Full Opinion

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified. IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Sep 30 2026, 10:24 am Griffin Nate, CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Appellant-Plaintiff Court of Appeals and Tax Court v. St. Joseph County Election Board and Dan Schaetzle, Appellees-Defendants September 30, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-PL-691 Appeal from the St. Joseph Circuit Court The Honorable John E. Broden, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 71C01-2602-PL-30 Opinion by Judge Mathias Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-691 | September 30, 2026 Page 1 of 10 Judge Weissmann concurs. Judge Pyle concurs in result without opinion. Mathias, Judge. [1] Griffin Nate, in his capacity as a registered voter in the relevant election district, challenged Dan Schaetzle’s declaration of candidacy for a St. Joseph County Council position during Indiana’s 2026 primary election. The St. Joseph County Election Board rejected Nate’s challenge, and Nate sought judicial review. After a hearing, the trial court affirmed the Board’s decision on its merits. [2] Indiana Code section 3-8-1-2(d) (2025) expressly authorizes any “registered voter of the election district that a candidate seeks to represent” to challenge that candidate’s declaration of candidacy to the county election board. And Indiana Code section 3-6-5-34 expressly authorizes a party who disagrees with the board’s decision to appeal that decision to a local trial court. [3] But the Indiana Supreme Court has recently made clear that statutory permission alone is insufficient to invoke the power of Indiana’s judiciary. City of Gary v. Nicholson, 190 N.E.3d 349, 351-52 (Ind. 2022). Rather, to seek judicial relief, our Supreme Court holds that the party must, under the Indiana Constitution, demonstrate an injury-in-fact. Id. Our Supreme Court has further stated that our legislature has no authority under the Indiana Constitution to Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-691 | September 30, 2026 Page 2 of 10 “expand[ ]or restrict” that constitutional requirement. Solarize Ind., Inc. v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 182 N.E.3d 212, 216 n.2 (Ind. 2022). [4] Nate has not demonstrated an injury-in-fact as required under the Indiana Constitution to seek judicial relief. We therefore vacate the trial court’s judgment and dismiss this appeal with prejudice. Facts and Procedural History [5] Prior to the 2026 primary election, Schaetzle submitted a declaration of candidacy form with the St. Joseph County Clerk. In that form, Schaetzle declared himself a candidate for the office of County Council, District C. In accordance with Indiana Code section 3-8-2-7(a)(4)(A), Schaetzle claimed an affiliation with the Republican Party based on his having voted in the two most recent Republican Party primary elections in Indiana. [6] Nate is a registered voter in the election district that Schaetzle sought to represent, and Nate is also a member of the Republican Party. Following Schaetzle’s declaration of candidacy, Nate filed a challenge to Schaetzle’s candidacy. In support of his challenge, Nate represented to the St. Joseph County Election Board the following: “Schaetzle is ineligible to be a candidate for the Republican Party nomination for the office of St. Joseph County Council Member District C because the Indiana Republican Party has determined that he is not a Republican in Good-Standing.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 3, p. 113 (emphasis removed). The Chairperson for the St. Joseph County Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-691 | September 30, 2026 Page 3 of 10 Republican Party filed her own challenge to Schaetzle’s candidacy on the same ground. [7] The Board held a hearing on the challenges and then unanimously denied them. But only Nate sought judicial review of the Board’s decision; the St. Joseph County Republican Party did not seek judicial review. After its own hearing on Nate’s petition, the trial court affirmed the Board’s decision. Schaetzle went on to lose the primary election. [8] This appeal ensued. Standard of Review [9] This appeal turns on the question of constitutionally sufficient standing. We review such issues de novo. O’Connell v. Clay, 267 N.E.3d 994, 999 (Ind. 2025). Discussion and Decision [10] Nate appeals the trial court’s judgment for the Board. According to Nate, the Board and the trial court erred in allowing Schaetzle to affiliate himself with the Republican Party on the 2026 primary ballot. We conclude that Nate lacks standing under the Indiana Constitution to seek judicial relief on his claim. [11] Indiana Code section 3-8-2-7 sets out the various requirements for a declaration of candidacy. Subsection 7(a)(4), the affiliation provision, includes a required “statement of the candidate’s party affiliation.” The affiliation provision further provides as follows: Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-691 | September 30, 2026 Page 4 of 10 For purposes of this subdivision, a candidate is considered to be affiliated with a political party only if any of the following applies: (A) The two (2) most recent primary elections in Indiana in which the candidate voted were primary elections held by the party with which the candidate claims affiliation. If the candidate cast a nonpartisan ballot at an election held at either of the two (2) most recent primary elections in which the candidate voted, a certification by the county chairman under clause (B) is required. (B) The county chairman of: (i) the political party with which the candidate claims affiliation; and (ii) the county in which the candidate resides; certifies that the candidate is a member of the political party. The declaration of candidacy must inform candidates how party affiliation is determined under this subdivision and permit the candidate to indicate on the declaration of candidacy which of clauses (A) or (B) applies to the candidate. If a candidate claims party affiliation under clause (B), the candidate must attach to the candidate’s declaration of candidacy the written certification of the county chairman required by clause (B). I.C. § 3-8-2-7(a)(4). [12] As noted above, Schaetzle affiliated himself with the Republican Party in accordance with clause (A) of the affiliation provision. Schaetzle’s affiliation with the Republican Party was not met with Nate’s approval, and Nate filed a Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-691 | September 30, 2026 Page 5 of 10 challenge to Schaetzle’s candidacy with the Board in accordance with Indiana Code section 3-8-1-2(d), which permits any “registered voter of the election district that a candidate seeks to represent” to challenge that candidate’s candidacy to the county election board. Nate’s argument at all times has been that Schaetzle’s affiliation with the Republican Party on the primary ballot was erroneous because Schaetzle was in fact not a member in good standing with the Indiana Republican Party. [13] However, while Indiana Code section 3-8-1-2(d) gives any registered voter in the relevant election district a statutory right to challenge a candidate before a county election board, our Supreme Court has made clear that statutory permission alone is insufficient to seek judicial relief. Specifically, in City of Gary, our Supreme Court considered a statute that appeared to confer standing to seek judicial relief upon any “person lawfully domiciled in Indiana.” 