Full Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING 2026 WY 123 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2026 November 20, 2026 SUELLEN L. DAVIDSON, Appellant (Plaintiff/Defendant), v. SCHLEEDLEWITZ, LLC, a Wyoming business organization; DELANEY BEND FARM, LLC, a Wyoming business organization; WHISTLE PIG, INC., a Wyoming corporation; S-26-0088 CHARLES N. DAVIDSON, individually, and as an employee, agent, or servant of Schleedlewitz, LLC, Delaney Bend Farm, LLC, and/or Whistle Pig, Inc.; and DEBORAH J. DAVIDSON, individually, and as an employee, agent or servant of Schleedlewitz, LLC, Delaney Bend Farm, LLC, and/or Whistle Pig, Inc. Appellees (Defendants/Plaintiffs). Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County The Honorable Dawnessa A. Snyder, Judge Representing Appellant: Robert T. Moxley, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Moxley. Representing Appellees Schleedlewitz, Whistle Pig, LLC, and C. Davidson: Scott A. Homar and April R. Baker, Overstreet, Homar & Kuker, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Homar. Representing Appellees D. Davidson and Delaney Bend Farm, LLC: Jodi D. Shea, Pence & MacMillan, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming. Before BOOMGAARDEN, C.J., and GRAY, FENN, JAROSH, and HILL, JJ. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume. BOOMGAARDEN, Chief Justice. [¶1] This consolidated case presents the newest installment in a litigious family feud between Suellen (Sue) Davidson and her two siblings, Charles (Chuck) and Deborah (Deb) Davidson. [¶2] Underlying this appeal are two disputes between the siblings. The first concerns their rights in a judicially created easement road near Saratoga, Wyoming (the “Chet Davidson Ranch Road” or “the easement road”), which provides Sue, Chuck, Deb, and an unrelated third party, Colton Newton, with access to their various properties located off Wyoming Highway 130. The second concerns Sue’s interference with a land-sale agreement between Chuck and Deb’s LLCs and the Platte Valley Healthcare Project (PVHP) for the purpose of developing a hospital near Saratoga (the “PVHP Deal”). The district court found Sue misused the Chet Davidson Ranch Road and ordered it relocated at Sue’s expense. The district court also awarded Chuck and Deb damages for Sue’s interference with the PVHP Deal, despite Sue’s claim of privilege protecting her interference. We affirm. ISSUES [¶3] We restate and order the issues as follows: 1. Did the district court err by holding Sue liable for her intentional interference with the PVHP Deal? 2. Did the district court err by awarding the full contract price as damages for Sue’s interference? 3. Should we consider for the first time on appeal whether the district court erred in ordering the Chet Davidson Ranch Road relocated at Sue’s expense? BACKGROUND [¶4] Sue, Chuck, and Deb are the three children of the late Dan and Earlene Davidson. At all times relevant here, Chuck and Deb, either together or separately, owned Schleedlewitz, LLC, Delaney Bend Farm, LLC, and Whistle Pig, Inc. 1 [¶5] Sue, Chuck, and Deb own various interests in two parcels near Saratoga, Wyoming: the Davidson Ranch and the Commercial Property. The Commercial Property lies between 1 For ease we refer to Chuck, Deb, Schleedlewitz, Delaney Bend Farm, and Whistle Pig collectively as Appellees. 1 the Davidson Ranch and Wyoming Highway 130. The Davidson Ranch is accessible only by crossing the Commercial Property on one of two roads: the Chet Davidson Ranch Road or the Dan Davidson Ranch Road. Since 2019, however, logs have blocked access to the Dan Davidson Ranch Road, leaving the Chet Davidson Ranch Road as the Davidson Ranch’s only access. [¶6] The Chet Davidson Ranch Road has two primary access points on Highway 130: 1) the Davidson Ranch Access Point to the north, and 2) the Whistle Pig Access Point to the south. [¶7] The Commercial Property was originally owned by a third party. The Davidson Ranch, by contrast, has remained in the Davidson family since 1928 when the siblings’ grandparents first acquired the ranch. In 1981, Dan obtained easement rights in the Chet Davidson Ranch Road, which provided him and Earlene access to the Davidson Ranch across the Commercial Property. Shortly after obtaining that easement, Dan and Earlene purchased the Commercial Property and began using it as an extension of the Davidson Ranch. [¶8] Some years later, Dan opened the Whistle Pig Bar and Saloon on a portion of the Commercial Property. Dan later conveyed the Commercial Property outright to Chuck and Deb, who during the relevant periods, owned it in equal shares. Chuck and Deb now own and operate the