Democratic National Committee v. Trump

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 26 - 3506 (LLA) v. DONALD J. TRUMP, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Democratic National Committee (the “DNC”) brings this action against President Donald J. Trump, the White House Office, the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”), and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) (collectively, “Defendants”). ECF No. 1. The DNC alleges that OMB and DHS acted contrary to law and in excess of statutory authority, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq., and that President Trump and the White House Office acted ultra vires, by using public funds to finance a national propaganda campaign in contravention of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026, Pub. L. No. 119-75, § 718, 140 Stat. 173 (2026); the Purpose Statute, 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a); and the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a), 1517. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 184-200. Pending before the court is the DNC’s motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) (or, in the alternative, a preliminary injunction) and a stay pursuant to Section 705 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 705. ECF No. 3. For the reasons explained below, the court grants the DNC’s motion and enters a TRO against Defendants pursuant to the terms outlined at the end of this opinion and order.  I. LEGAL BACKGROUND The Appropriations Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. “Textually, the command is unmistakable—‘no money can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act of Congress.’” Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass’n of Am., Ltd., 601 U.S. 416, 425 (2024) (quoting Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937)). “Decisions of the Supreme Court and [the D.C. Circuit] have strictly enforced the constitutional requirement, implemented by federal statutes, that uses of appropriated funds be authorized by Congress.” U.S. Dep’t of Navy v. Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth., 665 F.3d 1339, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh, J.). Three such federal statutes are at issue here. First, “[a] core tenet of appropriations law is enshrined” in the Purpose Statute, id. at 1348, which provides that “[a]ppropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made except as otherwise provided by law,” 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a). Next, the Anti-Deficiency Act prohibits any “officer or employee of the United States Government” from “mak[ing] or authoriz[ing] an expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount available in an appropriation or fund for the expenditure or obligation.” 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A). The Anti-Deficiency Act further prohibits any “officer or employee of the United States Government” from “involv[ing] [the] government in a contract or obligation for the payment of money before an appropriation is made unless authorized by law.” Id. § 1341(a)(1)(B). Finally, the Consolidated Appropriations Act specifies that “[n]o part of any appropriation . . . shall be used directly or indirectly, including by private contractor, for publicity 2 or propaganda purposes within the United States not heretofore authorized by Congress.” § 718, 140 Stat. at 495. 1 Once Congress appropriates funding, the Anti-Deficiency Act requires the President to apportion that funding. See 31 U.S.C. § 1513(b)(1). The President has delegated that authority to OMB. See Exec. Order No. 6,166 (June 10, 1933), as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,608, 52 Fed. Reg. 34617 (Sep. 9, 1987) (“The functions of making, waiving, and modifying apportionments of appropriations are transferred to [OMB].”). OMB, in turn, must apportion funds in accordance with Congress’s instructions. See Nat’l Endowment for Democracy v. United States, 795 F. Supp. 3d 63, 66 (D.D.C. 2025) (“After Congress appropriates funding, [OMB] ‘apportions’ those funds by setting a schedule to determine when they will become available to the relevant executive agency[.]”); Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget (“CREW”), 791 F. Supp. 3d 29, 37 (D.D.C. 2025) (“The decisions about how to allocate funds are called ‘apportionments,’ and they are used to ensure that the Executive Branch does not spend more or less than Congress appropriated.”), appeal docketed, No. 25-5267 (D.C. Cir. argued Oct. 13, 2026). “An apportionment is legally binding.” Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Off. of the President, OMB Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget § 120.1 (2025). “[O]bligations and expenditures (disbursements) that exceed an apportionment are a violation of, and are subject to reporting under, the Antideficiency Act,” id., which prohibits any “officer or employee of the United States Government” from “mak[ing] or authoriz[ing] an 1 Congress has prohibited the use of federal funds for “publicity or propaganda purposes” in annual appropriations bills since 1951. See Labor-Federal Security Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 82-134, § 702, 65 Stat. 209, 223 (1951) (“No part of any appropriation contained in this Act shall be used for publicity or propaganda purposes not heretofore authorized by the Congress.”). 3 expenditure or obligation exceeding an apportionment,” 31 U.S.C. § 1517(a)(1). Violations of that prohibition can result in administrative discipline, including removal from office, 31 U.S.C. § 1518, as well as criminal penalties of up to two years of imprisonment and a $5,000 fine, id. § 1519. 2 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY A. Appropriation and Apportionment of DHS Funds In July 2025, Congress enacted a budget reconciliation package known as the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act” (“OBBBA”). See Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 119-21, 139 Stat. 72 (2025). As relevant here, Section 90004 of the OBBBA, titled “Border Security, Technology, and Screening,” § 90004, 139 Stat. 359 (capitalization altered), appropriated $6,168,000,000 to Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), an agency within DHS, for the following expenditures: (1) Procurement and integration of new nonintrusive inspection equipment and associated civil works, including artificial intelligence, machine learning, and other innovative technologies, as well as other mission support, to combat the entry or exit of illicit narcotics at ports of entry and along the southwest, northern, and maritime borders. (2) Air and Marine operations’ upgrading and procurement of new platforms for rapid air and marine response capabilities. (3) Upgrades and procurement of border surveillance technologies along the southwest, northern, and maritime borders. 2 Congress has enacted other statutes, which are not at issue here, that mandate the public reporting and disclosure of OMB’s apportionment decisions. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-328, div. E, tit. II, § 204, 136 Stat. 4459, 4667 (2023); see also CREW, 791 F. Supp. 3d at 37, 53 (explaining that the laws require “final apportionment decisions be made publicly available to provide transparency to Congress and the public”). The DNC cites to some of those OMB public disclosures in its briefing. See ECF No. 3-4, at 55-60. Citations to ECF Nos. 3-4 and 10-1 refer to the CM/ECF-generated page numbers at the top of each page rather than any internal pagination. 4  (4) Necessary expenses, including the deployment of technology, relating to the biometric entry and exit system under section 7208 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (8 U.S.C. 1365b). (5) Screening persons entering or exiting the United States. (6) Initial screenings of unaccompanied alien children (as defined in section 462(g) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 279(g))), consistent with the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-457; 122 Stat. 5044). (7) Enhancing border security by combating drug trafficking, including fentanyl and its precursor chemicals, at the southwest, northern, and maritime borders. (8) Commemorating efforts and events related to border security. § 90004(a), 139 Stat. 359. 3 The report of the House Budget Committee accompanying the OBBBA described the “commemorative events” category as “honoring meritorious contributions and achievements related to border security, including events recognizing victims of crimes.” H.R. Rep. No. 119-106, at 792 (2025). The report specified that “[e]xamples of such events include Line-of-Duty death memorials, Department or agency anniversaries, and commendation ceremonies.” Id. The report further explained that appropriated funding for that category “can be used for venue and setup, program materials, commemoratives (e.g., plaques, flags, awards); and personnel and services (e.g., honor guard, officiants, security).” Id. In November 2025, OMB apportioned $500,000 to CBP for commemorative events pursuant to Section 90004 of the OBBBA. See ECF No. 3-4, at 58. Almost a year later, on September 19, 2026 at 6:15 p.m., CBP submitted a request to OMB to “make an additional 3 The $6,168,000,000 appropriation was designated “for fiscal year 2025” but “to remain available until September 30, 2029.” § 90004(a), 139 Stat. 359. 