Full Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 26-2797 ___________________________ Congressman Robert Onder; Richard Ray Brattin; Patricia Thomas; Debra Havens Plaintiffs - Appellees v. State of Missouri; Denny L. Hoskins, in his official capacity as Missouri Secretary of State Defendants - Appellees Richard Von Glahn; People Not Politicians Intervenors - Appellants ------------------------------ Missouri Association of County Clerks and Election Authorities; Jake Maggard; Gregg Lombardi; Campaign Legal Center; American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri Foundation; American Civil Liberties Union Foundation; One Hundred Ten Missouri Voters Amici on Behalf of Appellant(s) Club for Growth Amicus on Behalf of Appellee(s) ___________________________ No. 26-2827 ___________________________ Congressman Robert Onder; Richard Ray Brattin; Patricia Thomas; Debra Havens Plaintiffs - Appellants v. State of Missouri; Denny L. Hoskins, in his official capacity as Missouri Secretary of State Defendants - Appellees Richard Von Glahn; People Not Politicians Intervenors - Appellees ------------------------------ Club for Growth Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s) American Civil Liberties Union Foundation; American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri Foundation; Campaign Legal Center; One Hundred Ten Missouri Voters Amici on Behalf of Appellee(s) ____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis ____________ Submitted: September 17, 2026 Filed: September 21, 2026 [Published] ____________ -2- Before LOKEN, STRAS, and JUSTIN D. SMITH, Circuit Judges. ____________ PER CURIAM. On November 3, 2026, Missourians will vote for federal and state candidates in this year’s general election. Spirited congressional and ballot measure campaigns have intersected in federal and state courts. The question presented to this Court is which congressional district map Missouri should use for the November 2026 elections: the map adopted in 2025 and used in the August 2026 primary election, or the map adopted in 2022. The people of Missouri deserve an answer to this important question. This Court holds that Missouri’s current plan to use the 2022 map in the November 2026 general election violates the Constitution. Only use of the 2025 map complies with the Constitution and federal law. We affirm the district court1 and remand for entry of a permanent injunction. I. Pursuant to the process set forth by the Constitution, see U.S. CONST. art. I., § 2, cl. 3, the 2020 Census (like the 2010 Census before it) apportioned Missouri eight congressional seats. Before the next congressional election, in 2022, Missouri’s General Assembly truly agreed and finally passed House Bill 2909, which enacted new congressional district boundaries upon then-Governor Michael L. Parson’s signature (the “2022 map”). Missouri used the 2022 map in the primary and general elections in 2022 and 2024. 1 The Honorable Stephen R. Clark, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. -3- Missouri redrew its congressional district maps again in advance of the 2026 elections.2 In an extraordinary session called by Governor Mike Kehoe more than one year ago,3 the Missouri General Assembly truly agreed and finally passed House Bill 1 (“H.B. 1”), which repealed the 2022 map and enacted new congressional district boundaries (the “2025 map”). The most prominent changes in the 2025 map related to Missouri’s Fifth Congressional District, which Missouri lawmakers expected to benefit Republicans. See Mitch Smith, Missouri House Approves Map That Boosts Republicans, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2025), https://perma.cc/Z9GF-FUJ7.4 H.B. 1 passed by a margin of 21 to 11 in the Missouri Senate and 90 to 65 in the Missouri House of Representatives. Governor Kehoe signed H.B. 1 on September 28, 2025. Unlike the 2022 map, the 2025 map lacked an emergency clause and thus would not take effect until 90 days after the General Assembly adjourned its extraordinary session on September 12, 2025. MO. CONST. art. III, § 29. Under the state constitution, the people of Missouri have reserved the “power to approve or reject by referendum any act of the general assembly” that does not contain an emergency clause. Id. §§ 49, 52(a). A bill will be subject to a referendum 2 Missouri is not the only State to redraw its congressional district maps “[w]ith an eye on the upcoming 2026 midterm elections.” Abbott v. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 146 S. Ct. 418, 419 (2025). “Texas adopted the first new map, then California responded with its own map for the stated purpose of counteracting what Texas had done.” Id. Since 2025, nine States––California, Florida, Louisiana, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, Utah––have redrawn their maps, and three other States have begun the process to do so––Maryland, Mississippi, New York. Changing the Maps: Tracking Mid-Decade Redistricting, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGIS., https://perma.cc/BJR4-24G4 (last visited Sept. 21, 2026). 3 A session outside of the normal legislative session is an “extraordinary session” when convened by the governor, see MO. CONST. art. IV, § 9, and a “special session” when convened by super-majorities in both legislative chambers, see id. art. III, § 20(b). 