Full Opinion

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two October 6, 2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II THE UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL No. 62278-5-II WORKERS LOCAL 367, TACOMA FOR ALL, and THE TACOMA-PIERCE COUNTY DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS OF AMERICA, Respondents/Cross-Appellants, v. PIERCE COUNTY, LINDA FARMER, PUBLISHED OPINION in her official capacity, and CITY OF TACOMA, Appellants/Cross-Respondents. MAXA, J. – The City of Tacoma appeals the trial court’s grant of declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of six Tacoma voters who signed a petition to enact a local ordinance (the initiative) and the initiative’s institutional sponsors, the United Food and Commercial Workers Local 367 (UFCW) and the Democratic Socialists of America (collectively, the Union). The Union cross-appeals the trial court’s denial of its request for a declaration that Pierce County and City unreasonably delayed and violated state law during the process of verifying initiative petition signatures and rejecting the initiative. The County responds to the Union’s cross-appeal. No. 62278-5-II The Tacoma City Charter (TCC) establishes a process by which residents can directly enact legislation by proposing and passing an initiative. After it is verified that an initiative petition has received enough valid signatures, the City Council may enact or reject the initiative. If the City Council rejects the initiative or takes no action on it within 30 days, “the City Council shall submit the proposal to the people at the next Municipal or General Election that is not less than ninety (90) days after the date on which the signatures on the petition are validated.” TCC §2.19(j). State law sets a deadline for when a resolution calling for a special election on a local initiative must be submitted to a County Auditor for the initiative to be placed on the ballot. On June 24, 2025, the Union submitted an initiative petition along with approximately 10,000 signatures to be validated. On July 9, the Pierce County Auditor’s Office (PCAO) notified the City Clerk that there were enough valid signatures for the initiative to proceed to the City Council’s review process under the TCC. The notification stated that the state law deadline to submit items for the November 2025 ballot was August 5. On July 10, the City Clerk validated the petition signatures and informed the City Council that the verification process was complete. The City Council then held three study sessions to discuss the initiative, the last occurring on August 5. On August 8, within the 30-day review period allowed under the TCC, the City Council passed a resolution that rejected the initiative and requested that the Pierce County Auditor call for a special election on the initiative at the November 2025 election. However, because the state law deadline had passed on August 5, the PCAO informed the City Council that the initiative could not be placed on the November 2025 ballot. The Union promptly filed a declaratory judgment action against the City and the County, alleging that (1) the PCAO failed to use reasonable promptness in verifying the petition 2 No. 62278-5-II signatures, (2) the City Clerk caused unnecessary delay by validating the petition signatures, (3) the City Council improperly delayed its passage of the resolution, and (4) the state law deadline required the City Council to pass the resolution despite the 30-day period allowed by the TCC. The Union sought a declaration that the untimely resolution did not nullify the initiative and that the initiative could be placed on the November 2025 ballot. In addition, the Union later argued that the City’s actions were arbitrary and capricious and therefore violated due process. The trial court considered these issues on an expedited basis. The trial court rejected the Union’s arguments that the County failed to verify the signatures with reasonable promptness as required by RCW 35.21.005(4) and that the City Clerk caused unreasonable delay by validating the signatures. The court also ruled that the City Council did not unreasonably delay when it used the 30 days provided for in the TCC to review the initiative before it rejected it. Similarly, the court rejected the Union’s argument that the City Council had to issue its resolution before the August 5 deadline. However, the trial court ruled that the TCC required the City Council to submit the initiative to the voters at the next election that is available under state law. The court found that the City had violated due process by acting in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it passed a resolution to place the initiative on the ballot for the November 2025 election knowing that the state law deadline to do so had passed. On this basis, the court issued an injunction ordering the Pierce County Auditor to call for a special election on the initiative at the February 2026 election. This court stayed the trial court’s order to place the initiative on the February 2026 election ballot pending this appeal. The City argues that the trial court (1) exceeded its authority to grant relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA), chapter 7.24 