5 $20 million available for obligation” for the commemorative-events category. ECF No. 9-1 ¶¶ 3-4. The additional funding would come from funds obligated on a different line item for fiscal year 2027. Id.; see ECF No. 3-4, at 58. OMB approved the request less than two hours later, at 7:50 p.m., ECF No. 9-1 ¶ 5, and increased the CBP line item for commemorative events by $20 million, see ECF No. 3-4, at 60 (designating $20,500,000 for “OBBBA – Commerative [sic] Events”). The following day, on September 20, DHS issued a $20 million purchase order to Lepugh, Inc. (doing business as “LMD Agency, Inc.” or “LMD”), an advertising agency, for a “national media campaign.” ECF No. 3-4, at 72-73 (capitalization omitted); see ECF No. 9-2 ¶ 3. DHS acknowledged that funding for that purchase order came from appropriations pursuant to Section 90004 of the OBBBA, designated for “[c]ommemorating efforts and events related to border security.” ECF No. 9-2 ¶ 4 (alteration in original). The campaign entailed “placing national media buys”—that is, purchasing airtime to display advertisements—“with media outlets and programs on a national level using a combination of morning and evening cable news, 6-10am dayparts, 4-11pm dayparts, media programing through FOX, CNN, MSNOW, and NEWSMAX, Sunday shows including broadcasts with CBS, ABC, and NBC, and football commercial buys with CBS, ABC, ESPN, and other channels.” Id. ¶ 5. The purchase order’s “period of performance is September 20, 2026, through September 19, 2027, or until all deliverables and media placements have occurred.” Id. ¶ 7; see ECF No. 3-4, at 71 (denoting the contract end date as “Sep 19, 2027”). The challenged advertisements began to air on television on September 23, 2026. ECF No. 1 ¶ 54; ECF No. 3-5 ¶ 9. 6  B. The Challenged Advertisements The DNC challenges “at least 13 campaign-style ads” that were purportedly developed by the White House Office using appropriated funds and shared with LMD for eventual national distribution. ECF No. 1 ¶ 125. These ads fall into two groups. The first group consists of five ads that aired on television using appropriated funds: (1) “The Country He Loves” or “Love Me” ad, (2) the “Maduro” ad, (3) the “Final Battle” ad, (4) the “Mount Rushmore” ad, and (5) the “American Military Power” ad. Id. ¶¶ 59-123. “The Country He Loves” or “Love Me” Ad. This ad began airing on television on September 23, 2026. Id. ¶ 59. The video features a montage of footage and photos of President Trump, accompanied by the song “Love Me” by JSMN, which repeats the lyrics “Love me, love me, love me, love me.” Id. ¶¶ 60-64. The montage is overlaid with text stating that “America will never be a communist country” and includes a voiceover from President Trump declaring that “together we will defeat communism, socialism, and Marxism in America.” Id. ¶ 61. The ad concludes with Dana White, president of the Ultimate Fighting Championship (“UFC”), describing President Trump as “the toughest, most resilient person [he has] ever met,” followed by a disclosure stating that the ad was “Paid for by the U.S. Government.” Id. ¶¶ 65, 67. According to the DNC, a copy of the video without that disclosure was posted on the official White House YouTube channel on September 11. Id. ¶ 69. “Maduro” Ad. This ad began airing on television on September 24 in multiple versions ranging between thirty and sixty seconds long. Id. ¶¶ 74-75. The ad focuses on the United States’ military operation to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Id. ¶ 74. The ad cuts between footage of President Maduro giving a speech to “come get him” with footage of Administration officials announcing the operation’s success, including President Trump describing the military 7 action as “one of the most stunning and effective” in American history. Id. ¶¶ 76-78. The end of the ad features Secretary of State Marco Rubio stating that “people need to understand that this is not a President that just talks and does letters and press conferences,” and warning against “play[ing] games while this President is in office.” Id. ¶ 79. The ad concludes with a “Paid for by the U.S. Government” disclosure. Id. ¶ 80. According to the DNC, a copy of the video without that disclosure was posted on the President Trump’s Truth Social account on September 25. Id. ¶ 81. “Final Battle” Ad. This ad began airing on television over the weekend of September 26 and 27. Id. ¶ 86. The ad features black-and-white footage of President Trump walking down a hallway as his voiceover promises to “demolish the Deep State,” “cast out the communists, Marxists, and fascists,” “rout[] the fake news media,” and “liberate America from these villains once and for all.” Id. ¶¶ 88-89. The DNC alleges that the ad “is nearly identical to a political ad that President Trump used during his 2024 presidential election campaign,” except for the ad’s ending. Id. ¶ 92. Whereas the 2024 campaign ad concluded with graphics saying “Join President Trump’s Fight for America” and displaying President Trump’s 2024 campaign logo, the “Final Battle” ad ends with a “Paid for by the U.S. Government” disclosure. Id. ¶¶ 93-94. “Mount Rushmore” Ad. This ad began airing on television on September 27. Id. ¶ 100. The ad features remarks that President Trump delivered on July 3, 2026 at Mount Rushmore alongside footage of the event. Id. ¶¶ 102-104. In his remarks, President Trump describes the United States as “the most successful, most accomplished, most exceptional nation ever to exist in human history” and proclaims that “[t]his is only the beginning of the golden age of America.” Id. ¶ 104. The ad concludes with a “Paid for by the U.S. Government” disclosure. Id. ¶ 105. 