4 While “[d]isapproval of partisan gerrymandering dates back to the founding,” partisan advantage is “a constitutionally permissible criterion that States may rely on as desired.” Louisiana v. Callais, 146 S. Ct. 1131, 1156 (2026). -4- vote by filing with the Secretary of State “petitions signed by five percent of the legal voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts in the state.” Id. § 52(a). According to Secretary Hoskins, this requirement thus requires signatures from approximately 3.3% of Missouri’s legal voters. State Br. 3, 16. The petition must be submitted within the 90-day period before the bill takes effect. MO. CONST. art III, § 52(a). Some organizations and individuals dissatisfied with the outcome of the extraordinary session immediately pursued a statewide vote on the 2025 map. Before the ink dried on the governor’s signature, on September 29, 2025, People Not Politicians and its executive director, Richard von Glahn (collectively, “PNP”), submitted a petition to Secretary Hoskins seeking to force a referendum vote on H.B. 1. Prior to the 90-day deadline, PNP submitted, by its calculation, more than 300,000 referendum petition signatures to Secretary Hoskins on December 9, 2025. PNP Br. 11. Upon receipt of a referendum petition, the Secretary bears responsibility for determining whether the petition may be certified for the ballot. 5 See Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 116.120–116.150. The Secretary must determine that the petition “complies with the Constitution of Missouri” and applicable state law. Id. § 116.120.1. The Secretary also must verify that the petition has been signed by a sufficient number of Missouri voters. Id. § 116.130.1. The parties agree that, under state law, see id. § 116.150.3, Secretary Hoskins had until August 4, 2026, to issue a certificate of sufficiency or insufficiency on the referendum petition for the 2025 map. See State Br. 11; PNP Br. 11. 6 5 Referendum measures are placed on the November general election ballot unless the General Assembly orders a special election. MO. CONST. art. III, § 52(b). 6 One group of amici claim, without evidence, that “[t]here is no question that the Secretary violated Missouri law” in conducting the August 2026 primary election under the 2025 map. 110 Mo. Voters Br. 24. No party or amicus has identified any law that Secretary Hoskins violated in conducting the August 2026 primary election under the 2025 map. -5- PNP and its allies repeatedly—and unsuccessfully—filed cases in state court that would prevent the 2025 map from being used in the August 2026 primary election. Both a Missouri trial court and the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the governor’s ability to convene the extraordinary session that passed the 2025 map. See NAACP Mo. State. Conf. v. Kehoe, 734 S.W.3d 338, 343 (Mo. 2026). Both a Missouri trial court and the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the General Assembly’s ability to redistrict more than once per decade. See Luther v. Hoskins, 730 S.W.3d 567, 574 (Mo. 2026). Two Missouri trial courts and the Missouri Supreme Court rejected challenges to the 2025 map’s compactness, population division, and contiguity. See Healey v. State, 732 S.W.3d 827, 852 (Mo. 2026). And both a Missouri trial court and the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a challenge to Secretary Hoskins’ determination that the filing of a referendum petition did not automatically suspend the 2025 map under state law. See Maggard v. State, 733 S.W.3d 411, 421 (Mo. 2026). Until September 3, 2026, the 2025 map withstood every legal challenge against it. As a result, Missouri conducted virtually all of its 2026 congressional district elections to date under the 2025 map. Starting February 24, 2026, candidates began filing for Missouri’s eight congressional districts. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.349.2. When candidate filing closed on March 31, 2026, id. § 115.349.1, more than 60 candidates had filed to run for Congress, see Certified Candidate List: 2026 Primary Election, MO. SEC’Y STATE, https://perma.cc/7VUD-8YK2 (last visited Sept. 20, 2026). By the time that the August 2026 primary election arrived, “[m]ore than $6.5 million ha[d] been spent on broadcast ads to influence congressional primaries, mainly in the 1st, 5th and 6th Districts.” Rudi Keller, Missouri turnout could hit 1.4 million as ballot measures drive primary interest, MO. INDEP. (Aug. 3, 2026), https://perma.cc/Q54N-TY8T. Advocacy groups invested more than $3.5 million in the Fifth Congressional District Republican primary election alone. Rudi Keller, Missouri congressional incumbents flush with cash heading into primary election, MO. INDEP. (July 24, 2026), https://perma.cc/M3VA-58BK. -6- More than 1.2 million Missourians voted in the primary election on August 4, 2026. Representative Robert “Bob” Onder won the Republican nomination for the Third Congressional District. Candidate Richard “Rick” Brattin won the Republican nomination for the Fifth Congressional District. Because they received the greatest number of votes in the August 2026 primary election, Representative Onder and Candidate Brattin “shall be the only candidate of that party for the office at the general election,” and their names “shall be placed on the official ballot at the general election unless [they are] removed or replaced as provided by law.