Suellen L. Davidson v. Schleedlewitz, LLC, a Wyoming Business Organization; Delaney Bend Farm,Llc, a Wyoming Business Organization; Whistle Pig, Inc., a Wyoming Corporation; Charles N. Davidson, Individually, and as an Employee, Agent, Or Servant of Schleedlewitz, LLC, Delaney Bend Farm, LLC, And/Or Whistle Pig, Inc.; and Deborah J. Davidson, Individually, and as an Employee, Agent Or Servant of Schleedlewitz, LLC, Delaney Bend Farm, LLC, And/Or Whistle Pig, Inc.
CourtWyoming Supreme Court
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketS-26-0088
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING
2026 WY 123
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2026
November 20, 2026
SUELLEN L. DAVIDSON,
Appellant
(Plaintiff/Defendant),
v.
SCHLEEDLEWITZ, LLC, a Wyoming
business organization; DELANEY
BEND FARM, LLC, a Wyoming
business organization; WHISTLE PIG,
INC., a Wyoming corporation;
S-26-0088
CHARLES N. DAVIDSON,
individually, and as an employee, agent,
or servant of Schleedlewitz, LLC,
Delaney Bend Farm, LLC, and/or
Whistle Pig, Inc.; and DEBORAH J.
DAVIDSON, individually, and as an
employee, agent or servant of
Schleedlewitz, LLC, Delaney Bend
Farm, LLC, and/or Whistle Pig, Inc.
Appellees
(Defendants/Plaintiffs).
Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County
The Honorable Dawnessa A. Snyder, Judge
Representing Appellant:
Robert T. Moxley, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Moxley.
Representing Appellees Schleedlewitz, Whistle Pig, LLC, and C. Davidson:
Scott A. Homar and April R. Baker, Overstreet, Homar & Kuker, Cheyenne,
Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Homar.
Representing Appellees D. Davidson and Delaney Bend Farm, LLC:
Jodi D. Shea, Pence & MacMillan, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.
Before BOOMGAARDEN, C.J., and GRAY, FENN, JAROSH, and HILL, JJ.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are
requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of
any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the
permanent volume.
BOOMGAARDEN, Chief Justice.
[¶1] This consolidated case presents the newest installment in a litigious family feud
between Suellen (Sue) Davidson and her two siblings, Charles (Chuck) and Deborah (Deb)
Davidson.
[¶2] Underlying this appeal are two disputes between the siblings. The first concerns
their rights in a judicially created easement road near Saratoga, Wyoming (the “Chet
Davidson Ranch Road” or “the easement road”), which provides Sue, Chuck, Deb, and an
unrelated third party, Colton Newton, with access to their various properties located off
Wyoming Highway 130. The second concerns Sue’s interference with a land-sale
agreement between Chuck and Deb’s LLCs and the Platte Valley Healthcare Project
(PVHP) for the purpose of developing a hospital near Saratoga (the “PVHP Deal”). The
district court found Sue misused the Chet Davidson Ranch Road and ordered it relocated
at Sue’s expense. The district court also awarded Chuck and Deb damages for Sue’s
interference with the PVHP Deal, despite Sue’s claim of privilege protecting her
interference. We affirm.
ISSUES
[¶3] We restate and order the issues as follows:
1. Did the district court err by holding Sue liable for her
intentional interference with the PVHP Deal?
2. Did the district court err by awarding the full contract price
as damages for Sue’s interference?
3. Should we consider for the first time on appeal whether the
district court erred in ordering the Chet Davidson Ranch
Road relocated at Sue’s expense?
BACKGROUND
[¶4] Sue, Chuck, and Deb are the three children of the late Dan and Earlene Davidson.
At all times relevant here, Chuck and Deb, either together or separately, owned
Schleedlewitz, LLC, Delaney Bend Farm, LLC, and Whistle Pig, Inc. 1
[¶5] Sue, Chuck, and Deb own various interests in two parcels near Saratoga, Wyoming:
the Davidson Ranch and the Commercial Property. The Commercial Property lies between
1
For ease we refer to Chuck, Deb, Schleedlewitz, Delaney Bend Farm, and Whistle Pig collectively as
Appellees.
