R. Mancini v. Delaware County, PA
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledOctober 20, 2026
Docket1516 C.D. 2026
JudgeCovey
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Robert Mancini, :
Appellant :
:
v. :
: No. 1516 C.D. 2026
Delaware County, Pennsylvania : Submitted: October 9, 2026
BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE STELLA M. TSAI, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY FILED: October 20, 2026
Robert Mancini (Mancini), pro se, appeals from the Delaware County
(County) Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) September 28, 2026 order denying his
Application for Emergency Relief and Seeking a Preliminary Injunction
(Application). Mancini also filed in this Court an Emergency Application for
Preservation and Injunction Pending Appeal, and for Expedited Consideration
(Emergency Application). Essentially, there are two issues before this Court: (1)
whether the trial court properly denied the Application;1 and (2) whether this Court
1
Mancini presents three questions for this Court’s review: (1) whether the trial court may
preserve election infrastructure and require a county to report an admitted cyber incident, request
and cooperate with an authorized governmental examination, and refrain from deploying
implicated components until the responsible officials determine whether those components remain
secure and compliant - without the trial court itself finding that a compromise occurred; (2)
whether the trial court committed an error of law by effectively requiring Mancini to prove that
the election system had already been compromised before granting the requested relief; and (3)
whether the trial court’s decision lacked reasonable grounds where the record established a County
should grant the Emergency Application. After review, this Court affirms the trial
court’s order and denies Mancini’s Emergency Application.
On July 17, 2026, Mancini filed the Application in the trial court,
therein alleging that on “June 26, 2026, [the] County became aware of ‘unauthorized
activity’ in computer systems within the County” (the Breach), and that the “election
[information technology (]IT[)] infrastructure [(Election IT Infrastructure)] is
connected to the [I]nternet.” Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 13a-15a (emphasis
omitted). Mancini alleged that the parties responsible for the Breach had access to
the County’s computer systems long before the County discovered the Breach, and
prior to the 2026 primary election. See R.R. at 15a. Mancini further averred that
because the Election IT Infrastructure, which uses the Hart Verity Voting 2.7 system
(Verity Voting 2.7),2 is purportedly connected to the Internet, the Breach must have
compromised the Verity Voting 2.7 as well. Mancini requested the trial court to
enter a preliminary injunction to prevent the County from using its electronic voting
machines.
On September 9, 2026, the trial court held a hearing on Mancini’s
Application. Mancini presented no testimony, but offered the following evidence:
(1) a County press release acknowledging that a County computer system Breach
occurred on June 26, 2026; (2) a screenshot of the County Election Results website;
(3) the internal IT incident reporting policy for the Pennsylvania Office of
Administration (IT Reporting Policy); (4) a screenshot intending to show the testing
cyber incident, election functions connected to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s computer
network, repeated removable-media transfers between election system components and a network
computer, an incomplete investigation, and no competent evidence of effective segregation,
compliant media handling, authorized examination, or clearance for continued deployment. See
Mancini Br. at 5-6. These issues are subsumed in the stated issue and will be addressed
accordingly.
2
“Verity Voting 2.7 is a paper-based voting system that provides end-to-end election
support, from defining an election to generating final reports.” R.R. at 229a.
2
lab that certified the Verity Voting 2.7; (5) the Pennsylvania Department of State’s
Certification Test Report for Verity Voting 2.7 (see R.R. at 142a-184a); and (6) the
record of the Verity 2.7.1 trusted build (see R.R. at 185a-189a). Mancini then rested
his case-in-chief.
The County presented its Director of Elections James Allen (Director
Allen), who explained that the election system, i.e., the devices the County used for
vote tabulation, is not connected to the Internet, has never been connected to the
Internet, and the County does not plan to connect it to the Internet. See R.R. at 73a-
74a. Director Allen testified, specifically, and repeatedly, that the election system
was not subject to the Breach. See id. at 81a-82a, 87a-89a.
On September 18, 2026, Mancini filed a Post-Hearing Memorandum
and a Proposed Order. On September 23, 2026, the County filed its Post-Hearing
Brief. On September 24, 2026, Mancini filed a “Reply Brief and Reply to New
Matter.” R.R. at 327a. On September 28, 2026, the trial court denied the
Application. On September 28, 2026, Mancini filed an Emergency Motion for
Reconsideration and requested the trial court to issue a stay pending appeal. On
September 30, 2026, Mancini appealed to this Court.
On October 3, 2026, Mancini filed in this Court the Emergency
Application. Also on October 3, 2026, Mancini filed in this Court an Application
for Leave to File his Brief and Reproduced Record Before Issuance of the Ordinary
Briefing Schedule (Application for Leave to File) for an accelerated merits schedule
and disposition, and for leave to submit a short supplemental brief confined to any
factual finding or legal rationale first supplied in any opinion the trial court may file
pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Rule) 1925(a) (Rule 1925(a)
Opinion).3 By October 5, 2026 Order, this Court granted Mancini’s Application for
3
The trial court did not issue an opinion in support of its order.
