Full Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING 2026 WY 100 APRIL TERM, A.D. 2026 September 23, 2026 WAGONHOUND LAND & LIVESTOCK COMPANY, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. S-25-0303 LITTLE MEDICINE CREEK RANCH, INC., a Wyoming corporation, f/k/a BURNETT RANCH, INC., Appellee (Defendant). LITTLE MEDICINE CREEK RANCH, INC., a Wyoming corporation, f/k/a BURNETT RANCH, INC., Appellant (Defendant), S-25-0304 v. WAGONHOUND LAND & LIVESTOCK COMPANY, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company, Appellee (Plaintiff). Appeal from the District Court of Albany County The Honorable Misha E. Westby, Judge Representing Little Medicine Creek Ranch, Inc.: Mitchell H. Edwards, Nicholas & Tangeman, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming. Eric C. Rusnak, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, Washington, D.C. Argument by Mr. Rusnak. Representing Wagonhound Land and Livestock Company, LLC: William L. Hiser, Kermit C. Brown, Brown & Hiser, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Hiser. Before BOOMGAARDEN, C.J., GRAY, FENN, JAROSH, and HILL, JJ. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume. JAROSH, Justice. [¶1] Wagonhound Land & Livestock Company (Wagonhound) petitioned the district court to establish a private road across neighboring Little Medicine Creek Ranch (LMCR). Following a bench trial, the district court established a private road in favor of Wagonhound after concluding that the road was necessary for Wagonhound to access an isolated tract known as Parcel 1. The district court also established conditions and restrictions on the private road. Wagonhound appealed and challenges three of the district court’s conditions. In its cross-appeal, LMCR challenges the district court’s findings on good faith, necessity, route selection, and damages. LMCR also challenges the district court’s rejection of an agricultural-use-only restriction on the private road. [¶2] We affirm the district court’s findings on good faith, necessity, route selection, and damages, as well as its rejection of LMCR’s proposed agricultural-use-only restriction. Having found two of the district court’s restrictions on the private road are not supported by evidence, we reverse Condition 4 (in part) and Condition 6. ISSUES [¶3] These appeals present the following dispositive issues: 1. Did the district court err in finding Wagonhound proceeded with its private road action in good faith? 2. Did the district court err in finding necessity for the private road? 3. Did the district court err in selecting the route for the private road? 4. Did the district court err in its award of damages to LMCR? 5. Did the district court err in ordering Conditions 4, 5, and 6 on the private road when those restrictions were not recommended by the Viewers or supported by the record? 6. Did the district court err when it denied LMCR’s request to adopt an agricultural-only use restriction? FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS [¶4] Parcel 1 rests in a remote and rugged area of northern Albany County. At approximately 640 acres, Parcel 1 is surrounded almost entirely by deeded land owned by 1 LMCR and known as the Burnett Ranch. 1 To the east, Parcel 1 adjoins a small tract of land managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and a section of State trust land. As depicted below and aligned to the north, BLM land is shown in light yellow, State trust land is blue, and LMCR land is orange: LMCR’s BLM grazing allotment falls generally inside the red fenceline depicted in the image above, whereas Wagonhound’s BLM grazing allotment is to the east. [¶5] On April 21, 2023, Wagonhound sent LMCR a letter expressing interest in purchasing legally enforceable access to Parcel 1. It also shared its intent to construct a partition fence around Parcel 1. After Wagonhound’s effort to secure access to Parcel 1 proved unsuccessful, it filed a complaint with the district court to establish a private road pursuant to Wyoming’s private road statute. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-9-101-105 (2026). A. Initial Proceedings [¶6] The district court held an initial hearing to determine the necessity of establishing a private road. The district court found Wagonhound established necessity because it did not have legally enforceable access to Parcel 1. Although Wagonhound has an outlet from Parcel 1 to adjoining BLM land, the court reasoned that Parcel 1 is still “landlocked” 1 In 2023, this Court affirmed a district court decision to quiet title to Parcel 1 to Wagonhound following an effort by LMCR to claim the parcel through adverse possession. See generally, Little Medicine Creek Ranch, Inc. v. d’Elia Trustee of the d’Elia Fam. Trust, 2023 WY 30, 527 P.3d 856 (Wyo. 2023). 