8 According to the DNC, a copy of the video without that disclosure was posted on the official White House YouTube channel on September 9. Id. ¶ 106. “American Military Power” Ad. This ad began airing on television on September 30. Id. ¶ 111. The ad focuses on the United States’ military operation in Iran. Id. ¶¶ 112-113. The ad includes footage of military action interspersed with clips of President Trump, along with a voiceover from Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth declaring that President Trump has “reminded the world, as he has time and time again, being an American means something unbreakable.” Id. ¶¶ 114, 116. According to the DNC, a copy of the video without that disclosure was posted on the official White House YouTube channel on September 11. Id. 4 The second group of challenged ads consists of ads shared with LMD that have not yet aired on television, but “may be aired as the November 2026 elections approach.” Id. ¶ 124. These unaired ads include (1) a “UFC 250” ad featuring a UFC fight held at the White House; (2) a “King of the Jungle” ad showing a lion hunting in the wild and disparaging President Trump’s “perceived political enemies”; and (3) a “Resilience” ad highlighting various events in President Trump’s life, including the announcement of his presidential candidacy in 2015 and the assassination attempt during the 2024 election campaign. Id. ¶¶ 124-135. The unaired ads also include a “God Made Trump” ad, which was originally “made by President Trump’s supporters during the 2024 Presidential election” and “previously shown during the Republican Midterm Convention.” Id. ¶ 129. Like the aired ads, each unaired ad concludes with a disclosure stating that it was “Paid for by the U.S. Government.” Id. ¶ 130. 4 The DNC does not specify in the complaint whether the “American Military Power” ad contained the “Paid for by the U.S. Government” disclosure. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 111-123. 9  C. Continued Funding of the Challenged Advertisements On October 5, 2026, President Trump announced on Truth Social that he would pay for the ads himself and “with the money [he] raised for MAGA[] Inc.” because the “Radical Left [was] upset” that he was “paying for [the ads] with U.S.A. money.” ECF No. 3-4, at 45; see ECF No. 1 ¶ 157. The DNC identifies MAGA Inc. as a super PAC closely affiliated with President Trump, that has spent millions of dollars to support Republican candidates and oppose Democratic candidates in the November 2026 elections. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 5, 49, 172, 182. Despite President Trump’s commitment, the challenged ads continued to air with the “Paid for by the U.S. Government” disclosure. Id. ¶¶ 159-161. For example, on October 6, the “Final Battle” ad aired on a national broadcast of Dancing with the Stars. Id. ¶ 160. Then, on October 7, the “Final Battle” ad aired again during a broadcast of Fox & Friends. Id. ¶ 161. Additionally, on October 6, OMB apportioned $1 million to the CBP line item for commemorative events for fiscal year 2027. ECF No. 9-1 ¶ 9. The DNC alleges that after President Trump’s Truth Social announcement, at least $100,000 of appropriated funds were spent on the challenged ads. ECF No. 1 ¶ 162. D. This Litigation The DNC is the national committee responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Democratic Party. ECF No. 1 ¶ 8; see 52 U.S.C. § 30101(14). The DNC’s membership includes Democratic candidates running for office, as well as voters and volunteers for Democratic campaigns. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 4; ECF No. 3-5 ¶¶ 4-7, 13, 15, 18. In support of its mission “to elect[] Democratic candidates in federal, state, and local elections across the country,” the DNC “solicits contributions and makes expenditures—both independently of and in coordination with individual candidates—to support Democratic campaigns and committees.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 8. 