Greenstein v. Thomas

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Greenstein v. Thomas MARK GREENSTEIN ET AL. v. STEPHANIE THOMAS, SECRETARY OF THE STATE (SC 21291) Heard September 22—officially released October 27, 2026* Syllabus Pursuant to statute (§ 9-453o (b)), the secretary of the state shall approve the nominating petition of a prospective candidate who seeks to appear on an election ballot under a reserved party designation “only if [the petition] meets the signature requirement [set forth in § 9-453d] and if a statement endorsing such candidate is filed with the [s]ecretary by the party designation committee not later than” 4 p.m. on the sixty-second day before the election. The plaintiffs, G and C, filed the present action pursuant to statute (§ 9-323), seeking relief in connection with the November 3, 2026 election for the office of United States representative for Connecticut’s First Congres- sional District (First District). G had reserved the party designation Epic American Liberty (Epic) and sought to appear on the ballot, on the Epic party line, as a petitioning candidate for the First District. Accordingly, on May 15, 2026, G filed with the defendant, the secretary of the state, an applica- tion for nominating petition forms, which the defendant issued along with a letter indicating that September 2, 2026, was the last day that the Epic party designation committee could file its statement of endorsement under § 9-453o (b). G subsequently submitted to the defendant’s office several peti- tion pages bearing the signatures of registered voters in the First District. On August 28, 2026, the defendant notified G that his petition had been disapproved because he had not obtained the requisite number of signatures. After receiving additional signatures, the defendant reversed her decision and approved G’s nomination, notifying him, on September 1, 2026, that he had obtained the requisite number of signatures to appear on the ballot under the Epic party designation. On September 3, 2026, however, the defen- dant informed G that, although he had satisfied the signature requirement, Epic’s party designation committee had failed to file a statement endorsing him before the September 2 deadline. The defendant therefore notified G on September 3 that it was rescinding its September 1 approval. G subsequently executed a withdrawal of his proposed candidacy and, pursuant to statute (§ 9-460), a certification of replacement nomination, seeking to have C, the Republican Party’s nominee for the First District, be placed on the ballot under the Epic party line. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief compelling the defendant to approve G’s nominating petition and to accept the replacement nomination of C. Held: The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the present action, which was premised on her argu- ments that G had disavowed his candidacy for Epic when he executed the * September 22, 2026, the date that judgment was rendered, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.  Greenstein v. Thomas withdrawal of his proposed candidacy and that C, as the Republican Party nominee for the First District, was statutorily (§ 9-453t (a)) barred from being substituted as Epic’s candidate. G testified that, in the event C was disqualified under § 9-453t (a) from taking his place on the ballot under the Epic party designation, he would maintain his candidacy, and, thus, the present case was not moot because, regardless of the merits of C’s replacement nomination, the court could grant practical relief by ordering the defendant to approve G’s nominating petition and to place him on the ballot under the Epic party designation. Moreover, C raised a colorable claim that she was aggrieved by the defendant’s disapproval of G’s nominating petition insofar as G sought to withdraw his candidacy and to endorse C as Epic’s replacement nominee under § 9-460, and, accordingly, C had standing to pursue her claim. The court assumed without deciding that it had the authority to exercise its equitable powers to excuse a candidate’s failure to comply with a mandatory filing deadline, such as the one set forth in § 9-453o (b), when such a failure to comply has been caused by the action of an election official. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs failed to establish that they were entitled to relief under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, as Epic’s party designation committee could have filed a statement endorsing G at any time between May 15, 2026, when G submitted his application for nominating petition forms, and September 2, 2026, regardless of how many signatures G even- tually obtained and despite any confusion that may have arisen before the endorsement deadline as a result of the defendant’s allegedly contradictory communications. Furthermore, the defendant notified G of the endorsement requirement and September 2, 2026 deadline when she issued to G the nominating petitions on May 15, 2026, at which time G had all of the necessary information to comply with the endorsement requirement, and no action by the defendant prevented Epic from satisfying that requirement before the deadline. Accordingly, the defendant properly declined to approve G’s nominating petition, and, because C’s claim was premised on G’s withdrawal of his can- didacy, C’s claim necessarily failed insofar as there was no vacancy for Epic to fill by replacement nomination under § 9-460. Procedural History Action seeking, inter alia, an order directing the defen- dant to approve the named plaintiff’s nominating peti- tion under a reserved party designation for the office of United States representative for the First Congressional District of Connecticut for the 2026 general election, and for other relief, brought, pursuant to General Statutes  Greenstein v. Thomas § 9-323, to William H. Bright, Jr., a justice of the Supreme Court, who conducted a hearing on the plain- tiffs’ complaint. Judgment for the defendant. Mark Greenstein, self-represented, and Amy Chai, self-represented, the plaintiffs. Blake T. Sullivan, assistant attorney general, for the defendant. Opinion BRIGHT, J. In this original jurisdiction proceeding brought under General Statutes § 9-323,1 the self-rep- resented plaintiffs, Mark Greenstein and Amy Chai, challenge a ruling of the defendant, Stephanie Thomas, the Secretary of the State, in connection with an elec- tion for federal office. Greenstein sought a spot on the November 3, 2026 general election ballot as a petitioning candidate for the office of United States representative for the First Congressional District of Connecticut (First District) under the party designation “Epic American Liberty” (Epic). The defendant disapproved Greenstein’s nominating petition because Epic failed to file a state- ment endorsing Greenstein before the deadline prescribed in General Statutes § 9-453o (b). In their complaint, the plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief compel- ling the defendant to approve Greenstein’s nominating petition and to accept Epic’s replacement nomination of Chai for the First District. In response, the defen- dant claims that this court lacks subject matter juris- diction over the proceeding and, alternatively, that the plaintiffs’ claims fail on the merits.1 After an expedited 1 The defendant also argued that this court lacked personal jurisdic- tion over her because she was never served in accordance with General Statutes § 52-64 (a), which provides in relevant part: “Service of civil process in any civil action or proceeding maintainable against . . . the state or against any . . . agent or employee of the state . . . may be made by a proper officer (1) leaving a true and attested copy of the process, including the declaration or complaint, with the Attorney General at the office of the Attorney General in Hartford, or (2) sending a true and attested copy of the process, including the summons and complaint, by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the Attorney General at  Greenstein v. Thomas the office of the Attorney General in Hartford.” The court declines to address the defendant’s claim because the parties have not provided any analysis of § 9-323 and because the court agrees with the defendant that the plaintiffs’ claims fail on the merits. Section 9-323 provides in relevant part that “the complainant shall file a certification attached to the complaint indicating that a copy of the complaint has been sent by first-class mail or delivered to the State Elections Enforcement Commission. If such complaint is made prior to such election, such judge shall proceed expeditiously to render judgment on the complaint and shall cause notice of the hearing to be given to the Secretary of the State and the State Elections Enforcement Commission. . . .” In a postelection contest, the court also must provide notice of the hearing “to any . . . candidates whose election may be affected by the decision upon such hearing, to such election official . . . and to any other . . . parties whom such judge deems proper parties thereto . . . .” General Statutes § 9-323. The defendant argues in conclusory fashion that § 52-64’s “require- ments for service of pwrocess apply to [the plaintiffs], who filed a com- plaint directly with this court and ask[ed] it to adjudicate these claims as a trier of fact against the state.” The defendant, however, does not address the absence of an express requirement of service of process in § 9-323, although that requirement appears in other statutes. See, e.g., General Statutes (Supp. 2026) § 4-183 (c) (“[s]ervice of the appeal shall be made by a state marshal making service in the same manner as complaints are served in ordinary civil actions”); General Statutes (Supp. 2026) § 47a-23 (c) (2) (B) (notice to quit possession of commercial property shall be provided “by making service on the