3
Leave to File, and directed that the matter be submitted for expedited disposition on
the papers. That same day, Mancini filed his brief and Reproduced Record, and a
Preliminary Statement and Direct Answer (Preliminary Statement). The County
neither filed an answer to the Emergency Application nor a brief. On October 9,
2026, Mancini filed a reply brief.4
I. Mancini’s Appeal
Initially,
an appellate court reviews an order granting or denying a
preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion. Summit
Towne C[tr.], Inc. v. Shoe Show of Rocky Mount, Inc., . . .
828 A.2d 995, 1000 (Pa. 2003). Under this highly
deferential standard of review, an appellate court does not
inquire into the merits of the controversy, but examines the
record “to determine if there were any apparently
reasonable grounds for the action of the court below.” Id.,
(quoting Roberts v. B[d.] of Dirs. of Sch. Dist., . . . 341
A.2d 475, 478 (Pa. 1975)). “Apparently reasonable
grounds” exist to support a [trial] court’s denial of
injunctive relief where the [trial] court has properly
found that any one of the six “essential prerequisites”
for a preliminary injunction is not satisfied. Id. at 1002.
The six essential prerequisites that a moving party must
demonstrate to obtain a preliminary injunction are as
follows: (1) the injunction is necessary to prevent
immediate and irreparable harm that cannot be
compensated adequately by damages; (2) greater injury
would result from refusing the injunction than from
granting it, and, concomitantly, the issuance of an
injunction will not substantially harm other interested
4
As permitted by this Court’s October 5, 2026 Order which stated that Mancini “may file
with the Court four copies of a reply brief, if any, including any response to the trial court’s Rule
1925(a) [O]pinion[,]” Mancini filed what he characterized as a “Reply Brief” despite that the
County did not file a brief.
4
parties in the proceedings; (3) the preliminary injunction
will properly restore the parties to their status as it existed
immediately prior to the alleged wrongful conduct; (4) the
party seeking injunctive relief has a clear right to relief and
is likely to prevail on the merits; (5) the injunction is
reasonably suited to abate the offending activity; and[] (6)
the preliminary injunction will not adversely affect the
public interest. Warehime v. Warehime, . . . 860 A.2d 41,
46-47 (Pa. 2004) (citing Summit Towne C[tr.], Inc., 828
A.2d at 1001).
SEIU Healthcare Pa. v. Commonwealth, 104 A.3d 495, 501-02 (Pa. 2014) (bold and
underline emphasis added; footnote omitted).
“Because the grant of a preliminary injunction is a harsh
and extraordinary remedy, it is to be granted only when
and if each [factor] has been fully and completely
established.” Pa. AFL-CIO by George v. Commonwealth,
683 A.2d 691, 694 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (emphasis in
original). However, “if the petitioner fails to establish any
one of them, there is no need to address the others.” Lee
Publ[’]ns, Inc. v. Dickinson Sch[.] of Law, 848 A.2d 178,
189 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (en banc) . . . (quoting C[nty.] of
Allegheny v. Commonwealth, . . . 544 A.2d 1305, 1307
(Pa. 1988)).
Cutler v. Chapman, 289 A.3d 139, 150 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023).
With respect to irreparable harm,
[a p]etitioner [is] required to present “concrete evidence”
demonstrating “actual proof of irreparable harm.”
Greenmoor, Inc. v. Burchick Constr[.] Co., Inc., 908 A.2d
310, 314 (Pa. Super. 2006). A claim of irreparable harm
cannot be based on speculation and hypothesis, and for
purposes of a preliminary injunction, the harm must be
irreversible before it is deemed irreparable. Id. at 314; see
also Kiddo v. Am[.] Fed[’n] of State (Pa. Cmwlth.[] No.
468 C.D. 2019, filed Aug[.] 3, 2020)[5] . . . (quoting Novak
5
This Court’s unreported memorandum opinions filed after January 15, 2008, may be cited
“for [their] persuasive value, but not as binding precedent.” Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth
5
v. Commonwealth, . . . 523 A.2d 318, 320 ([Pa.] 1987), and
stating that “the alleged harm or consequences must not be
speculative in nature and [that] ‘speculative considerations
. . . cannot form the basis for issuing [a preliminary
injunction]’”).
Cutler, 289 A.3d at 154-55.
Here, Director Allen testified repeatedly and emphatically that the
County’s election system is not connected to the County’s website and is not
connected to the Internet. Thus, according to Director Allen, the Breach of the
County’s computer system could not have affected the County’s election system.
As fact-finder, the trial court maintains exclusive province
over matters involving the credibility of witnesses and the
weight afforded to the evidence. In re Penn-Delco Sch[.]
Dist[.], 903 A.2d 600, 608 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) . . . . The
trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all
credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the
evidence.