10  The DNC filed suit against Defendants on October 7, 2026. ECF No. 1. Two days later, on October 9, the DNC sought a TRO (1) prohibiting Defendants from spending appropriated funds to develop and air the challenged ads and (2) prohibiting any further use of ads developed using public dollars. See ECF No. 3-1, at 2, 25; ECF No. 3-2, at 1-2. The court ordered expedited briefing on the TRO motion. Oct. 9, 2026 Minute Order. In its opposition brief filed on October 11, Defendants represented that the Administration would no longer use federal funds to air the challenged ads moving forward. ECF No. 9, at 1. Defendants included an October 10 declaration from Holly Mehringer, DHS’s “Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Chief Financial Officer,” ECF No. 9-2 ¶ 1, attesting that LMD had executed media buys under the purchase order “through Sunday, October 11, 2026, at an approximate cost of $19,000,000,” id. ¶ 8. Ms. Mehringer represented that DHS had “directed [LMD] not to make any additional media buys past October 11 and expects that [LMD] will submit its final invoice for services performed under the Order after that date.” Id. Once the final invoice is received, “that invoice will be paid for services already performed under the Order.” Id. Ms. Mehringer further represented that “[a]ny residual funding left under the Order after October 11, 2026, after all invoices have been paid, will be de-obligated.” Id. ¶ 9. Finally, Ms. Mehringer attested that “to the best of [her] knowledge and belief, [DHS] has no plans to make any additional media buys under the Order or to renew the Order or otherwise use DHS appropriated funds on any similar contracts for the creation or distribution of the media that is the subject of this lawsuit.” Id. ¶ 10. 11  The TRO motion has been fully briefed, ECF Nos. 3-1, 9, 10, and the court heard oral argument on the motion on October 15. Oct. 15, 2026 Minute Entry. 5 The DNC subsequently filed three status reports regarding additional ads available on the White House’s YouTube page, at least some of which the DNC had not previously identified to the court. See ECF Nos. 14, 21, 25. The DNC alleges that these additional ads were unlawfully developed by “White House Office personnel,” ECF No. 14, at 1; ECF No. 21, at 2, or with unspecified “staff time,” ECF No. 25, at 2. According to the DNC, MAGA Inc. has paid for at least some of these ads to air on television. See ECF No. 14, at 1; ECF No. 21, at 1. The DNC also submitted a fourth status report regarding discovery updates from parallel proceedings in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York indicating that “[White House Executive Office of the President (“EOP”)] staff compiled” some of the challenged ads. ECF No. 24, at 2. 6 E. Parallel Litigation in the Southern District of New York On the same day that the DNC filed this suit, Common Cause and other plaintiffs (collectively, the “Common Cause plaintiffs”) filed suit in the Southern District of New York against DHS, DHS Secretary Markwayne Mullin, OMB, OMB Director Russell Vought, the EOP, and White House Chief of Staff Susie Wiles. See Compl., Common Cause v. Dep’t of Homeland 5 Pending before the court is a substantially similar action filed by the Democratic Party of Wisconsin and Yee Leng Xiong against President Trump, DHS, DHS Secretary Markwayne Mullin, CBP, CBP Commissioner Rodney S. Scott, OMB, and OMB Director Russell Vought. See Compl., Democratic Party of Wis. v. Trump, No. 26-CV-3547 (D.D.C. Oct. 9, 2026), ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs in that case filed a notice of support of the DNC’s motion for a TRO. Notice, Democratic Party of Wis., No. 26-CV-3547 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2026), ECF No. 7. The court has directed the parties to address whether consolidation of these two matters would be appropriate. See Oct. 14, 2026 Minute Order. 6 The White House Office and OMB are both components within the EOP. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 10-11; see Sculimbrene v. Reno, 158 F. Supp. 2d 26, 29 (D.D.C. 2001). 12 Sec., No. 26-CV-8882 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2026), ECF No. 1. Like the DNC, the Common Cause plaintiffs challenge the use of federal funds appropriated to DHS to pay for the ads, which they claim are propaganda. See id. The next day, on the evening of October 8, the Common Cause plaintiffs filed a motion for a TRO and a stay under Section 705 of the APA. Mot., Common Cause, No. 26-CV-8882 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2026), ECF No. 25. The next morning, on October 9, the district court held an initial conference on the motion and ordered expedited briefing. See Order, Common Cause, No. 26-CV-8882 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2026), ECF No. 33. In support of their opposition to the TRO, the defendants included the same declaration from Ms. Mehringer