2 because vehicle access is controlled by LMCR. The district court also rejected a claim by LMCR that Wagonhound failed to bring its private road action in good faith. [¶7] As required by statute, the district court appointed three disinterested viewers and appraisers (the Viewers) to “locate and mark out a private road and alternative routes as they deem appropriate …” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101(h) (2026). The district court issued its instructions for the Viewers and appointed Don Schramm, Jon Keil, and Professor Alan Romero. Mr. Schramm is a licensed surveyor and former BLM employee once responsible for supervising transportation planning, road construction, road maintenance, and easement acquisition. Mr. Keil is a rancher, outfitter, real estate broker, and licensed attorney. Professor Romero teaches introductory and advanced property law courses at the University of Wyoming College of Law. He also instructs classes on real estate finance, land use law, and agricultural law. Professor Romero’s scholarship similarly focuses on property law, land use, and takings. B. Locating the Private Road [¶8] The district court instructed the Viewers to consider the two routes identified by the parties in their pleadings. The map below, aligned to the north, depicts the general location of the potential routes: 1. Wagonhound’s Proposed Route [¶9] Wagonhound proposed connecting the southern end of Parcel 1 with a county road by relying, in part, on an existing route LMCR uses to access its seasonal headquarters. The first 0.8 miles of this proposed route from the county road is a “marginal road” until the point where LMCR turns off to its headquarters. After that fork, the proposed route is a two-track road until it reaches the southern portion of Parcel 1. 3 2. LMCR’s Alternative Route [¶10] The alternative route LMCR recommended joins the county road at the same point as the proposed route but follows a developed road for one mile until arriving at a gravel pit owned by LMCR. From there, Wagonhound would need to construct a new segment of road approximately 1/3 of a mile long to access Parcel 1. However, a rocky ridge separates the gravel pit from Parcel 1. As a result, it would require significant construction to complete the route. 3. The Parsons Creek Route [¶11] In addition to identifying its alternative route for the private road, LMCR’s answer alleged a private road is not necessary because Wagonhound has an outlet from Parcel 1 to the adjoining BLM parcel. 2 The outlet consists of a rough two-track road across the adjoining BLM parcel which then crosses a State trust section before arriving at LMCR deeded land. That existing two-track must then bisect approximately 1,700 feet of LMCR before returning to a larger tract of BLM land to the east. 3 LMCR maintains the outlet from Parcel 1 constitutes access to a public road because the road is on public land. [¶12] LMCR also maintains the Parsons Creek Route provides Wagonhound with legally enforceable access to Parcel 1 from the east because it can secure authorization from BLM and the State of Wyoming to construct a bypass around LMCR’s deeded land, thereby connecting the two BLM tracts through the State trust section. Such a bypass would allow Wagonhound to travel from east to west several miles from Wagonhound’s BLM grazing allotment to Parcel 1. C. The Viewers’ Report and Recommendations [¶13] After conducting a site visit, the Viewers recommended locating the private road along Wagonhound’s proposed route. The Viewers determined the proposed route “is the most reasonable and convenient” and is “shorter and more direct” than the alternative route 2 The private road statute requires a defendant’s answer to “set forth the location and description” in a specified manner of “any alternative routes proposed by the defendant and the owners of record.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101(b) (2026). LMCR’s answer identified the alleged outlet from Parcel 1 in its answer but did not set forth the complete Parsons Creek Route as an alternative route as required by statute. LMCR maintains it did not designate the Parsons Creek Route in its answer because it believes the route is a public road. Later, LMCR asked the district court to consider the Parsons Creek Route at trial, and it did so. Because Wagonhound did not object, and the Parsons Creek Route was a basis for the district court’s order, we will consider the matter as an issue tried by consent. See W.R.Civ.P. 15(b)(2) (For Issues Tried by Consent). 3 The record offers conflicting positions as to whether LMCR would grant Wagonhound an easement to cross the 1,700 feet of LMCR land to use the Parsons Creek Route. The bulk of the record, however, reflects LMCR’s strong opposition to entertain any easement. 