’s “H.J. Res.”
designation suggested that the bill originated in the House, “congressional
consideration of the constitutional questions [did] not foreclose subsequent
judicial scrutiny of the law’s constitutionality.” Id. at 391.
In another case shortly after Munoz-Flores, the Supreme Court
reiterated that Marshall Field’s enrolled-bill rule concerns the nature of the
evidence that courts may consider in assessing whether a bill passed
Congress. U.S. Nat. Bank of Ore. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S.
439, 455 n.7 (1993). The enrolled-bill rule was “irrelevant to th[e] case . . .
[because] there is no doubt . . . that the [challenged] Act as printed in the
Statutes at Large is identical to the enrolled bill.” Id.
At bottom, the enrolled-bill doctrine instructs that a bill’s enrollment
is proof that the bill is indeed the one that passed Congress. Extrinsic, or
even intrinsic, evidence cannot be used to demonstrate otherwise. This
understanding is consistent not only with Supreme Court precedent, but also
the opinions of our sister circuits. See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C.,
486 F.3d 1342, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“The Court crafted a clear rule: ‘It is
not competent for a party raising a bicameralism challenge to show, from the
journals of either house, from the reports of committees or from other
documents printed by authority of Congress, that an enrolled bill’ differs
from that actually passed by Congress.” (cleaned up) (quoting Marshall
Field, 143 U.S. at 680)); OneSimpleLoan v. U.S. Sec’y of Educ., 496 F.3d 197,
205 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Permitting litigants to impeach the text of an enrolled bill
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by other congressional documents would likewise create ‘uncertainty in the
statute laws.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 675)).
2.
The foregoing reveals why the enrolled-bill doctrine is inapplicable to
Texas’s Quorum Clause challenge: There are no disputed facts regarding
the enrollment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023. Everyone
agrees on the underlying facts of the Act’s passage—relevantly, that the
House established a purported quorum only by including proxies in the
quorum count. But judicial review is not obviated by the mere fact that the
House asserted that it had a quorum when it passed the Act. As the Court
explained in Munoz-Flores, “[a] law passed in violation of the Origination
Clause would . . . be no more immune from judicial scrutiny because it was
passed by both Houses and signed by the President than would be a law
passed in violation of the First Amendment.” 495 U.S. at 397. The same
holds true for a law passed in violation of the Quorum Clause.
Bolstering this conclusion is the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892), decided the same day as Marshall Field. In
Ballin, the House had adopted a rule allowing the quorum count to include
non-voting Members who were nonetheless in attendance at the legislative
session. Id. at 5. The House then used the rule in passing a bill. Id. at 4. The
Court began by observing that “[t]he enrolled bill is found in the proper
office, that of the secretary of state, authenticated and approved in the
customary and legal form. There is nothing on the face of it to suggest any
invalidity.” Id. at 3. The Court also noted that “if reference may be had to
[the House’s] journal, it must be assumed to speak the truth.” Id. at 4. And
the House’s journal denoted that the House had established a quorum only
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by counting as present the attending-but-not-voting Members. Id.6 There
was thus no dispute as to the bill’s authenticity, and no dispute as to how the
House had established a quorum. The House’s action on the bill “was taken
in direct compliance with [the House’s] rule.” Id. at 5. “The question,
therefore, [was] as to the validity of this rule”—a question that the Court
then proceeded to answer. Id.
This discussion in Ballin exemplifies when judicial review of a
Quorum Clause challenge is appropriate. The record indisputably showed
that the House had reached a quorum only by counting non-voting Members
as present, and with that determined, the Court proceeded to the merits of
the Quorum Clause challenge. The House’s mere assertion that it had a
quorum did not cordon off the House’s quorum-counting rule from scrutiny.
As the Court explained, Congress “may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints.” Id. Texas’s challenge is much like the one in Ballin: The parties
agree on the underlying facts, but they disagree on the proper meaning of the
Quorum Clause.
Our assessment gains additional support from the enrolled-bill rule’s
brief appearance in NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014). There, the
Supreme Court noted that under the enrolled-bill rule, courts “generally take
at face value the Senate’s own report of its actions.” Id. at 551. So “when
the Journal of the Senate indicates that a quorum was present, under a valid
Senate rule, at the time the Senate passed a bill, [courts] will not consider an
argument that a quorum was not, in fact, present.” Id. (emphasis added).
_____________________
6
See Ballin, 144 U.S. at 2–3 (There were “212 members present, constituting a
quorum present to do business,” but 74 of those Members were “present and refus[ed] to
vote.”).