attesting that DHS would not purchase any additional airtime beyond October 11. See Decl., Common Cause, No. 26-CV-8882 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2026), ECF No. 38. On October 11, upon the conclusion of briefing, the district court entered a TRO effective as of 6:45 p.m. that day. Order, Common Cause, No. 26-CV-8882 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2026), ECF No. 41. After the TRO went into effect, the Common Cause plaintiffs notified the district court that some of the challenged ads had continued to air on national television on October 12. Notice, Common Cause, No. 26-CV-8882 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2026), ECF No. 43. The district court thereafter permitted the Common Cause plaintiffs to proceed with limited discovery in connection with their preliminary injunction (“PI”) motion, scheduled a hearing on the PI motion for November 4, 2026, and extended the TRO through November 8, 2026. Order, Common Cause, No. 26-CV-8882 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2026), ECF No. 53. Upon consent motions from the parties, the district court has rescheduled the PI motion hearing to November 13, 2026, and extended the TRO through November 20, 2026. Order, Common Cause, No. 26-CV-8882 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2026), ECF No. 80. That litigation remains ongoing. 13  III. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Temporary Restraining Order A TRO is an extraordinary remedy meant to prevent serious and imminent harm in dire circumstances. To obtain one, “the moving party must show (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) that it would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction were not granted, (3) that an injunction would not substantially injure other interested parties, and (4) that the public interest would be furthered by the injunction.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006). When a government entity is a party to the case, the third and fourth factors merge. Pursuing Am.’s Greatness v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 831 F.3d 500, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)). Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), courts in this Circuit tended to employ a “sliding-scale” method in which “a strong showing on one factor could make up for a weaker showing on another.” Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2011). While the D.C. Circuit has considered abandoning the sliding-scale method for one that treats the substantial likelihood prong as “an independent, free-standing requirement,” id. at 393, it has yet to decide one way or the other, see Changji Esquel Textile Co. v. Raimondo, 40 F.4th 716, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2022). At the very least, however, the plaintiff must present a “serious legal question on the merits.” Changji Esquel Textile, 40 F.4th at 726 (quoting Sherley, 644 F.3d at 398). Given the ambiguity with respect to the sliding-scale approach, the court will consider all factors and only delve into their relevant weight if it would affect the outcome. See Costa v. Bazron, 456 F. Supp. 3d 126, 133 (D.D.C. 2020). 14  B. Stay Under Section 705 of the APA The APA permits a court reviewing agency action to “issue all necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective date of an agency action or to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings” if it is “necessary to prevent irreparable injury.” 5 U.S.C. § 705. The standard for an administrative stay is substantially the same as the standard for a TRO. Nken, 556 U.S. at 433-34. IV. DISCUSSION The DNC asserts that it has satisfied all the factors for a TRO. See ECF No. 3-1, at 8-25; ECF No. 10, at 2-18. Defendants’ primary argument in response is that no relief is warranted at this juncture because Defendants have ceased their purportedly unlawful conduct, so the DNC will not suffer any injury moving forward. See ECF No. 9, at 5-8. The court addresses each TRO factor in turn. A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits The DNC argues that Defendants developed and aired the challenged ads, which are “publicity or propaganda” in violation of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, Purpose Statute, and Anti-Deficiency Act. ECF No. 3-1, at 8-18. The DNC raises (1) an APA claim against OMB and DHS and (2) an ultra vires claim against the White House Office. 7 In response, Defendants argue that (1) the DNC’s APA claim fails because neither OMB nor DHS engaged in final agency action subject to APA review, and (2) the DNC’s ultra vires claim fails because the relevant statutes do not justify ultra vires review. ECF No. 9, at 8-15. In doing so, Defendants do not 7 Although the DNC’s complaint raises an ultra vires claim against President Trump, see ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 193-200, the DNC has clarified that it does not seek relief against the President, see ECF No. 10, at 14 n.3. 