Full Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 26-2469 AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION; AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY, Appellants v. ANTHONY J. ALBENCE, in his official capacity as State Elec- tion Commissioner for the State of Delaware; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF DELAWARE _____________________________ On Appeal from the U.S. District Court, D. Del. Judge Jennifer L. Hall, No. 1:26-cv-00445 Before: HARDIMAN, BIBAS, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges Argued: Aug. 10, 2026; Filed: Aug. 31, 2026 _____________________________ OPINION OF THE COURT BIBAS, Circuit Judge. A court considering a preliminary injunction should weigh not only the merits and risk of irrepa- rable injury, but also the balance of equities and public interest. See Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Ordinarily, the bal- ance of equities strongly favors preserving the status quo, not disrupting it. And if the case would survive through final judg- ment without a preliminary injunction, issuing one may well be unnecessary. The challengers here claim that Delaware’s campaign- finance disclosure law violates the First Amendment. But by asking for a preliminary injunction, they seek to disrupt the decade-long status quo, and they show no need for an injunc- tion to keep the case alive. Plus, they have made almost no fac- tual record to flesh out their likelihood of success and the inju- ries they fear in the meantime. So we will AFFIRM the District Court’s order denying the preliminary injunction. I. ANOTHER CHALLENGE TO THE DELAWARE ELECTIONS DISCLOSURE ACT In 2012, Delaware enacted the Elections Disclosure Act. The Act applies to groups that spend more than $500 on “elec- tioneering communication[s]” within 30 days of a primary election or 60 days of a general election. 15 Del. C. §§ 8002(10), 8031(a). Those groups must publicly disclose the names and addresses of anyone who gave them more than $100 during that election cycle. § 8031(a). Disclosure is not limited to donors who earmark their donations for political ads or for use in Delaware. Nor may donors avoid disclosure by giving money on the condition that it cannot be used for political ads. And because of how the Act defines election cycles, groups may have to disclose donors who gave up to four years before the election. See § 8002(11)(a)(1); Appellant’s Br. 7. More than a decade ago, this Court upheld the Act against a First Amendment challenge, applying “exacting scrutiny.” Del. Strong Fams. v. Att’y Gen. of Del., 793 F.3d 304, 309–13 (3d Cir. 2015). Six years later, in a case that did not involve campaign finance, the Supreme Court clarified how to apply 2 “exacting scrutiny” to donor-disclosure laws. Ams. for Pros- perity Found. v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595, 611–12 (2021). Five years after Bonta, the challengers filed this suit, claim- ing that Bonta abrogated Delaware Strong Families. They raise both facial and as-applied First Amendment challenges. The challengers are nonprofit corporations that engage in issue advocacy across the nation. They have not and do not currently run electioneering communications in Delaware. But they plan to do so for the upcoming November 2026 election—if the Dis- trict Court enjoins enforcement of the Act. Seven weeks after the challengers sued, the District Court held a preliminary-injunction hearing. The challengers put on no live witnesses and offered no affidavits from donors who feared disclosure. For their evidence, they relied entirely on a single employee’s declarations that the challengers’ employees, supporters, and donors have faced threats before. The allega- tions were “generic” and not tied specifically to election dona- tions. App. 11. On this “very slim” evidentiary record, the District Court denied the preliminary injunction. App. 6. It found no likeli- hood of success on the facial challenge because Delaware Strong Families had upheld the Act and Bonta did not clearly abrogate that ruling. It also doubted that the challengers would succeed on their as-applied challenge because the “generic, undated” evidence of threats to the organization, “as opposed to specific donors,” did not show that disclosing donor infor- mation would likely expose donors to harm. App. 12. Plus, the court noted, the Act had been “on the books” and enforced for more than a decade. App. 13–14. Thus, it left in place the status 3 quo, “exercis[ing] [its] discretion to decline to enter the injunc- tion.” App. 14. We have jurisdiction to review the denial of a preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We review the District Court’s legal rulings de novo, its findings of fact for clear error, and its ultimate decision for abuse of discretion. Del. State Sportsmen’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Del. Dep’t of Safety & Homeland Sec., 108 F.4th 194, 198 (3d Cir. 2024). We review “deferen- tially,” because “the denial of a preliminary injunction is almost always based on an abbreviated set of facts, requiring a delicate balancing that is the responsibility of the district judge.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). II. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS EXIST TO KEEP CASES ALIVE Equitable relief is exceptional, reserved for “extraordinary cases, which are exceptions to general rules.” The Federalist No. 83, at 505 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (footnote omitted). Because injunctions can inflict as much harm as they prevent, equity traditionally aims to “arrive at a nice adjustment and reconciliation between the competing claims” of harm. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). Not only does the plaintiff fear harm from being denied an injunction; the defendant state, if it loses, suffers irreparable injury from hav- ing enforcement of its law enjoined. Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579, 602 n.17 (2018); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1351 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers); Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., 4 in chambers); Labrador v. Poe, 144 S. Ct. 921, 923 (2024) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the grant of stay). Balancing harms is especially fraught for preliminary injunc- tions, where courts must rule quickly based on limited infor- mation. Courts risk making mistakes. That risk is high because courts do not know for certain who will ultimately win on the merits, let alone whether a final injunction will follow. The court makes “only a prediction about the merits of the case.” United States v. Loc. 560 (I.B.T.), 974 F.2d 315, 330 (3d Cir. 1992). And it makes that prediction on thin evidence. “Affida- vits drafted by lawyers are poor substitutes for discovery, live testimony, and cross-examination.” Del. State Sportsmen’s, 108 F.4th at 200. Given these unknowns, the preliminary injunction’s func- tion “is not to take whatever steps are necessary to prevent irreparable harm.” O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 1012 (10th Cir. 2004) (McConnell, J., concurring). Instead, it is “merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339, 346 (2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the court acts to maintain the status quo, “to preserve the court’s power to render a meaningful decision after a trial on the mer- its.” Del. State Sportsmen’s, 108 F.4th at 201 (internal quota- tion marks omitted). Though some harm may be suffered either way, the status quo helps courts choose the lesser of two evils. First, the harm from temporarily changing the status quo is likely greater than the harm from temporarily leaving it alone. “Disruption is 5 expensive,” and altering the status quo only to change it back disrupts things twice, rather than once at the end. O Centro, 389 F.3d at 1017 (McConnell, J., concurring). Second, the status quo gives courts a glimpse (albeit a hazy one) into how much each party would suffer in the meantime. A “party’s willingness to put up with a situation in the past can serve as an indication that the party’s injury is not as serious as alleged, or that the party has implicitly consented to the sup- posed injury.” Id.; see also Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 276 (2d Cir. 1985). Finally, altering the status quo makes the court complicit in whatever harm its preliminary action might inflict. A court in equity should refuse to be “the abettor of iniquity.” Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 456 F.2d 592, 598 (3d Cir. 1972) (internal quotation marks omitted). So a “judicial version of Hippocrates’ ancient injunction to physicians—above all, to do no harm—counsels against forcing changes before there has been a determination of the parties’ legal rights.” O Centro, 389 F.3d at 1012 (McConnell, J., concurring). For all these reasons, “[w]hen a statute has long been on the books and enforced, … it is exceedingly unusual for a litigant who challenges its constitutionality to obtain (or even to seek) a preliminary injunction against its continued enforcement.” Id. at 1018; see also Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survi- vors, 468 U.S. 1323, 1324 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers). Old statutes are not immune from preliminary relief, but their age heightens the challengers’ burden. 6 III. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY PRESERVED THE STATUS QUO In exercising its discretion to grant or deny a preliminary injunction, a district court looks to four guideposts: (1) the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the risk of irreparable injury absent preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities; and (4) the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. When the government is the defendant, factors three and four merge. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). In the district court, the party asking for the preliminary injunction must per- suade the court “by a clear showing” that it deserves one. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). And on appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunction, appellants “bear[ ] a heavy burden.” Chesimard v. Mulcahy, 570 F.2d 1184, 1187 (3d Cir. 1978). Here, they have not borne it. A. The likelihood of success is hazy The challengers argue forcefully that they are likely to suc- ceed on the merits. True, Delaware Strong Families rejected a similar First Amendment challenge. But, the challengers urge, Bonta tightened up the narrow-tailoring requirement. Compare 594 U.S. at 608, with 793 F.3d at 311–12 (analyzing only whether the law bears a “substantial relation” to an important state interest). And, the challengers argue, Delaware Strong Families did not consider the Act’s nationwide scope or four- year lookback provision, provisions that they attack today. 793 F.3d at 310–12 & n.5. On the other hand, Bonta was not an election case. Neither was the other recent case on which the challengers rely. First 7 Choice Women’s Res. Ctrs., Inc. v. Davenport, 608 U.S. ___, ___, 146 S. Ct. 1114, 1124 (2026) (holding that a charity sub- poenaed for donor information has standing to challenge the subpoenas). That distinction matters, because election-law precedents recognize that “disclosure often represents a less restrictive alternative” to other options. Nat’l Republican Sen- atorial Comm. v. FEC, 609 U.S. ___, ___, 146 S. Ct. 2404, 2421 (2026) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Buck- ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976) (“[D]isclosure require- ments—certainly in most applications—appear to be the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption.”). Indeed, the government has an interest in informing voters where election-related spending is coming from. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 367 (2010). A panel of this Court, and possibly our entire Court sitting en banc, may have to grapple with whether to revisit Delaware Strong Families based on Bonta and First Choice’s observa- tions in other contexts. If Delaware Strong Families is no longer good law, the rec- ord before us says little about whether Delaware demands more disclosure than its interests justify. Delaware plans to provide that evidence at trial, including testimony from voters and cam- paign officials who value donor disclosures, and statistics about how many people visit Delaware’s donor-disclosure data- base. On this underdeveloped record, it is hard to forecast whether Delaware will show that its tailoring is narrow enough to defeat the facial challenge. The same is true for the as-applied challenge. For that, the challengers must show a “reasonable probability that disclo- sure of its contributors’ names will subject them to threats, 8 harassment, or reprisals.