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Here, Texas challenges the validity of the House’s proxy-presence
rule, through which the House ostensibly established a quorum. Unlike Noel
Canning, Texas’s argument does not require us to “determine such matters
as who is, and who is not, in fact present on the floor during a particular
[House] session.” Id. at 555. Instead, we “take at face value the [House]’s
own report of its actions.” Id. at 551. And that (undisputed) report shows
that the House’s determination that it had a quorum relied on the inclusion
of proxies. Therefore, the enrolled-bill rule is inapplicable to Texas’s claim
that the House’s passage of the Act violated the Quorum Clause.
3.
The Government’s alternative understanding of the enrolled-bill
doctrine is unpersuasive. The Government insists that nothing in the
Supreme Court’s precedents limits the doctrine’s application only to fact-
intensive disputes as opposed to legal ones. Therefore, the Government
essentially argues that our court, out of respect for a coordinate branch of
government, should accept as legally conclusive the House’s assertion that it
had a quorum when it passed the Act.
That asks for too much. The enrolled-bill rule instructs that courts
cannot second-guess the fact of a bill’s passage; it does not command that we
defer to Congress on constitutional questions. In Munoz-Flores, the Supreme
Court explained that “[i]n the absence of any constitutional requirement
binding Congress, [the Court] stated [in Marshall Field] that ‘[t]he respect
due to coequal and independent departments’ demands that the courts
accept as passed all bills authenticated in the manner provided by Congress.
Where . . . a constitutional provision is implicated, Field does not apply.” 495
U.S. at 391 n.4 (citation omitted) (quoting Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 672).
Here, Texas’s constitutional challenge hinges entirely on the proper meaning
of the Quorum Clause. While the House may contend that its proxy-
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presence rule is consistent with the Quorum Clause, we cannot merely take
the House’s word for it.7 Given the uncontested fact that the House reached
a quorum only by including proxies, the House’s assertion that it had a
quorum does not itself resolve the legal question of whether that supposed
quorum was constitutionally valid.8
The Government next turns to persuasive authority, arguing that
several of our sister circuits have held that the enrolled-bill rule precludes
review of claims that a statute is invalid because a chamber of the legislature
allegedly lacked a quorum at the time of its vote. See United States v. Farmer,
583 F.3d 131, 151–52 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Small, 487 F. App’x 302,
303 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Gonzalez-Arenas, 496 F. App’x 866, 867
(10th Cir. 2012). But rather than supporting the Government’s position,
these cases only illustrate the type of Quorum Clause challenges to which the
enrolled-bill rule appropriately applies.
In Farmer, the defendant argued that the “Congressional Record . . .
show[ed] that a quorum was not present” on the date that Congress passed
the relevant statute. 583 F.3d at 152. The defendants in Small and Gonzalez-
Arenas offered functionally identical arguments. See Small, 487 F. App’x at
_____________________
7
Before the House voted to adopt the proxy-presence rule, some in the House
argued that the rule would violate the Quorum Clause. See, e.g., 166 Cong. Rec. H2009;
H2021; H2025 (daily ed. May 15, 2020). But given that the House ultimately adopted the
rule, we presume that a majority of the House agreed that the rule was constitutional. See
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) (“[W]e assume [Congress] legislates in the light
of constitutional limitations.”).
8
The Government’s position would mean that in Ballin, the Supreme Court itself
violated Marshall Field’s enrolled-bill rule: The Ballin Court assumed, albeit without
deciding, that it was appropriate to look to the House’s undisputed journal in setting the
stage for its Quorum Clause analysis. Ballin, 144 U.S. at 4. By the Government’s
reckoning, the Court should have found dispositive the House’s mere pronouncement that
it had a quorum. Yet the Ballin Court, on the same day that it decided Marshall Field, did
not do so.
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303; Gonzalez-Arenas, 496 F. App’x at 867. In all three cases, the courts
applied the enrolled-bill doctrine to foreclose what would have turned into
factual investigations of Congress’s legislative actions. And in all three cases,
the defendants’ challenges did not turn on the Quorum Clause’s proper
meaning, but on whether—as a factual matter—the Clause’s agreed-upon
requirements had been met.
Texas’s Quorum Clause challenge is the opposite. Texas does not
contest the facts regarding the House’s passage of the Act, conspicuously
including that the House established a quorum only by counting proxies.