parties in the same manner as complaints are served in ordinary civil actions using the rules of civil process under any provision of the general statutes”). Nor does the defendant address the expedited nature of an election contest proceeding or the court’s role in providing notice after a complaint is filed under § 9-323. See, e.g., Heussner v. Hayes, 289 Conn. 795, 805, 961 A.2d 365 (2008) (observing that “there is a logical basis to apply different treatment to notice requirements in [civil actions and probate appeals]” because probate appeals “are not commenced by the service of process” but, rather, “by filings with the Probate Court” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also In re Election of the United States Representative for the Second Congressional District, 231 Conn. 602, 608–609 and n.7, 653 A.2d 79 (1994) (in postelection contest under § 9-323, three justice panel of Supreme Court thanked “the sheriffs of New London, Windham, Tolland and Middlesex [c]ounties for their yeoman service in completing the necessary service of process within a very short time span”). For their part, the plaintiffs contend that the Office of the Appellate Clerk never informed them that service of process was required under § 9-323 or afforded an opportunity to cure any defect. Thus, neither party has addressed the central issue of statutory interpretation implicated by the defendant’s claim. Given the  Greenstein v. Thomas hearing on September 22, 2026, the court issued an oral decision, rendering judgment for the defendant. The court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the proceeding under § 9-323, that Greenstein was not entitled to relief from the mandatory filing deadline, and that the plaintiffs’ claim concerning Chai’s right to replace Greenstein as Epic’s endorsed candidate also failed because it was predicated on Greenstein’s right to be on the ballot. The court stated that a written opinion would follow in due course, and this is that opinion. The relevant facts are not in dispute. In May 2026, Greenstein reserved the Epic party designation and formed a party designation committee, which autho- rized Greenstein and Michelle Ambrosio to execute and file statements of endorsement with the defendant as required by § 9-453o (b). See General Statutes § 9-453u (d). On May 15, 2026, Greenstein filed with the defendant an application for nominating petition forms for his pro- posed nomination for the First District; the defendant issued Greenstein the petition forms that same day. See General Statutes § 9-453b. To appear on the ballot by nominating petition under the Epic party designation, Greenstein needed to satisfy two requirements. First, he had to submit, either to the defendant or to the appropriate town clerk, peti- tion pages containing 3305 signatures of registered voters in the First District before 4 p.m. on August 5, 2026. See General Statutes §§ 9-453d (1) and 9-453i (a). Second, Epic’s party designation committee had to file with the defendant a statement endorsing Greenstein before 4 p.m. on September 2, 2026. See General Statutes § 9-453o (b). In the cover letter accompanying the nominating peti- tion forms issued to Greenstein, the defendant clearly informed him that “September 2, 2026, by 4:00 p.m., is the last day that the party committee . . . may file with the [defendant] [s]tatements of [e]ndorsement of candidates cursory discussion of the issue, and because the court concludes that the plaintiffs’ claims fail on the merits, the court declines to consider the defendant’s challenge to the court’s personal jurisdiction.  Greenstein v. Thomas petitioning under this designation.” (Emphasis in origi- nal.) The instructions prepared by the defendant’s office, which were given to Greenstein, also emphasized the endorsement requirement: “A nominating petition filed with a party designation will not be approved by the [defendant] unless a statement endorsing the candidate(s) listed on the petition is filed, with the [defendant], by the agents for the party designation committee . . . by 4:00 p.m. Wednesday, September 2, 2026.” (Emphasis in original.) Although petition pages may be submitted to the defendant, the defendant was required to submit those pages to the appropriate town clerk to certify the signatures.2 See General Statutes § 9-453i (c). When petition pages are submitted, either the town clerk or the defendant must provide the circulator of the petition pages with a dated receipt indicating the number of pages submitted. See General Statutes § 9-453k (c). Within two weeks of receiving petition pages, the town clerk must review the petition pages, certify all signatures that satisfy the statutory crite- ria; see General Statutes § 9-453k (d); and forward the petitions with their official certifications to the defen- dant. See General Statutes § 9-453n. At that point, the defendant “shall approve the petition only if it meets the signature requirement