4 offered by LMCR. The Viewers also expressed doubt about the viability of the alternative route. Although the alternative route would allow Wagonhound to use an established road to reach LMCR’s gravel pit, the Viewers anticipated the rocky ridge separating the gravel pit from Parcel 1 would deny Wagonhound winter access to its property. [¶14] The Viewers also determined the private road along the proposed route would affect 680 acres of LMCR land. They relied on calculations and appraisals from a comparable report, the Lummis Report, used to establish a private road on a property in Albany and Platte County. Unable to find better sales data, the Viewers adopted the value used in the Lummis Report — a $90 per acre reduced market value for land with a private road easement. The Viewers prepared a “before and after” appraisal and concluded that LMCR suffered $61,200 in damages from locating the private road along the proposed route. [¶15] The Viewers made two other recommendations. First, they suggested the private road should not exceed thirty feet in width, with the centerline along the existing ranch road. Second, the Viewers recommended Wagonhound install and maintain culverts and “be responsible for maintaining the road for its use.” [¶16] While not a proposed route, LMCR asked the Viewers to look at the Parsons Creek Route. The Viewers attempted to traverse the route from the west before turning around halfway due to the steepness and ruggedness of the terrain. One Viewer described the Parsons Creek Route after it leaves the 1,700 feet of LMCR land as “not much more than a trail.” A Wagonhound surveyor similarly attempted to locate the Parsons Creek Route from the opposite direction and reported a similar experience, testifying the route “was more of a trail than a road.” D. The District Court’s Order [¶17] Following a two-day bench trial during which the Viewers and the parties’ respective witnesses testified, the district court entered an order establishing a private road along the Viewers’ recommended route, i.e., Wagonhound’s proposed route. It also ordered Wagonhound to pay LMCR the recommended $61,200 in damages and costs. In adopting the Viewers’ damage recommendation, the district court found that “there was no testimony or evidence provided that disputed the viewers’ calculations of the 680 acres of affected land, the $90 dollars per acre of decreased value of the land after the private road is established, nor was there testimony disputing the calculation of the $61,200 in damages.” [¶18] The district court also denied LMCR’s request to order Wagonhound to pay $30,000 to $50,000 per year in alleged “operational damages” because Wyoming Statute, § 24-9- 101(j) (2026), does not authorize such damages. 5 [¶19] Finally, the district court ordered seven conditions on the private road, three of which are disputed in this appeal: [Condition] 4. Wagonhound is responsible for maintaining the road for its use, including all expenses related to installing culverts, upkeep, and maintenance of the road. Wagonhound is responsible for paying all costs associated with fixing any damage caused to the road, regardless of whether LMCR or Wagonhound, or any associated guests, actually caused the damage. [Condition] 5. Wagonhound is required to maintain the road so as to minimize extra dust that may affect LMCR’s property. Wagonhound shall regularly apply water as a dust suppressant to the road to reduce dust. [Condition] 6. The only vehicles that will be permitted to use the private road to access Wagonhound’s property are vehicles with four or less axels [sic]. Semi-tractor-trailers will not be permitted on the road, unless related to maintenance, repairs, construction, and dust mitigation of the road. The district court adopted these conditions “to reduce the damage to LMCR’s property.” It recognized that LMCR requires the gravel operation on its land to use water as a dust suppressant on the gravel pit road and reasoned: [S]ince LMCR already approves of this dust suppressant method, that is the method the Court will order Wagonhound to perform on the new road. In addition, to decrease dust and any nuisance from extra noises and lights, the Court has determined Wagonhound will not be permitted to use the new road for semi-tractor-trailer traffic in order to mitigate the damage to LMCR’s property. The district court also denied LMCR’s request to adopt a condition limiting the private road to only agricultural purposes because LMCR did not provide any evidence that any roads in the area had a similar restriction. STANDARD OF REVIEW [¶20] The district court held a bench trial pursuant to Wyoming Statute § 24-9-103(a) (2026). We therefore review the district court’s “findings of fact for clear error, and its conclusions of law de novo.” Sharpe v. Timchula, 2019 WY 121, ¶ 19, 453 P.3d 761, 766 (Wyo. 2019) (citing Clark v. Ryan Park Prop. & Homeowners Ass’n, 2014 WY 169, ¶ 6, 340 P.3d 288, 289 (Wyo. 2014)). When reviewing a district court’s factual findings for clear error, we have stated: 6 The factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a jury verdict. While the findings are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record. Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail reweighing disputed evidence. Findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. In considering a trial court’s factual findings, we assume that the evidence of the prevailing party below is true and give that party every reasonable inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from it. We do not substitute ourselves for the trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we defer to those findings unless they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as a matter of law. The district court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Boot Ranch, LLC v. Wagonhound Land & Livestock Co., LLC, 2024 WY 136, ¶ 23, 560 P.3d 887, 893 (Wyo. 2024) (citations omitted). DISCUSSION I. Wagonhound proceeded with the private road action in good faith. [¶21] LMCR maintains the district court erred in finding Wagonhound acted in good faith when it initiated its private road action. According to LMCR, Wagonhound acted in bad faith when it: (1) failed to make a firm offer to purchase a private easement; (2) demanded LMCR share the cost of a partition fence; and (3) bid on an adjoining State trust land lease during the private road proceedings. [¶22] Proceeding in good faith is a substantive requirement for commencing a private road action. Lavitt v. Stephens, 2015 WY 57, ¶ 18, 347 P.3d 514, 519 (Wyo. 2015). “Our definition of good faith is that it encompasses an honest, lawful intent, and actions taken without knowledge of fraud and without any intent to assist in any fraudulent or otherwise unlawful scheme.” Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 996 P.2d 663, 668 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Brown v. Avery, 850 P.2d 612, 617 (Wyo. 1993) (Thomas, J., specially concurring)); see also Mayland v. Flitner, 2001 WY 69, ¶ 16, 28 P.3d 838, 845 (Wyo. 2001). 7 [¶23] LMCR argues Wagonhound did not comply with the good faith requirement because it did not offer a “definite price” for purchasing access to Parcel 1. The statute, in relevant part, requires a complaint for establishing a private road to provide, “[a] description of the plaintiff’s efforts to purchase a legally enforceable access to a public road[.]” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101(a)(iii) (2026). [¶24] In its complaint, Wagonhound stated it contacted LMCR through written letters and phone conversations inviting negotiations to purchase private road access, and that those conversations were unsuccessful. Indeed, an April 21, 2023, letter to LMCR from Wagonhound identified Parcel 1, described its proposed route for the private road, and stated, “we hereby offer to purchase a thirty-foot (30’) non-exclusive access right-of-way, fifteen feet on either side of centerline of the existing ranch roads and as indicated on the [attached] maps.” That letter also stated Wagonhound was “willing to offer LMCR the difference between the appraised value of its land with and without the proposed easement or a fair price per rod for acquisition.” [¶25] We find no textual support for the notion that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101(a)(iii) (2026) required Wagonhound to make a sum certain offer to purchase legal access before initiating its private road action. See, e.g., Adekale v. State, 2015 WY 30, ¶ 13, 344 P.3d 761, 765 (Wyo. 2015) (stating “we will not add language or choose other words to change the meaning of a statute.”) (citation omitted). Wagonhound’s offer to purchase access was not evasive; it constituted a reasonable effort to start negotiating with LMCR. Because Wagonhound attempted to purchase access, and then described those efforts in its complaint, it satisfied the requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101(a)(iii) (2026). [¶26] LMCR also argues Wagonhound acted in bad faith because it sought to construct a partition fence around Parcel 1. In its offer to purchase access to Parcel 1, Wagonhound notified LMCR it intended to construct a partition fence around the inholding and seek one-half of the cost for constructing the fence from LMCR. Under Wyoming law, “the owner of any lawful fence which is or becomes a partition fence separating the owner’s land from that belonging to some other person may require the person to pay for one-half (½) of what it would or does actually cost to construct the partition fence.