Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT ARTHUR CZYSZCZON, in his official capacity as Treasure Island City Commissioner, Appellant, v. CITY OF TREASURE ISLAND; LISA-MARIE KENNEDY, in her official capacity as Treasure Island City Clerk; RICHARD MATTHEW; SUSAN LOVELADY; and JULIE MARCUS, in her official capacity as Supervisor of Elections of Pinellas County, Appellees. No. 2D2026-0389 August 26, 2026 Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Thomas M. Ramsberger, Judge. Juan-Carlos Planas of Law Firm of Juan-Carlos Planas, P.A., Miami, for Appellant. Ralf Brookes, Gretchen R.H. Vose, Chloe Berryman, and Taylor Simonds, of Vose Law Firm, LLP, Winter Park, for Appellees City of Treasure Island and Lisa-Marie Kennedy, in her official capacity as Treasure Island City Clerk. Elizabeth Murray of Ice Cold Legal LLC, St. Petersburg, for Appellee Richard Matthew. Richard E. Coates and Mason Coates of Coates Law Firm, PL, Tallahassee, for Appellee Susan Lovelady. No appearance for remaining Appellee Julie Marcus, in her official capacity as Supervisor of Elections of Pinellas County. ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, Judge. Arthur Czyszczon was elected to a two-year term on the Treasure Island City Commission in March 2025. In December 2025 a petition for recall was initiated against him under section 100.361, Florida Statutes (2025). Czyszczon filed a complaint and an amended complaint in the trial court seeking a declaratory judgment that the petition and recall proceedings did not comply with section 100.361 and an injunction to enjoin the election. He also filed an amended emergency motion for injunctive and declaratory relief, which sought, among other things, a temporary and permanent injunction. After concluding that the petition and recall committee chair had substantially complied with section 100.361, the court entered an order denying Czyszczon's motion, which Czyszczon now appeals.1 We conclude that the trial court erred in denying Czyszczon temporary injunctive relief because strict compliance with section 100.361 was required and, in any event, the petition neither strictly nor substantially complied with its provisions. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.2 Historical and Procedural Facts 1 A recall election was scheduled for April 21, 2026. However, this court issued an order staying the underlying proceeding and the recall election until further order of this court. 2 The trial court's order does not expressly dispose of the amended complaint pending below, and we review the order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(B), which authorizes appeals of nonfinal orders that "grant, continue, modify, deny, or dissolve injunctions, or refuse to modify or dissolve injunctions." 2 The petition initiated against Czyszczon asserted the following grounds for recall: On September 11, 2025, at 4:10 AM, Treasure Island City Commissioner of District 3, Arthur Czyszczon committed misfeasance by misusing a city issued cell phone to send unsolicited, non-city related text messages to one of his constituents. The text is as follows: "What is Kim wearing? Other than rent. Did you kill Charlie? When can I clean your feet? Kisses to Kim 1st then you 2nd. Oh Kim your baby is CVTI! Be a big boy and make them change it. I put in to buy the building just to kick renters out!!" The Signature statement on the first page of the petition was signed by Susan Lovelady and stated, "I am a qualified elector of the City of Treasure Island, Florida, and I hereby join in the petition to recall Commissioner Arthur Czyszczon for the grounds stated above." The petition did not identify the recall committee chair. However, a cover letter to the petition, which was directed to the City of Treasure Island City Clerk's Office and signed by Lovelady, stated that Lovelady was the chair. After the supervisor of elections certified the requisite number of votes and the city clerk served the petition on Czyszczon, the city clerk prepared the Recall Petition and Defense.3 This document repeated the statement of grounds from the petition and included the defensive statement by Czyszczon. However, unlike the original petition, the Recall Petition and Defense also included a signature statement that identified Lovelady as the recall committee chair. In the meantime, however, Czyszczon had filed his complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and had requested emergency consideration. Because Czyszczon had not been served with the cover 3 See § 100.361(3) (describing the required contents of the document entitled "Recall Petition and Defense"). 3 letter that identified Lovelady as the chair of the recall committee, his complaint alleged that Richard Matthew, the recipient of the text referenced in the petition, had initiated the recall and was the chair of the recall committee.4 Czyszczon then filed an amended complaint naming Lovelady as the chair but retaining Matthew as a named defendant. Count I sought a declaration that recall would be illegal because the petition failed to state the name of the committee chair, in violation of section 100.361; the petition failed to delineate any action by Czyszczon that constituted one of the seven statutory grounds for recall; and the recall committee had failed to register under chapter 106, Florida Statutes. Count II requested that the court enjoin the recall process for noncompliance with section 100.361, enjoin the certification of the petition, and prevent the city clerk from furthering the recall process.5 Czyszczon also filed plaintiff's amended emergency motion for permanent injunction and declaratory relief in the trial court. The motion sought to enjoin further proceedings in the recall effort and to determine the rights and responsibilities of the parties, including the facial validity and legal sufficiency of the recall petition and recall process based upon the allegations in the amended complaint. Czyszczon argued that he had a likelihood of success because the requirements under the recall statute are clear and unambiguous and Matthew and Lovelady 4 Matthew moved to dismiss the complaint as to him, primarily arguing that he was misidentified as the chair and that there was no cause of action against him personally. 