RCW, based on the City Council’s 3 No. 62278-5-II administration of the TCC; and (2) erred when it found that the City acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner and violated due process.1 In its cross-appeal, the Union argues that (1) the trial court erred by rejecting its arguments that (a) the PCAO did not act with reasonable promptness in validating the initiative signatures, (b) the trial court lowered the standard of reasonable promptness by considering the Union’s delay in submitting its signatures to the PCAO, (c) the City Clerk’s validation of the initiative signatures caused unreasonable delay, (d) the City Council unreasonably delayed in issuing its resolution, and (e) the City Council should have abbreviated its review process to meet the state law deadline for placing the initiative on the November 2025 ballot because the state law deadline for placing the initiative on the ballot superseded the TCC’s 30 day consideration period; (2) regardless of the trial court’s order, it is entitled to placement of the initiative on a future election ballot2; and (3) the trial court correctly found that the City violated due process by issuing a resolution to place the initiative on the November 2025 ballot knowing that the deadline to do so had passed. Both the City and the Union agree that the trial court erred when it ordered the Pierce County Auditor to place the initiative on the February 2026 election ballot. But that issue is moot because that election has passed. We hold that (1) the UDJA did not authorize relief based on the Union’s arguments that the PCAO and the City Council unreasonably delayed the process of validating initiative 1 The City also argues that the trial court erred when it expedited the proceedings. However, the City does not assign error to the court’s ruling on this issue. And the City does not explain how the result in the trial court would have been different if the proceedings had not been expedited. Therefore, we do not address this issue. 2 The Union actually requests that the initiative be placed on the November 2026 election ballot. However, the deadline for placing the initiative on that ballot has long passed. 4 No. 62278-5-II signatures and rejecting the initiative; (2) the UDJA allows for consideration of the arguments regarding the City Clerk’s validation and whether state law superseded the 30 day consideration period, but those arguments have no merit; (3) the trial court had the authority under the UDJA to interpret what the TCC required the City Council to do regarding the initiative, and the court correctly concluded that the TCC required the City Council to adopt a resolution to submit the initiative at the next legally available election and that the City Council violated the TCC by failing to do so; and (4) the court’s ruling that the City Council violated due process exceeded the court’s authority under the UDJA. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part, and we remand for the trial court apply a remedy that is consistent with this opinion and applicable law. FACTS Background On February 4, 2025, two petitions with proposed ballot ordinances were filed with the Tacoma City Attorney for review. The petitions were forwarded to Tacoma’s City Clerk the next day. After a required judicial review period, the petitioners were permitted to begin collecting signatures from voters on March 5. On June 17, a UFCW employee sent an email to the City Clerk that stated, “I’m happy to say that we are ready to turn in our petitions” and said that they would do so on the following Monday. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 493, 136. On June 24, the petitioners submitted one of the two initial proposed ordinances (the initiative) along with approximately 10,000 signatures to be validated. The initiative was referred to as the Workers Bill of Rights. On June 26, the PCAO received 2,000 petition pages from the City Clerk for signature verification. That day, the PCAO began scanning, numbering, and labeling the signature pages. 5 No. 62278-5-II It also began setting up the computer program that State agencies use to verify signatures. PCAO staff worked on these tasks the next day as well. On June 30, the PCAO completed a process to exclude illegible or blank signature lines from the verification pages. That day, the PCAO notified the initiative sponsors, the political parties, and the City Clerk that the signature verification process would begin on July 7. The PCAO believed that the signature verification process must be open to the public with proper notice. On July 7, the PCAO began the process of ensuring the signatures on the petition matched the signatures of registered voters in the City of Tacoma. The process involved eight full time staff members and two seasonal staff. On July 8, the process continued with nine full time staff and seven seasonal staff. On July 9, the process involved nine full time staff members and five seasonal staff. At 11:00 AM that day, the PCAO concluded that the number of verified signatures met the threshold required for the initiative to be placed on the ballot. The PCAO process totaled 286.5 employee hours. During the signature verification process, the PCAO also worked on other tasks in preparation for the August primary election. On July 9, the PCAO informed the City Clerk by email that the signature verification process was complete and that the petition had received enough valid signatures to proceed in the City’s initiative process. The email also stated, “Please note that the deadline to submit items for the November 4, 2025 ballot is August 5, 2025.” CP at 488. Section 2.19(j) of the TCC requires the City Clerk to determine the validity of the petition. On July 10, the City Clerk validated the petition signatures and confirmed that the initiative received the required number of valid signatures, and notified the City Council that the process had been completed. 