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 11-28-106(a) (2026). As the owner of Parcel 1, Wyoming law entitles Wagonhound to construct the partition fence and recover one-half of the cost from LMCR. Absent any argument the proposed fence is unlawful, Wagonhound’s plans to construct a partition fence does not amount to bad faith. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 11-28-102 (2026) (defining lawful fences generally). [¶27] Finally, LMCR claims Wagonhound acted in bad faith by filing a conflicting State grazing lease application after filing its private road action. Wagonhound’s conflicting lease application competed with LMCR for access to grazing on State lands adjacent to Parcel 1. LMCR’s argument lacks merit. Any conflicting application for a grazing lease on State trust lands must be filed by a qualified applicant and submitted within a narrow 8 statutory window. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 36-5-104(b)(2026) (process for filing a conflicting application to lease grazing and agricultural lands). Although LMCR suggests Wagonhound’s application was filed for unscrupulous reasons, the timing of that application was dictated by the term of the existing lease and Wyoming statute. LMCR also takes issue with acknowledgements and statements Wagonhound made in its application about its access and existing fencing in relation to the State trust land. Considering good faith is a prerequisite to commencing a private road action, in this context, LMCR’s argument is unconvincing. See Mayland, ¶ 13, 28 P.3d at 843 (“This court has found good faith in bringing the application is an essential prerequisite.”). Otherwise, any allegation against Wagonhound regarding their application for a State grazing lease is best addressed by the State Board of Land Commissioners. [¶28] Wagonhound acted lawfully and complied with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101(a)(iii) (2026) in initiating the private road action. The district court did not err when it concluded Wagonhound proceeded in good faith. II. The district court did not err in finding a necessity for the private road. [¶29] “Wyoming’s private road statute was enacted to ensure that a landowner who otherwise has no access to his property is able to use his land for productive purposes.” Thornock v. Esterholdt, 2016 WY 63, ¶ 15, 375 P.3d 750, 754 (Wyo. 2016) (citations omitted). The statute outlines the circumstances under which a private road will be considered and the information required to support a private road complaint. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101(a) (2026) (requirements for commencing a private road complaint). “The taking of property for a private road is, however, constitutionally restricted, and any private road applicant must make a threshold showing that the road is a necessity.” Thornock, ¶ 16, 375 P.3d at 755 (citing Reidy v. Stratton Sheep Co., 2006 WY 69, ¶ 11, 135 P.3d 598, 604 (Wyo. 2006)); see also In re Crago, 2007 WY 158, ¶ 17, 168 P.3d 845, 854 (Wyo. 2007) (“Wyo. Const. Art. I, § 32 mandates that in order to constitutionally justify a private condemnation of property, there must be necessity.”). [¶30] The district court must hold an initial hearing to determine whether the plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of the statute and that “access is necessary because the plaintiff has no legally enforceable access.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101(h) (2026). Once a plaintiff proves there is no legally enforceable means to gain access to a public road, the plaintiff has demonstrated the “necessity” for a private road. In re Crago, ¶ 6, 168 P.3d at 849 (citing Pine Bar Ranch, LLC v. Luther, 2007 WY 35, ¶ 9, 152 P.3d 1062, 1066 (Wyo. 2007)) (citation modified). [¶31] At the initial hearing, the district court concluded Wagonhound demonstrated necessity by showing Parcel 1 was landlocked. LMCR argues the district court erred in its finding because a two-track road to adjoining BLM land provides Wagonhound with an “immediate” outlet from Parcel 1 and connection to what LMCR considers a public road. 9 Additionally, LMCR argues the two-track road on BLM land provides Wagonhound with access to a public road via the Parsons Creek Route. [¶32] LMCR land prevents the two-track road outlet from Parcel 1 from connecting to the Parsons Creek Route. Therefore, we will bifurcate LMCR’s necessity arguments. We will first consider whether the BLM two-track road in and of itself is a public road, then we will determine whether the Parsons Creek Route