5 Matthew also moved to dismiss the amended complaint as to him. The lower tribunal's docket reflects that the trial court granted Matthew's expedited motion for attorney's fees under section 768.295, Florida Statutes (2025), and awarded him $10,025 in attorney's fees. But it has neither granted his motion to dismiss nor dismissed him from the action. 4 failed to follow them. He further argued that in the absence of injunctive relief, there was a likelihood of irreparable harm because he would be forced to face an illegal recall election and Treasure Island residents would be forced to pay for an illegal recall election. For the same reasons, he argued that there was no other adequate remedy at law. As there was no properly stated ground for recall, Czyszczon argued, he could not defend himself in a statement of defense or in a subsequent recall election. Finally, he contended the injunction was in the public interest because a recall should only occur "under the most extreme measures" and an injunction would enforce the law with respect to required proceedings under the statute and protect the public from having to bear the costs of an illegal election. After a hearing, the trial court determined that Czyszczon had not established that he would be irreparably harmed or that an injunction would serve the public interest. The court concluded that the appellees had substantially complied with section 100.361 "as they identified the chairman of the recall committee listed on the first cover letter when they submitted the petitions and thus did not need to list the chair on every single petition, as it gets repeated and prevents it from getting confusing if it changes." The order further stated that the petition substantially complied with that section because the chairman of the petitioners recall committee was listed on the first cover letter when they submitted the first round of petitions, and the petitioner committee chair was listed by name as Susan Lovelady on the front of the "recall petition and defense" form during the second round of the required 15% of the voter signatures. Finally, the court concluded that "[t]he use or misuse of a city-owned telephone and what occurred in some communications, [is] properly characterized Misfeasance as per the requirements of the statute." 5 The trial court denied the motion for injunctive and declaratory relief and directed the clerk to close the case. The court's order, however, did not explicitly dismiss or rule on the amended complaint, and the proceeding remains open in the lower tribunal. Thus, we consider the order on appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(B). Standard of Review "This court 'employ[s] a hybrid standard of review for orders on temporary injunctions: "To the extent the trial court's order is based on factual findings, we will not reverse unless the trial court abused its discretion; however, any legal conclusions are subject to de novo review." ' " Surgery Ctr. Holdings, Inc. v. Guirguis, 318 So. 3d 1274, 1277 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting REV Recreation Grp., Inc. v. LDRV Holdings Corp., 259 So. 3d 232, 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)). Section 100.361, Florida Statutes Section 100.361 governs the recall of a member of a governing body for a municipality and requires multiple steps. § 100.361(1). Section 100.361(2)(a) requires a recall petition to "contain the name of the person sought to be recalled and a statement of grounds for recall." Grounds are limited to "1. Malfeasance; 2. Misfeasance; 3. Neglect of duty; 4. Drunkenness; 5. Incompetence; 6. Permanent inability to perform official duties; and 7. Conviction of a felony involving moral turpitude." § 100.361(2)(a), (d). Section 100.361(2)(c) provides for the establishment of the recall committee and chair and sets forth the requirements therefor as follows: Electors of the municipality or district making charges contained in the statement of grounds for recall, as well as those signing the recall petition, shall be designated as the recall committee. A specific person shall be designated in the 6 petition as chair of the committee, and this person shall act for the committee. The recall committee and the officer being recalled are subject to the provisions of chapter 106. (Emphasis added.) The recall committee chair "shall file the signed petition forms with the auditor or clerk of the municipality or charter county, or his or her equivalent," and "[t]he petition may not be amended after it is filed with the clerk." § 100.361(2)(f) (emphasis added). The clerk submits the forms to the county supervisor of elections, who verifies the signatures and determines whether the requisite number of valid signatures were obtained. § 100.361(2)(g)1. If the petition