1
the Davidson Ranch and Wyoming Highway 130. The Davidson Ranch is accessible only
by crossing the Commercial Property on one of two roads: the Chet Davidson Ranch Road
or the Dan Davidson Ranch Road. Since 2019, however, logs have blocked access to the
Dan Davidson Ranch Road, leaving the Chet Davidson Ranch Road as the Davidson
Ranch’s only access.
[¶6] The Chet Davidson Ranch Road has two primary access points on Highway 130:
1) the Davidson Ranch Access Point to the north, and 2) the Whistle Pig Access Point to
the south.
[¶7] The Commercial Property was originally owned by a third party. The Davidson
Ranch, by contrast, has remained in the Davidson family since 1928 when the siblings’
grandparents first acquired the ranch. In 1981, Dan obtained easement rights in the Chet
Davidson Ranch Road, which provided him and Earlene access to the Davidson Ranch
across the Commercial Property. Shortly after obtaining that easement, Dan and Earlene
purchased the Commercial Property and began using it as an extension of the Davidson
Ranch.
[¶8] Some years later, Dan opened the Whistle Pig Bar and Saloon on a portion of the
Commercial Property. Dan later conveyed the Commercial Property outright to Chuck and
Deb, who during the relevant periods, owned it in equal shares. Chuck and Deb now own
and operate the bar through Whistle Pig, Inc.
[¶9] Sue, Chuck, and Deb then inherited the Davidson Ranch through their parents, each
taking an equal, undivided interest. Following periods of turmoil and litigation between the
siblings, Deb initiated a partition action to divide ownership of the Davidson Ranch and its
accompanying assets. Sue purchased the ranch in 2017 and has remained its sole owner
since. Sue has also retained an easement in the Chet Davidson Ranch Road.
FACTS
[¶10] Two disputes underlie this appeal. The first involved Sue’s alleged misuse of the
Chet Davidson Ranch Road. The second involved Sue’s intentional interference with the
PVHP Deal. We bifurcate the facts as they relate to each.
The Easement Dispute
[¶11] During the relevant periods, Sue treated the Davidson Ranch as her second home,
visiting the property on weekends throughout the summer and fall. As manager of the
Whistle Pig Bar and Saloon, Chuck also spent most of his weekends and some weeks on
the Commercial Property, while Deb visited the Commercial Property less frequently.
When Sue visited the ranch, she used the Davidson Ranch Access Point to access the Chet
2
Davidson Ranch Road. This was largely due to a no-trespass order barring Sue from
utilizing the Whistle Pig Access Point.
[¶12] Chuck sometimes hosted special events on the Whistle Pig portion of the
Commercial Property. To control traffic and prevent unauthorized use of the Chet
Davidson Ranch Road during those events, Chuck closed the Davidson Ranch Access Point
and permitted Sue to use the Whistle Pig Access Point, despite the no-trespass order. Chuck
and the Whistle Pig staff also accommodated Sue by stopping the event when Sue
approached to ensure she could travel the Chet Davidson Ranch Road unimpeded.
Although Sue typically traversed the Chet Davidson Ranch Road only three to four times
per weekend, she used the road more often during those events.
[¶13] Sue’s other actions over the years similarly impacted Appellees’ use of the easement
road and Commercial Property. On several occasions, Sue left open or destroyed gates on
the road, which Chuck installed to ensure his family’s horses couldn’t escape when they
were on the property, to prevent Whistle Pig patrons from entering the Davidson Ranch
Access Point, and to mitigate third-party interference with Sue’s use of the road. Sue also
filed regular police reports complaining about Chuck’s alleged interference with her use of
the road.
[¶14] Despite Chuck’s accommodation attempts, Sue sued Appellees in the Carbon
County District Court (Docket No. 22-12), claiming they unlawfully interfered with her
use and enjoyment of the Chet Davidson Ranch Road by obstructing the road with fences,
gates, logs, snow, and vehicles. Appellees counterclaimed, alleging Sue had misused her
easement, seeking to terminate or relocate Sue’s easement, and claiming damages.