Ziegler v. City of Reading, 216 A.3d 1192, 1202 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). The trial court
as fact-finder was free to credit Allen’s testimony. Because Director Allen was the
only witness who testified and the only other evidence presented during the hearing
was Mancini’s documentary evidence, this Court can infer from the trial court’s
decision denying the Application that it found Director Allen credible.
Importantly, here, Mancini did not testify and offered no other
testimony in his case-in-chief. Rather, Mancini only presented documentary
evidence relating to the existence of the Breach, a County Election Results website
screenshot, the IT Reporting Policy, and technical documents relating to the
County’s election devices. Because Director Allen testified that the Breach of the
Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a). Kiddo is cited for its persuasive
value.
6
County’s computer system could not have affected the County’s election system, it
was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that Mancini did not meet his burden
of proving that the injunction is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable
harm. Mancini’s supposition that the County system’s Breach infected the election
system and will affect the vote tabulation in the election, i.e., the irreparable harm,
is simply speculation. Thus, Mancini did not provide the requisite “‘concrete
evidence’ demonstrating ‘actual proof of irreparable harm.’” Cutler, 289 A.3d at
154 (quoting Greenmoor, 908 A.2d at 314). This deficiency alone constituted
reasonable grounds for the trial court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. See
Cutler.6 Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the Application.
II. Mancini’s Emergency Application
In his Emergency Application, Mancini requested this Court to issue a
stay or enjoin the trial court’s order. Rule 1732 governs the filing of an application
for a stay or injunction pending appeal. Rule 1732(a) provides that an application
for a stay “must ordinarily be made in the first instance to the trial court[.]”
Pa.R.A.P. 1732(a). Notwithstanding, Rule 1732(b) states that an application for a
stay of a trial court’s order
may be made to the appellate court or to a judge thereof,
but the application shall show that application to the trial
court for the relief sought is not practicable, or that the trial
6
Although the trial court did not make any factual findings or credibility determination,
this Court need not remand to the trial court because Mancini did not present any evidence on the
required factors for a preliminary injunction. See Dep’t of Agric. by Redding v. Miller, 329 A.3d
145, 152 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025) (wherein this Court reversed the trial court’s partial grant of a
preliminary injunction where the trial court did not make a finding that there would be irreparable
harm without a preliminary injunction, stating that although the trial court did not make any factual
findings in support of its preliminary injunction order, “it would not make sense for th[is] Court to
remand for the trial court to make [] finding[s] because [the petitioner] presented no evidence
whatsoever” on the required factors).
7
court has denied an application, or has failed to afford the
relief which the applicant requested, with the reasons
given by the trial court for its action.
Pa.R.A.P. 1732(b). In his Emergency Application, Mancini explained that in his
September 28, 2026 Emergency Motion for Reconsideration he requested the trial
court to issue a stay pending appeal, but the trial court did not rule on his request.
Given the limited time before the election, this Court concludes that it would not be
practicable to wait for the trial court to deny Mancini’s Emergency Motion for
Reconsideration before ruling on his Emergency Application in this Court.
This Court has explained:
It is well established that a stay pending appeal is
warranted only if:
1. The [moving party] makes a strong
showing that he is likely to prevail on the
merits[;]
2. The [moving party] has shown that without
the requested relief, he will suffer irreparable
injury[;]
3. The issuance of a stay will not substantially
harm other interested parties in the
proceedings[; and]
4. The issuance of a stay will not adversely
affect the public interest.
Pa. Pub[.] Util[.] Comm’n v. Process Gas Consumers
Grp., . . . 467 A.2d 805, 808-09 (Pa. 1983). Applicants
must make a strong showing on each of the above criteria
in order to justify the issuance of a stay. Id.
Bethke v. City of Phila., 282 A.3d 884, 888 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022).
Mancini’s Emergency Application and his Preliminary Statement refer
to the evidence he presented to the trial court in support of his argument that he is
entitled to a stay. As stated above, because Mancini’s supposition that the County
8
system’s Breach infected the election system and will affect the vote tabulation in
the upcoming election, i.e., the irreparable harm, is simply speculation, Mancini did
not furnish the requisite “‘concrete evidence’ demonstrating ‘actual proof of
irreparable harm.’” Cutler, 289 A.3d at 154 (quoting Greenmoor, 908 A.2d at 314).
Since Mancini cannot show that without the requested relief, he will suffer
irreparable injury, he cannot justify the issuance of a stay. See Bethke. Accordingly,
this Court denies Mancini’s Emergency Application.
For all of the above reasons, the trial court’s order is affirmed.
___________________________________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
9
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Robert Mancini, :
Appellant :
:
v. :
: No. 1516 C.D. 2026
Delaware County, Pennsylvania :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 20th day of October, 2026, the Delaware County
Common Pleas Court’s September 28, 2026 order is AFFIRMED. Robert Mancini’s
Emergency Application for Preservation and Injunction Pending Appeal, and for
Expedited Consideration is DENIED.
___________________________________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge