Robles v. City of Ontario CA4/3

Filed 10/22/26 Robles v. City of Ontario CA4/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE CHRIS ROBLES et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants G065946 v. (Super. Ct. No. CIVDS2007038) CITY OF ONTARIO et al., OPINION Defendants and Appellants. Appeal and cross-appeal from orders of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Michael A. Sachs, Judge. Affirmed. Law Offices of Scott J. Rafferty and Scott J. Rafferty for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Nielsen Maerksamer, Marguerite Mary Leoni and Christopher E. Skinnell; Best Best & Krieger and Ruben Duran for Defendants and Appellants. * * *  What began as a voting rights case about district elections in the City of Ontario (Ontario or defendants) has become an overheated dispute about attorney fees, in which it seems that both sides will leave no stone unturned and no matter unlitigated. In our previous opinion in this matter, we reversed and remanded for the trial court to decide, in the first instance, whether plaintiffs Chris Robles and the California Voting Rights Initiative (collectively Robles or plaintiffs) were entitled to any further attorney fees. (Robles et al. v. City of Ontario (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 574, 576.) The trial court awarded Robles $162,000 in attorney fees and costs of $2,159.30. In their appeal, Robles argues the trial court erred by setting the lodestar too low, excluding over 200 hours of claimed attorney work, and limiting litigation expenses and costs. In their cross-appeal, unsurprisingly, Ontario claims Robles is entitled to nothing. On the cross-appeal, we reject Ontario’s contentions asserting that Robles is not entitled to any fee award at all. On the appeal, we reject Robles’ contentions relating to the amount of the fee and cost awards. Accordingly, both orders are affirmed. STATEMENT OF FACTS A more complete statement of facts is available in our prior opinion. (Robles, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 577–581.) Suffice to say that Robles filed this case asserting claims under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10301(c)), the California Voting Rights Act of 2001 (Elec. Code, § 14027) (CVRA), and Title 42 United States Code section 1983. Robles alleged Ontario violated state and federal election law by conducting at-large, instead of district, elections for members of its city council. The parties eventually entered into a settlement and stipulated judgment which would 2 change Ontario’s election procedures over time. The stipulated judgment provided for attorney fees incurred prior to its entry. (Robles, at p. 576.) Our prior opinion addressed whether plaintiffs were entitled to seek additional attorney fees to enforce the stipulated judgment’s terms. (Robles, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 581–583.) Interpreting the relevant portions of the stipulated judgment, we concluded the answer was yes. We remanded the matter for the trial court to decide, in the first instance, whether the plaintiffs were prevailing parties, and if so, what amount of fees should be awarded. (Id. at p. 583.) On remand, the court set a briefing schedule for plaintiffs’ attorney fees motion, with dates to file the motion, opposition, and reply. Unfortunately, the parties did not view these filings as exclusive. After the date their reply brief was due, plaintiffs filed a total of 253 pages of additional documents. Plaintiffs’ additional filings triggered what the trial court referred to as a “cascade” of additional filings by defendants during the following week, totaling hundreds of additional pages. This led to further filings by plaintiffs. The court found these “hundreds of pages of additional documents and filings that the parties submitted after April 28, 2025 [the deadline for filing plaintiffs’ reply brief in the court’s briefing schedule], were not useful in resolving the issues in the fees motion.” Neither party had sought leave of court to file additional papers, and neither side demonstrated good cause for failing to present all pertinent evidence and argument during the scheduled briefing. The court declined to consider any document filed after the April 28 reply deadline. Robles requested $490,323.37 in fees, plus a multiplier enhancement of $196,129.35. The trial court found that plaintiffs were the prevailing parties, because their “litigation objectives, including the 3 enforcement motion, succeeded at a practical level in vindicating and rectifying” defendants’ violation of the CVRA. With respect to the amount of attorney fees, based on the lack of evidence presented by Robles, the court decided the lodestar was the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in San Bernardino County for voting rights cases, and assigned an hourly rate to Robles’ lead counsel, Scott J. Rafferty, of $750, rather than the claimed rate of $1,089–$1,247, which varied by year. As to the number of hours claimed, Robles requested compensation for 426.5 hours from