Full Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed November 13, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________ No. 3D26-1967 Lower Tribunal No. 26-17398-CA-01 ________________ Hector Medina, Appellant, vs. Kassandra Timothe, et al., Appellees. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Christopher Green, Judge. Law Firm of Juan-Carlos Planas, P.A., and Juan-Carlos Planas, for appellant. Straghn Law, PLLC, and Dedrick D. Straghn (Delray Beach), for appellee Kassandra Timothe; Weiss Serota Helfman Cole & Bierman, PL., and Richard Rosengarten and Amanda Pulido, for appellee City of North Miami. Before SCALES, C.J., and LINDSEY, and REBULL, JJ. PER CURIAM. Hector Medina appeals a consolidated final declaratory judgment of the trial court declaring that he failed to qualify as a candidate for the North Miami City Council because the check he tendered for his qualifying fee was not a properly executed check drawn upon the candidate’s campaign account within the meaning of section 99.061(7)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2026). The check was drawn on Medina’s campaign account, the Clerk accepted his papers and deposited his check, and no one warned him of the defect during the nine days that remained in the qualifying period. But, dispositive to this appeal, the check was signed by Medina himself, who had not been designated as his campaign treasurer or deputy treasurer. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND Medina, desired to run for office as Councilmember in the City of North Miami (the “City”), for District 2. The City’s municipal general election was scheduled for November 3, 2026. The qualifying period for candidates began on August 10, 2026, and ended at noon on August 20, 2026. On April 6, 2026, Medina filed a Form DS-DE 9 appointing a campaign treasurer and designating a campaign depository. On that form, he 2 designated Alina Medina, his wife, as his campaign treasurer. He did not designate himself as campaign treasurer or deputy campaign treasurer. On August 11, 2026, Medina submitted his qualifying papers to the City Clerk, including a check drawn on his campaign account to pay the qualifying fee. That check was signed by Medina personally. The City processed the papers and deposited the check, and it was paid by the bank. No one in the Clerk’s office advised him of any problem with the check before the qualifying period closed. By letter dated August 20, 2026, appellee, Kassandra Timothe— Medina’s opposing candidate—notified the City of the signature defect and demanded that Medina be deemed disqualified. In response, Medina e- mailed the City, insisting he properly qualified, arguing that the issues Timothe complained of were of such hyper-technical levels that courts are reluctant to use them as determiners of electoral issues, and that, under Florida law, any doubt over candidacy should be resolved in favor of the candidate. Upon review of the matter, the City concluded that Medina should indeed be disqualified, and sent him a letter dated August 25, 2026, notifying him. II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On August 27, 2026, faced with competing threats of litigation, the City filed its own action for declaratory relief and, to ensure a measure of fairness 3 regardless of the outcome, transmitted to the Supervisor of Elections a ballot that included Medina’s name. That same day, Timothe filed an emergency complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging Medina’s qualification. The City’s companion declaratory action was consolidated into Timothe’s case. On September 1, 2026, the trial court held a hearing. By agreement of all parties, the hearing constituted an expedited final hearing on the merits pursuant to section 99.0211, Florida Statutes (2026). The trial court also found that Medina conceded standing during that hearing. The question for the trial court was whether Medina’s failure to have the check signed by the campaign treasurer means the check was not “properly executed,” as required by section 99.061(7)(a)1. On September 3, 2026, the circuit court entered final judgment for Timothe and granted the declaratory relief sought by both Timothe and the City. The trial court found that Medina failed to satisfy the qualifying requirement imposed by section 99.061(7)(a)1.; that the qualifying check he executed and submitted was not a “properly executed check” within the meaning of that statute; and that Medina is not a qualified candidate for the District 2 seat. The court reasoned that Chapter 99, Florida Statutes (2026), does not define “properly executed check”; that, under the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Amador v. Sec'y, Florida Dep't of State, No. SC2026- 4 1039, 2026 WL 2323248 (Fla. Aug. 11, 2026), an undefined term in section 99.061 must be construed by reference to related provisions of the Election Code1; and that section 106.11(1)(b)4., Florida Statutes (2026), requires a campaign-account check to bear the signature of the campaign treasurer or deputy treasurer. The court expressly held that the action was a challenge to Medina’s qualification under Chapter 99 and did not seek to enforce Chapter 106, Florida Statutes (2026) as an independent private cause of action. Because Medina’s name had already been incorporated into the ballot, the trial court did not order physical removal of his name. Instead, it directed the Supervisor of Elections to implement the procedures prescribed by the Florida Department of State’s DE Reference Guide 0007 for a candidate judicially determined not to have qualified after ballots have been programmed, including notice to voters that votes cast for Medina would not be counted. The trial court also granted a limited stay through September 8, 2026, to permit expedited appellate review. 