Republican Party of Connecticut v. Merrill

****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Con- necticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be repro- duced and distributed without the express written per- mission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** REPUBLICAN PARTY OF CONNECTICUT v. DENISE W. MERRILL, SECRETARY OF THE STATE (SC 19010) Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, Harper and Vertefeuille, Js. Argued September 12—officially released September 26, 2012* Proloy K. Das, with whom was Richard P. Healey, for the appellant (plaintiff). Gregory T. D’Auria, solicitor general, with whom were Jane R. Rosenberg and Maura Murphy Osborne, assistant attorneys general, and, on the brief, George Jepsen, attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).  Opinion ROGERS, C. J. The primary issue to be resolved in this matter is the proper construction of General Stat- utes (Sup. 2012) § 9-249a.1 The plaintiff, the Republican Party of Connecticut, brought a declaratory judgment action in which it sought a determination that, because its candidate for the office of governor in the 2010 election received the highest number of votes under the designation of the Republican Party line on the ballot, the defendant, Denise W. Merrill, the secretary of the state, was required to list the candidates of the Republican Party first on the ballots for the 2012 elec- tion pursuant to § 9-249a (a). The defendant contended in response that the action was barred by sovereign immunity and that, because the Democratic Party candi- date for the office of governor in the aggregate received the highest number of votes in the 2010 election, the candidates of the Democratic Party should be listed first on the 2012 ballots. The trial court granted the joint request of the parties to reserve the following questions for the advice of the Appellate Court or this court, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-235 and Prac- tice Book § 73-1: (1) ‘‘Is the [plaintiff’s] complaint barred by sovereign immunity?’’; and (2) ‘‘Does . . . § 9-249a require that the [plaintiff’s] candidates for office be placed on the first line of the ballots for the November 6, 2012 election?’’2 After oral argument before this court, we ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs on two questions, which we later reframed as follows:3 ‘‘Did the plaintiff have an available administrative rem- edy in the present case? If so, did the plaintiff exhaust the administrative remedy?’’ Thereafter, on September 26, 2012, we issued a summary decision in the form of an order in which we stated that the answer to the two questions on which we had ordered supplemental briefs was ‘‘yes,’’ the answer to the first reserved question was ‘‘no,’’ and the answer to the second reserved ques- tion was ‘‘yes.’’ We also indicated that a full written opinion would follow. This is that opinion. The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. On July 26, 2012, Jerry Labriola, Jr., the chairman of the Republican Party, John McKin- ney, the Senate Republican leader, and Lawrence F. Cafero, Jr., the House of Representatives Republican leader (collectively, Republicans), in their capacities as party leaders as well as candidates for state office, sent a letter to the defendant in which they stated that Tom Foley, the Republican candidate for the office of gover- nor in the 2010 election, had received 560,874 votes, all of which were on the Republican Party line, and Dannel Malloy, the Democratic candidate for the office of gov- ernor, had received 540,970 votes on the Democratic Party line and 26,308 votes on the party line for the Working Families Party. The Republicans also pointed out that, in the 2011 municipal elections, the Democratic Party had been listed first on the ballots. The Republi- cans contended that, under § 9-249a, the Republican Party should have been listed first on the ballots in the 2011 election and it should be listed first on the ballots in the 2012 election because Foley had ‘‘polled the highest number of votes in the last-preceding election’’ for the office of governor on the Republican Party line. General Statutes § 9-249a (a). In support of their argument, the Republicans relied on a similar situation that had occurred in New York in 1995, when it was determined that the party whose candidate had received the most votes on the candidate’s party line in the preceding election should be placed first on the ballot. On July 27, 2012, the defendant responded to the Republicans’ letter. The defendant stated that the Republicans had failed to ‘‘differentiate between the appearance of a candidate on the ballot by ‘party’ nomi- nation and by nominating petition with a ‘party designa- tion.’ Taking this crucial difference into account results in the conclusion reached by my office in 2011: the Democratic Party is listed on the first row on the ballot followed by the Republican Party listed on the second row. Governor Malloy was a candidate of only a single ‘party’ on the ballot in 2010, that of the Democratic Party. Ballot access by Governor Malloy on the Working Families Party line was achieved by nominating petition with ‘party designation’ in 2010.’’ Thereafter, the plaintiff brought this action for declar- atory and injunctive relief seeking a judicial determina- tion that § 9-249a required the defendant to place the candidates for the Republican Party on the first line of the ballots for the November 6, 2012 election and a mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to comply with the statute. The parties then jointly requested that the trial court submit the reserved questions to the Appellate Court and indicated that, upon the granting of the request, they would request an immediate trans- fer of the reserved questions to this court. The trial court granted the request and we transferred the reser- vation to this court. After oral argument on the reserved questions before this court, we ordered the parties to submit supplemen- tal briefs on the two additional questions we previously set forth, which we subsequently reframed. The defen- dant contended in its supplemental brief that the plain- tiff was required to request a declaratory ruling pursuant to General Statutes § 4-176 (a)4 and that its failure to do so deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff submitted a brief in which it contended, inter alia, that it had exhausted its adminis- trative remedies when the Republicans submitted the July 26, 2012 letter to the defendant. We agree with the plaintiff that it exhausted its admin- istrative remedies. Accordingly, we treat this action as an administrative appeal, with respect to which the state has waived its sovereign immunity by statute. On the merits of the plaintiff’s statutory claim, we conclude that § 9-249a requires the defendant to list the plaintiff’s candidates first on the ballot for the 2012 election. I We first address the question of whether the plaintiff exhausted its administrative remedies. As we have indi- cated, in her supplemental brief, the defendant con- tended that the plaintiff was required pursuant to § 4- 176 to request from the defendant a declaratory ruling on the meaning and proper application of § 9-249a before the plaintiff could bring an action in the trial court. The plaintiff contends that it had no administra- tive remedy because, among other reasons, the power to interpret § 9-249a lies with the attorney general, pur- suant to General Statutes § 3-125, not with the defen- dant. See footnote 16 of this opinion for the text of § 3- 125. Alternatively, the plaintiff argues that it had, in fact, exhausted this administrative remedy. We con- clude that the plaintiff was required to request a declara- tory ruling from the defendant before it could seek redress in the trial court and that the Republicans’ July 26, 2012 letter to the defendant constituted such a request.5 We also conclude that the defendant’s July 27, 2012 letter in response constituted a declaratory ruling. Accordingly, we conclude that the action is not barred by the exhaustion doctrine. ‘‘The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative reme- dies is well established in the jurisprudence of adminis- trative law. . . . Under that doctrine, a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action that seeks a remedy that could be provided through an administra- tive proceeding, unless and until that remedy has been sought in the administrative forum. . . . In the absence of exhaustion of that remedy, the action must be dis- missed.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Piteau v. Board of Education, 300 Conn. 667, 678, 15 A.3d 1067 (2011); see also id., 684 (‘‘[i]f the available administrative procedure . . . provide[s] the [plaintiff] with a mechanism for attaining the remedy that [he] seek[s] . . . [the plaintiff] must exhaust that remedy’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). Section 4-176 (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a]ny person may petition an agency . . . for a declaratory ruling as to . . . the applicability to specified circum- stances of a provision of the general statutes . . . .’’ An aggrieved party can appeal from a declaratory ruling to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 4- 183. See General Statutes §§ 4-166 (3)6 and 4-176 (h).7 In addition, if an agency declines to issue a declaratory ruling, the person who requested the ruling may bring a declaratory judgment action pursuant to General Stat- utes § 4-175 (a).8 The defendant is expressly authorized by statute to issue declaratory rulings. See General Stat- utes § 9-3.9  This court repeatedly has held that when a plaintiff can obtain relief from an administrative agency by requesting a declaratory ruling pursuant to § 4-176, the failure to exhaust that remedy deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over an action challenging the legality of the agency’s action. See Polymer Resources, Ltd. v. Keeney, 227 Conn. 545, 557–58, 630 A.2d 1304 (1993) (plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief was barred by exhaustion doctrine when plaintiff failed to seek declaratory ruling from commissioner of depart- ment of environmental protection pursuant to § 4-176); Housing Authority v. Papandrea, 222 Conn. 414, 422 n.6, 610 A.2d 637 (1992) (principle that ‘‘procedures set forth in § 4-176 [a] must be exhausted before an action challenging the applicability of a regulation may be brought in the Superior Court applies with equal force to the plaintiff’s challenge . . . to the commissioner’s statutory authority’’ to engage in challenged conduct); Housing Authority