bar through Whistle Pig, Inc. [¶9] Sue, Chuck, and Deb then inherited the Davidson Ranch through their parents, each taking an equal, undivided interest. Following periods of turmoil and litigation between the siblings, Deb initiated a partition action to divide ownership of the Davidson Ranch and its accompanying assets. Sue purchased the ranch in 2017 and has remained its sole owner since. Sue has also retained an easement in the Chet Davidson Ranch Road. FACTS [¶10] Two disputes underlie this appeal. The first involved Sue’s alleged misuse of the Chet Davidson Ranch Road. The second involved Sue’s intentional interference with the PVHP Deal. We bifurcate the facts as they relate to each. The Easement Dispute [¶11] During the relevant periods, Sue treated the Davidson Ranch as her second home, visiting the property on weekends throughout the summer and fall. As manager of the Whistle Pig Bar and Saloon, Chuck also spent most of his weekends and some weeks on the Commercial Property, while Deb visited the Commercial Property less frequently. When Sue visited the ranch, she used the Davidson Ranch Access Point to access the Chet 2 Davidson Ranch Road. This was largely due to a no-trespass order barring Sue from utilizing the Whistle Pig Access Point. [¶12] Chuck sometimes hosted special events on the Whistle Pig portion of the Commercial Property. To control traffic and prevent unauthorized use of the Chet Davidson Ranch Road during those events, Chuck closed the Davidson Ranch Access Point and permitted Sue to use the Whistle Pig Access Point, despite the no-trespass order. Chuck and the Whistle Pig staff also accommodated Sue by stopping the event when Sue approached to ensure she could travel the Chet Davidson Ranch Road unimpeded. Although Sue typically traversed the Chet Davidson Ranch Road only three to four times per weekend, she used the road more often during those events. [¶13] Sue’s other actions over the years similarly impacted Appellees’ use of the easement road and Commercial Property. On several occasions, Sue left open or destroyed gates on the road, which Chuck installed to ensure his family’s horses couldn’t escape when they were on the property, to prevent Whistle Pig patrons from entering the Davidson Ranch Access Point, and to mitigate third-party interference with Sue’s use of the road. Sue also filed regular police reports complaining about Chuck’s alleged interference with her use of the road. [¶14] Despite Chuck’s accommodation attempts, Sue sued Appellees in the Carbon County District Court (Docket No. 22-12), claiming they unlawfully interfered with her use and enjoyment of the Chet Davidson Ranch Road by obstructing the road with fences, gates, logs, snow, and vehicles. Appellees counterclaimed, alleging Sue had misused her easement, seeking to terminate or relocate Sue’s easement, and claiming damages. The PVHP Deal Dispute [¶15] As noted, during the relevant periods, Chuck and Deb each owned equal one-half shares in the Commercial Property. In June 2019, PVHP representative Will Faust contacted Chuck and Deb to inquire about purchasing a portion of the Commercial Property to build a hospital to serve the Saratoga region. After several months of negotiating, Chuck and Deb, through their LLCs, entered a land-sale contract with PVHP for the sale of roughly five acres of the Commercial Property, which the Chet Davidson Ranch Road crossed. [¶16] Under the contract, PVHP agreed to purchase the parcel for $90,000—$18,000 of which PVHP paid as a nonrefundable earnest money deposit. Chuck and Deb were to furnish marketable title and a general warranty deed at closing, and PVHP retained discretion to rescind the contract if Chuck and Deb failed to remedy any title defect within 30 days’ written notice. Chuck and Deb also had the option, upon PVHP’s breach, to seek damages, specific performance, or retain the earnest money deposit as liquidated damages. The parties set closing for February 3, 2020, which they later extended to May 15. 