provides Wagonhound with legally enforceable access to a public road. A. The adjoining BLM land does not provide Wagonhound with an outlet to or connection with a public road. [¶33] An isolated tract of BLM land adjoins Parcel 1 to the east. A primitive two-track leads from Parcel 1, crosses the BLM land, bisects a section of State trust land, and then reaches LMCR property. Because that route provides Wagonhound with a point of egress from Parcel 1 to a road on public land, LMCR argues Wagonhound has an outlet to and connection with a public road. [¶34] “The [Wyoming private road] statute does not require connection with a public road that is state or county controlled.” McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1287 (Wyo. 1980). As a matter of law, we have held “a road over federal lands may be considered a public road within the meaning of our private road statutes, provided the characteristics of the road indicate it is available to the general public.” Reidy, ¶ 19, 135 P.3d at 606. In the absence of a statutory definition, we define a “public road” as “one that the public generally — not merely a portion of the public — is privileged to use.” Reidy, ¶ 13, 135 P.3d at 605 (quoting McGuire, 608 P.2d at 1287-88). [¶35] LMCR equates Wagonhound’s legal access to adjoining public land as access to a public road for purposes of the private road statute. But LMCR’s argument requires this Court to conclude that having a point of egress from a landlocked parcel alone is sufficient to demonstrate a lack of necessity for a private road. That argument is inconsistent with the plain language in the statute. Wyoming’s private road statute provides “[a]ny person whose land has no outlet to, nor connection with a public road” may commence a private road action. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101(a) (2026) (emphasis added). Because “nor” is a coordinating conjunction meaning “and not” the plain language of the statute requires both an outlet and connection with a public road. See nor, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2023) (“and not – often used with inversion of subject and predicate after an affirmative that is equivalent to or implies a negative”); and Wyo. Dep’t of Revenue v. PacifiCorp, 2025 WY 126, ¶ 36, 580 P.3d 491, 501 (Wyo. 2025) (recognizing we “construe each statutory provision in pari materia, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence according to their arrangement and connection.”) (citations omitted). The controlling question, therefore, is whether the two-track road on the adjoining BLM land leading from Parcel 1 possesses the characteristics of a public road. 10 [¶36] Practical considerations govern our determination as to whether a road is a public road. See, e.g., McGuire, 608 P.2d at 1287 (relying on evidence and testimony of actual, longstanding public use of a BLM road); Reidy, ¶ 20, 135 P.3d at 606-07 (noting evidence the Forest Service improved and maintained the road); Thornock, ¶ 23, 375 P.3d at 757 (evidence the BLM road was open for public recreation and casual use); see also Pine Bar Ranch, LLC, ¶¶ 14-15, 152 P.3d at 1068-69 (considering the Bureau of Indian Affairs regulatory definition of a public road and evidence road use was limited to ranch employees). The Court also does not presume a road is public merely because the road is in the public domain. See Wagstaff v. Sublette Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2002 WY 123, ¶ 17, 53 P.3d 79, 8384 (Wyo. 2002) (noting the absence of evidence that the public has the privilege to traverse unimproved dirt tracks on State trust and BLM land). [¶37] Only surrounding landowners or their employees are known to have ever used the two-track road across the isolated BLM tract adjoining Parcel 1. BLM’s grazing allotment map indicates the existence of this two-track road and shows all points leading to/from the road blocked by private land – Parcel 1 to the west, LMCR to the south and north, and after crossing the State trust land LMCR to the northeast. At the necessity hearing, a BLM employee expressed doubt as to whether the BLM portion of the road is publicly accessible because private land thwarts any vehicle access. Specifically, the existing two-track road must cross 1,700 feet of private land owned by LMCR before crossing back onto BLM land. [¶38] LMCR maintains we can rely on Thornock to conclude Wagonhound has access to a public road. In Thornock, the Court considered whether a two-track road on public land connecting the petitioning landowner’s south and north properties was a public road. Thornock, ¶¶ 22-28, 375 P.3d at 756-57. There, the petitioning landowner controlled both ends of the two-track road and claimed it was not a public road because he