June 1, 2022 through May 31, 2025. The court found that “Rafferty’s timekeeping records are plagued by numerous instances of block billing.” “Block billing occurs when ‘a block of time [is assigned] to multiple tasks rather than itemizing the time spent on each task.’” (Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 279.) The court specified these entries in a chart, and found a total of 210.5 hours were block billed. These reductions lowered the lodestar to 216 hours multiplied by the $750 hourly rate, for a total lodestar of $162,000. The court declined to apply a multiplier. Thus, the total fee award was $162,000. With respect to costs, Robles filed a costs memorandum seeking $497,095.99 in costs. Ontario filed a motion to tax. It appeared to the court that plaintiffs were seeking costs in connection with the 2022 motion to enforce the stipulated judgment and appellate costs for the prior appeal. The court noted that the costs memorandum plaintiffs filed on March 10, 2025, used the wrong Judicial Council form. To correct this error, plaintiffs filed a revised costs memorandum on April 15 and a memorandum of costs on appeal on the correct Judicial Council form. The April 15 memorandum sought $4,327.61, a very substantial reduction from the March 10 memorandum. It appeared to the court that plaintiffs had abandoned their 4 pursuit of the costs in the March 10 filing. The court denied the request for costs as originally claimed in the March 10 costs memorandum. With regard to the revised memorandum dated April 15, those items were solely postjudgment costs, as none related to the appeal. Again, however, plaintiffs did not use the correct Judicial Council form, which was mandatory. Because they did not use the correct form, their revised costs memorandum did not list the statute that authorized the various costs sought. The court denied the motion for costs on that basis. Plaintiffs filed a separate memorandum of costs on appeal on April 15. The court reviewed defendants’ arguments about the appeal cost items, denied them, and awarded plaintiffs $2,159.30 in costs on appeal. Both parties filed appeals. In their appeal, the plaintiffs contend the amount awarded in fees and costs is erroneous. In their cross-appeal, defendants argue plaintiffs were not prevailing parties, and even if they were, the trial court applied the wrong standard to determine whether plaintiffs were entitled to an award. DISCUSSION I. MOTIONS While we have carefully reviewed all of the parties’ voluminous motions, in the interest of brevity, we summarize them only briefly before ruling. A. Robles’ Motion to Dismiss Ontario’s Cross-Appeal Robles moves to dismiss notices of appeal filed by Ontario because Ontario did not follow local rules which require that appellate documents be physically delivered for filing. Robles attached a document entitled “First Amended General Order” (the General Order) dated August 7, 5 2025. The General Order ordered mandatory electronic filing in certain types of cases, including general civil cases. Paragraph two states that “Documents ineligible for electronic filing as posted on the Court’s website for the above Designated Case types may not be electronically filed and must be submitted in hard copy form unless otherwise ordered . . . .” As recently discussed in Gharraee v. Trader Joe’s Company (2026) 122 Cal.App.5th 786, 798, local rules, including general orders, must be consistent with state law. The California Rules of Court, rule 2.253(b)(1) “does not authorize the superior court to adopt a local rule that mandates electronic filing in civil cases except for particular documents or categories of documents.” (Gharraee, at p. 800.) To the extent that the General Order does so, it is invalid. Ontario’s evidence demonstrates counsel timely e-filed the notices of appeal. (See Lazar v. Bishop (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 668, 676.) The motion to dismiss is denied. B. Ontario’s Motion to Strike Material from Opening Brief and Appendix and Robles’ Application to File Errata and Conformed Opening Brief We discuss these two motions together because they are interrelated. Ontario moved to strike items from the appellant’s appendix and “unsupported” statements from Robles’s opening brief. While we appreciate Ontario’s fealty to the California Rules of Court, we exercise our discretion to deny the motion, with the exception of the following pages of the appellant’s appendix: 44, 45, 195, and 216. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.124(g).) If references to these documents are unavailable elsewhere in the record, the statements these citations support will be disregarded. In response to Ontario’s motion to strike, in addition to opposing, Robles filed an application to “accept errata and to file conformed brief.” 