3 [¶17] Chuck and Deb later agreed to include in the sale an additional, smaller parcel for $36,000. PVHP paid $6,768 as an additional nonrefundable earnest money deposit. [¶18] Although Sue was not privy to the PVHP Deal negotiations, shortly after Chuck, Deb, and PVHP entered the initial contract, Sue visited the ranch and saw heavy equipment parked on the Commercial Property. Sue quickly became skeptical that “something was going on.” On November 25, 2019, Sue confirmed her suspicion. During Deb’s deposition in another lawsuit, Sue sat in as Deb testified that she and Chuck had been in “negotiation[s] with [PVHP] to sell the property for the purpose of building a hospital.” [¶19] In the meantime, PVHP was busy preparing to construct the hospital. Shortly after entering the initial contract, PVHP obtained a title commitment, which disclosed various easement rights in the Chet Davidson Ranch Road, including those of Sue and the siblings’ unrelated neighbor, Mr. Newton. To resolve these encumbrances, PVHP began working with Chuck, Deb, Sue, Mr. Newton, and other interested parties to relocate the easement road to improve each party’s access rights while promoting the efficient development of the hospital. [¶20] While the PVHP Deal was under way, Sue, Chuck, and Deb were tied up in another lawsuit in the Laramie County District Court in which Sue claimed an interest in the Commercial Property. Believing Chuck would owe her money in that lawsuit and to prevent “money laundering between the various entities within which [Chuck] was involved,” Sue recorded a notice of lis pendens on the Commercial Property in January 2020, nearly two months after first learning of the PVHP Deal. Sue, however, never disclosed the existence of the lis pendens to Chuck, Deb, Mr. Newton, or PVHP during their easement negotiations. [¶21] After further discussion with Sue concerning the easement road, PVHP offered to purchase Sue’s rights in the road. The offer provided PVHP would pay Sue $10,000 and would facilitate alternative access to the Davidson Ranch through the Whistle Pig Access Point. At the time, PVHP had already secured Chuck and Deb’s approval to permit Sue to use the Whistle Pig Access Point in connection with the proposed new easement. PVHP made similar offers to Mr. Newton and others who held rights in the easement road. [¶22] The offer further stated, “Although PVHP could certainly accomplish its goal without the easement, we believe it would be more neighborly and more efficient to purchase the existing right of way in favor of alternate access.” 4 [¶23] Sue generated a counteroffer, which provided as follows: In addition to the terms of th[e March 27 offer], a gravel roadway will be built by [PVHP] from the point of my anticipated entry (“my entry”) to the north of Colton Newton’s entry virtually directly east to the point that it intersects the road . . . . This would require the installation of two cattle guards and at least one culvert and one or two gates. All costs of the same are to be borne by [PVHP]. All road work will be completed on or before September 15, 2020. While Colton Newton is willing to be responsible for plowing the road as necessary, because he travels extensively, an additional term is that when Colton Newton is unavailable to do the plowing, [PVHP] shall be responsible to plow the road from the start of the easement’s point of entry south of the Whistle Pig off the highway down to the house on the Davidson Ranch for a period of five years. Before sending her counteroffer to PVHP, Sue sought Mr. Newton’s input. Mr. Newton responded with concern: My view is, we are winning greatly with the approval from Chuck to relocate your driveway in the deal. The cost for road material, culverts, cattle guards, equipment and man hours will greatly exceed $10,000. With that being said, you will be benefiting far more than $10,000 in the near term and far term. I’m not sure a nonprofit will be able to move on both. (citation modified). [¶24] Mr. Newton’s reluctance stemmed from his belief that Sue’s counteroffer may “shut the whole [PVHP Deal] down.” Despite Mr. Newton’s reservations, however, Sue relayed the counteroffer, unamended, to PVHP. [¶25] PVHP never responded to Sue’s counteroffer. Instead, on April 9, 2020, PVHP notified Chuck that a second title search revealed Sue’s lis pendens, which clouded title to the Commercial Property. Consistent with the contract, the letter requested Chuck cure the title defect within 30 days. In response, Chuck moved the Laramie County District Court to release the lis pendens. On April 20, however, before the court intervened, Mr. Faust called Chuck to inform him that “the deal was off” due to PVHP’s concern regarding potential delays caused by the lis pendens and the litigation it referenced. Despite Chuck 5 and Deb’s further remediation efforts, PVHP terminated the PVHP Deal and found an alternative parcel on which to build the hospital. This Litigation [¶26] Following PVHP’s repudiation, Appellees sued Sue in the Carbon County District Court (Docket No. 22-114), claiming intentional interference with a business expectancy and prospective economic advantage (Intentional Interference) resulting from Sue’s interference with the PVHP Deal. 2 Appellees alleged Sue improperly caused PVHP to terminate the PVHP Deal by filing the lis pendens and