6 No. 62278-5-II Under section 2.19(j) of the TCC, the City Council may enact or reject a verified initiative. If the City Council rejects the initiative or takes no action within 30 days, “the City Council shall submit the proposal to the people at the next Municipal or General Election that is not less than ninety (90) days after the date on which the signatures on the petition are validated.” TCC §2.19(j). The City Council held study sessions regarding the initiative on July 15, July 29, and August 5. At these sessions, the City Council received presentations on the initiative process, considered the potential impacts of the Union’s proposed initiative, and heard community comments on the initiative. At the final study session, the Tacoma Mayor scheduled a special City Council meeting on August 8. The City Clerk helped draft an action memorandum for that meeting that would call for the City Council to reject the initiative and transmit a request to the PCAO to call for a special election for the initiative at the November 2025 election. At the August 8 meeting, the City Council passed Resolution 41733, which rejected the initiative and requested that the PCAO place the initiative on the November 2025 special election ballot. The resolution was passed within the 30 day deadline in the TCC. The City Clerk then emailed the resolution to the PCAO. However, the PCAO informed the City Clerk that it was unable to place the initiative on the November ballot because the deadline for submitting a measure to be included on the ballot was August 5. Union Lawsuit On August 12, the Union filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint named the City, the County, and the Pierce County Auditor as defendants. The complaint stated, “This Court’s intervention is required to ensure that the Workers Bill of Rights Initiative appears on the 2025 General Election ballot.” CP at 3. 7 No. 62278-5-II The complaint stated, “A controversy exists regarding whether the Initiative can be rejected from the 2025 General Election ballot based upon Resolution 41733 purportedly being three days late, when the delay was due to actions of local governments.” CP at 6. The complaint alleged that (1) the County Auditor failed to use “reasonable promptness” in the signature verification process as required under RCW 35.21.005; (2) the City Clerk could not legally cause further delay by validating the petition signatures; (3) “the City Council acted improperly in delaying the passage of Resolution 41733,” CP at 7; (4) “the City had a duty to pass Resolution 41733 prior to the deadline required to place the Initiative on the November 2025 ballot,” CP at 7; and (5) the state law deadline for placing items on the November 2025 ballot required the City Council to pass Resolution 41733 before that deadline regardless of the time allowed in the TCC. The Union sought a declaration that the City and County “did not act with the reasonable promptness and diligence required to protect the people’s right of initiative” in the signature verification process, again citing RCW 35.21.005. CP at 6. The Union also sought an injunction requiring the initiative to be placed on the November 2025 general election ballot. At the same time the Union filed its complaint, Joseph Kennedy3 filed an Affidavit for Correction of Election Errors pursuant to RCW 29A.68.011, .013, and .030. The affidavit stated that Kennedy was a registered voter in the City of Tacoma and stated that he contested the exclusion of the initiative from the November 2025 ballot for the reasons stated in the complaint filed by the Union. Kennedy was represented by the same attorneys who represented the Union. 3 Kennedy is not named as a party in the Union’s complaint and he is not a party to this appeal. 8 No. 62278-5-II Motion to Shorten Time On August 18, Kennedy filed a pleading titled Emergency Motion to Shorten Time to Meet Statutory Deadline. He argued that the case was subject to a statutory deadline under RCW 29A.68.011,4 and that the case needed to be resolved by September 3 to meet the PCAO’s ballot printing deadlines. The motion stated that the plaintiffs in the declaratory judgment action joined in the motion to shorten time and even though the UDJA claim was not subject to a statutory deadline, “courts always hear these matters in time for the printing of the ballots.” CP at 43. Both the City and the County opposed the motion. The City argued that RCW 29A.68.011 applied only to ballot printing errors, and that the Union had not raised a ballot printing error. The City also asserted that it would be prejudiced by an abbreviated proceeding because it would prevent it from developing the record. At the hearing on the motion, the Union stated that it was “just proceeding under the [UDJA]” and that the affidavit regarding election errors was filed to help with scheduling. Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 38. The trial court granted the motion and set a hearing on the merits of the Union’s claim on August 26. Substantive Briefing On the same date that Kennedy filed his motion to shorten time, the Union filed a Motion to Correct Election Error (RCW 29A.68) and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and a supporting memorandum. The Union sought the following relief: A. Correct the election error pursuant to RCW 29A.68.011 by ordering the Tacoma 4 RCW 29A.68.011 states that a court can intervene under the following circumstances: “(1) An error or omission has occurred or is about to occur in printing the name of any candidate on official ballots; or (2) An error other than as provided in subsections (1) and (3) of this section has been committed or is about to be committed in printing the ballots; or (3) The name of any person has been or is about to be wrongfully placed upon the ballots.” 9 No. 62278-5-II Workers’ Bill of Rights Initiative to be placed on the November 2025 ballot.5 B. Declare that voters secured their place on the 2025 ballot by turning in sufficient valid signatures on June 24, 2025, and any untimeliness in the City’s passage of Resolution 41733 can be traced to the actions of local governments. C. Order Pierce County and Pierce County Elections to place the Initiative on the November 2025 ballot. D. Alternatively, enter declaratory judgment rejecting the City’s untenable position that its untimely resolution nullifies the signatures on the petition, and order the Initiative placed on the February 2026 ballot. CP at 58. In the motion, the Union contended that after the litigation had begun, the City took the position that the initiative never could be placed on a ballot because the state law deadline had passed. The Union therefore raised a new argument asserting that if it was not possible to place the initiative on the November 2025 ballot, the trial court could order the initiative to be placed on to a subsequent ballot. The City responded that its conduct conformed with the TCC and state law. The City also argued that the trial court lacked authority to consider the challenge under the UDJA because the Union failed to raise a question regarding the construction or validity of a law. The County argued that its signature verification process was “reasonably prompt” under RCW 35.21.005 because it began the process immediately after it received the signature pages and properly staffed its office. The County also pointed out that the initiative sponsors had delayed for a week in submitting their signatures to the City. And the County argued that it complied with state law when it rejected the City’s untimely request that it place the initiative on the November 2025 ballot. The County took no position on whether the initiative could be 5 We note that the Union’s complaint did not request relief under RCW 29A.68.011, and the Union previously had stated that it was proceeding only under the UDJA. 10 No. 62278-5-II placed on a future ballot but asserted that it would require a resolution from the City to place it on a future ballot. In their reply brief, the Union argued for the first time that “[t]he City Council’s actions are the exact type of arbitrary and capricious government action that violate due process.” CP at 413. At oral argument on the motion, the trial court asked the City if it knew the PCAO could not put the initiative on the November ballot but asked it to do so anyway, “[h]ow is that not a violation of due process?” RP at 552-53. The City responded that it would brief the issue, but expressed its objection at the trial court asking what it characterized as an unfair question. On August 27, the trial court issued an initial order denying the Union’s request for an order requiring the County Auditor to place the initiative on the November 2025 ballot. The court stated that a written opinion would follow. The court acknowledged that the Union raised constitutional issues that previously had not been asserted in either their complaint or initial motion. The court gave the City and the County the opportunity to provide supplemental briefing regarding those issues. The City responded that the Union did not have a constitutional right to have the initiative placed on the ballot and that the local initiative power is subject to limitations established under state law and city charters. The City also argued that the Union failed to establish that the City violated either procedural or substantive due process. And the City emphasized that the Union failed to articulate its constitutional argument with sufficient clarity. Trial Court’s Order On September 9, the trial court entered a detailed order on the Union’s request for relief. First, the court rejected the Union’s argument that the County failed to verify the signatures with 11 No. 62278-5-II reasonable promptness as required by RCW 35.21.005(4). The court noted that the County began its