15 challenge the substantive merits of either claim. The court concludes that the DNC has established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its APA claim against OMB and DHS. Because that provides sufficient grounds to grant the TRO, the court declines to reach the DNC’s ultra vires claim against the White House Office. See AIDS Vaccine Advoc. Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 766 F. Supp. 3d 74, 82 (D.D.C. 2025) (“The Court need only find that [the] [p]laintiffs are likely to succeed on one of these claims for this factor to weigh in favor of a temporary restraining order.”). 8 1. Standing To obtain a TRO, “‘[a] plaintiff must show a likelihood of success encompass[ing] not only substantive theories but also establishment of jurisdiction,’ including standing to sue.” Cabrera v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 792 F. Supp 3d 91, 99-100 (D.D.C. 2025) (alterations in original) (quoting Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). This means that a “plaintiff cannot ‘rest on . . . mere allegations, but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts’ that, if ‘taken to be true,’ demonstrate a substantial likelihood of standing.” Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Presidential Advisory Comm’n on Election Integrity, 878 F.3d 371, 377 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). “To establish standing, a plaintiff must show: (1) an ‘injury in fact’; (2) a ‘causal connection between the injury’ 8 Because any relief granted must be “adequately tailored to the showing made at this stage,” AIDS Vaccine Advoc. Coal., 766 F. Supp. 3d at 84, the court’s relief will apply to the five ads that the DNC alleges were unlawfully aired using funds appropriated to DHS: (1) “The Country He Loves” or “Love Me” ad, (2) the “Maduro” ad, (3) the “Final Battle” ad, (4) the “Mount Rushmore” ad, and (5) the “American Military Power” ad, see ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 59-123. The court’s relief, at this juncture, will not apply to the remaining ads that the DNC primarily alleges were unlawfully developed using White House personnel, see ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 124-135, some of which appear to be on the White House’s YouTube page, see ECF No. 14, at 1-2; ECF No. 21, at 1; ECF No. 25, at 1-2. Both parties will, of course, have the opportunity to develop their claims further at the preliminary-injunction phase, where the record and therefore the appropriate relief may well evolve. 16 and the challenged action; and (3) a likelihood that the ‘injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.’” Cabrera, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 101 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61). Furthermore, “standing is assessed as of the time a suit commences,” meaning that post-complaint events will not deprive a plaintiff of standing. Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. United States, 570 F.3d 316, 324 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The court easily concludes that the DNC has met its burden. The DNC asserts that Defendants’ unlawful actions impose competitive harm on the DNC and its members, including Democratic candidates running for office. ECF No. 3-1, at 18-21; see ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 180-183. The court agrees. In Shays v. Federal Election Commission, 414 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005), the D.C. Circuit recognized that political candidates have standing to challenge the “illegal structuring of a competitive environment” in which “rival parties defend their concrete interests (e.g., their interest in . . . winning reelection).” Id. at 85-86. This type of standing is relevant “when a plaintiff challenges an improper benefit to a competitor” because political-competitor standing “recognizes that certain benefits predictably inflict concrete harms on the head-to-head competitors of their beneficiaries.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Exec. Off. of President (“LULAC”), 808 F. Supp. 3d 29, 56 (D.D.C. 2025) (citing Shays, 414 F.3d at 85-87.). Here, the DNC alleges that by unlawfully using public funds to develop and air political ads advancing Republican electoral interests, Defendants “fundamentally alter the environment,” Shays, 414 F.3d at 87, and necessarily cause Democratic campaign prospects to suffer, ECF No. 3-1, at 19-20; see ECF No. 3-5 ¶¶ 14-18. As the DNC explains, and as common sense dictates, election resources are finite. See ECF No. 3-5 ¶ 18. Thus, every public dollar spent on airing the challenged ads allows MAGA Inc.