by “engaging in unauthorized negotiations” with PVHP. They sought damages in “the amount of the expected sale, the loss of the value of the infrastructure improvements, and other consequential damages in an amount to be proven at trial.” [¶27] The district court consolidated the pending cases between the parties. After a five- day bench trial, the district court denied Sue’s claims relating to Appellees’ alleged interference with Sue’s use of the Chet Davidson Ranch Road. At the same time, the court granted Appellees’ Intentional Interference claim and ordered Sue to pay $101,232 in damages, representing the full price of the contracts underlying the PVHP Deal less the earnest money deposits Chuck and Deb retained. 3 The court reasoned Sue improperly interfered with and caused the termination of the PVHP Deal by 1) filing the lis pendens with knowledge of the PVHP Deal, 2) failing to disclose the lis pendens during easement negotiations despite knowing it clouded title to the acres of Commercial Property underlying the PVHP Deal, and 3) selfishly attempting to extract further concessions from PVHP through her counteroffer. The court also granted Appellees’ claims regarding Sue’s misuse of the Chet Davidson Ranch Road and ordered Sue to pay to relocate the easement. [¶28] Following the district court’s order, the Appellees requested clarification regarding Sue’s relocation of the easement road. Sue similarly filed a post-trial motion, challenging 2 The parties and the district court below conflated the terms “intentional interference with contract” and “intentional interference with a business expectancy and prospective economic advantage.” While we acknowledge the two causes of action largely target similar conduct, they are not the same. See, e.g., Ahearn v. Anderson-Bishop P’ship, 946 P.2d 417, 423–24 (Wyo. 1997) (“Wyoming has adopted the Restatement formulations of the tort of intentional interference with a contract, First Wyoming Bank, Casper v. Mudge, 748 P.2d 713, 715 (Wyo.1988) (quoting Restatement, Second, Torts § 766 (1979)), and the tort of intentional interference with a prospective contractual relation, Four Nines Gold, Inc. v. 71 Const., Inc., 809 P.2d 236, 238 (Wyo.1991) (quoting Restatement, Second, Torts § 766B (1979)). . . . Both tortious interference theories lie only against outsiders who interfere with the contractual expectancies of others.”). Accordingly, our use of Intentional Interference in this opinion refers strictly to intentional interference with a business expectancy and prospective economic relation, as Appellees pleaded in their complaint. 3 Specifically, the contract price for the original agreed-to sale of five acres of the Commercial Property was $90,000, of which PVHP paid Chuck and Deb earnest money deposits totaling $18,000. The agreed- upon price for the additional parcel was $36,000, of which PVHP paid earnest money deposits totaling $6,768. 6 the court’s finding of liability and award of damages tied to the Intentional Interference claim. The court issued an order clarifying additional facts relating to the easement reformation and upholding its finding of liability and award of damages. Sue appealed, claiming the court erred by 1) finding Sue liable for Intentional Interference, 2) awarding damages totaling the full price of the contracts underlying the PVHP Deal, and 3) requiring Sue to pay to relocate the easement road. We consider each argument in turn. DISCUSSION I. The district court properly found Sue intentionally interfered with the PVHP Deal. [¶29] Sue claims the district court made three categorical errors in finding her liable for Intentional Interference. First, Sue contends the district court improperly found her liable based on her filing of the lis pendens because the act of filing lis pendens is absolutely privileged from tort liability. Second, Sue challenges the district court’s findings concerning impropriety, causation, and knowledge. And third, Sue claims the district court erred by not applying the factors set out in Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist. v. Johnston, 717 P.2d 808 (Wyo. 1986), to determine whether Sue’s interference with the PVHP Deal was improper. [¶30] We disagree that the absolute litigation privilege protected Sue from liability for Intentional Interference. Instead, since 1966, this Court has recognized the applicable privilege against liability for Intentional Interference is that set forth in Restatement of Torts § 773, which immunizes conduct asserting or threatening to protect a legally protected interest in good faith and by appropriate means. 