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.343. Also on August 4, 2026, Secretary Hoskins issued a certificate of insufficiency for the referendum petition “because the Missouri Constitution does not authorize a referendum on congressional redistricting plans passed by the General Assembly.” See Stipulated Ex. 5, von Glahn v. Hoskins, No. 26AC-CC00440 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 2026).7 Secretary Hoskins’ certificate of insufficiency incorporated by reference and attached an opinion by the Missouri Attorney General, which concluded that the “Constitution and federal law require Missouri election officials to enforce House Bill 1 during the November 2026 election.” See id. Von Glahn sued Secretary Hoskins in state court one hour after Secretary Hoskins announced his decision. Von Glahn sought to enjoin the Secretary “and those acting in concert with him from taking any further steps to implement or mandate the use of HB 1.” Pet. ¶ 61, von Glahn v. Hoskins, No. 26AC-CC00440 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Aug. 4, 2026). The state trial court issued judgment in favor of Secretary Hoskins on August 19, 2026. See Judgment, von Glahn v. Hoskins, No. 7 PNP asks the Court to take judicial notice of the parties’ “filings in the state- court action and at the U.S. Supreme Court,” which “were not formally made part of the record at the district court” “[d]ue to the fast-moving nature of this case.” PNP Br. 9 n.1. “[F]ederal courts may sua sponte take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts if they relate directly to the matters at issue.” Conforti v. United States, 74 F.3d 838, 840 (8th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). The Court grants PNP’s request and takes judicial notice of filings and proceedings in other courts directly relating to this matter, which are referenced as appropriate in this opinion. -7- 26AC-CC00440 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Aug. 19, 2026). In its ruling, the state trial court found that using the 2022 map instead of the 2025 map in the general election “would move hundreds of thousands of voters into different districts for the imminent 2026 general election compared to the districts in which they cast their ballots in the August primary elections . . . .” Id. ¶ 20. Von Glahn appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court on August 20, 2026, which ordered expedited briefing8 in advance of an expedited oral argument on September 2, 2026. The day after the oral argument, on September 3, 2026, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the trial court. The Missouri Supreme Court ordered Secretary Hoskins “to issue a certificate of sufficiency as to the referendum petition . . . to place the referendum petition on the November 2026 general election ballot, and to take any and all additional steps necessary to place the referendum petition on the ballot at that election before September 8, 2026.” von Glahn v. Hoskins, --- S.W.3d ---, 2026 WL 2628846, at *7 (Mo. Sept. 3, 2026). The Missouri Supreme Court also “restrained and enjoined” Secretary Hoskins “and all of those acting in concert with him . . . from implementing, using, or mandating the use of the congressional redistricting in HB 1 for the November 2026 general election or at any other time thereafter unless and until HB 1 is approved by the voters at the November 2026 general election and takes effect 30 days thereafter.” Id. At the same time that it issued its judgment, which prohibited any post-judgment motions, the Missouri Supreme Court also issued its mandate. Secretary Hoskins immediately sought to stay the Missouri Supreme Court’s ruling based on arguments under the Constitution that the Missouri Supreme Court declined to address. Within hours of the decision’s release, Secretary Hoskins asked the Missouri Supreme Court to stay its injunction while Secretary Hoskins pursued an emergency application to the Supreme Court. The Missouri Supreme Court overruled Secretary Hoskins’s stay motion on September 4, 2026, in an unreasoned 8 The Supreme Court ordered von Glahn to file his brief by noon on August 25, 2026; Secretary Hoskins to file his brief by noon on August 27, 2026; and von Glahn to file his reply brief by noon on August 31, 2026. -8- order. Later that day, Secretary Hoskins filed an emergency application for stay and administrative stay pending appeal with the Supreme Court. Justice Kavanaugh, the circuit justice for the Eighth Circuit, denied Secretary Hoskins’s application on September 8, 2026. See Hoskins v. Von Glahn, No. 26A304, 2026 WL 2647016, at *1 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2026). While Secretary Hoskins pursued his emergency stay application to the Supreme Court, Representative Onder, Candidate Brattin, and two voters, Patricia “Pat” Thomas and Debra Havens (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”), filed this lawsuit against Secretary Hoskins in the district court. Representative Onder and Candidate Brattin (collectively, the “candidate Plaintiffs”) alleged that using the 2022 map for the November 2026 general election would significantly change