process immediately, and that delays in the process were reasonable in light of the complexity of the process, staffing requirements, and the totality of the circumstances. In its discussion regarding the County’s process, the court pointed out that one of the initiative’s sponsors emailed the City stating that they “are ready to turn in our petitions” but then actually submitted them a week later. CP at 493. Second, the trial court found that the City Clerk’s one day delay to validate the petition was reasonable because the TCC requires the City Clerk to validate the petition and the state law did not preempt that TCC provision. Third, the trial court stated that the City Council did not unreasonably delay when it used the 30 days provided for in the TCC to review the initiative before it rejected it. The court stated that the City Council had discretion to use all 30 days, and under the circumstances using the entire period reflected a reasonable effort to understand the consequences of passing the initiative. Similarly, the court rejected the Union’s argument that the City Council had to reject the initiative at the August 5 study session when it decided that it would reject the petition. The court determined that the City Council had no duty to abbreviate its 30 day review period provided by the charter, and delay until August 8 was necessary to draft the resolution and provide public notice of the action. The court ruled that the City Council did not improperly delay passing the resolution to place the initiative on the ballot. The trial court then turned to “whether the City Council exercised its authority in a valid manner under the State Constitution.” CP at 498. The court stated, The Court agrees with the Plaintiff that Sec. 2.19(j) of the City Charter does not direct the City Council to pass an invalid resolution and thereby preventing the initiative from the[n] being placed on the ballot. The Charter requires the City Council to submit the measure to the voters at the next election that is possible 12 No. 62278-5-II under state law. The City Council acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in passing Resolution 41733 which demanded the Pierce County Auditor’s Office to violate State law by placing the initiative on the November 2025 ballot beyond the statutory deadline. Such action by the City Council is a violation of the Plaintiffs’ constitutionally protected substantive and procedural due process rights. CP at 498 (emphasis added). The trial court granted declaratory relief in favor of the Union and ordered the County Auditor to hold a special election for the initiative on the date of the February 2026 special election. The City appealed the trial court’s order, and the Union cross-appealed. The County responded to the Union’s cross-appeal to address the issues that implicated its signature verification process. Proceedings in Appellate Court On November 7, 2025, a commissioner of this court issued an order staying the trial court’s injunction requiring the County to hold a special election for the initiative. Both parties stipulated to the stay. The initiative was not placed on the February 2026 ballot. After the City initiated this appeal, the Union moved in the trial court to amend its first amended complaint under CR 15(b). The Union sought to add plaintiffs, add constitutional claims, and amend its allegations to conform to the litigation. The trial court denied this motion. The Union attempted to appeal this decision by filing an amended notice of appeal in this case. But this court converted the notice into a motion for discretionary review under a separate case number. A commissioner of this court denied the Union’s motion for discretionary review.6 6 The Union dedicates a portion of its brief to its appeal of the trial court’s denial of its motion to amend. This issue is not properly before this court because it was converted into a motion for discretionary review under a separate case number. Therefore, we decline to address this issue. 13 No. 62278-5-II ANALYSIS A. ELECTION LAW PRINCIPLES Washington statutes permit cities to provide for a local initiative process. See Jewels Helping Hands v. Hansen, 4 Wn.3d 665, 686, 567 P.3d 19 (2025). However, “[t]he local initiative power is more limited than the statewide initiative power.” Id. Although the Washington Constitution guarantees the right to legislate directly by statewide initiative or referendum, the right to file a local initiative is not guaranteed by the constitution. Id. And local initiative power may be limited by a city charter or other statutory or constitutional limits. Id. First-class cities may provide for “direct legislation by the people through the initiative and referendum.” RCW 35.22.200. Tacoma is a first-class city. The TCC states, “Residents of Tacoma may by initiative petition ask the voters to approve or reject ordinances or amendments to existing ordinances.” TCC § 2.19. The TCC establishes the procedure required for an initiative petition to be submitted to the voters. TCC § 2.19(a)-(j). Once an initiative petition is approved as to form and a 10 day waiting period passes, petitioners have 180 days to collect signatures from registered voters. TCC § 2.19(c)-(h). Petitioners must collect