4 See Wartensleben v. Willey, 415 P.2d 613, 614 (Wyo. 1966). Because Sue’s conduct here was not in good faith, she cannot benefit from § 773’s protective shield. We likewise conclude the district court committed no clear error in finding Appellees satisfied each element of Intentional Interference, and given its reasoned findings as to impropriety, the court was not required to apply the Toltec factors. See Toltec, 717 P.2d at 814; Sunshine Custom Paints & Body, Inc. v. S. Douglas Hwy. Water & Sewer Dist., 2007 WY 206, ¶ 26, 173 P.3d 398, 405 (Wyo. 2007). 4 Although this Court originally adopted Restatement of Torts § 773 (1939) in Wartensleben, it has since adopted the more recent formulation set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 773 (1979), which provides essentially the same protections. See Toltec, 717 P.2d at 814 (adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 773 (1979)). Compare Restatement of Torts § 773 (1939) (“One is privileged purposely to cause another not to perform a contract, or enter into or continue a business relation, with a third person by in good faith asserting or threatening to protect properly a legally protected interest of his own which he believes may otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the performance of the contract or transaction.”), with Restatement (Second) of Torts § 773 (1979) (“One who, by asserting in good faith a legally protected interest of his own or threatening in good faith to protect the interest by appropriate means, intentionally causes a third person not to perform an existing contract or enter into a prospective contractual relation with another does not interfere improperly with the other’s relation if the actor believes that his interest may otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the performance of the contract or transaction.”). 7 A. The Absolute Litigation Privilege [¶31] For years this Court has recognized that certain statements and conduct during the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged from civil liability. See, e.g., Elmore v. Van Horn, 844 P.2d 1078, 1084–86 (Wyo. 1992) (defendant absolutely privileged from tort liability for statements made in her affidavit and during live testimony); Johnson v. Griffin, 922 P.2d 860, 862 (Wyo. 1996) (holding the prosecutors and witnesses in the case were “absolutely immune from suit for the performance of their duties during a trial”); Abromats v. Wood, 2009 WY 100, ¶14, 213 P.3d 966, 971 (Wyo. 2009) (“[S]tatements made by the victim of a crime to a crime victim service provider for submission to the court . . . cannot support tort liability for libel because a victim has absolute immunity as a witness when making statements in the course of the judicial proceedings.”). This ancient privilege, or “witness immunity,” serves a vital role in protecting the integrity of our judicial system; it prevents censorship, enhances the search for truth, and encourages free access to the courts. 5 As this Court has stated, Traditionally, witnesses and those who participate in judicial proceedings enjoy absolute immunity for civil claims which could result from their statements made in open court. The immunity of parties and witnesses from subsequent damages liability for their testimony in judicial proceedings was well established in English common law. The United States Supreme Court summarized the two main reasons for affording witnesses civil immunity for their testimony: A witness’ apprehension of subsequent damages liability might induce two forms of self-censorship. First, witnesses might be reluctant to come forward to testify. And once a witness is on the stand, his testimony might be distorted by the fear of subsequent liability. Elmore, 844 P.2d at 1084 (quoting Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330–31, 333, 103 S. Ct. 1108, 1113–14, 75 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1983) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 5 See, e.g., Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 333, 103 S. Ct. 1108, 1114, 75 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1983) (“A witness who knows that he might be forced to defend a subsequent lawsuit, and perhaps to pay damages, might be inclined to shade his testimony in favor of the potential plaintiff, to magnify uncertainties, and thus to deprive the finder of fact of candid, objective, and undistorted evidence.”); Westfield Dev. Co v. Rifle Inv. Assocs., 786 P.2d 1112, 1117 (Colo. 1990) (noting “the basis of an absolute privilege” is “encouraging free access to the courts”); Louise Lark Hill, The Litigation Privilege: Its Place in Contemporary Jurisprudence, 44 Hofstra L. Rev. 401, 402 (2015) (“Often used in response to defamation claims, the privilege has been noted to be ‘the backbone to an effective and smoothly operating judicial system.’”) (quoting Tuff-N- Rumble Mgmt., Inc. v. Sugarhill Music Publ’g Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 673, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). 