contains "the requisite number of verified and valid signatures, then the procedures outlined in subsection (3) must be followed." § 100.361(2)(g)4. Upon receipt of a written determination that the requisite number of signatures was obtained, the clerk must immediately serve a certified copy of the petition on the person sought to be recalled. § 100.361(3)(a). Within five days of service, the person may file a defensive statement. Id. Within five days of receipt of the defensive statement or after the last day for filing one, "the clerk shall prepare a document entitled 'Recall Petition and Defense.' " § 100.361(3)(b) (emphasis added). "The 'Recall Petition and Defense' shall consist of the recall petition, including copies of the originally signed petitions and counterparts[,] . . . [and] must contain . . . the defensive statement or, if no defensive statement has been filed, a statement to that effect." Id. (emphasis added). After preparing and making sufficient copies of the Recall Petition and Defense, the clerk delivers them to the designated committee chair. Id. Within sixty days after delivery, the committee may circulate the Recall Petition and Defense to obtain the signatures of fifteen percent of 7 the electors and file them with the clerk. § 100.361(3)(c). The clerk assembles the signed petitions and submits them to the supervisor of elections. § 100.361(3)(d). Within thirty days of receipt of the signed Recall Petition and Defense, the supervisor determines the number of valid signatures and certifies whether fifteen percent of the qualified electors signed the petitions. § 100.361(3)(e). If so, the clerk serves notice on the person to be recalled and delivers to the governing body a certificate as to the percentage of qualified electors who signed. § 100.361(3)(f). Within five days of the foregoing notice, the person to be recalled may file his or her written resignation. If no resignation is filed, the chief judge of the circuit court in which the municipality is located fixes a day for a recall election, which shall be held not less than thirty days and no more than sixty days after expiration of the five-day period following the clerk's notice to the person to be recalled. § 100.361(4). Strict Compliance with Section 100.361 is Required The trial court erred in denying a temporary injunction of the recall proceedings on the ground that the petition substantially complied with section 100.361 because the plain language of that section demands strict compliance with its terms. In so concluding, we find ourselves in good company with one of our sister districts. In Burton v. Oates, 362 So. 3d 311, 315 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023), the Fifth District determined that the filing of a recall petition directly with the county supervisor of elections, rather than with the municipal clerk as required by section 100.361(2)(f), could not be excused as substantially complying with the statute. The court first observed that " '[s]hall' is mandatory," id. (citing Sanders v. City of Orlando, 997 So. 2d 1089, 1095 (Fla. 2008)), and that "section 100.361(2)(f) provides that the petition shall be filed with the 8 municipality's auditor, clerk, or their equivalent," id. As we highlight above, many provisions of section 100.361 include that mandatory language. And specifically for our purposes, section 100.361(2)(c) provides, "A specific person shall be designated in the petition as chair of the committee . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, as the Fifth District further observed: "[S]ection 100.361 contains no language that permits substantial compliance with the statute. Nor does it provide that the failure to comply with the filing requirements of the statute can be excused if there is an alleged lack of prejudice to the elected official targeted for election recall." Burton, 362 So. 3d at 315. We agree that absent such language, strict compliance with the statute's mandatory language is warranted, and because the petition failed to designate the chair of the recall committee, it was invalid. Cf. Pecchia v. Wayside Ests. Home Owners Ass'n, 388 So. 3d 1136, 1144 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024) ("Substantial compliance is not applicable under chapter 720 where the statutory language contains mandatory requirements."); Dwork v. Exec. Ests. of Boynton Beach Homeowners Ass'n, 219 So. 3d 858, 861 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (rejecting a homeowners association's substantial compliance argument "[b]ecause section 720.305(2)(b) is unambiguous as to its fourteen-day written notice requirement and does not contain any exceptions permitting considerations of substantial compliance"). In arguing that the trial court correctly determined that the petition substantially complied with section 100.361, Lovelady relies on Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1975); Ferguson v. Kelly, 185 So. 148 (Fla. 1938); Platt v. Ross, 150 So. 716 (Fla. 1933); and State ex rel. Landis v. Tedder, 143 So. 148 (Fla. 1932). In Tedder, the supreme court recognized as follows: 9 A recall election is a special, extraordinary, and unusual proceeding. The authority for any recall of an officer must rest upon a substantial compliance with the statutory provisions by which it is authorized. In this respect recall elections differ from ordinary elections, because the latter must be held at some designated time and place appointed by law, whereas recall elections can only be held when the statute providing therefor has been substantially complied with, and no unalterable time for holding same is ordinarily fixed by law therefor. 