their congressional districts from the August 2026 primary election. Thomas and Havens (collectively, the “voter Plaintiffs”) alleged that they voted in the Fifth Congressional District in the August 2026 primary election, but they would vote in the Third Congressional District if the 2022 map were used in the November 2026 general election. Plaintiffs alleged that using a different congressional district map in the general election than in the primary election would violate the Elections Clause, Article I, Section 2, and the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order to require use of the 2025 map in the November 2026 general election. Shortly after Justice Kavanaugh denied Secretary Hoskins’ emergency application to stay the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision on September 8, 2026, the district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order. The district court found that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claims that using the 2022 map in the November 2026 general elections violated Article I, Section 2 and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court “enjoin[ed], on federal law grounds, . . . Hoskins––as well as his officers, agents, employees, and attorneys–– from implementing, using, publishing, distributing, or mandating the use of any congressional district map other than the HB 1 map for the November 3, 2026 general election.” R. Doc. 35 at 13. The temporary restraining order “remains in effect” through September 22, 2026. -9- PNP immediately sought to stay the district court’s ruling. Both the district court and this Court denied PNP’s emergency stay motions on September 9, 2026. However, on September 10, 2026, the Supreme Court granted PNP’s emergency stay application in a short order. See People Not Politicians v. Onder, No. 26A326, 2026 WL 2659767, at *1 (U.S. Sept. 10, 2026). The Court stayed the district court’s temporary restraining order “pending the disposition of the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court, if such a writ is timely sought.” Id. Because Secretary Hoskins advised local election authorities to use the 2025 map after receiving the district court’s temporary restraining order, in the two days following the district court’s temporary restraining order, the Missouri Supreme Court conducted expedited contempt proceedings. After the Supreme Court’s stay, Secretary Hoskins advised local election authorities of the stay and directed them to use the 2022 map. PNP App. 738. The Missouri Supreme Court ultimately held Secretary Hoskins in contempt, but concluded that he purged the contempt by directing local election authorities to use the 2022 map. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s order, and in light of the looming November 2026 general election and associated deadlines, this Court scheduled expedited briefing and arguments on PNP’s appeal of the district court’s temporary restraining order. Plaintiffs cross-appealed the district court’s decision on their claim under the Elections Clause.9 II. This Court reviews de novo the legal issues underlying a district court’s injunctive relief order, including questions of jurisdiction, abstention, and the merits of the underlying claims. See Revenue Mgmt. Sols., LLC v. Com. Bank, 183 F.4th 9 Even though Plaintiffs were not aggrieved by the district court’s decision, because this Court is resolving this case on the merits, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate their appeal with PNP’s appeal. -10- 618, 624 (8th Cir. 2026). The Court reviews the district court’s decision to not require a bond for abuse of discretion. Hill v. Xyquad, Inc., 939 F.2d 627, 632 (8th Cir. 1991). A. “The Judiciary Act of 1789 ‘established the general principle that only final decisions of the federal district courts would be reviewable on appeal.’” Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579, 594 (2018) (quoting Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 83 (1981)). Congress later created an exception that “gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction over ‘[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts’ ‘granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions,’ ‘except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)). Pursuant to this exception, this Court has jurisdiction to review a district court’s interlocutory order granting a preliminary injunction. See La Belle Dairy, LLC v. Sharpe Hldgs., Inc., 183 F.4th 606, 611 (8th Cir. 2026). Yet even under this exception, this Court generally lacks jurisdiction “to hear an interlocutory appeal from the district court’s grant or denial of a TRO.” In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2020). 