selectively determined which members of the public were allowed to use the road. Id., ¶ 24, 375 P.3d at 756-57. We found the two-track was a public road because the relevant land management agency considered it open to public use, and but for petitioners’ gatekeeping, the road provided recreational access to the public. Id., ¶¶ 25-28, 375 P.3d at 757. [¶39] However, LMCR conceded at oral argument Thornock is distinguishable. Unlike that case, all access to the isolated BLM two-track is controlled by LMCR. The two-track road, therefore, is a dead end for Wagonhound — after leaving Parcel 1, vehicles can only access the adjoining BLM tract or State trust lands until reaching LMCR property. Likewise, LMCR’s land prevents vehicle traffic from accessing the two-track road in the opposite direction. Accordingly, Thornock is not persuasive here. [¶40] Because no evidence was offered at trial showing the public has ever used the BLM two-track road, our reasoning in Wagstaff controls. See Wagstaff, ¶ 17, 53 P.3d at 83-84 (noting the absence of any evidence that the public generally has the privilege to traverse 11 the unimproved dirt tracks on federal and State trust land). In that case, we found the unimproved dirt tracks crossing BLM and State trust lands were not a public road because BLM did not maintain it, the route was only slowly passable during summer months, and it was only used occasionally by hunters. Id., ¶¶ 15-20, 53 P.3d at 83-84. None of the practical considerations we typically consider are present, and trial testimony reveals only adjoining landowners or their employees are known to have accessed the adjoining BLM tract. Id.; see also Pine Bar Ranch, ¶ 15, 152 P.3d at 1069 (finding the access road in question was not a public road based on the limited class of individuals (e.g., employees, former employees, and family members) allowed to access the road). [¶41] Given the physical isolation of the two-track segment, and the lack of evidence that the public has ever accessed it, the outlet is not to a public road. See Reidy, ¶ 13, 135 P.3d at 605 (reiterating “[a] public road is one that the public generally—not merely a portion of the public—is privileged to use.”). The district court did not err when it concluded Wagonhound satisfied the necessity requirement of the private road statute. B. The Parsons Creek Route does not provide Wagonhound with an existing outlet to or connection with a public road. [¶42] Alternatively, LMCR challenges the district court’s necessity finding by arguing that Wagonhound has access to a public road because it can secure BLM authorization to construct a new road around LMCR, thereby connecting the two-track road with the Parsons Creek Route. That argument is unconvincing and inconsistent with the private road statute. [¶43] We have held that the “no outlet to, nor connection with” language in Wyoming Statute § 24-9-101(a) means “no legally enforceable, existing outlet to nor connection with a public road.” Reaves v. Riley, 782 P.2d 1136, 1137 (Wyo. 1989) (citing McGuire, 608 P.2d at 1286) (emphasis added). The bypass LMCR wants Wagonhound to use does not physically exist; therefore, the Parsons Creek Route does not provide Wagonhound with a legally enforceable connection to a public road. [¶44] In lieu of constructing its own public land bypass, LMCR maintains Wagonhound can obtain a permit to trail livestock with dirt bikes across the roadless section of BLM land. An authorization to trail livestock across open range is not the type of “outlet” or “connection” contemplated by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 (2026). See Reaves, 782 P.2d at 1137 (noting a legal right to cross a property alone, is not an “outlet” for purposes of the private road statute). LMCR’s open range trailing suggestion also tacitly concedes the very point it seeks to refute – Parcel 1 is landlocked and only accessible by vehicle across LMCR land. [¶45] Even if a bypass road connecting the BLM two-track road and the Parsons Creek Route existed, the district court concluded the Parsons Creek Route was not a reasonable, 12 convenient, or practical option. See Tilden v. Jackson, 2025 WY 57, ¶ 13, 568 P.3d 1197, 1202 (Wyo. 2025) (recognizing courts must also “inquire into the convenience of using the available public road.”) (citing Thornock, ¶ 18, 375 P.3d at 755). LMCR claims the district court lacked evidence to weigh the inconvenience of the Parsons Creek Route. We disagree; the record unequivocally supports the district court’s findings. [¶46] The Parsons Creek Route does not appear on the BLM master plat or the Parsons Creek grazing allotment map. A BLM employee expressed doubt at the necessity hearing about the existence of the Parsons Creek Route and testified