143 So. at 149. Significantly, Platt, Tedder, and Ferguson were decided nearly 100 years ago when the method and grounds for recall were controlled by city charter rather than state statute. See, e.g., Platt, 150 So. at 716 ("The bill of complaint . . . sets up sufficient facts, if proved, to show that the recall proceedings attempted to be carried out against the complainant, Harry E. Platt, one of the city commissioners of the city of Miami, do not rest on substantial compliance with section 12 of chapter 10847, Sp. Acts 1925, Laws of Florida, and section 12–A, as added by Sp. Acts 1929, c. 14234, § 1, the City Charter of Miami . . . ."); Tedder, 143 So. at 148 ("The charter of the city of Hollywood provides that any member of the city commission of that city may be recalled and removed from office by the electors of the city in the method by said city charter provided." (citing article 14, chapter 12877, Special Acts 1927)). The legislature did not adopt section 100.361 until 1974. See ch. 74–130, §§ 1, 2, Laws of Fla. Section 100.361 "supersedes existing city recall measures and provides uniform procedures for recalling members of municipal or charter county governing bodies." Summary of General Legislation 1974, Regular Session April 2–May 31, CS for CS HB 1739, ch. 74–130, at 99–100. Since its enactment, several district court decisions apply or reference the substantial compliance standard in connection with section 10 100.361. See, e.g., Thompson v. Napotnik, 923 So. 2d 537, 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (quoting Tedder's discussion of elected official's right to demand substantial compliance with provisions of statute authorizing recall election); Adkinson v. Mun. Recall Comm. of June 7, 1985, 488 So. 2d 621, 622 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) ("Noting appellants' reliance on [Tedder], we find the supreme court therein called only for substantial compliance with the statutory mandate. At least substantial compliance has been demonstrated here . . . ."). Contrary to what these opinions suggest, however, the supreme court has not applied the substantial compliance standard to section 100.361. As Lovelady and Matthew point out, the supreme court in Boardman, 323 So. 2d at 259, which postdated the adoption of section 100.361, applied a substantial compliance standard to an election statute. That decision, however, does not concern section 100.361 or recall election procedures. Rather, the issue there was "whether the absentee voting law requires absolute strict compliance with all its provisions, or whether substantial compliance is sufficient to give validity to the ballot." Id. at 262. The court held that "substantial compliance with the absentee voting laws is all that is required to give legality to the ballot." Id. at 264. Moreover, the supreme court's reasoning for requiring only substantial compliance in Boardman actually supports our conclusion that strict compliance is required here. In undertaking its analysis, the court stated: We first take note that the real parties in interest here, not in the legal sense but in realistic terms, are the voters. They are possessed of the ultimate interest and it is they whom we must give primary consideration. The contestants have direct interests certainly, but the office they seek is one of high public service and of utmost importance to the people, 11 thus subordinating their interests to that of the people. Ours is a government of, by and for the people. Our federal and state constitutions guarantee the right of the people to take an active part in the process of that government, which for most of our citizens means participation via the election process. The right to vote is the right to participate; it is also the right to speak, but more importantly the right to be heard. We must tread carefully on that right or we risk the unnecessary and unjustified muting of the public voice. By refusing to recognize an otherwise valid exercise of the right to a citizen to vote for the sake of sacred, unyielding adherence to statutory scripture, we would in effect nullify that right. Id. at 263 (emphasis added). As our supreme court observed in Garvin v. Jerome, 767 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 2000), however, a recall election seeks to undo the result of what Boardman described as "an otherwise valid exercise of the right to a citizen to vote." In Garvin, the supreme court addressed whether a recall election could proceed based on a petition alleging five grounds for recall under section 100.361 when four were determined to be legally insufficient. Concluding that it could not, the court looked—as we have here—to the "unambiguous language of the recall statute," which, in pertinent part, "expressly provide[d] that a recall petition must be 'limited solely to the grounds specified in paragraph [1](b).' " Id. at 1192 (quoting § 100.361(1)(a)). The court continued, "To permit a recall under such circumstances would constitute a clear violation of the statute's limitation of grounds for recall and permit an illegal recall based on unlawful grounds." Id. at 1192–93. In closing, the court noted that recall elections frustrate the ability of duly elected officials to do their jobs and stated: As the statutory scheme for recall elections presently stands, it is apparent that recall is treated as an extraordinary proceeding with the burden on those seeking to