10 However, in limited circumstances, this Court has jurisdiction over a temporary restraining order when it “has the ‘practical effect’ of granting an injunction.” La Belle Dairy, 183 F.4th at 611 (quoting Abbott, 585 U.S. at 594). The Supreme Court implicitly determined that it had jurisdiction when it granted PNP’s emergency stay application. See People Not Politicians, 2026 WL 2659767, at *1. Following the Supreme Court’s stay order, all parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction to review the appeal. PNP Br. 1; State Br. 1; Pls. Br. 12–13. The district court’s temporary restraining order effectively requiring use of the 2025 map in the November 2026 general election would have governed ballot printing and mailing 10 The Court cited Rutledge when it denied PNP’s motion to stay the district court’s temporary restraining order, explaining alternative reasons that “we either lack jurisdiction over the appeal or, based on the briefing we have so far, the stay factors have not been met.” -11- of absentee ballots, which is “in practical effect a preliminary injunction.” La Belle Dairy, 183 F.4th at 612. Therefore, the Court concludes that this is a limited circumstance in which it has jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Plaintiffs argue that PNP lacks both Article III and appellate standing because PNP has succeeded in its effort to place the 2025 map referendum on the November 2026 general election ballot.11 This Court concludes that PNP has standing. B. PNP raises five arguments why this Court should not reach the merits of this appeal: three different jurisdictional arguments, an abstention argument, and a mootness argument. PNP also contends that the district court abused its discretion by failing to require a bond. The Court rejects each argument. 1. PNP first argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction because a three- judge court was required. Under federal law, “[a] district court of three judges shall be convened … when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a). But unlike the previous version of Section 2284, the “duty to refer the matter for convening of a three-judge court” is not triggered upon the “‘filing of the application’ to enjoin an unconstitutional state law.” Shapiro v. McManus, 577 U.S. 39, 43–44 (2015). Instead, “the current § 2284(b)(1) triggers the district judge’s duty “‘[u]pon the filing of a request for three judges.’” Id. at 44 (emphasis in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(1)). Congress’ amendment to the statute makes clear that a request must 11 At oral argument, counsel for PNP represented that, like the voter Plaintiffs, von Glahn resides in a different congressional district under the 2025 map than he did under the 2022 map. The Court has not found the factual support for this representation in the affidavit that von Glahn filed in support of PNP’s motion to intervene below or elsewhere in the record for this case. -12- be filed before the district court must refer the matter for convening of a three-judge court. PNP claims that it “request[ed] a three-judge panel,” PNP Br. 16, but it never did. To support its assertion, PNP’s sole citation is to the motion to dismiss that it filed at the district court. See id. (citing PNP App. 55–74, R. Doc 12–4). On the last page of its motion to dismiss, PNP faulted Plaintiffs for not requesting a three-judge court. PNP App. 73. PNP did not file a stand-alone request for a three-judge court, nor has it identified any statement in the record in which it affirmatively requested such a court. Without a request for a three-judge court, the law did not require the district court to refer this matter for the convening of a three-judge court. Nor would PNP prevail on this point even if it had filed a request for a three- judge court. While the Court doubts that an action contesting which map Missouri should use in the November 2026 election “challeng[es] the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts” handled by three-judge courts, 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a), federal law allows the district court to “grant a temporary restraining order” without referring the matter for convening of a three-judge court, id. § 2284(b)(3). Accordingly, the district court did not lack jurisdiction when it issued a temporary restraining order without referring the matter for the convening of a three-judge court. 2. PNP next argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction because this lawsuit is neither a case nor a controversy because Plaintiffs and Secretary Hoskins “take the same position on the constitutionality” of using the 2022 map in the November 2026 general election. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 939 (1983). Contrary to PNP’s argument, adversity still exists between the government and a private party who agree on a litigation position if the government is bound to act in a way adverse to the legal interests of the private party. Id. at 939–40. “[I]t would be a curious result if, in the administration of justice, a person could be denied access to the courts -13- because the Attorney General of the United States”—or here, the Missouri Attorney General—“agreed with the legal arguments asserted by the individual.” Id. at 939. Notwithstanding any agreement between Plaintiffs and Secretary Hoskins on litigation positions, the Missouri Supreme Court’s injunction in von Glahn requires Secretary Hoskins to act in an adverse manner to Plaintiffs. Indeed, the day that Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, Secretary Hoskins advised local election authorities to use the 2022 map. See Hannah Falcon, Missouri Supreme Court Decision to Block Republican-Drawn Map Leaves Questions, KVFS News 12 (Sep. 4, 2026), https://perma.cc/R5TN-BE8Q. In the days since, Secretary Hoskins has formally directed local election authorities to use the 2022 map. PNP App. 738. This Court’s decision thus will have “real meaning,” Chadha, 462 at 939: if the Court rules for Plaintiffs, Missouri will use the 2025 map; if the Court rules against Plaintiffs, Missouri will use the 2022 map. Therefore, the parties are adverse. 