v. Papandrea, supra, 424 (‘‘[e]ven a claim that an administrative agency has exceeded its statutory authority or jurisdiction may be the subject of an administrative appeal’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); Savage v. Aronson, 214 Conn. 256, 269, 571 A.2d 696 (1990) (request for declaratory ruling would have been available administrative remedy for purposes of exhaustion doctrine if plaintiff had claimed only that defendant’s 100 day emergency housing limit conflicted with statutes, but action was not barred because plain- tiffs could not have raised constitutional claims in peti- tion for declaratory ruling); Connecticut Mobile Home Assn., Inc. v. Jensen’s, Inc., 178 Conn. 586, 588–89, 424 A.2d 285 (1979) (declaratory judgment action seeking determination that certain lease provisions violated state statute was barred by exhaustion doctrine when plaintiff failed to seek declaratory ruling from real estate commission pursuant to § 4-176, which confers on state agencies power to interpret statutes and regula- tions); see also Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Cas- sidy, 6 Conn. App. 723, 726, 507 A.2d 499 (1986) (plaintiff’s declaratory judgment actions were barred by exhaustion doctrine when it failed to seek declaratory rulings on issue from department of consumer protec- tion pursuant to § 4-176).10 We conclude, therefore, that, prior to bringing an action in the trial court, the plaintiff in the present case was required to exhaust its adminis- trative remedies by requesting a declaratory ruling from the defendant on the question of whether § 9-249a required the defendant to list the plaintiff first on the ballot in the 2012 election.11 We further conclude that the plaintiff exhausted its administrative remedies under § 4-176 because the July 26, 2012 letter to the defendant constituted a request for a declaratory ruling. This court previously has con- cluded that, under certain circumstances, a letter to a state agency by a person seeking a determination regarding the applicability of a statute to specific facts may be treated as a petition for a declaratory ruling even if the person does not expressly invoke § 4-176. In Cannata v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 239 Conn. 124, 680 A.2d 1329 (1996), the plaintiff landown- ers submitted a letter to the commissioner of environ- mental protection (commissioner) in which they requested a determination that the proposal to clear-cut their land was exempt from regulation by the defendant department of environmental protection (department) or, if it was not, that they were entitled to a permit authorizing them to clear-cut the land. Id., 126–27. They did not, however, expressly seek a declaratory ruling pursuant to § 4-176. The commissioner concluded that the land was not exempt from the department’s regula- tions and the plaintiffs were not entitled to a permit. Id., 131. The plaintiffs appealed from the decision pursu- ant to § 4-183, and the department and the defendant attorney general moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the decision was not a final decision in a contested case pursuant to § 4-166 (2). Id., 131–32. The plaintiffs conceded that the decision was not a final decision in a contested case, but contended that it was a declaratory ruling and, therefore, was appealable pur- suant to § 4-166 (3) (B). Id., 135. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that ‘‘the plaintiffs had requested, and the commissioner had issued, a declaratory ruling . . . .’’ Id., 133. On appeal, this court concluded that the plaintiffs’ express request for a decision as to whether the pro- posed use of the land was exempt from regulation by the department fell ‘‘squarely within the purview of § 4- 176 (a).’’ Id., 135. This court rejected the defendants’ contention that the failure of the parties to comply with the notice requirements regarding declaratory rulings in the department’s regulations meant that the plaintiffs’ letter should not be treated as a declaratory ruling.12 Id., 136–37. In addition, the court noted that ‘‘[t]he defendants have not claimed that the form or content of the plaintiffs’ submission contravened any such requirement promulgated by the department.’’ Id., 135 n.19; see also Peruta v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 128 Conn. App. 777, 785–86, 20 A.3d 691 (trial court’s determination that plaintiff’s e-mail to department of public safety could not be treated as petition for declara- tory ruling was not clearly erroneous when plaintiff did not ask department of public safety to ‘‘apply or examine a regulation or statute with respect to a speci- fied set of circumstances’’ and e-mail ‘‘lack[ed] any indi- cation that [the plaintiff] sought any form of reasoned analysis or decision from the department’’ [emphasis in original]), cert. denied, 302 Conn. 919, 28 A.3d 339 (2011); cf. Housing Authority v. Papandrea, supra, 222 Conn. 432 n.16 (declining to treat letter from third party to defendant raising issues similar to those raised by plaintiff on appeal as petition for declaratory ruling from which plaintiff could have appealed, because defendant’s response to letter did not meet statutory requirements for declaratory ruling). In the present case, the Republicans’ July 26, 2012 letter to the defendant clearly sought a decision on the ‘‘applicability to specified circumstances of a provision of the [G]eneral [S]tatutes,’’ as required by § 4-176 (a). In addition, it met all of the substantive requirements of the defendant’s regulations governing declaratory rulings13 because it was in writing, it clearly stated the substance and nature of the request, it identified the statute under which the inquiry was made, and it pro- vided supporting data, facts and arguments. Specifi- cally, the plaintiff clearly explained that the Republican Party had received the highest number of votes on the designated party line for the office of governor in the 2010 election and that it believed that that party should therefore be listed first on the ballot in the 2012 election, and it provided authority for that proposition. In addi- tion, although the letter apparently did not contain the addresses and telephone numbers of the persons mak- ing the request, as required by the regulation, it clearly identified the authors as the Republicans, all of whom were presumably well-known to the defendant. We are mindful that the plaintiff did not characterize the Republicans’ letter as a request for a declaratory ruling in the proceedings before the trial court and continues to claim before this court that § 4-176 (a) does not provide an adequate remedy. Indeed, because the Republicans’ letter sought written confirmation of the defendant’s intended prospective application of the statute shortly before initiation of the present declara- tory judgment action, the logical inference is that the plaintiff’s intention was merely to obtain a statement of the defendant’s position to support the plaintiff’s entitlement to declaratory relief in the likely event that the defendant declined to change the ballot order for the 2012 election. See Wilson v. Kelley, 224 Conn. 110, 121, 617 A.2d 433 (1992) (‘‘An action for declaratory judgment is a special proceeding . . . [that] requires the existence of an actual bona fide and substantial question in dispute which requires settlement between the parties. . . . [T]he declaratory judgment procedure may not be utilized merely to secure advice on the law . . . or to secure the construction of a statute if the effect of that construction will not affect a plaintiff’s personal rights.’’ [Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]). Nevertheless, the plaintiff’s intention in filing the letter does not change the essential fact that, for purposes of exhaustion of administrative reme- dies, the letter meets all of the defendant’s substantive requirements for a request for a declaratory ruling, nor does that intention bear on the defendant’s election to respond to the letter in a manner bearing all of the hallmarks of a declaratory ruling. The letter clearly raised an actual controversy regarding the application of § 9-249a to the specific facts of this case, and the Republicans clearly had taken the position that the defendant was violating the statute, thereby affecting their existing rights both as candidates and as party leaders. Thus, the letter cannot reasonably be character- ized as a request either for an advisory opinion or for instructions.14 We conclude, therefore, that, because the July 26, 2012 letter had all of the characteristics of a request for a declaratory ruling and met the statutory and regulatory requirements for such a request, as in Cannata, the letter constituted a request for a declara- tory ruling.15 We also conclude that the defendant’s July 27, 2012 letter in response constituted a declaratory ruling. The defendant gave no indication in the letter that her posi- tion that the Democratic Party should be listed first on the ballot pursuant to § 9-249a was anything other than a full and final disposition of the issue raised by the Republicans in their July 26, 2012 letter or that she might reconsider her position if they resubmitted the letter with an express request for a declaratory ruling. To the extent that the defendant claims that she might have given notice to other interested parties, conducted a hearing on the issue or requested an opinion from the attorney general pursuant to General Statutes § 3- 12516 if the Republicans had expressly characterized their letter as a request for a declaratory ruling, we are not persuaded. Those procedures are discretionary even when a formal request has been filed pursuant to § 4-176, and nothing prevented the defendant from doing any of those things if she thought that they were necessary for a considered determination of the mean- ing of § 9-249a.17 We conclude, therefore, that, because the July 26, 2012 letter constituted a request for a declar- atory ruling, and because the July 27, 2012 letter consti- tuted a declaratory ruling, the plaintiff exhausted its administrative remedy pursuant to § 4-176. Finally, we conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, we may treat this declaratory judgment action as an administrative appeal pursuant to § 4-183. See Mario v. Fairfield, 217 Conn. 164, 167 n.6, 585 A.2d 87 (1991) (treating declaratory judgment action as administrative appeal). The plaintiff has reaped no procedural advantage by bringing a declaratory judg- ment action and seeks the same remedy and relief that it would have been entitled to seek in an administrative appeal.18 See Stepney Pond Estates, Ltd. v. Monroe, 260 Conn. 406, 422, 797 A.2d 494 (2002).19 In addition, because the question before us is a pure legal question, the absence of an administrative record does not render the plaintiff’s claim unreviewable. Accordingly, we con- clude that it would elevate form over substance to require the plaintiff to initiate a new proceeding that in all material respects would be identical to this one.20 Id. We conclude, therefore, that we have jurisdiction to address the merits of the second reserved question.  