190 N.E.3d at 351 (quoting I.C. § 5-2-18.2-5). The plaintiffs asserted that that statute defined the entirety of their standing requirements. But our Supreme Court disagreed. Id. The Court recognized that the statute did not contain “an injury- in-fact requirement,” and, “[b]ecause the plaintiffs allege no injury, there is no justiciable dispute.” Id. That is, the Court held that complying with the statutory language was by itself insufficient to “meet our constitutional requirements for conferring standing” to seek judicial relief. Id. at 352. [14] Our Supreme Court has explained that standing under the Indiana Constitution is based on our constitutional separation of powers. Hoosier Contractors, LLC v. Gardner, 212 N.E.3d 1234, 1238 (Ind. 2023). Accordingly, in Solarize our Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-691 | September 30, 2026 Page 6 of 10 Supreme Court declared that “the legislature cannot expand—or restrict— beyond constitutional limits the class of persons who possess standing” to seek judicial relief. 182 N.E.3d at 216 n.2. That is, the Indiana Constitution’s implied restriction of the exercise of judicial power to those who show and maintain the ability to show an injury-in-fact cannot be altered by statute. Id. [15] Accordingly, Nate cannot only rely on his status as a registered voter in the relevant election district to seek judicial relief following the Board’s rejection of his challenge to Schaetzle’s candidacy. Rather, to have standing to invoke the power of Indiana’s judiciary, Nate must further show that he has suffered, or is in immediate danger of suffering, “a direct injury as a result of the complained- of conduct.” Hoosier Contractors, 212 N.E.3d at 1238 (cleaned up). And, again, the complained-of conduct is Schaetzle appearing on the 2026 primary ballot as a member of the Republican Party. [16] In his attempt to show that he has sufficient standing under the Indiana Constitution, Nate argues that allowing Schaetzle to appear on the 2026 primary ballot as a member of the Republican Party “resulted in an unconstitutional application” of the affiliation provision by violating “the First Amendment rights of the political party and its adherents” to associate, and not to associate, with certain persons. Appellant’s Br. at 15-16. In other words, Nate asserts that judicial relief is necessary to remedy (or to avoid future injury to) both his and the Indiana Republican Party’s First Amendment freedom-of- association rights, namely, the right to exclude Schaetzle from appearing on the ballot as affiliated with the Republican Party. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-691 | September 30, 2026 Page 7 of 10 [17] But Nate is not the Indiana Republican Party, and he has no standing to assert its rights. Indeed, the local party chairperson separately sought—on behalf of the Party—to have Schaetzle removed from the primary ballot. But, upon the Board’s unanimous decision to not remove him, she chose not to seek judicial relief. That was the end of the Republican Party’s participation on this question. [18] And Nate erroneously conflates the Indiana Republican Party’s standing with his own. In support of his position that he and the Party have the same standing, he cites the Supreme Court of the United States for the proposition that “any interference with the freedom of a [political] party is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of its adherents.” Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 215 (1986) (cleaned up). But that statement from the Supreme Court was in approval of a political party advocating on behalf of its members (e.g., associational standing). Id. The statement was not made as Nate seeks to use it—as a member advocating for the rights of the political party when the political party has itself not sought to advocate for those rights. We are therefore unpersuaded by Nate’s reliance on Tashjian. [19] Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States has identified what must be shown to establish an injury-in-fact under the First Amendment’s freedom-of- association provision. The Court recently made clear that “[a]n injury in fact does not arise only when a defendant causes a tangible harm to a plaintiff, like a physical injury or monetary loss. It can also arise when a defendant burdens a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” First Choice Women’s Res. Ctrs., Inc. v. Davenport, 608 U.S. 174, 189 (2026). Such a burden can occur when “groups and Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-691 | September 30, 2026 Page 8 of 10 individuals . . . cease or modify protected First Amendment” behavior due to the complained-of conduct. Id. (emphasis added). [20] Thus, to establish standing in his own right to pursue judicial relief from an Indiana court on his federal constitutional claim, Nate was required to demonstrate that the complained-of conduct—Schaetzle appearing on the primary ballot as affiliated with the Republican Party—caused Nate to cease or modify his protected association rights in some way. Nate has made no such allegation or factual showing. He has therefore failed to establish standing to seek judicial relief on his purported First Amendment claim. [21] Finally, we briefly note that the 2026 primary is over, and Schaetzle lost. Thus, there are good arguments before us to dismiss this appeal as moot. But doing so would leave the trial court’s judgment in place as valid. As we conclude that Nate lacked constitutionally sufficient standing to seek judicial relief in the first place, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and dismiss this appeal with prejudice. [22] The trial court’s judgment is vacated, and this appeal is dismissed with prejudice. Weissmann, J., concurs. Pyle, J., concurs in result without opinion. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-691 | September 30, 2026 Page 9 of 10 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Sean M. Surrisi Wyland, Humphrey, Clevenger & Surrisi, LLP Plymouth, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE ST. JOSEPH COUNTY ELECTION BOARD Michael P. Smyth Andrew B. Jones Jones Law Office LLC South Bend, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE DAN SCHAETZLE Peter J. Agostino Anderson, Agostino & Keller, P.C. South Bend, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PL-691 | September 30, 2026 Page 10 of 10