3. PNP also argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the Rooker- Feldman doctrine bars this action. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes suits in federal court that seek “what in substance would be appellate review of [a] state judgment.” T.M. v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 146 S. Ct. 1739, 1749 (2026) (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06 (1994)). Rooker-Feldman applies to “state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Rooker-Feldman does not apply here because Plaintiffs were not parties to the state-court action and because the complaint here raised only federal-law claims that the Missouri Supreme Court did not address in the state-court action. See von Glahn, 2026 WL 2628846, at *2 n.5 (Mo. Sept. 3, 2026) (expressly limiting its decision to an issue of state law). In a case remarkably similar to this action, the Supreme Court -14- emphasized that Rooker-Feldman is a “narrow doctrine” that “does not bar actions by nonparties to the earlier state-court judgment simply because, for purposes of preclusion law, they could be considered in privity with a party to the judgment.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464, 466 (2006). In Lance, Colorado citizens filed suit in federal district court to force the Colorado Secretary of State to use the Colorado General Assembly’s redistricting plan, rather than the plan imposed by the Colorado Supreme Court. Id. at 460–61. The district court ruled that Rooker- Feldman barred the suit on the theory that the citizen-plaintiffs were in privity with the Colorado General Assembly, which was a losing party in the earlier state-court action. Id. at 462. The Supreme Court reversed, explaining that “Rooker–Feldman is not simply preclusion by another name.” Id. at 466. At oral argument in this case, counsel for PNP acknowledged that “Lance is a problem for [their] Rooker analysis.” Onder v. von Glahn, No. 26-2797, Hearing at 23:51–56 (8th Cir. Sept. 17, 2026). Like Lance, Plaintiffs “were plainly not parties to the underlying state-court proceeding.” Lance, 546 U.S. at 465. Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar this action. 4. PNP next argues that the district court should have abstained under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). As a general rule, federal courts are “obliged to decide cases within the scope of federal jurisdiction,” even if “a pending state-court proceeding involves the same subject matter.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013). “Younger abstention only applies to three ‘exceptional’ categories of cases: (1) ‘ongoing state criminal prosecutions;’ (2) ‘certain civil enforcement proceedings;’ and (3) ‘pending civil proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.’” Wassef v. Tibben, 68 F.4th 1083, 1087 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, 571 U.S. at 78). The Supreme Court recognized these three categories in New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans (“NOPSI”), 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989). -15- PNP only argues the third NOPSI category, relying on the Missouri Supreme Court’s contempt proceedings to argue that state proceedings were “ongoing.” However, the action before this Court does not interfere with the Missouri Supreme Court’s contempt proceedings because those proceedings did not begin until after the district court issued its temporary restraining order, and they are not pending now. The Supreme Court has recognized that “the relevant principles of equity, comity, and federalism ‘have little force in the absence of a pending state proceeding.’” Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974) (quoting Lake Carriers’ Ass’n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972)). When no state proceeding “is pending at the time the federal complaint is filed,” federal litigation does not duplicate or disrupt the state’s legal system. Id. In this case, the Missouri Supreme Court issued its mandate before Plaintiffs filed their federal complaint, and no contempt proceedings were pending at that time. “Requiring the federal courts totally to step aside when no state [civil proceeding] is pending against the federal plaintiff would turn federalism on its head.” Id. at 472. Nor did Plaintiffs have the “opportunity to present their federal claims in the state proceedings.” Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977). They could not; Plaintiffs were not parties to the state proceedings. Secretary Hoskins also was prevented from asserting in the state proceedings any of the federal claims pending before this Court. von Glahn, 2026 WL 2628846, at *2 n.5 (noting that “claimed federal law violations and whether the congressional redistricting in HB 1 should or must remain in place through the 2026 election cycle” were arguments “outside the scope of Secretary Hoskins’s authorized statutory review in section 116.120.1”). 