8 [¶32] Despite the privilege’s ancient roots, many issues remain as to its application. See, e.g., Hill, supra, at 404–06. The same is true here. As noted above, Sue claims the litigation privilege protected her filing of the lis pendens on the Commercial Property from liability for Intentional Interference. This Court, however, has never determined whether the absolute privilege protects the act of filing lis pendens against liability for Intentional Interference. [¶33] Courts have answered this question differently. Some have held the act of filing lis pendens is absolutely privileged from liability for Intentional Interference. See, e.g., Salma v. Capon, 161 Cal. App. 4th 1275, 1290, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 873, 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). Others have held the absolute privilege protects only statements made within the notice of lis pendens, and not the act of recording the lis pendens itself. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 269 A.3d 1215, 1219–20 (N.J. 2022). Still others have held the act of filing of lis pendens is entitled to only qualified immunity from Intentional Interference liability under Restatement of Torts § 773. See, e.g., Westfield Dev. Co., 786 P.2d at 1118. [¶34] Our precedent dictates Westfield’s approach is proper. See Wartensleben, 415 P.2d at 614 (adopting § 773’s qualified immunity for Intentional Interference). Section 773 provides, One who, by asserting in good faith a legally protected interest of his own or threatening in good faith to protect the interest by appropriate means, intentionally causes a third person not to perform an existing contract or enter into a prospective contractual relation with another does not interfere improperly with the other’s relation if the actor believes that his interest may otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the performance of the contract or transaction. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 773 (1979). Section 773 acts as an affirmative defense, which Sue bore the burden of proving at trial. Sweetwater Station, LLC v. Pedri, 2022 WY 163, ¶¶ 34–35, 522 P.3d 617, 627 (Wyo. 2022). It is both qualified and narrow: it “protects the actor only when (1) he has a legally protected interest, and (2) in good faith asserts or threatens to protect it, and (3) the threat is to protect it by appropriate means.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 773 cmt. a (1979); Sunshine Custom Paints & Body, Inc., 2007 WY 206, ¶ 24, 173 P.3d at 404–05; Westfield Dev. Co., 786 P.2d at 1118. [¶35] Because § 773 safeguards only those acting in good faith to protect a legally recognized interest through appropriate means, the absolute litigation privilege does not apply here. Section 773 specifically targets liability for Intentional Interference, while the litigation privilege traditionally sought to protect in-court statements from liability for defamation. See Elmore, 844 P.2d at 1084 (quoting Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 330–31, 103 S. 9 Ct. at 1113); Hill, supra, at 405. Moreover, § 773 recognizes the need to protect current or prospective contractual or economic relationships from bad faith conduct or interference by inappropriate means—conduct wholly antithetical to the objectives of the litigation privilege. We therefore decline to absolutely shield lis pendens filings from liability for Intentional Interference, and instead conclude a party has only a qualified privilege under § 773 to interfere with another’s contractual relationship, business expectancy, or prospective economic advantage. B. Intentional Interference [¶36] We now turn to Sue’s remaining arguments concerning Intentional Interference and her claim of privilege under § 773. [¶37] This Court has adopted the definition of Intentional Interference laid out in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B, which provides: One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another’s prospective contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of the relation, whether the interference consists of (a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or continue the prospective relation or (b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective relation. Downs v. Homax Oil Sales, Inc., 2018 WY 71, ¶ 21, 421 P.3d 518, 523 (Wyo. 2018) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B (1979)). A plaintiff must satisfy four elements to prove Intentional Interference: (1) The existence of a valid contractual relationship or business expectancy; (2) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the interferer; (3) intentional and improper interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy; and (4) resultant damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy has been disrupted. Downs, 2018 WY 71, ¶ 21, 421 P.3d at 524 (quoting Gore v. Sherard, 2002 WY 114, ¶ 13, 50 P.3d 705, 710 (Wyo. 2002)). 