The PVHP Deal Dispute
[¶15] As noted, during the relevant periods, Chuck and Deb each owned equal one-half
shares in the Commercial Property. In June 2019, PVHP representative Will Faust
contacted Chuck and Deb to inquire about purchasing a portion of the Commercial Property
to build a hospital to serve the Saratoga region. After several months of negotiating, Chuck
and Deb, through their LLCs, entered a land-sale contract with PVHP for the sale of
roughly five acres of the Commercial Property, which the Chet Davidson Ranch Road
crossed.
[¶16] Under the contract, PVHP agreed to purchase the parcel for $90,000—$18,000 of
which PVHP paid as a nonrefundable earnest money deposit. Chuck and Deb were to
furnish marketable title and a general warranty deed at closing, and PVHP retained
discretion to rescind the contract if Chuck and Deb failed to remedy any title defect within
30 days’ written notice. Chuck and Deb also had the option, upon PVHP’s breach, to seek
damages, specific performance, or retain the earnest money deposit as liquidated damages.
The parties set closing for February 3, 2020, which they later extended to May 15.
3
[¶17] Chuck and Deb later agreed to include in the sale an additional, smaller parcel for
$36,000. PVHP paid $6,768 as an additional nonrefundable earnest money deposit.
[¶18] Although Sue was not privy to the PVHP Deal negotiations, shortly after Chuck,
Deb, and PVHP entered the initial contract, Sue visited the ranch and saw heavy equipment
parked on the Commercial Property. Sue quickly became skeptical that “something was
going on.” On November 25, 2019, Sue confirmed her suspicion. During Deb’s deposition
in another lawsuit, Sue sat in as Deb testified that she and Chuck had been in
“negotiation[s] with [PVHP] to sell the property for the purpose of building a hospital.”
[¶19] In the meantime, PVHP was busy preparing to construct the hospital. Shortly after
entering the initial contract, PVHP obtained a title commitment, which disclosed various
easement rights in the Chet Davidson Ranch Road, including those of Sue and the siblings’
unrelated neighbor, Mr. Newton. To resolve these encumbrances, PVHP began working
with Chuck, Deb, Sue, Mr. Newton, and other interested parties to relocate the easement
road to improve each party’s access rights while promoting the efficient development of
the hospital.
[¶20] While the PVHP Deal was under way, Sue, Chuck, and Deb were tied up in another
lawsuit in the Laramie County District Court in which Sue claimed an interest in the
Commercial Property. Believing Chuck would owe her money in that lawsuit and to
prevent “money laundering between the various entities within which [Chuck] was
involved,” Sue recorded a notice of lis pendens on the Commercial Property in January
2020, nearly two months after first learning of the PVHP Deal. Sue, however, never
disclosed the existence of the lis pendens to Chuck, Deb, Mr. Newton, or PVHP during
their easement negotiations.
[¶21] After further discussion with Sue concerning the easement road, PVHP offered to
purchase Sue’s rights in the road. The offer provided PVHP would pay Sue $10,000 and
would facilitate alternative access to the Davidson Ranch through the Whistle Pig Access
Point. At the time, PVHP had already secured Chuck and Deb’s approval to permit Sue to
use the Whistle Pig Access Point in connection with the proposed new easement. PVHP
made similar offers to Mr. Newton and others who held rights in the easement road.
[¶22] The offer further stated, “Although PVHP could certainly accomplish its goal
without the easement, we believe it would be more neighborly and more efficient to
purchase the existing right of way in favor of alternate access.”
4
[¶23] Sue generated a counteroffer, which provided as follows:
In addition to the terms of th[e March 27 offer], a gravel
roadway will be built by [PVHP] from the point of my
anticipated entry (“my entry”) to the north of Colton Newton’s
entry virtually directly east to the point that it intersects the
road . . . . This would require the installation of two cattle
guards and at least one culvert and one or two gates. All costs
of the same are to be borne by [PVHP]. All road work will be
completed on or before September 15, 2020.
While Colton Newton is willing to be responsible for plowing
the road as necessary, because he travels extensively, an
additional term is that when Colton Newton is unavailable to
do the plowing, [PVHP] shall be responsible to plow the road
from the start of the easement’s point of entry south of the
Whistle Pig off the highway down to the house on the
Davidson Ranch for a period of five years.
Before sending her counteroffer to PVHP, Sue sought Mr. Newton’s input. Mr. Newton
responded with concern:
My view is, we are winning greatly with the approval from
Chuck to relocate your driveway in the deal. The cost for road
material, culverts, cattle guards, equipment and man hours will
greatly exceed $10,000. With that being said, you will be
benefiting far more than $10,000 in the near term and far term.
I’m not sure a nonprofit will be able to move on both.
(citation modified).
[¶24] Mr. Newton’s reluctance stemmed from his belief that Sue’s counteroffer may “shut
the whole [PVHP Deal] down.” Despite Mr. Newton’s reservations, however, Sue relayed
the counteroffer, unamended, to PVHP.
[¶25] PVHP never responded to Sue’s counteroffer. Instead, on April 9, 2020, PVHP
notified Chuck that a second title search revealed Sue’s lis pendens, which clouded title to
the Commercial Property. Consistent with the contract, the letter requested Chuck cure the
title defect within 30 days. In response, Chuck moved the Laramie County District Court
to release the lis pendens. On April 20, however, before the court intervened, Mr. Faust
called Chuck to inform him that “the deal was off” due to PVHP’s concern regarding
potential delays caused by the lis pendens and the litigation it referenced. Despite Chuck
5
and Deb’s further remediation efforts, PVHP terminated the PVHP Deal and found an
alternative parcel on which to build the hospital.
This Litigation
[¶26] Following PVHP’s repudiation, Appellees sued Sue in the Carbon County District
Court (Docket No. 22-114), claiming intentional interference with a business expectancy
and prospective economic advantage (Intentional Interference) resulting from Sue’s
interference with the PVHP Deal. 2 Appellees alleged Sue improperly caused PVHP to
terminate the PVHP Deal by filing the lis pendens and by “engaging in unauthorized
negotiations” with PVHP. They sought damages in “the amount of the expected sale, the
loss of the value of the infrastructure improvements, and other consequential damages in
an amount to be proven at trial.”
[¶27] The district court consolidated the pending cases between the parties. After a five-
day bench trial, the district court denied Sue’s claims relating to Appellees’ alleged
interference with Sue’s use of the Chet Davidson Ranch Road. At the same time, the court
granted Appellees’ Intentional Interference claim and ordered Sue to pay $101,232 in
damages, representing the full price of the contracts underlying the PVHP Deal less the
earnest money deposits Chuck and Deb retained. 3 The court reasoned Sue improperly
interfered with and caused the termination of the PVHP Deal by 1) filing the lis pendens
with knowledge of the PVHP Deal, 2) failing to disclose the lis pendens during easement
negotiations despite knowing it clouded title to the acres of Commercial Property
underlying the PVHP Deal, and 3) selfishly attempting to extract further concessions from
PVHP through her counteroffer. The court also granted Appellees’ claims regarding Sue’s
misuse of the Chet Davidson Ranch Road and ordered Sue to pay to relocate the easement.
[¶28] Following the district court’s order, the Appellees requested clarification regarding
Sue’s relocation of the easement road. Sue similarly filed a post-trial motion, challenging
2
The parties and the district court below conflated the terms “intentional interference with contract” and
“intentional interference with a business expectancy and prospective economic advantage.” While we
acknowledge the two causes of action largely target similar conduct, they are not the same. See, e.g., Ahearn
v. Anderson-Bishop P’ship, 946 P.2d 417, 423–24 (Wyo. 1997) (“Wyoming has adopted the Restatement
formulations of the tort of intentional interference with a contract, First Wyoming Bank, Casper v. Mudge,
748 P.2d 713, 715 (Wyo.1988) (quoting Restatement, Second, Torts § 766 (1979)), and the tort of
intentional interference with a prospective contractual relation, Four Nines Gold, Inc. v. 71 Const., Inc.,
809 P.2d 236, 238 (Wyo.1991) (quoting Restatement, Second, Torts § 766B (1979)). . . . Both tortious
interference theories lie only against outsiders who interfere with the contractual expectancies of others.”).
Accordingly, our use of Intentional Interference in this opinion refers strictly to intentional interference
with a business expectancy and prospective economic relation, as Appellees pleaded in their complaint.