Instead, Texas argues that the House rule permitting that is inconsistent with
the constitutional limitations of the Clause. In short, Texas’s claim
implicates only the legal meaning of the Quorum Clause. Resolving that issue
requires no investigatory fact-finding proscribed by the enrolled-bill rule.
With both Supreme Court precedent and persuasive authority
unavailing, the Government points as its redoubt to the principles underlying
the enrolled-bill doctrine, namely, veneration of the separation of powers and
the Supreme Court’s recognition of the significant consequences that would
flow from declaring an enrolled bill not properly enacted. In the
Government’s view, those concerns are no less implicated by a legal
challenge than a factual one. The Government therefore warns that both
legal and factual Quorum Clause challenges risk the “uncertainty and
disruption that would result if statutes could be invalidated on the basis of an
alleged lack of quorum.”
We are mindful that the separation of powers entitles a coordinate
branch of government to great respect and deference. See United States v.
Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883). But we must remain equally mindful of our
own role: It is “the duty of . . . court[s], from the performance of which
[they] may not shrink, to give full effect to the provisions of the
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[C]onstitution relating to the enactment of laws.” Marshall Field, 143 U.S.
at 670. “[H]owever disagreeable that duty may be, in cases where [the
court’s] own judgment shall differ from that of other high functionaries, it is
not at liberty to surrender, or to waive it.” United States v. Dickson, 40 U.S.
141, 162 (1841) (Story, J.). Our deep respect for the national legislature
does not enable us to turn a blind eye to potential constitutional problems
with one of its enactments.
As for the “uncertainty and disruption” that the Government warns
may follow if we do not apply the enrolled-bill rule to Texas’s challenge, the
Government’s position asks us to exceed the constraints of our judicial role.
As has often been repeated, the courts “have neither force nor will but merely
judgment.” The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton). Our duty, while
unflinching, is therefore a limited one: “[T]o say what the law is.” Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). And that duty forbids us from
allowing our judgment to be infected by extrajudicial considerations. See Hall
v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 721 (2014). “Too big to be unconstitutional” is not
an accepted canon of constitutional interpretation.
In sum, the enrolled-bill doctrine does not foreclose judicial review of
whether the House’s passage of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of
2023 was consistent with the Quorum Clause. It is uncontested that the
House established a quorum for passage only because hundreds of proxies
were included in its quorum count. Texas’s challenge rests on no disputed
facts; the issue is a question of law properly brought before the judiciary.
B.
We now turn to the merits of Texas’s challenge. Pursuant to the
House’s proxy-presence rule, the House passed the Act after mustering a
quorum only by counting proxies. Texas argues that this is inconsistent with
the Constitution’s Quorum Clause. The Government responds that the
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Quorum Clause contains no physical-presence requirement that would
prohibit the House from adopting its proxy-presence rule.
At the outset, we clarify that the question before us is not whether the
Quorum Clause necessarily requires physical, bottom-in-a-seat presence.
Nor is it whether Congress may employ voting by proxy. Rather, the question
is only whether the Quorum Clause allows proxy presence to be included in
a quorum count, i.e., whether an absent Member’s assignment of a proxy may
render that Member “present” for quorum purposes. The answer is no.
1.
The Quorum Clause provides:
[A] Majority of each [House] shall constitute a Quorum to do
Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day,
and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent
Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each
House may provide.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. Apart from its decision in United States v.
Ballin, the Supreme Court has had little occasion to construe the Clause.
At issue in Ballin was a House rule that allowed the Speaker to count,
for purposes of establishing a quorum, non-voting Members who were
nonetheless in the legislative chamber during the session. 144 U.S. at 5. The
House utilized that rule when passing a tariff bill in May 1890. The measure
received 138 votes in favor, while another 74 Members in attendance did not
vote. Id. at 2–3. In total, 212 Members were in the House chamber during
the vote; in 1890, that constituted a majority of the House. Id. at 4.
The Court concluded that the Quorum Clause had been satisfied:
[W]hen a majority are present the [H]ouse is in a position to do
business. Its capacity to transact business is . . . created by the
mere presence of a majority, and does not depend upon the
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disposition or assent or action of any single member or fraction
of the majority present. All that the [C]onstitution requires is
the presence of a majority, and when that majority are present
the power of the [H]ouse arises.
Id. at 5–6. The Court explained that the Constitution “prescribed no method
of making th[e] determination” of “the presence of a majority.” Id. at 6.
Therefore, the House could “prescribe any method which shall be reasonably
certain to ascertain the fact.” Id. The Court then listed a few permissible
examples: The House could “prescribe answer to roll-call,” or “require the
passage of memb