overturn the regular elective process to base the petition upon 12 lawful grounds or face the invalidation of the proceedings. In our view, the present legislative scheme protects public officials from being ousted when illegal grounds provide the basis for recall. Since we place enormous value on the regular elective process, this legislative scheme is certainly not unreasonable. Accordingly, public officials should not face removal from the office they were lawfully and properly elected to on a ballot that contains illegal grounds for recall in express violation of the statute. Id. at 1193. We acknowledge that Garvin was not decided (at least not expressly) on strict compliance grounds. Yet, when read together, Boardman and Garvin suggest the unremarkable principle that the will of the people, as expressed in a full and fair election, is best served by permitting substantial compliance with statutes that facilitate the people's participation in such elections while requiring strict compliance with statutes that allow the results of such elections to be prematurely undone. Our reading of the plain language of section 100.361 is entirely consistent with that principle. The Petition did not Strictly or Substantially Comply with Section 100.361 The simple application of the requirements of section 100.361 to the recall petition in this case establishes that the petition and committee chair did not strictly comply with section 100.361. The petition failed to designate a specific person as chair, as required by section 100.361(2)(c). Then, Lovelady's name appeared in the Recall Petition and Defense, in violation of the requirement that the petition not be amended after it is filed with the clerk. See § 100.361(2)(f). Further, the Recall Petition and Defense prepared by the clerk did not comply with the requirement under section 100.361(3)(b) that it consist of the recall petition, including copies of the originally signed petitions and 13 counterparts, because the clerk substituted an amended petition identifying the committee chair for the original one. Even if substantial compliance were the appropriate standard, it did not occur in these circumstances. See, e.g., Platt, 150 So. at 716 (stating that recall proceedings were not in substantial compliance with city charter when "the petition blanks for the proposed removal were not on printed forms furnished as required by the statute"); State v. Culligan, 454 So. 2d 700, 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (holding that appellee did not substantially comply with Agreement on Detainers to commence speedy trial period when "motion was inadequate to provide the information required by" the statute). The omission of the committee chair's name from the petition during the first round of circulation was not merely a technical defect. Voters who signed the petition during that round had no way of knowing who was leading the charge against Czyszczon and therefore could not fully assess its merits. Indeed, Czyszczon himself was unable to correctly identify the person against whom he should bring suit. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Temporary Injunctive Relief Having addressed the legal issue at the heart of this action, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying temporary injunctive relief. "A temporary injunction should only issue when 'the moving party has demonstrated (1) irreparable harm to the moving party unless the injunction issues, (2) unavailability of an adequate legal remedy, (3) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, and (4) that the public interest is supported by the entry of the injunction.' " Surgery Ctr. Holdings, Inc., 318 So. 3d at 1277 (quoting Atomic Tattoos, LLC, v. Morgan, 45 So. 3d 63, 64-65 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)). 14 Czyszczon established irreparable harm because absent compliance with section 100.361, he will be forced to face an illegal recall election and could be deprived of his right to hold office, the residents of Treasure Island will be forced to bear the expense of an illegal recall election, and the voters who initially elected him could have their lawful votes effectively invalidated. For the same reasons, considerations of public interest support issuance of an injunction. Moreover, there is no adequate remedy at law other than injunctive relief. The city clerk is not authorized to reject the petition based upon a determination that it is insufficient. See City of Miami v. Piper, 306 So. 3d 156, 158 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (stating that deletion of language in section 100.361 granting the clerk authority to review recall petitions for legal sufficiency reflected the legislature's intent to terminate that authority). Absent action by the trial court, the recall election will go forward, and Czyszczon and the residents of Treasure Island will suffer the irreparable harm described above. Finally, because the recall petition neither strictly nor substantially complied with section 100.361, Czyszczon demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. Because Czyszczon met all four requirements for injunctive relief, the trial court erred in denying such relief. Accordingly, we reverse the order on appeal and remand for the court to enter a temporary injunction and to conduct further proceedings in the underlying matter consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. SILBERMAN and BLACK, JJ., Concur. 15 Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication. 16