valid signatures equal to 10 percent of the votes cast in the last Mayoral election to proceed to the next step of the initiative procedure. TCC § 2.19(i). When the City receives signatures from the petitioners, “The City Clerk shall forward the signatures to the County Auditor to be verified.” TCC § 2.19(j). RCW 35.21.005 establishes rules for determining the sufficiency of petitions “[w]herever in this title petitions are required to be signed and filed.” RCW 35.21.005(4) states, [T]he officer with whom the petition is filed shall transmit the petition to the county auditor for petitions signed by registered voters, or to the county assessor for petitions signed by property owners for determination of sufficiency. The officer or officers whose duty it is to determine the sufficiency of the petition shall proceed 14 No. 62278-5-II to make such a determination with reasonable promptness and shall file with the officer receiving the petition for filing a certificate stating the date upon which such determination was begun, which date shall be referred to as the terminal date. (Emphasis added.) Once the County Auditor has verified the signatures, the TCC states that the City Clerk then “shall determine the validity of the petition” based on the County Auditor’s review. TCC § 2.19(j). The City Council then considers the initiative: If the petition is validated, the City Council may enact or reject the Initiative, but shall not modify it. If it rejects the Initiative or within thirty (30) calendar days fails to take final action on it, the City Council shall submit the proposal to the people at the next Municipal or General Election that is not less than ninety (90) days after the date on which the signatures on the petition are validated. TCC § 2.19(j) (emphasis added). A “general election” is an election that is “required to be held on a fixed date recurring at regular intervals.” RCW 29A.04.073. Any other election is a “special election.” RCW 29A.04.175. “The Revised Code of Washington contains no definition for . . . ‘municipal elections.’ ” A Better Richland v. Chilton, 5 Wn.3d 931, 937, 583 P.3d 1 (2026). However, the Supreme Court interpreted the phrase “next regular municipal election” to mean both general elections and special elections. Id. at 942. RCW 29A.04.330 governs the timing of general and special elections. RCW 29A.04.330(1) states “All city, town, and district general elections shall be held throughout the state of Washington on the first Tuesday following the first Monday in November in the odd- numbered years.” RCW 29A.04.330(2) states, The county auditor, as ex officio supervisor of elections, upon request in the form of a resolution of the governing body of a city, town, or district, presented to the auditor prior to the proposed election date, shall call a special election in such city 15 No. 62278-5-II . . . . Such a special election shall be held on one of the following dates as decided by the governing body: (a) The second Tuesday in February; (b) The fourth Tuesday in April; (c) The day of the primary election as specified by RCW 29A.04.311; or (d) The first Tuesday after the first Monday in November. (Emphasis added.) RCW 29A.04.330(3) states, A resolution calling for a special election on a date set forth in subsection (2)(a) and (b) of this section must be presented to the county auditor at least sixty days prior to the election date. A resolution calling for a special election on a date set forth in subsection (2)(c) of this section must be presented to the county auditor no later than the Friday immediately before the first day of regular candidate filing. A resolution calling for a special election on a date set forth in subsection (2)(d) of this section must be presented to the county auditor no later than the day of the primary. (Emphasis added.) “Primaries for general elections to be held in November . . . must be held on the first Tuesday of the preceding August.” RCW 29A.04.311. B. UDJA PRINCIPLES The UDJA gives trial courts the authority to “declare rights, status, and other legal relations” through a declaratory judgment action whether or not further relief could be claimed. RCW 7.24.010. RCW 7.24.020 states that a person whose “rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute [or] municipal ordinance” may seek a judicial determination regarding “any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute [or] municipal ordinance . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.” A court may also declare rights, status, and other legal relations where a “judgment or decree will terminate 16 No. 62278-5-II the controversy or remove an uncertainty.” RCW 7.24.050. The UDJA is to be “liberally construed and administered.” RCW 7.24.120. “Declaratory judgments are proper ‘to determine the facial validity of an enactment, as distinguished from its application or administration.’ ” Sifferman v. Chelan County, 19 Wn. App. 2d 631, 649, 496 P.3d 329 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hood Canal Sand & Gravel, LLC v. Goldmark, 195 Wn. App. 284, 305, 381 P.3d 95 (2016)); see also Bainbridge Citizens United v. Dept. of Nat. Res., 147 Wn. App. 365, 374, 198 P.3d 1033 (2008). Trial courts lack the authority to issue a declaratory judgment when an action does not “raise a ‘question of construction or validity.’ ” Bainbridge Citizens United, 147 Wn. App. at 374-75 (quoting RCW 7.24.020). “Declaratory judgments are not available where a party seeks to determine whether an agency properly applied or administered a law when it performed a discretionary act.” Hood Canal Sand & Gravel, 195 Wn. App. at 305-06. Similarly, “[d]eclaratory judgments are not meant to compel government agencies to enforce laws. If the UDJA allowed otherwise, . . . [c]ourts would be forced to supervise administrative agencies, a function we have long found contrary to the judiciary’s proper role.” Bainbridge Citizens United, 147 Wn. App. at 375. However, RCW 7.24.080 states that “[f]urther relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper.” “We review orders, judgments, and decrees under the UDJA de novo.” State v. Am. Tobacco Co., 28 Wn. App. 2d 452, 469, 537 P.3d 303 (2023). We also review the issue of a trial court’s statutory authority de novo because it is a question of law. Okeson v. City of Seattle, 150 Wn.2d 540, 548-49, 78 P.3d 1279 (2003). 17 No. 62278-5-II C. INITIATIVE PROCESSING The Union argues that the trial court erred in rejecting its arguments associated with getting the initiative on the November 2025 ballot, specifically that (1) the PCAO’s signature verification was not made with “reasonable promptness” as required under RCW 35.21.005(4), (2) the trial court lowered the standard of reasonable promptness by considering the Union’s delay in submitting its signatures to the PCAO, (3) the City Clerk unreasonably delayed by validating the petition after the PCAO had verified the signatures, (4) the City Council unreasonably delayed in issuing its resolution, and (5) the City Council should have abbreviated its review process to meet the state law deadline for placing the initiative on the November 2025 ballot because the state law deadline for placing the initiative on the ballot superseded the TCC’s 30 day consideration period. The Union contends that these arguments support a ruling that the initiative must be placed on a future election ballot. As noted above, declaratory judgment regarding the administration or application of a statute or other enactment is inappropriate. See Sifferman, 19 Wn. App. 2d at 649. The argument that the PCAO and the City Council improperly caused delays in their handling of the initiative sought a declaration about how the PCAO and the City Council administered their discretionary duties under the TCC. These arguments did not implicate the construction or validity of any enactment. Therefore, we hold that relief was not appropriate under the UDJA on these grounds. Regarding the City Clerk’s validation of the initiative, the Union argues that the TCC provision requiring validation is preempted by RCW 35.21.005(4), which requires the County Auditor to verify signatures. This argument can be addressed under the UDJA. Wash. State Council of County & City Emps. v. City of Spokane, 200 Wn.2d 678, 687, 520 P.3d 991 (2022) 18 No. 62278-5-II (holding that a union’s argument that a statute preempted the Spokane City Charter was justiciable under the UDJA). However, the Union does not explain how RCW 35.21.005(4) preempts the TCC provision. And the City Clerk’s validation only delayed the process by one day. The Union has not explained how this caused any prejudice. We hold that the trial court did not err in rejecting this claim. The Union’s argument that the state law deadline for placing the initiative on the ballot superseded the TCC’s 30 day consideration period also can be addressed under the UDJA because it arguably involves construction of the TCC. See Nelson v. Appleway Chevrolet, Inc., 160 Wn.2d 173, 185, 157 P.3d 847 (2007) (concluding that under the UDJA, a plaintiff had “the right to seek a declaratory judgment finding [that a defendant] violated” a statute). However, RCW 29A.04.330(3) – which establishes the deadlines for calling a special election – is not inconsistent with TCC § 2.19(j). RCW 29A.04.330(3) does not state that a City is required to meet those deadlines under these circumstances. We reject this argument. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in ruling that the City and the County did not unreasonably delay in the handling of the initiative. D. VALIDITY OF CITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION The trial court ruled that the TCC required the City Council to submit an initiative to the voters “at the next election that is possible under state law.” CP at 498 (emphasis added). The City argues that the court’s ruling was beyond the scope of the relief allowed under the UDJA. The Union argues that once the initiative signatures were verified, the TCC required the City Council to pass a resolution that actually would submit the initiative to the voters at a special election. The Union emphasizes that the City Council’s adoption of an ineffective 19 No. 62278-5-II resolution to place the initiative on the November 2025 ballot does not negate the City Council’s obligation to submit the initiative at some future election. We hold that (1) the trial court had the authority under the UDJA to interpret what the TCC required the City Council to do regarding the initiative because