12 12 The Missouri Supreme Court also found that Secretary Hoskins did not properly preserve these federal arguments by attaching an opinion from the Attorney General of Missouri containing them. See von Glahn, 2026 WL 2628846, at *2 n.5. This finding does not affect this Court’s analysis since the Missouri Supreme Court then explained that it would not have considered the federal arguments even had they been preserved. See id. -16- State proceedings ended before Plaintiffs filed their federal complaint initiating this action. Plaintiffs were not part of those proceedings, and Secretary Hoskins did not have the opportunity in the state proceedings to present the federal claims pending before this Court. Accordingly, Younger abstention is inapplicable here. Because no NOPSI category is present, the Court need not consider the Middlesex factors. 13 5. PNP also argues mootness. Article III limits federal-court jurisdiction to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. A case becomes moot under Article III “when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’” and “it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (citations omitted). “[A]s long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.” Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307– 08 (2012) (citation omitted). “A court with jurisdiction has a ‘virtually unflagging obligation’ to hear and resolve questions properly before it.” FBI v. Fikre, 601 U.S. 234, 240 (2024) (citation omitted). In their brief, PNP identifies two factual developments that it believes render this appeal “likely moot.” PNP Br. 3. First, PNP argues that the Supreme Court’s stay of the district court’s temporary restraining order renders the order “unenforceable” on a timeline that “will likely extend beyond September 22, when the [temporary restraining order] expires.” Id. at 3–4. However, the Supreme Court did not vacate or modify the temporary restraining order or rule on its validity; it 13 The district court also rejected arguments made by PNP that the court should abstain under Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), and that the Anti-Injunction Act applied. PNP does not raise these arguments on appeal, and thus they are waived. See Beadle v. City of Omaha, 983 F.3d 1073, 1075 (8th Cir. 2020) (“by not briefing the issue, [the appellant] has waived review”). -17- merely stayed that order. People Not Politicians, 2026 WL 2659767, at *1. In addition, this Court is issuing a final judgment on the merits before September 22, 2026, which wholly removes the temporary restraining order’s expiration as a basis for mootness. PNP’s second argument is that Secretary Hoskins “has now directed election officials to use the 2022 congressional map.” PNP Br. 4. This argument, which relies on Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam), “confuses mootness with the merits.” Chafin, 568 U.S. at 174. PNP does not cite any decision in which a court applied Purcell to find a case moot, and the Court declines to apply Purcell in that manner. At oral argument, PNP also pointed to certain election deadlines that it claims affect mootness: the deadline for transmitting military and overseas ballots, and the commencement of absentee voting. The Court examines each in turn. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (“UOCAVA”) requires Missouri to “transmit a validly requested absentee ballot to an absent uniformed services voter or overseas voter … in the case in which the request is received at least 45 days before an election for Federal office, not later than 45 days before the election.” 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8)(A). While the federal deadline for UOCAVA ballot transmission for the November 3, 2026, general election fell on September 19, 2026, Missouri moved this Saturday deadline to the preceding business day, September 18, 2026. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.914.1.14 But as counsel for Plaintiffs noted at oral argument, UOCAVA itself contemplates circumstances in which a State cannot comply with that deadline: Congress authorized hardship waivers where, among other circumstances, a “legal contest” creates an undue 14 If an absentee ballot application from a voter covered by UOCAVA arrives within 45 days of election, the ballot must be sent to the voter “not later than two business days after the application arrives.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.914.3. This deadline would arrive no sooner for any voter than September 22, 2026, and thus it has not yet passed. -18- hardship preventing timely transmission. 52 U.S.C. § 20302(g)(2)(B)(ii). A state may request such a waiver “as soon as practicable.” Id. § 20302(g)(3)(B). The Court need not decide whether Missouri would receive such a waiver. 15 Instead, its availability demonstrates that UOCAVA ballot transmission on September 18, 2026, is not itself a jurisdictional point of no return and effectual relief remains available. Chafin, 568 U.S. at 172. Though uncommon, this situation is not unprecedented. Courts around the country have ordered ballot changes after absentee ballots already have been distributed under UOCAVA. For example, on October 2, 2002—just 34 days before the general election— the New Jersey Supreme Court granted a request by the New Jersey Democratic State Commi