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 367 (internal quotation marks omitted). On a more thorough rec- ord, they might be able to make that showing. But the challeng- ers have not yet offered anything from donors—just “generic, undated” examples of “threats to AFP as an organization as opposed to specific donors.” App. 12. These affidavits give us little confidence in the likelihood of success. This early on, it is hard to say. B. A preliminary injunction is discretionary; there is no right to one The challengers would have us stop there. They argue that if they show a likelihood of success on the merits, the District Court lacks discretion to deny an injunction. They reason that they will suffer irreparable injury in being forced to choose between silence and disclosure before final judgment. And because the challengers assert that the merits are in their favor, they say the equities entirely favor them. After all, they reason, Delaware has no “interest in enforcing an unconstitutional law.” Oral Arg. 7:55, https://perma.cc/9X6T-C4JW. They mis- understand equity. “As a matter of equitable discretion, a preliminary injunc- tion does not follow as a matter of course from a plaintiff’s showing of a likelihood of success on the merits.” Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. 155, 158 (2018) (per curiam). “[A] federal judge sitting as chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of law,” let alone every likely violation of law. Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 313. It makes no difference that challengers invoke the First Amendment. We may not “do away with the traditional 9 prerequisites for injunctive relief simply because First Amend- ment freedoms [a]re implicated.” Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 164 (3d Cir. 1997). True, we presume First Amendment harms irreparable. Del. State Sportsmen’s, 108 F.4th at 204. But we also presume that enjoining enforcement of the law would irreparably harm Delaware. Abbott, 585 U.S. at 602 n.17. Irrep- arable injury is not a light switch, but a spectrum. Challengers must show us where they sit on that spectrum, so that we can evaluate their harms in light of the equities on both sides. C. Though there may be some irreparable harm, its size and scope are unclear The challengers spend little time showing irreparable harm. Rather, they rely on the presumption that First Amendment harm is irreparable. Del. State Sportsmen’s, 108 F.4th at 204. But we presume only the nature of the harm, not its probability or degree. The challengers say that, without a preliminary injunction, they will stay silent during the sixty days before the general election rather than disclose their donors’ information. That may be some irreparable harm, but we do not know how much. The challengers were free to speak until sixty days before the election but did not. And we have only an affidavit from the organization, not testimony from their donors, that speaks in generalities about possible harms from disclosure. Plus, as Del- aware notes, the challengers could create and fund a Delaware political-action committee or unincorporated association, lim- iting disclosure to donors who fund those Delaware-specific groups. Appellees’ Br. 9–10. It is possible that these extra hoops add an unconstitutional burden to the challengers’ 10 speech. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337–38; see also Del. Strong Fams., 793 F.3d at 312 n.10. But we do not yet know. D. The balance of equities favors Delaware and the status quo We spot the challengers some likelihood of success and some irreparable injury. Even so, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying the injunction. Preliminary injunctions exist mainly to keep cases alive so that the parties can contest the merits. But there is no risk of this case dying. As the District Court noted, the Act “has been on the books for more than a decade”; it stands to reason the challenges will survive if it stays there for another year or two. App. 13–14. That delay will not moot the case or render final judgment “useless.” See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975). “The presumption of constitutionality which attaches to [legislation] is not merely a factor to be considered in evaluat- ing success on the merits, but an equity to be considered in favor of [the government] in balancing hardships.” Walters, 468 U.S. at 1324 (Rehnquist, J., in chambers). Faced with the state’s weighty interest in enforcing its law, which counterbal- ances the challengers’ own feared injury, the challengers should have proven the risks that their donors would face under the Act’s longstanding requirements. Instead, they declined the District Court’s invitation to hold an evidentiary hearing. And they failed to explain why they chose not to bring this suit ear- lier. Equity aids the diligent, not the tardy. Bowman v. Wathen, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 189, 193 (1843). The challengers say they decided only recently to speak in Delaware. But when pressed, 11 counsel was unsure when they made that decision. Promptness is especially important for elections. The Supreme Court has repeatedly warned lower courts not to “alter the election rules on the eve of an election.” Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Demo- cratic Nat’l Comm., 589 U.S. 423, 424 (2020) (per curiam). Two months out from an election, caution is a virtue. The District Court properly recognized that its decision was an “exercise [of] discretion.” App. 13. And it properly exer- cised that discretion to preserve the status quo. The challengers have not shouldered their heavy burden to disturb it. ***** Preliminary injunctions are discretionary; they are designed primarily to keep cases alive and usually to preserve the status quo. Even if there is some likelihood of success and some irrep- arable injury, a district court may find that the balance of equi- ties is enough to cut the other way. Because the District Court properly exercised its discretion to preserve the status quo and deny the preliminary injunction, we will AFFIRM. Counsel for Appellants Allen J. Dickerson [Argued] Erika D. Prouty Richard B. Raile Robert J. Tucker BAKER HOSTETLER 12 Counsel for Appellees Emily V. Burton [Argued] Jennifer-Kate Aaronson DELAWARE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE Tara Malloy CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER 13