he could not locate it using aerial imagery. He also confirmed no BLM rights-of-way existed within the grazing allotment, which typically would indicate the existence of a road. A second BLM employee, a range specialist, confirmed his colleague’s conclusion. [¶47] The Wagonhound surveyor, Mr. Neumiller, mapped the Parsons Creek Route during an effort to find access to Parcel 1 from the east. That effort proved difficult and required extensive route finding. Mr. Neumiller testified the Parsons Creek Route “was more of a trail than a road” by the time he reached the BLM grazing allotment boundary. As the route narrowed, Mr. Neumiller was forced to exchange his side-by-side for an ATV to navigate the remaining few miles of terrain. Mr. Neumiller ended his survey where the Parsons Creek Route met and continued onto LMCR land. When the Viewers attempted to traverse the Parsons Creek Route from the opposite direction, they abandoned their efforts halfway through after concluding it was not a reasonable route, also describing it as “not much more than a trail.” [¶48] LMCR land prevents the Parsons Creek Route from connecting with the two-track outlet from Parcel 1. The evidence presented at the necessity hearing and trial also shows the Parsons Creek Route does not provide vehicle access to Parcel 1. Whether we consider the two-track road leading from Parcel 1 in isolation, or the Parsons Creek Route in its entirety, neither route offers Wagonhound legally enforceable access to a public road. The district court’s finding that a private road was necessary for Wagonhound to access Parcel 1 was not clearly erroneous. III. The district court did not err in selecting the route for the private road. [¶49] The Viewers recommended locating the private road along the route proposed by Wagonhound. The district court then adopted the Viewers’ recommendation, concluding it was the most reasonable and convenient route. LMCR argues the Viewers and district court clearly erred in selecting this route because it is “more damaging” to LMCR than LMCR’s alternative route. Because the proposed route and LMCR’s alternative route meet the public road at the same point, LMCR also asserts the district court should have found both routes equally convenient. 13 A. The Viewers’ statutory requirement to recommend “the most reasonable and convenient route” is distinct from their duty when locating and marking out a private road. [¶50] Section 101(h) establishes statutory requirements for both locating and determining the route for a private road. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-9-101(h) (2026). With respect to route selection, “[t]he viewers must recommend to the court, and the court must select, the most reasonable and convenient route, provided that access shall be along section and boundary lines whenever practical.” Sharpe, ¶ 22, 453 P.3d at 767 (citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-9- 101(h), -103(a)) (internal quotations omitted). LMCR’s argument that the Viewers erred in “selecting a more damaging route” is inconsistent with the statute because it suggests the Viewers were required to select the least damaging route. [¶51] The plain text of Section 101 requires Viewers to “recommend to the court the most reasonable and convenient route . . . .” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101(h) (2026). Correspondingly, Section 103 requires the district court to “select the most reasonable and convenient route for the access, . . . .” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-103 (a) (2026). [¶52] The Viewers’ statutory requirement to recommend “the most reasonable and convenient route” is distinct from their duty to physically “locate and mark out” a private road. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101(h) (2026). This court has discussed, at length, the series of amendments to the private road statute. See Whaley v. Flitner Ltd. P’ship, 2017 WY 59, ¶¶ 16-23, 395 P.3d 653, 659-61 (Wyo. 2011) (comparing 2011 enactments with the 1985 revision); Sharpe, ¶ 31, 453 P.3d at 770, n.9 (discussing 2013 amendment to vest district courts with authority to adjudicate private road actions). The requirement that a proposed road, “shall be located so as to do the least possible damage to the lands through which the private road is located” has not changed since 1985. 4 Compare 1985 Session Laws ch. 88, §§ 1-3; with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101(h) (2026). Notably, the 1985 statute gave significant weight to the petitioner in proposing the route for a private road. Whaley, ¶ 18, 395 P.3d at 659-60; see also Goodman v. Voss, 2011 WY 33, ¶ 31, 248 P.3d 1120 (Wyo. 2011) (recognizing under the 1985 statute the petitioner had the right to ch