10 [¶38] No party disputes that Appellees had a valid contractual relationship and business expectancy with PVHP under the PVHP Deal. Sue, however, challenges the district court’s findings relating to the remaining elements and her claim of privilege under § 773. We turn first to Sue’s intentional, improper interference causing PVHP to terminate the PVHP Deal, and Sue’s related claim of privilege under § 773, before addressing Sue’s knowledge of the PVHP Deal at the time of that interference. 1. Sue’s intentional, improper interference caused PVHP to terminate the PVHP Deal, leaving Sue unprotected by § 773. [¶39] Sue maintains the district court erred by 1) finding she intentionally and improperly caused PVHP to terminate its relationship with the Appellees under the PVHP Deal, 2) failing to apply the Toltec factors for determining impropriety, and 3) denying her claim of privilege under § 773. The district court committed no such errors. [¶40] The third element of Intentional Interference requires “intentional and improper interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy.” Downs, 2018 WY 71, ¶ 21, 421 P.3d at 524. Whether Sue’s interference with the PVHP Deal was intentional, improper, and caused PVHP to terminate its relationship with Appellees are all questions of fact, which we review for clear error. Gore, 2002 WY 114, ¶ 14, 50 P.3d at 710; Allmaras v. Mudge, 820 P.2d 533, 542 (Wyo. 1991). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. In considering a trial court’s factual findings, we assume that the evidence of the prevailing party below is true and give that party every reasonable inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from it. We do not substitute ourselves for the trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we defer to those findings unless they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as a matter of law. Anderson v. Messinger, 2026 WY 42, ¶ 28, 587 P.3d 519, 527–28 (Wyo. 2026) (quoting Leeks Canyon Ranch, LLC v. Jackson Hole Hereford Ranch, LLC, 2025 WY 63, ¶ 31, 569 P.3d 1120, 1130 (Wyo. 2025)). [¶41] Although the third element is framed as one requiring intent, its focal point is impropriety. See Sunshine Custom Paints & Body, Inc., 2007 WY 206, ¶¶ 21–27, 173 P.3d at 403–05 (upholding district court’s finding of liability because the interferer acted improperly, and listing among the factors for determining impropriety, “the actor’s motive”); Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Comm., 868 P.2d 211, 225 (Wyo. 1994) (“To be actionable as intentional interference with prospective contractual relations, the 11 claimed interference must be improper, although malice need not be shown.”) (citing Four Nines Gold, Inc. v. 71 Constr., Inc., 809 P.2d 236, 238 (Wyo. 1991)). When determining whether conduct that intentionally interferes with a contract or business expectancy is improper, we have stated the seven factors listed in Toltec prove useful. See Toltec, 717 P.2d at 814 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766). 6 [¶42] Nevertheless, when undisputed facts show the interferer’s conduct was improper, weighing these factors is not required. Sunshine Custom Paints & Body, Inc., 2007 WY 206, ¶ 26, 173 P.3d at 405. [¶43] In its July 15, 2025 order, the district court listed the Toltec factors and then independently analyzed the impropriety of Sue’s course of conduct. The court found Sue improperly interfered with the PVHP Deal by 1) filing the lis pendens with knowledge of the PVHP Deal for the improper purpose of preserving a speculative damages award against potential “money laundering,” 2) failing to notify Appellees or PVHP of the lis pendens during easement negotiations, and 3) attempting to extract further concessions from PVHP through her counteroffer, which Mr. Newton cautioned may “shut the whole [PVHP Deal] down.” Collectively, this conduct formed the basis for the court’s finding of liability. [¶44] Giving Appellees the benefit of all reasonable factual inferences and assuming the evidence supporting Sue’s impropriety to be true, the district