1 Section 100.3605(1), Florida Statutes (2026), states that “[t]he Florida Election Code, chapters 97-106, shall govern the conduct of a municipality’s election in the absence of an applicable special act, charter, or ordinance provision.” 5 Medina timely appealed. 2 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review the trial court's determination and interpretation of sections 99.061 and 106.11 de novo. See Wright v. City of Miami Gardens, 200 So. 3d 765, 770 (Fla. 2016); Martinez v. Hernandez, 227 So. 3d 1257, 1259 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“[T]he standard of appellate review with respect to the interpretation of a charter or ordinance is de novo.”). The controlling question on this appeal is whether a campaign account check that was accepted by the Clerk and honored by the bank, but signed by a candidate who was not the designated campaign treasurer or deputy treasurer, was a "properly executed check" under section 99.061(7)(a)1. If not, then Medina’s failure to have the check signed by the campaign treasurer means the check was not “properly executed,” and Medina was properly disqualified.3 2 We denied Medina’s emergency motion for stay but granted expedited review on September 15, 2026, and denied his renewed motion for stay on September 23, 2026. The municipal general election was held, as scheduled, on November 3, 2026. 3 Because the facts were generally stipulated to, no transcript of the September 1, 2026 hearing was included in Medina’s appendix. So, Applegate does not bar review of the controlling issue, because it is a pure question of law on undisputed facts. People's Tr. Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 263 So. 3d 231, 234 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (citation omitted) (“The rule of Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 1979), applies only where the trial court's decision turns on its resolution of contested facts.”); Miami Dade Coll. v. Nader + Museu I, LLLP, 388 So. 3d 121, 125 (Fla. 3d 6 IV. ANALYSIS A. Mootness Because the election was held on November 3, 2026, the City argues this appeal is moot. We decline this invitation to dismiss the appeal because the issue presented is of great public importance and is likely to recur in future elections. See Plante v. Smathers, 372 So. 2d 933, 935 (Fla. 1979) (exercising jurisdiction even though the triggering election had already occurred, where the issue was a “matter of great importance and of general public interest and will probably recur in the next general election”); Junior v. LaCroix, 263 So. 3d 159, 161 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (citation modified) (“It is well settled that mootness does not destroy an appellate court's jurisdiction when the questions raised are of great public importance or are likely to recur.”). B. “Properly Executed Check” “In order for a candidate to be qualified” the filing officer must receive by the end of the qualifying period “[a] properly executed check drawn upon DCA 2023) (finding where “the issue presented . . . is a pure question of law . . . the absence of a transcript is not fatal to our review”). 7 the candidate's campaign account[.]” § 99.061(7)(a)1, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). And “[f]ailure to pay the fee as provided in this subparagraph shall disqualify the candidate.” Id. Notably, Chapter 99 does not define “properly executed.” The Florida Supreme Court’s recent Amador decision supplies the controlling methodology for construing this phrase. See No. SC2026- 1039, 2026 WL 2323248 (Fla. Aug. 11, 2026). In Amador, the undefined phrase was “campaign account” under section 99.061(7)(a)1. See id. at *1. The Supreme Court instructed that “[t]o help understand the meaning of” an undefined term in this context “one must look to related statutes in the election code” and then consulted section 106.11(1)(a) to determine how a lawful qualifying check must be drawn. See id. Applying that instruction here to “properly executed,” which is found in the same sentence of section 99.061(7)(a)1., we look to the Election Code provision that prescribes how a campaign account check is executed. Section 106.11(1)(a) provides that expenditures from the primary campaign depository may be made “only by means of a bank check drawn upon the campaign account of the candidate.” And section 106.11(1)(b)4. requires that check to “contain, as a minimum, . . . [t]he signature of the campaign treasurer or deputy treasurer.” 8 Medina’s contrary assertion that the check is “properly executed” simply because the Clerk accepted it and the bank honored it is irreconcilable with the statutory text. If any campaign account check that clears is “properly executed,” the phrase would do no work at all; the Legislature could have required only a check drawn upon the candidate’s campaign account. The added words must mean something. See Green v. Cottrell, 204 So. 3d 22, 27 (Fla. 2016) (citation omitted) (“[I]t is an elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.”); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012) (“If possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect (verba cum effectu sunt accipienda).”). Reading “properly executed” together with section 106.11, as Amador’s reasoning requires, both renders meaning to the phrase and construes the related Election Code provisions in harmony. See State v. Peraza, 259 So. 3d 728, 732 (Fla. 2018) (citation omitted) (“[W]here possible, courts must give effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.”). Accordingly, contrary to Medina’s argument, the court below did not add words to section 99.061(7)(a)1. Instead, it gave meaning to the words the Legislature drafted 9 by, as Amador instructs, consulting the portion of the Election Code that governs proper execution of this precise kind of check. This construction of section 99.061(7)(a)1. has now been applied to nearly identical facts by our sister court in Wright v. Gelin, 51 Fla. Weekly D2284 (Fla. 4th DCA Oct. 28, 2026). 4 There, as here, a candidate personally signed a campaign-account check without having been validly designated as campaign treasurer or deputy treasurer. See Wright, 51 Fla. Weekly D2284 at *1. Similarly, the city clerk accepted his payment and deemed him qualified. See id. The court reaffirmed that payment by a properly executed campaign account check “is a basic qualification requirement and must be strictly followed” under a “true bright line” rule whose violation requires disqualification. See id. at *2. Accordingly, the court held that the fee was not paid by a check properly executed on the primary campaign account because section 106.11(1)(b)4. requires the check to contain the signature of the campaign treasurer or deputy treasurer and the candidate’s check contained neither. See id. at *3. We find Wright’s reasoning sound and consistent with our decision in Thompson v. N. Bay Vill., which recognized that section 99.061(7)(a)1.’s requirement of a properly executed campaign account check is a genuine 4 Wright was decided after the parties briefed this appeal. 10 condition of qualification. See 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1727 (Fla. 3d DCA Aug. 21, 2026), reh'g denied (Oct. 12, 2026) (affirming trial court’s strict enforcement of section 99.061(7)(a)1. where candidate submitted a bank- issued cashier's check, instead of a check drawn upon his campaign account). Here, it is undisputed that Medina’s qualifying check was a campaign account expenditure, that Alina Medina was his designated treasurer, and that Medina was not the treasurer or a deputy treasurer when he signed it. So, Medina’s failure to have the check signed by his campaign treasurer, as prescribed by section 106.11(1)(b)4. means the check was not “properly executed,” as required by section 99.061(7)(a)1. This failure requires disqualification. See § 99.061(7)(a)1, Fla. Stat. C. Chapter 99 Private Action Medina contends that the signature requirement derives from Chapter 106, that Chapter 106 creates no private right of action, and that any irregularity in who signed the check lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Florida Elections Commission. This premise is mistaken. To begin with, the Final Judgment expressly rejects that characterization: This action is a challenge to Medina's qualification under Chapter 99, Florida Statutes. Plaintiff does not 11 seek to enforce Chapter 106 as an independent private cause of action. Further, the operative qualification requirement, and the source of Medina’s disqualification, is section 99.061(7)(a)1. itself. See, e.g., Wright, 51 Fla. Weekly D2284 at *2. Section 106.11(1)(b)4. is consulted only to supply the meaning of an undefined Chapter 99 term, which is exactly what Amador did when it looked to sections 106.021 and 106.11 to construe “campaign account.” See 2026 WL 2323248, at *2. So, the trial court’s resort to Chapter 106 as an interpretive context to construe “properly executed” does not transform a Chapter 99 qualification challenge into a Chapter 106 enforcement proceeding. D. Section 99.0211(2) Standing Medina argues that Timothe does not have standing under section 99.0211(2) 5 because, in his view, it was enacted to address only party- affiliation disputes and not a same-race candidate’s challenge to his 5 “A candidate must be able to satisfy all statutory and constitutional requirements for the office for which he or she is seeking nomination or election.” § 99.0211(1), Fla. Stat. (2026). “A candidate or a political party with a candidate in the same race, . . . may challenge a candidate's compliance with subsection (1) by filing an action for declaratory and injunctive relief in the circuit court for the county in which the filing officer is headquartered.” § 99.0211(2), Fla. Stat. (2026). 12 qualification.6 But the trial court found that Medina conceded standing during the hearing and all parties agreed that the September 1 hearing would constitute a final adjudication on the merits under section 99.0211. We therefore cannot reach the merits of this issue because Medina failed to preserve the argument in the trial court. See, e.g., Joli v. Hannon, 336 So. 3d 343, 344 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (holding disqualified candidate's argument on appeal that city clerk lacked standing to challenge her qualification was waived where she did not object to clerk's standing below); Republic of Ecuador v. Dassum, 255 So. 3d 390, 394 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (noting it is “well-established that standing is an affirmative defense that must be raised by the defendant to avoid waiver”). E. Substantial Compliance Medina emphasizes that the Clerk accepted his papers, deposited his check, and never warned him of the defect during the nine days that remained in the qualifying period. We are not persuaded by these facts. Section 99.061(7)(c) expressly provides that the filing officer “performs a ministerial function” and “may not determine whether the contents of the qualifying papers are accurate.” So, the Clerk’s acceptance of Medina’s 6 Before the final merits hearing, Timothe filed a Supplemental Memorandum of Law and Notice of Supplemental Authority expressly invoking the newly enacted section 99.0211 as statutory authorization for a same-race candidate to seek declaratory and injunctive relief. 13 facially negotiable check says nothing about its legal sufficiency. Browning v. Young, 993 So. 2d 64, 67–68 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (finding that “the official accepting the papers has no obligation to advise the candidate that he or she must take additional steps to meet all of the requirements[,]” and “is not required to act as legal advisor for a candidate”). Responsibility for compliance with the qualifying requirements rests with the candidate, not the filing officer. Boatman v. Hardee, 254 So. 3d 604, 606, 607–09 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (affirming disqualification despite the deputy supervisor’s assurance that nothing further was needed). Nor does the doctrine of substantial compliance assist Medina. That doctrine “does not apply to basic qualification requirements, like proper payment of the fee.” Wright, 51 Fla. Weekly D2284 at *3; see also State ex rel. Siegendorf v. Stone, 266 So. 2d 345, 347 (Fla. 1972) (finding substantial compliance does not apply to basic requirements like “paying a proper fee, the filing of necessary qualifying papers and registering to vote”). So, the trial court correctly declined to treat the Clerk’s acceptance and the clearing of the check as a substitute for section 99.061(7)(a)1.’s express statutory requirements. F. Policy Favoring Ballot Access Finally, Medina invokes the strong policy favoring ballot access and the rule that doubts about a candidate’s qualification should be resolved in 14 favor of candidacy. See Vieira v. Slaughter, 318 So. 2d 490, 492 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) (“The imposition of restrictions upon the right of a person to hold public office should receive a liberal construction in favor of the people exercising freedom of choice in the selection of their public officers.”). We need not resort to this policy as there is no doubt here about Medina’s qualifications. The Florida Supreme Court has made clear that in drafting section 99.061(7)(a)1. the Legislature intended to effect “a true bright line.” See Wright v. City of Miami Gardens, 200 So. 3d 765, 771–72 (Fla. 2016). And because the statute is not ambiguous, there is no occasion to deploy such canons and policy that depend on ambiguity. See id. at 772. This may be a harsh result, but a generalized preference for candidacy cannot displace a clear statutory command. Medina’s reliance on City of Miami Gardens is misplaced. There, the Supreme Court found section 99.061(7)(a)1. unconstitutional as applied to a candidate whose properly executed check was returned solely because of a bank error beyond his control. See id. at 772. The Court was careful to note that, “[f]or those prospective candidates who tender properly executed checks,” the statute “poses no problem.” Id. at 776. Medina’s circumstance is the opposite. Who served as his campaign treasurer and who signed his qualifying check were matters entirely within his control, fixed by his own filed designation and his own signature. He has not raised a constitutional 15 challenge to the signature requirement. And the trial court did not disqualify Medina for another’s error; it enforced a clear statutory condition that he failed to satisfy. V. CONCLUSION The trial court correctly construed section 99.061(7)(a)1. in light of Amador and section 106.11(1)(b)4., correctly finding that Medina’s campaign account check was not properly executed and so section 99.061(7)(a)1. required his disqualification. The remaining issues Medina raises do not warrant reversal. Accordingly, we affirm. Affirmed. 16