and if a statement endorsing such candidate is filed with the [defendant] by the party designation committee not later than four o’clock p.m. on the sixty-second day before the election.” General Statutes § 9-453o (b). Greenstein submitted several petition pages to the defendant, which were forwarded to the town of Bloom- field to be certified by its town clerk. On August 26, 2026, the Bloomfield town clerk certified the qualifying signa- tures but did not inform the defendant at that time. On August 28, having not received the certification of sig- natures from the Bloomfield town clerk, the defendant’s 2 For this reason, any petition pages submitted directly to the defendant had to be submitted by 4 p.m. on July 29, 2026. After that deadline, petition pages still could be submitted to the appropriate town clerk by 4 p.m. on August 5.  Greenstein v. Thomas office emailed Greenstein and informed him that his petition had been disapproved because he did not obtain the requisite 3305 signatures; a formal disapproval letter was included as an attachment to the email. On August 31, the Bloomfield town clerk notified the defendant that it had certified additional signatures for Greenstein’s nominating petition and hand delivered those pages to the defendant’s office on September 1. That afternoon, the defendant’s office emailed Greenstein and informed him that he had obtained enough qualified signatures to appear on the ballot under the Epic party designation; a formal approval letter was included with the email. Epic’s party designation committee, however, never filed with the defendant a statement endorsing Greenstein before the September 2 deadline. On September 3, 2026, the defendant’s office called Greenstein and informed him that the defendant was rescinding the September 1 approval letter because, although Greenstein had satisfied the signature require- ment, Epic had failed to file a statement endorsing Green- stein before the September 2 deadline. In an email, the defendant memorialized the phone conversation and issued a formal letter disapproving Greenstein’s proposed nomination. Later that day, Greenstein and Chai went to the defendant’s office and attempted to file with the defendant a statement endorsing Chai as Epic’s nomi- nee for the First District; the endorsement was signed by both Greenstein and Ambrosio on September 3. The defendant’s staff declined to accept the untimely filing. On September 8, 2026, Greenstein executed a with- drawal of his proposed candidacy for the First District and a “certification of replacement nomination” of Chai to fill the resultant vacancy pursuant to General Statutes § 9-460.3 The plaintiffs then filed their complaint in the 3 General Statutes § 9-460 provides in relevant part: “If any party has nominated a candidate for office, or . . . if a candidate has qualified to appear on any ballot by nominating petition under a reserved party designation . . . and such nominee thereafter, but prior to forty-six days before the opening of the polls on the day of the election for which such nomination has been made . . . withdraws such nominee’s name . . . such party or . . . the party designation committee may make a nomination to fill such vacancy or provide for the making of such nomination as  Greenstein v. Thomas Supreme Court pursuant to § 9-323, seeking to com- pel the defendant to approve Greenstein’s nominating petition and to accept Epic’s replacement nomination of Chai under § 9-460. They argue that Greenstein is entitled to relief from the September 2 deadline because the defendant’s contradictory communications regarding the approval of his nominating petition caused Epic’s party designation committee to miss the deadline for submitting its endorsement of Greenstein. The defendant responds that this court lacks subject matter jurisdic- tion over the proceeding and, alternatively, that the plaintiffs’ claims fail on the merits. I As an initial matter, the defendant contends that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the proceed- ing because (1) the plaintiffs’ claims are moot, and (2) Chai is not aggrieved within the meaning of § 9-323. Mindful of the strong presumption in favor of jurisdic- tion, the court rejects the defendant’s jurisdictional claims. “In considering whether facts alleged establish a predi- cate for the exercise of [the court’s] jurisdiction, as in other contexts, [the court] look[s] only to whether the claim is colorable . . . . For a claim to be colorable, the [plaintiff] need not convince the . . . court that he neces- sarily will prevail; he must demonstrate simply that he might prevail. . . . The ultimate legal correctness of the claim is not relevant to our jurisdictional analysis. This is consistent with the well established rule that [t]he jurisdictional and merits inquiries are separate . . . .” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal its rules prescribe . . . . No withdrawal, and no nomination to replace a candidate who has withdrawn, under this section shall be valid unless the candidate who has withdrawn has filed a letter of withdrawal signed by such candidate with the Secretary of the State in the case of a state or district office . . . . No nomination to fill a vacancy under this section shall be valid unless it is certified to the Secretary of the State in the case of a state or district office . . . by the organization or committee making such nomination, at least forty-two days before the opening of the polls on the day of the election . . . .”  Greenstein v. Thomas quotation marks omitted.) Whitnum Baker v. Secretary of the State, 350 Conn. 753, 760, 326 A.3d 235 (2024). The defendant argues that Greenstein’s claims are moot and that Chai lacks standing to assert her claims because “Greenstein disavowed his candidacy for Epic, and Chai is statutorily ineligible for it” under General Statutes § 9-453t (a), which provides in relevant part that “the nomination of a candidate by a major or minor party under this chapter for any office shall disqualify such candidate from appearing on the ballot by nominat- ing petition for the same office.” The court disagrees. “The test for determining mootness is whether a judg- ment, if rendered, would have any practical legal effect [on] an existing controversy. Thus, the central question in a mootness problem is whether a change in the circum- stances . . . has forestalled the prospect for meaningful, practical, or effective relief. [Simply because] there are difficulties in formulating a remedy in an otherwise living case does not evidence the absence of a case or controversy, nor will a case be considered moot [when], although the court cannot grant the specific relief origi- nally requested by the plaintiff, the plaintiff still has a stake in the outcome of the proceedings for which effec- tive relief can be provided.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v. Burton, 282 Conn. 1, 13–14, 917 A.2d 966 (2007). Although Greenstein attempted to withdraw his can- didacy and to have Chai nominated in his stead, he also testified before the court that, if Chai is disqualified under § 9-453t (a), he either will maintain his candidacy or select a different replacement nominee for Epic. Thus, regardless of the merits of Chai’s replacement nomina- tion, the court could grant Greenstein practical relief by ordering the defendant to approve his nominating petition and to place him on the ballot under the Epic party designation. See, e.g., id., 14 (case is not moot when “the plaintiff still has a stake in the outcome . . .  Greenstein v. Thomas for which effective relief can be provided” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As to the application of § 9-453t (a), the defendant argues that Chai is not aggrieved by the rejection of Greenstein’s petition because, as a major party candidate, she is statutorily barred from being substituted as Epic’s candidate. The defendant may well be correct that the statute disqualifies Chai, the Republican Party’s nomi- nee for the First District, from appearing on the ballot under the Epic party designation for the same office. For purposes of jurisdiction, however, the plaintiffs are not required to establish that they necessarily will prevail on their claims—only that they “might prevail.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Whitnum Baker v. Secretary of the State, supra, 350 Conn. 760. Chai has raised a colorable claim that she is aggrieved by the defendant’s disapproval of Greenstein’s nominating petition because Greenstein sought to withdraw his can- didacy and to endorse her as Epic’s replacement nominee under § 9-460. Although the defendant argues that Chai is not aggrieved because excluding her from the ballot is “in total conformity with the law,” the Supreme Court recently explained that “[a]n election official’s claimed adherence to the law will not, without more, defeat juris- diction under the election contest statutes when ‘the gravamen’ of the plaintiff’s claim is the misapplication of a law.” Amadsun v. Armstrong, 354 Conn. 240, 250, 350 A.3d 534 (2026). Because the plaintiffs challenge the defendant’s application of § 9-453o (b) and argue that § 9-453t (a) does not apply to nominations under § 9-460, the gravamen of the plaintiffs’ complaint is the misapplication of the law.4 Thus, Chai has standing to pursue her claim. II As to the merits of the plaintiffs’ complaint, the court notes that the plaintiffs do not dispute that the language 4 Although, for the reasons set forth in this opinion, it is not neces- sary for the court to fully address the parties’ competing interpreta- tions of § 9-453t (a), the court is highly skeptical of the plaintiffs’  Greenstein v. Thomas of § 9-453o (b) is mandatory in nature. Their concession is unsurprising given the statutory language: “In the case of a candidate who petitions under a reserved party des- ignation the [defendant] shall approve the petition only if it meets the signature requirement and if a statement endorsing such candidate is filed with the [defendant] by the party designation committee not later than four o’clock p.m. on the sixty-second day before the election. . . . No candidate shall be qualified to appear on any ballot by nominating petition unless the candidate’s petition is approved by the [defendant] pursuant to this subsection.” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 9-453o (b). By the statute’s express terms, the defendant has no discretion to approve a nominating petition that does not satisfy both statutory requirements. See, e.g., Whitnum Baker v. Secretary of the State, supra, 350 Conn. 764; Butts v. Bysiewicz, 298 Conn. 665, 676–77, 5 A.3d 932 (2010). The plaintiffs nevertheless contend that this court has equitable authority to afford them relief from the manda- tory filing deadline because the defendant caused Epic’s noncompliance with § 9-453o (b). In Butts v. Bysiewicz, supra, 298 Conn. 666–67, the Supreme Court addressed a similar issue involving a candidate’s failure to submit his party’s endorsement before a mandatory filing deadline. The statute at issue in Butts barred the defendant from accepting an untimely filed endorsement, and the court concluded that it could interpretation. The plaintiffs acknowledge that the plain language of the statute precludes the possibility that Chai, the Republican Party nominee for the First District, could herself petition to be included on the ballot as Epic’s endorsed candidate. They nonetheless argue that the statute does not preclude Epic from substituting her as its party endorsed candidate pursuant to § 9-460. Not only is this argument con- trary to the plain language of § 9-453t; see General Statutes § 9-453t (a) (“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of the general statutes or any special act, and except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the nomination of a candidate by a major or minor party under this chapter for any office shall disqualify such candidate from appearing on the ballot by nominating petition for the same office”); but it would lead to the absurd result that a major party candidate could enlist stalking horse petitioning candidates to secure ballot spots that could then be turned over to the major party candidate. The court believes that it is highly unlikely that the legislature intended such a result.  Greenstein v. Thomas not “invoke its equitable authority to compel the defen- dant to act in direct contravention to [a] clear legislative mandate.” Id., 688–89. The court noted that “[s]ome jurisdictions have concluded that, in extraordinary cir- cumstances,” courts have equitable authority to excuse a candidate’s failure to comply with mandatory filing deadlines when either the actions of an election official caused the late filing or compliance with the deadline was impossible. Id., 676 n.7. Because neither circumstance was implicated in Butts, the Supreme Court declined to opine on “whether [Connecticut] courts would have authority to extend filing deadlines under such extraor- dinary circumstances.” Id., 677 n.7. Recently, in Whitnum Baker v. Secretary of the State, supra, 350 Conn. 753, a three justice panel of the Supreme Court assumed without deciding that Connecticut courts had such equitable authority but ultimately concluded that that case did “not pres- ent the type of extraordinary circumstance . . . that would warrant equitable relief from the operation of a mandatory statutory provision . . . .”(Citation omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 756. Although, in that case, the defendant issued instruc- tions to the plaintiff that included an erroneous filing deadline, because the correct filing deadline also was set forth in the instructions, the court concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to equitable relief when she “failed to exercise any due diligence in resolving the apparent inconsistency.” Id The plaintiffs claim that the present case presents the type of extraordinary circumstance that was absent in Whitnum Baker. They argue that the defendant’s August 28 notice that Greenstein failed to satisfy the signature requirement caused Epic to forgo filing the statement endorsing Greenstein before the deadline prescribed by § 9-453o (b). They also suggest that the defendant is responsible for Greenstein’s noncompliance because the defendant did not provide “direct notice” to Greenstein on September 1 when she reversed her August 28 ruling. The defendant responds that, “[r]egardless of the effect of the rejection and approval letters, Epic could have  Greenstein v. Thomas submitted a statement of endorsement of a candidate at any time between May 15, 2026, when the nominating petition pages were issued, and September 2, the statu- tory deadline. . . . Epic simply did not do so.” (Citations omitted.) Assuming without deciding