6 (Capitalization & boldface omitted.) The purpose of the conformed brief, Robles stated, was to address the issues in Ontario’s motion. This application, however, came far too late in the briefing process. We deny the application. C. Ontario’s Objections to and Motion to Strike Material from Combined Reply Brief, Cross-Respondent’s Brief and Revised Appendix Ontario also filed objections to Robles’ proposed revised appendix and combined reply brief. The objections to the revised appendix are moot, as we denied Robles’ application to file it. We again exercise our discretion to deny the motion to strike certain portions of the brief. II. ONTARIO’S CROSS-APPEAL We address the cross-appeal first, because if Ontario prevails in the cross-appeal, Robles’ appeal is moot. A. The Catalyst Theory Does Not Apply “An important exception to the American rule that litigants are to bear their own attorney fees is found in [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1021.5,” which “‘codifi[es] . . . the private attorney general doctrine of attorney fees developed in prior judicial decisions.’” (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 565.) The statute allows a court to award attorney fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in an action enforcing an important right affecting the public interest if a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons and the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5.)1 1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated. 7  The “‘fundamental objective’” of section 1021.5 “‘is to encourage suits enforcing important public policies by providing substantial attorney fees to successful litigants in such cases.’” (Graham, supra, 34 Cal.4th at 565.) “In order to effectuate that policy, [our Supreme Court] ha[s] taken a broad, pragmatic view of what constitutes a ‘successful party.’” (Ibid.) A favorable final judgment is not necessary and, under the catalyst theory, rather “courts look to the practical impact of the public interest litigation in order to determine whether the party was successful, and therefore potentially eligible for attorney fees.” (Id. at p. 566.) In other words, the catalyst theory is rooted in a construction of the phrase “successful party” in section 1021.5 to mean “the party to litigation that achieves its objectives,” which may be “by means of [the] defendant’s ‘voluntary’ change in conduct in response to the litigation.” (Id. at pp. 571-572.) The California Supreme Court has set forth “sensible limitations” on the catalyst theory intended to discourage extortionate lawsuits “without putting a damper on lawsuits that genuinely provide a public benefit.” (Graham, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 575.) “In order to obtain attorney fees without . . . a judicially recognized change in the legal relationship between the parties, a plaintiff must establish (1) that the lawsuit was a catalyst motivating the defendants to provide the primary relief sought; (2) that the lawsuit had merit and achieved its catalytic effect by threat of victory, not by dint of nuisance and threat of expense . . . ; and, (3) that the plaintiffs reasonably attempted to settle the litigation prior to filing the lawsuit.” (Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 604, 608.) Ontario contends Robles must be seeking attorney fees under the catalyst theory because “he did not get a judicial ruling in his favor.” Ontario then argues Robles does not meet the three requirements set forth above. 8  In opposition, Robles relies on Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th 243. In that case, the court held that the case before it was not a catalyst case because Vasquez successfully obtained a stipulated injunction, which resulted in a judicially recognized change to the parties’ legal relationship. (Id. at p. 260.) Here, Robles argued, plaintiffs obtained a stipulated judgment, which also brought about a judicially recognized change in the parties’ relationship and imposed continuing obligations on Ontario with respect to city council elections. Defendants argue “Vasquez does not hold that a stipulated judgment qualifies a party as ‘prevailing’ forever thereafter, no matter the outcome of subsequent efforts to enforce the judgment.” But the trial court did not decide otherwise. What the trial court did decide is that the catalyst theory does not apply here, and we agree. As in Vasquez, the parties’ agreement resulted in a change to their legal relationship. The lack of such a change is required for the catalyst theory to apply. (Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 608.) The trial court did not err by determining the catalyst theory does not apply to this case. B. Robles Was Properly Deemed a Prevailing Party on the Motion to Enforce As we discussed in our prior opinion, the trial court has discretion to determine which party has prevailed. (Robles, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 584.) Quoting the California Supreme Court, we also noted that “‘[T]he terms ‘prevailing party’ and ‘successful party,’ . . . are synonymous.’” (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 570.) “The term ‘successful party,’ as ordinarily understood, means the party to litigation that achieves its objectives. . . . ‘In everyday