—which has already spent $25,000,000 in the 2025-26 federal election cycle to support Republican candidates and oppose Democratic candidates—to conserve 17 its resources for other political efforts adverse to the DNC. ECF No. 3-1, at 19-20; see ECF No. 3-5 ¶ 15 (“For every taxpayer dollar President Trump spends on his propaganda campaign, it is a dollar that MAGA Inc. can instead invest in paid media, get-out-the vote efforts, and direct voter communications.”). These harms are particularly acute in close political races in the final weeks before the November 2026 elections. See ECF No. 3-1, at 20; ECF No. 3-5 ¶¶ 11, 15. Defendants do not dispute any of these assertions. See generally ECF No. 9. Moreover, Defendants attest that their own conduct caused the federally funded national media campaign disseminating the challenged ads. See ECF No. 9-2 ¶¶ 3-6. Accordingly, the court concludes that the DNC has satisfied its burden of establishing a concrete and imminent injury that is traceable to Defendants’ conduct. Furthermore, that injury is redressable by this court, which can enjoin Defendants from further disseminating the challenged ads in the national media market. In response, under an argument heading principally addressing “irreparable harm,” see ECF No. 9, at 6, Defendants contend that the DNC cannot establish standing because “no more federal funds will be used to air the[] [challenged] ads [after October 11],” id. at 7. To begin, the record evidence belies that assertion: at minimum, challenged ads with the “Paid for the U.S. Government” disclosure continued to air the very next day, on October 12. See, e.g., ECF No. 10-1, at 8-13, 58-66. Next, even accepting Defendants’ representation as true, the argument still fails, regardless of whether it is construed as one relating to irreparable harm or to standing. See ECF No. 9, at 8 (asserting that “whether framed in terms of substantive principles governing the grant of equitable relief or standing, this Court cannot grant the relief Plaintiff requests”). For clarity, the court will address Defendants’ irreparable harm argument in the relevant section below. See infra Part IV.B. But to offer a preview, the DNC correctly points out that Defendants’ 18 argument is best understood as one of mootness, and Defendants fail to carry their burden of showing that the DNC no longer has a live controversy. See ECF No. 10, at 5-6. In all events, the DNC has met its burden of establishing standing. To be sure, a plaintiff “must establish a substantial risk of future injury” to obtain forward-looking relief. Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 69 (2024). But as courts have often explained, standing is determined “by examining the facts at the time the suit was filed.” Am. Fed’n of Lab. & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. Dep’t of Lab., 836 F. Supp. 3d 137, 157 (D.D.C. 2026) (emphasis added) (citing Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554, U.S. 724, 734 (2008)); see Garcia v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 168 F. Supp. 3d 50, 65 (D.D.C. 2016) (“[W]hereas a standing inquiry is concerned with the presence of injury, causation, and redressability at the time a complaint is filed, a mootness inquiry scrutinizes the presence of these elements after filing—i.e., at the time of a court’s decision.”). “[A]t the time [the DNC] sought relief from [this] court,” Advanced Mgmt. Tech., Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin. 211 F.3d 633, 636 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the challenged ads were undisputedly still airing on national television. That suffices for standing purposes. Accordingly, at this juncture, the court finds that the DNC has demonstrated a substantial likelihood of standing. 9 9 As an alternative ground for standing, the DNC asserts that the organization and its members, including Democratic candidates, are directly harmed by being forced to compete in unlawfully structured elections. ECF No. 3-1, at 18; see ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 176-179. To support this argument, the DNC points to an expansive theory of candidate standing recently recognized by the Supreme Court in Bost v. Illinois Board of Elections, 607 U.S. 71 (2026). In Bost, the Court held that political candidates have standing to challenge “the rules that govern the counting of votes in their elections”—such as a rule extending a ballot-receipt deadline—“regardless [of] whether those rules harm their electoral prospects or increase the cost of their campaigns.” 607 U.S. at 82. The Court reasoned that candidates’ “interest[s] extend[] to the integrity of the election—and the democratic process by which they earn or lose the support of the people they seek to