court did not clearly err in holding Sue intentionally and improperly interfered with the PVHP Deal. See Anderson, 2026 WY 42, ¶ 28, 587 P.3d at 527–28 (quoting Leeks Canyon Ranch, 2025 WY 63, ¶ 31, 569 P.3d at 1130) (“[W]e assume that the evidence of the prevailing party below is true and give that party every reasonable inference . . . .”) [¶45] First, when asked why she filed lis pendens on the Commercial Property, Sue testified as follows: Well, there were monies, certainly, that were at stake, and if the lawsuit was, call it, won by me in the Laramie County action, then Chuck would owe me money. And this was a mechanism to assure that, basically, there wasn’t any money laundering between the various entities within which [Chuck] was involved. 6 These factors are “(a) the nature of the actor’s conduct, (b) the actor’s motive, (c) the interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct interferes, (d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, (e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other, (f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the interference, and (g) the relations between the parties.” Toltec, 717 P.2d at 814 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766) 12 Sue’s then-attorney who helped file the lis pendens also stated it was “designed to ensure that assets did not come or go to the entities that were engaged, that, for lack of a better term, would get away.” [¶46] We agree that filing a lis pendens for this purpose is improper. A lis pendens may be filed in an action “affecting the title or right of possession of real property” to notify the world of pending litigation affecting property rights. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-6-106, -108 (2025); Matter of Est. of Fisher, 2023 WY 25, ¶ 17, 526 P.3d 901, 907 (Wyo. 2023) (“[T]he purpose of lis pendens is to give notice of pending litigation affecting property rights.”) (citing Wyo. Bank & Tr. v. Haught, 2003 WY 111, ¶ 13, 76 P.3d 301, 307 (Wyo. 2003)). Clearly, that was not Sue’s purpose for filing the lis pendens here. [¶47] Sue’s failure to disclose the improperly filed lis pendens during negotiations with PVHP, despite knowing it clouded title to the Commercial Property acreage underlying the PVHP Deal, bolsters the district court’s finding of impropriety. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1- 6-106 (“When a summons has been served or publication made, the action is pending so as to charge third persons with notice of its pendency, and while pending no interest can be acquired by third persons in the subject matter thereof as against the plaintiff’s title.”) Mr. Faust, Chuck, and Deb all testified that despite their ongoing negotiations with Sue, they learned of the lis pendens only through a later title search and PVHP’s letter notifying Appellees of a defect in title caused by the lis pendens. What’s more, Sue conceded at trial she never informed Appellees or PVHP she filed the lis pendens. [¶48] Sue’s interactions with Chuck and Deb following her recording of the lis pendens further support the district court’s finding of impropriety. After receiving PVHP’s letter, Chuck and Deb asked Sue to remove the lis pendens to clear title to the Commercial Property as required under their initial contract with PVHP. Sue declined to do so absent Chuck and Deb’s assent to further demands relating to Davidson Ranch access—demands Chuck and Deb branded as “blackmail,” “extortion,” and a “hostage situation.” [¶49] Finally, given the circumstances surrounding Sue’s easement negotiations with Appellees and PVHP and her actions related to the lis pendens, Sue’s counteroffer buttressed the impropriety of her interference. After receiving PVHP’s offer to purchase her rights in the Chet Davidson Ranch Road and facilitate alternative access to the Davidson Ranch, Sue counteroffered, despite that the other parties were ready to move forward with the PVHP Deal and relocate the easement road. This counteroffer sought additional concessions, the monetary value of which exceeded PVHP’s $10,000 purchase offer and the benefits of which extended to only Sue. [¶50] Together, these undisputed facts support the district court’s finding that Sue interfered with the PVHP Deal intentionally, improperly, and without good faith. The court, therefore, was not required to apply the factors listed in Toltec. Sunshine Custom Paints & Body, Inc., 2007 WY 206, ¶ 26, 173 P.3d at 405. To that end, the district court 13 also did not clearly err in finding Sue unprotected by § 773. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 773 cmt. a (The rule “is of narrow scope and protects the actor only when