use, “prevail” means “gain victory by virtue of strength or superiority: win mastery: triumph.” [Citation.] . . . A lawsuit’s ultimate purpose is to achieve actual relief from an 9 opponent. Favorable judgment may be instrumental in gaining that relief. Generally, however, “the judicial decree is not the end but the means. At the end of the rainbow lies not a judgment, but some action (or cessation of action) by the defendant . . . .” [Citation.] On this common understanding, if a party reaches the “sought-after destination,” then the party “prevails” regardless of the “route taken.”’” (Id. at p. 571.) Here, the route taken was not direct. The parties reached what Robles hoped would be a final settlement when the stipulated judgment was entered, but Ontario left its obligations unfulfilled. Robles could have backed away and gone home with a paper victory, but his litigation objectives were unmet. Instead, he filed the motion to enforce, seeking an order to either adopt Robles’ proposed map or to defer a decision pending completion of procedures for additional public input. As we noted in our prior opinion, at the hearing on the motion, the trial court expressed numerous concerns about the stipulated judgment, questioning its validity, but also found Ontario had not complied with the settlement’s terms. “The minute order stated the motion to enforce the stipulated judgment was granted in part and denied in part.” (Robles, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 580.) While Robles was partly successful on the motion at the time, continued developments resulted in the achievement of plaintiffs’ litigation objectives. Ontario conceded the issue of the validity of the stipulated judgment. Robles championed another proposed map, “the ‘Unity Map,’” which was ultimately adopted. (Robles, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 580.) Thus, the motion to enforce led directly to plaintiffs’ ultimate success. We find no error in the trial court’s determination that Robles was the prevailing party. 10 C. The Trial Court Properly Allowed Attorney Fees Defendants next contend the trial court erred by failing to apply the criteria set forth in section 1025 to determine whether plaintiffs were entitled to an award of attorney fees. The trial court specified that plaintiffs were entitled to fees under Elections Code section 14030. That section requires an award of attorney fees to a prevailing plaintiff “in any action to enforce Section 14027 and section 14028” of the California Voting Rights Act. (§ 14030.) They claim the motion to enforce “did not allege a violation of Section 14027 (maintenance of a dilutive at-large voting system) or Section 14028 (racially polarized voting).” We find defendants’ interpretation of the statute unduly narrow. While the motion to enforce itself does not allege maintenance of a dilutive at-large voting system, the motion is part and parcel of a larger action where eliminating such a system was the very heart of the matter. Thus, the “action” was one “to enforce Section 14027.” (§ 14030.) Because attorney fees were appropriate under section 14027, we need not consider whether section 1021.5 was a valid alternate ground. D. The Trial Court Did Not Improperly Rely on this Court’s Prior Opinion Defendants claim we remanded the case for the trial court “to determine three things: 1) whether Plaintiff prevailed on the Motion to Enforce the Stipulated Judgment and, if so, 2) whether Plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees, and 3) the amount.”2 They claim the court did not exercise its discretion to determine if plaintiffs were the prevailing party. We 2 What the prior opinion actually said is this: “We therefore remand for the trial court to decide, in the first instance, whether plaintiffs qualify as prevailing parties, and if so, the amount of fees that should be awarded.” (Robles, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 583.) 11 disagree. “Discretion” is not a magic word that must be invoked. Rather, reading this portion of the court’s ruling as a whole, we conclude proper discretion was exercised. While the trial court quotes from our prior opinion, it never indicates that its ruling is not the product of its own application of the law to the specific facts. “‘“‘[A]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to support [the judgment] on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.’”’” (Rey v. Madera Unified School Dist. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1244 (Rey).) We do not find the court’s written ruling, or its statements at oral argument, to indicate it applied the wrong legal standard or that it was not exercising its discretion. This contention is without merit. III. ROBLES’S APPEAL A. Robles Cannot Raise New Issues Robles cannot raise issues here that were never proffered below. At the end of his opening brief, he offers a brief argument that “federal law preempts state restrictions on the recovery of fee awards” and claims, among other things, that he is entitled to litigation expenses without any costs memorandum. (Boldface omitted.) He did not mention federal law at all in his motion for attorney fees, instead relying on “Election Code, §14303, [the court’s] equitable powers under Code of Civil Procedure, §1021.5, and in compliance with the . . . stipulated judgment.” Nor do Robles’s briefs offer citations to the record demonstrating this issue was raised below. “‘“[A]rguments not asserted below are waived and will not be considered for the first time on appeal.”’” (Quinteros v. Harbor Distributing, LLC (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 60, 72.) These contentions are forfeited. 12  Robles’ reply brief also seeks to raise issues not discussed in the opening brief. These include the assertions that the trial court’s “lack of experience” with the case should lead to less deference and that Ontario abused an “unbalanced schedule” (apparently referring to the briefing schedule). Robles also complains of a due process violation (again with regard to the briefing), and raises other matters that are either new or not adequately connected to one of the arguments in his opening brief. None of these issues are appropriately raised for the first time in a reply brief, and we disregard them. (Schubert v. Reynolds (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 100, 108–109.) B. The Trial Court Properly Set Rafferty’s Hourly Rate Under the CVRA, prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to receive “a reasonable attorney’s fee.” (Elec. Code, § 14030.) The basic principles behind setting attorney fee awards are well-established. “In determining a reasonable attorney fee award under fee-shifting statutes, the trial court begins by calculating a lodestar figure based on the hours reasonably spent, multiplied by the prevailing hourly rate for private attorneys in the community conducting litigation of the same type.” (Rey, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1240.) “The determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his or her court. [Citation.] Accordingly, the trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is wrong. [Citation.] In other words, the trial court’s exercise of discretion will be reversed only if its decision ‘exceeded the bounds of reason,’ i.e., it was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd.” (Rey, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1240.) 13  1. Home Market Rates Robles complains the trial court set Rafferty’s reasonable hourly rate too low, at $750 per hour instead of the claimed rate of $1,089–$1,247 per hour. He contends that Rafferty was entitled to the home market hourly rate for attorneys in the San Francisco Bay Area, where Rafferty works. In calculating the lodestar, “[t]he reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “[I]n the ‘unusual circumstance’ that local counsel is unavailable a trial court may consider out-of-town counsel’s higher rates. [Citation.] Nevertheless, the use of the higher rates for out-of-town counsel requires a sufficient showing that hiring local counsel was impracticable. [Citation.] A plaintiff must at least make ‘“a good-faith effort to find local counsel.”’” (Rey, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1241.) The party seeking out-of-town rates has the burden of establishing they made a good-faith effort to retain local counsel. The evidence presented on this point cannot be speculative. (Rey, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1241.) Robles’ initial memorandum in support of attorney fees did not include any evidence at all. He simply asserted, without citations to evidence, that in “every CVRA case Robles located in San Bernardino and Riverside Counties, the plaintiffs have been represented by one or more firms located in Los Angeles or the Bay Area. Defense counsel from the Bay Area . . . have also assisted city attorneys in some cases.” The memorandum also stated: “The non-availability of local counsel was an extraordinary problem for Robles and affected his negotiating position at the time of the settlement. All politics may be local, and so are many business opportunities for law firms. Although Robles seeks to protect the identity of a firm that wanted to be helpful, its partners ultimately concluded that CVRA matters would not be 14 consistent with its business strategy.” That was the entire sum of “evidence” in Robles’ initial memorandum. The trial court did locate a single reference in Rafferty’s time records to “unsuccessful efforts to recruit local counsel” which was block billed along with several other items at 3.25 hours. The court disregarded new evidence included in a reply declaration by Rafferty, noting new evidence is not permitted in reply papers. The trial court was well within its discretion to decide that Robles had not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate he made a good faith effort to retain local counsel. He was therefore entitled to local rates in San Bernardino County. 