that the court has the authority identified in Butts and Whitnum Baker, the court concludes that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the equitable relief they seek. As in Whitnum Baker, the plaintiffs’ reliance based claim implicates the doctrine of equitable estoppel. See Whitnum Baker v. Secretary of the State, supra, 350 Conn. 765. “There are two essential elements to an estop- pel: the party [against whom it is asserted] must do or say something [that] is intended or calculated to induce another to believe in the existence of certain facts and to act [on] that belief; and the other party, influenced thereby, must actually change his position or do some- thing to his injury [that] he otherwise would not have done. Estoppel rests on the misleading conduct of one party to the prejudice of the other. In the absence of prejudice, estoppel does not exist. . . . Whether an equi- table estoppel exists is a question of fact . . . and the party claiming estoppel . . . has the burden of proof. . . . “Moreover, estoppel against a public agency is limited and may be invoked: (1) only with great caution; (2) only when the action in question has been induced by an agent having authority in such matters; and (3) only when special circumstances make it highly inequitable or oppressive not to estop the agency. . . . A party seek- ing to justify the application of the estoppel doctrine by establishing that a public agency has induced his actions carries a significant burden of proof.” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 766. The plaintiffs do not dispute that Epic could have filed with the defendant a statement endorsing Green- stein at any time between May 15 and September 2, 2026, regardless of how many signatures Greenstein had obtained. Thus, it was entirely possible for Epic to timely file an endorsement of Greenstein, despite any  Greenstein v. Thomas purported confusion that arose in the days before the endorsement deadline. Although the plaintiffs argue that Epic had no reason to file its endorsement until after Greenstein had satisfied the signature requirement, there also was no reason for Epic not to do so, particularly when Greenstein, as the petitioning candidate, was the only candidate who Epic could have endorsed for the First District. See General Statutes § 9-453o (b) (petitioning candidate must satisfy signature requirement, and party designation committee must file “a statement endorsing such candidate” before deadline (emphasis added)).5 Furthermore, the defendant did in fact inform Green- stein that he had obtained the required number of sig- natures by emailing him a letter confirming that fact on September 1, 2026. That letter was sent to the email address Greenstein provided to the defendant when he received his petition forms, and the plaintiffs admit that the email was received at the designated email address on September 1, although Greenstein apparently did not see it until September 3. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ suggestion, the defendant was not obligated to notify Greenstein by phone to inform him either that he had satisfied the signature requirement or that he had failed to satisfy the endorsement requirement. Greenstein was responsible for checking his campaign designated email account and, as a candidate for office, for knowing and complying with the applicable election laws, including mandatory filing deadlines. See, e.g., Airey v. Feliciano, 350 Conn. 162, 164, 323 A.3d 1037 (2024). In fact, the defendant twice expressly notified Green- stein of the endorsement requirement and deadline when she issued the nominating petitions in May 2026. At that point, Greenstein had all of the necessary infor- mation to comply with the mandatory requirement, and no action of the defendant prevented Epic from 5 Notably, on September 3, 2026, after Greenstein learned that he had satisfied the signature requirement, he and Ambrosio executed a state- ment endorsing Chai as Epic’s nominee, which was not only untimely but also erroneous. Epic, in fact, has never sought to file an endorsement of Greenstein, which would have been required for him to then withdraw and for Epic to seek to replace him.  Greenstein v. Thomas satisfying that requirement before the deadline. Under these circumstances, the plaintiffs are unable to justify the application of equitable estoppel against a public agency. Consequently, the defendant properly declined to approve Greenstein’s nominating petition. This conclu- sion means that Chai’s claim premised on Greenstein’s withdrawal of his candidacy necessarily fails, because there is no vacancy for Epic to fill by replacement nomi- nation under § 9-460. The plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory and injunctive relief compelling the defendant to approve Greenstein’s nominating petition and to accept Epic’s nomination of Chai for the First District are denied. Judgment is rendered for the defendant.