II A We begin our analysis of the second reserved question with the standard of review. The meaning of § 9-249a is a question of statutory interpretation over which our review is plenary.21 ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z22 directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the mean- ing of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and unam- biguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Bysiewicz v. DiNardo, 298 Conn. 748, 765, 6 A.3d 726 (2010). The present case concerns the order of candidates on a general election ballot. Specifically, it requires us to determine the order of parties on general election ballots when the current governor required the votes of a cross-endorsing party to prevail in the election contest. According to the plaintiff, the top line on the ballot is reserved for the party with the most votes on its party line in the preceding gubernatorial election. In contrast, the defendant contends that the party of the current governor should be placed first, regardless of whether the margin of victory was achieved through votes on a different line as a cross-endorsed candidate. We begin with the language of the statute. General Stat- utes (Sup. 2012) § 9-249a (a) provides: ‘‘The names of the parties shall be arranged on the ballots in the follow- ing order: (1) The party whose candidate for Governor polled the highest number of votes in the last-preceding election; (2) Other parties who had candidates for Gov- ernor in the last-preceding election, in descending order, according to the number of votes polled for each such candidate; (3) Minor parties who had no candidate for Governor in the last-preceding election; (4) Petition- ing candidates with party designation whose names are contained in petitions approved pursuant to section 9-453o; and (5) Petitioning candidates with no party designation whose names are contained in petitions approved pursuant to section 9-453o.’’  ‘‘The test to determine ambiguity is whether the stat- ute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DaimlerChrysler Services North America, LLC v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 274 Conn. 196, 203, 875 A.2d 28 (2005). As we explain in the following paragraphs, we conclude that the text and surrounding statutes allow for more than one rea- sonable interpretation of § 9-249a for the purposes of determining the order of parties on the ballot. We begin by noting that the subject matter of the statute is the order of parties on election ballots, and the text of General Statutes (Sup. 2012) § 9-249a begins with the command: ‘‘The names of the parties shall be arranged on the ballots in the following order . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Section 9-249a thus appears primar- ily addressed to political parties, not candidates. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the statute intends to measure party, not candidate, support. We recognize, however, that the plain language of the stat- ute could be subject to reasonable contrary interpre- tations. The defendant contends that ‘‘the statute focuses on the candidate’s vote total, not the party’s vote total,’’ arguing that the placement of the word ‘‘polled’’ follow- ing the word ‘‘candidate’’ compels an interpretation of the statute whereby the party of the candidate with the most total votes has precedence on the ballots in the subsequent general election. Although we have held that referential words and phrases usually refer to the last antecedent, this instruction applies only to the extent that ‘‘no contrary intention appears’’ and the construction does not otherwise impair the meaning of the sentence. (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Foley v. State Elections Enforcement Commission, 297 Conn. 764, 786, 2 A.3d 823 (2010); see 2A N. Singer & J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Con- struction (7th Ed. 2007) § 47:33, pp. 487–90. Here, the order of the words in § 9-249a is not sufficient to support the defendant’s argument that the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face. The defendant’s interpretation, while plausible, does not overcome the statute’s ambiguity. Most fatal to the defendant’s view of the statute’s plain meaning is the fact that the term ‘‘party’’ is not defined in § 9-249a, and has different meanings in related statutes. In her July 27, 2012 letter to the Republicans, the defendant relied on the definition of party provided in General Statutes § 9-37223 to assert that ‘‘Governor Malloy was a candi- date of only a single ‘party’ on the ballot in 2010, that of the Democratic Party.’’ The Working Families Party appeared in the 2010 gubernatorial race pursuant to a nominating petition for then candidate Malloy with a ‘‘party designation’’ under General Statutes § 9-453.24 The defendant argues that because the Working Fami- lies Party was not a major or minor party under § 9- 372 in 2010, all of the votes for Governor Malloy, who was listed on both the Democratic Party and the Work- ing Families Party lines, must accrue only to the Demo- cratic Party under § 9-249a. The definitions in § 9-372, however, do not, by their own terms, apply to the ballot ordering statute. Indeed, § 9-249a is conspicuously absent from the list of statutes to which the definitions in § 9-372 apply.25 ‘‘Unless there is evidence to the contrary, statutory itemization indi- cates that the legislature intended the list to be exclu- sive.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. Mellon, 286 Conn. 687, 693, 945 A.2d 464 (2008). Consequently, invoking definitions from another section of title 9 of our General Statutes does not cure the ambiguity in the ballot ordering statute.26 In addition, another election statute, General Statutes § 9-453t,27 allows the Working Families Party to be clas- sified as a party during the 2010 election. Pursuant to § 9-372 (6), minor party status is determined on an office-by-office basis, according to the number of votes received by the party’s candidate for that office in the preceding election.28 The Working Families Party was not a ‘‘minor party’’ in the 2010 governor’s race, but it had achieved ‘‘minor party’’ status for other offices on the 2010 ballot.29 Indeed, the cross endorsement of Dem- ocratic Party candidate Malloy by nominating petition was possible only because the Working Families Party was ‘‘(1) . . . an existing minor party with the same party designation at the time of [the] nomination, and (2) . . . otherwise qualified to nominate candidates on the same ballot.’’ General Statutes § 9-453t.30 Thus, in 2010, the Working Families Party was a ‘‘minor party’’ for the purposes of § 9-453t, which permitted it to cross endorse a major party candidate, but not a ‘‘minor party’’ under the § 9-372 definition, which does not gov- ern the section we are called on to interpret. Given the multiple plausible definitions of the crucial term ‘‘party,’’ the statutory language does not have a plain meaning. We conclude that § 9-249a is not clear and unambiguous on its face and turn to extratexutal sources for guidance. B In seeking to determine the legislative intent behind an ambiguous statute, we turn to ‘‘the legislative history and circumstances surrounding [the statute’s] enact- ment, to the legislative policy it was designed to imple- ment, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general sub- ject matter . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bysiewicz v. DiNardo, supra, 298 Conn. 765. We con- clude that these interpretive aids support the plaintiff’s construction of the statute, under which the party whose candidate received the most votes for the office of governor on its party line is entitled to the top line on the ballot in the succeeding election. Most important to our analysis is the legislative his- tory of § 9-249a and its predecessor statutes. It is undis- puted that, before 1953, the ballot ordering statute directed that the party with the most support on its party line in a governor’s race be given the top place in the next election. The defendant urges that subsequent changes in the language of the ballot ordering statutes were substantive, and changed the meaning of the stat- ute so that the party of the candidate who received the most votes across all party endorsements is placed first. A review of the legislative history, however, shows that the 1953 revisions were merely organizational, and were not intended to change the meaning of the ballot order- ing statute as it had been understood to award the top line to the party with the most support on its party line. We turn to a review of the genealogy and legislative history of Connecticut’s ballot ordering statutes. Before 1953, the relevant statutory language was set forth in General Statutes (1949 Rev.) § 1199, which provides in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he name of the political party polling the largest number of votes for governor shall be first, and the party polling the next largest number of votes for the same office shall be second, and so on. . . .’’ This language had been substantially similar since 1903, and was reenacted in various ballot ordering mea- sures throughout the years.31 The current wording of the statute dates to the 1953 revisions of our election statute. See Public Acts 1953, No. 368, § 214. The lan- guage of that provision, which survives in relevant part in § 9-249a, provided that ‘‘[t]he names of the political parties shall be arranged on the machine, either in col- umns or horizontal rows, in such order as the secretary of [the] state may determine, precedence being given to the party whose candidate for governor polled the highest number of votes at the last-preceding election for such office, and so on in descending order. . . .’’ Public Acts 1953, No. 368, § 214. According to the defendant, this change is significant and compels the conclusion that the legislature intended to modify the meaning of the ballot ordering statute from one focused on a party’s support to one focused on a candidate’s support. We have already noted that the plain language of the statute is ambiguous and could support either party’s construction. An exam- ination of the legislative history, moreover, contradicts the defendant’s assertion, and demonstrates that the 1953 revisions were not intended to change the meaning of the statute. The 1953 revisions originated in a Special Act direct- ing the secretary of the state to ‘‘prepare a revision of the sections of the [G]eneral [S]tatutes relating to elections, primaries, caucuses and conventions for the purpose of consolidating and clarifying the same . . . .’’ 26 Spec. Acts 363, No. 521 (1951). The report of the then secretary of the state, Alice Leopold, to the legislature listed the proposed revisions alongside the current statutes. See A. Leopold, Proposed Revision of the Sections of the General Statutes Pertaining to Elections (1953). In the preface to the report, Leopold was careful to note that the proposed revisions dealt only with ‘‘clarification and recodification’’ of Connecti- cut’s election laws.32 Upon presenting the revisions to the General Assembly, Leopold appeared before the Joint Standing Committee and explained that ‘‘[t]his legislation is not a change in the meaning of any laws, it is a rearrangement and re-codification of the existing laws. We were empowered to make only that kind of change by the last [l]egislature. . . . We did not intrude into the [l]egislative field in making changes in meaning only reorganization.’’ Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Elections, 1953 Sess., p. 34, remarks of Leo- pold. The legislature adopted the revisions with little debate. See Public Acts 1953, No. 368. This legislative history provides strong evidence that the legislature intended the meaning of the revised ballot ordering provisions to be consistent with the way the statute had previously been interpreted. ‘‘It is well established that testimony before legislative committees may be considered in determining the particular problem or issue that the legislature sought to address by legisla- tion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Castonguay v. Commissioner of Correction, 300 Conn. 649, 664 n.15, 16 A.3d 676 (2011). Moreover, there is no indication that the legislature intended to change the existing meaning of the ballot ordering provision in the amended history of Public Acts 1953, No. 368, or any subse- quent codifications.33 This conclusion is supported by an analysis of the statute in the context of contemporaneous elections. At the time that the revisions were adopted, the meaning of the ballot ordering statute was well settled. First, the plain meaning of the statutory text in General Statutes (1949 Rev.) § 1199, providing that ‘‘[t]he name of the political party polling the largest number of votes for governor shall be first,’’ clearly directed that prece- dence be given to the party with the most votes. Any doubt as to the meaning of the statute was settled in 1939, when a controversy similar to the one now before us was raised as a result of the 1939 governor’s race. In that election, the Republican candidate for the office of governor, Raymond E. Baldwin, received 358 fewer votes than his Democratic Party opponent, but was declared governor by a margin of 3046 votes due to his cross endorsement on the Union Party line.34 Subsequent to the election, then Secretary of the State Sara B. Crawford, sought the opinion of then Attorney General Francis A. Pallotti on the following question: ‘‘[D]ue to the fact that the [g]overnor was elected at the last general election by the combined votes polled by two parties, which major party shall, therefore, be placed in the first column of election bal- lots to be used in coming elections?’’ Opinions, Conn. Atty. Gen. (March 21, 1939) p. 230. The attorney general was charged with interpreting General Statutes (1930 Rev.) § 587, which provided in relevant part that ‘‘[e]ach column shall be headed by the name of the party whose candidates are listed therein . . . precedence being given to the party which polled the highest number of votes for governor at the last preceding general election for such office, and so on. . . .’’35 In Pallotti’s opinion, the legislature ‘‘intended that preference be given to that party which has polled more votes for its candidate as governor than the other parties did for their respec- tive candidates. It did not intend that preference be given to a party, which did not poll the highest number of votes, but whose candidate was elected with the votes received as an indorsed candidate of another party.’’ Opinions, Conn. Atty. Gen., supra, p. 232. Conse- quently, the party whose candidate lost the election, but who had received the most votes on its party line, was listed first in the subsequent presidential election. This language was retained in General Statutes (1949 Rev.) § 1199, the last version of the ballot ordering stat- ute prior to the 1953 revisions.36 This genealogy clarifies the legislature’s understand- ing of the language adopted in 1953 and preserved in the current revision of § 9-249a. Pallotti’s 1939 opinion settled any questions arising from the application of the ballot ordering statute to races for the office of governor decided by the votes on a cross endorsing party’s line. A review of the legislative history and gene- alogy reveals no evidence of legislative objection to this interpretation. Subsequently, when the legislature did change the language of the statute in 195