2. The $750 Hourly Rate The $750 hourly figure was arrived at reasonably. In his memorandum in support of fees, Robles urged the use of the “Laffey Matrix,” named for a 1983 federal district court opinion. (Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. (D.D.C. 1983) 572 F. Supp. 354.) He asserted, without citation to evidence, that those rates were “consistent with rates accepted by Ontario.” Robles contended the rates were similar to an award in a published case, Yumori-Kaku v. City of Santa Clara (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 385. He also claimed that a city attorney, during a public meeting, stated Ontario “advised his client and the public that they should accept a $1000/hour rate for [Rafferty’s] services.” No citation to evidence was offered. Ontario submitted evidence that the rates for lawyers litigating CVRA cases in Southern California, including San Bernardino County, ranged from $585 to $630 per hour. In setting the amount of attorney fees at $750, the court noted Rafferty’s educational background, years of experience, and prior work on 15 voting rights cases. The court also observed that Robles had offered evidence that Rafferty’s hourly rate had been set at $700 per hour in 2022. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to set Rafferty’s hourly rate at $750. 3. Multiplier “Once the lodestar is fixed, the court may increase or decrease that amount by applying a positive or negative ‘multiplier’ to take other factors into account. [Citation.] These factors include, but are not limited to, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (2) the skill displayed in presenting them; (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; (4) the contingent nature of the fee award; and (5) the fact that an award against the state would ultimately fall upon the taxpayers.” (Rey, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1240.) Robles next claims Rafferty was “entitled” to a multiplier. There is no such entitlement as a matter of law—“applying a multiplier is discretionary.” (Rey, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1242.) Below, Robles argued that a multiplier was appropriate because of the contingent and political risk, the need to hold “powerful, political subdivisions accountable,” preclusion from employment with public entities, and the undesirability of CVRA practice. His argument on this point was four paragraphs long and included no citations to evidence. He stated the requested 1.4 multiplier was the same as the one applied in Yumori-Kaku v. City of Santa Clara, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th 385. His reply memorandum similarly did not cite evidence on his factual points. Defendants offered the declaration of John O’Connor, who was the fee expert in the Yumori-Kaku case relied upon by Robles. After reviewing the history of this case, he opined: “There is nothing in Mr. Rafferty’s work to support a multiplier. As we know, he was paid handsomely 16 for his original work, perhaps excessively so. But any risk he took was compensated by the $300,000 he was paid, and any contribution to the law or to society compensated fully as well. [¶] Moreover, his skill level shown in this portion of the case was not prepossessing or extraordinary. As I noted above, I cannot opine that this work was unusually skillful, or for that matter, even modestly skillful.” The trial court considered the request, noting the contingent nature of the matter was not in doubt. “However, Plaintiffs did not supply any evidence of the other factors; there was no evidence that Robles or CVRI suffered ostracism or reprisals, or that Rafferty was precluded from other employment, or that this practice area is undesirable. While there undoubtedly was some risk, the court can observe that Plaintiffs’ counsel was paid $300,000 in connection with the stipulated judgment which no doubt mitigated some of the risk.” By his own admission, this case did not preclude Rafferty from working on other cases—he has worked on many other CVRA cases during the pendency of this matter. Robles’s moving papers lacked evidentiary support on the other factors relevant to multipliers. There was simply no evidence to support the contention that Rafferty’s work postjudgment was so difficult or required such skill that a multiplier was appropriate. The trial court’s determination was not an abuse of discretion. C. The Trial Court Properly Excluded Improperly Documented Time As noted above, the trial court excluded a total of 210.5 hours of Rafferty’s time that were block billed. Block billing occurs when “a block of time [is assigned] to multiple tasks rather than itemizing the time spent on each task.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1010.) “Block billing is particularly problematic in cases 17 where there is a need to separate out work that qualifies for compensation under . . . section 1021.5 from work that does not.” (Jaramillo v. County of Orange (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 811, 830.) Under such circumstances, trial courts have discretion to penalize block billing. (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC, at p. 1010.) Block billing also obscures the work claimed and can exacerbate vague descriptions. This can prevent the trial court from determining whether time spent on a given task was reasonable. (See Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1325.) During the hearing on the fees motion, the trial court went through the block billed items it later set forth in a chart in the written ruling. The court’s ruling noted many of the block billed entries were for lengthy periods of three to eight hours, and included “multiple, disparate tasks, such as travel and attending court hearings or meetings. . . . Other entries report varied tasks such as a client meeting or activists meeting coupled with some other legal task as preparing a document or research; it is axiomatic that an attorney cannot be conducting a meeting while preparing a legal brief or doing research.” Further, the block billed time was “not limited to a handful of entries, which could justify overlooking them. Instead, the timekeeping entries show they are permeated with improper block billing to the extent that almost half the requested time is improperly recorded.” The block billing, the court found, made it impossible “to determine a reasonable fee[] for the work allegedly billed.” We agree. One day, for example, was billed at eight hours for the following: “2 calls (one long) with Chris Robles, brief call with Ana Gonzalez, long call with Maria Grijalva, finalize and file voters and Grijlava oppositions, serve courtesy copies; numerous continued communications regarding Supreme Court filings.” If the eight hours had been separately 18 billed, the court could have determined whether the amount of time spent and amount billed on each task was reasonable. It is simply impossible when the time is block billed. Matters were further complicated by Rafferty’s inclusion of travel time, which was billed at 50 percent, in entries that included substantive work. Robles complains that because defendants did not raise this issue, he had no opportunity to respond. He does not demonstrate that he requested a continuance or the opportunity for briefing after the hearing to address this concern. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to disallow block billed time. D. The Trial Court Properly Ruled on the Cost Memoranda In a three-paragraph argument, Robles’s opening brief contends the court erred by disallowing “all trial court costs” because they were reported on the wrong form. It is not clear exactly what Robles is appealing. As discussed above, plaintiffs filed multiple documents. Robles first filed a memorandum on March 10 seeking $497,095.99 in costs. It appeared to the court that this memorandum sought costs in connection with both the motion to enforce the stipulated judgment and appellate costs for the prior case. In their motion to tax costs, defendants pointed out that Robles had used the wrong form. They complained that using the wrong form had resulted “in a confused jumble of items mixing appellate and trial court costs and allowable and disallowed items.” Robles apparently took note of this issue and filed a “corrected” costs memorandum on April 15 and a separate memorandum of costs on appeal. The April 15 memorandum sought $4,327.61, a very substantial 19 reduction from the March 10 memorandum. Robles also filed a memorandum of costs on appeal seeking $2,159.30.3 It appeared to the court that plaintiffs had abandoned their pursuit of the costs in the March 10 filing. The court denied any request for costs in the March 10 filing. As to the April 15 filing, the court noted that Robles had used Judicial Council MC-010 and MC-011. But the correct form was MC-012, and the difference was not merely cosmetic. “Had Plaintiffs used the correct form, they presumably would have indicated the statute that authorized the various post judgment costs they are seeking. Plaintiffs’ 4/15/25 costs memorandum and their opposition to the motion to tax costs does not supply this information.” Because the incorrect form “did not supply the statutes authorizing recovery of those costs, that is sufficient basis to deny costs recovery.” The court was correct. As we said above, it is not clear whether Robles is now appealing from the order denying recovery based on his original March 10 memo or the later April 15 one. Ultimately, it does not matter, as both were correctly denied. Denying the costs based on the missing information on the incorrect forms was within the court’s discretion. (Friends of Spring Street v. Nevada City (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1104.) 3 As noted, the court granted the full amount of Robles’s costs sought on appeal. 20  DISPOSITION All pending motions are denied with the exception of Ontario’s motion to strike portions of Robles’s appendix, which is granted in part as discussed above. The orders granting, in part, plaintiffs’ attorney fees and costs are affirmed. Each party is to bear its own costs on this appeal. MOORE, J. WE CONCUR: MOTOIKE, P. J. GOODING, J. 21