3
Specifically, the contract price for the original agreed-to sale of five acres of the Commercial Property
was $90,000, of which PVHP paid Chuck and Deb earnest money deposits totaling $18,000. The agreed-
upon price for the additional parcel was $36,000, of which PVHP paid earnest money deposits totaling
$6,768.
6
the court’s finding of liability and award of damages tied to the Intentional Interference
claim. The court issued an order clarifying additional facts relating to the easement
reformation and upholding its finding of liability and award of damages. Sue appealed,
claiming the court erred by 1) finding Sue liable for Intentional Interference, 2) awarding
damages totaling the full price of the contracts underlying the PVHP Deal, and 3) requiring
Sue to pay to relocate the easement road. We consider each argument in turn.
DISCUSSION
I. The district court properly found Sue intentionally interfered with the PVHP Deal.
[¶29] Sue claims the district court made three categorical errors in finding her liable for
Intentional Interference. First, Sue contends the district court improperly found her liable
based on her filing of the lis pendens because the act of filing lis pendens is absolutely
privileged from tort liability. Second, Sue challenges the district court’s findings
concerning impropriety, causation, and knowledge. And third, Sue claims the district court
erred by not applying the factors set out in Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist. v.
Johnston, 717 P.2d 808 (Wyo. 1986), to determine whether Sue’s interference with the
PVHP Deal was improper.
[¶30] We disagree that the absolute litigation privilege protected Sue from liability for
Intentional Interference. Instead, since 1966, this Court has recognized the applicable
privilege against liability for Intentional Interference is that set forth in Restatement of
Torts § 773, which immunizes conduct asserting or threatening to protect a legally
protected interest in good faith and by appropriate means. 4 See Wartensleben v. Willey, 415
P.2d 613, 614 (Wyo. 1966). Because Sue’s conduct here was not in good faith, she cannot
benefit from § 773’s protective shield. We likewise conclude the district court committed
no clear error in finding Appellees satisfied each element of Intentional Interference, and
given its reasoned findings as to impropriety, the court was not required to apply the Toltec
factors. See Toltec, 717 P.2d at 814; Sunshine Custom Paints & Body, Inc. v. S. Douglas
Hwy. Water & Sewer Dist., 2007 WY 206, ¶ 26, 173 P.3d 398, 405 (Wyo. 2007).
4
Although this Court originally adopted Restatement of Torts § 773 (1939) in Wartensleben, it has since
adopted the more recent formulation set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 773 (1979), which
provides essentially the same protections. See Toltec, 717 P.2d at 814 (adopting Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 773 (1979)). Compare Restatement of Torts § 773 (1939) (“One is privileged purposely to cause
another not to perform a contract, or enter into or continue a business relation, with a third person by in
good faith asserting or threatening to protect properly a legally protected interest of his own which he
believes may otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the performance of the contract or transaction.”), with
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 773 (1979) (“One who, by asserting in good faith a legally protected
interest of his own or threatening in good faith to protect the interest by appropriate means, intentionally
causes a third person not to perform an existing contract or enter into a prospective contractual relation with
another does not interfere improperly with the other’s relation if the actor believes that his interest may
otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the performance of the contract or transaction.”).
7
A. The Absolute Litigation Privilege
[¶31] For years this Court has recognized that certain statements and conduct during the
course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged from civil liability. See, e.g.,
Elmore v. Van Horn, 844 P.2d 1078, 1084–86 (Wyo. 1992) (defendant absolutely
privileged from tort liability for statements made in her affidavit and during live
testimony); Johnson v. Griffin, 922 P.2d 860, 862 (Wyo. 1996) (holding the prosecutors
and witnesses in the case were “absolutely immune from suit for the performance of their
duties during a trial”); Abromats v. Wood, 2009 WY 100, ¶14, 213 P.3d 966, 971 (Wyo.
2009) (“[S]tatements made by the victim of a crime to a crime victim service provider for
submission to the court . . . cannot support tort liability for libel because a victim has
absolute immunity as a witness when making statements in the course of the judicial
proceedings.”). This ancient privilege, or “witness immunity,” serves a vital role in
protecting the integrity of our judicial system; it prevents censorship, enhances the search
for truth, and encourages free access to the courts. 5 As this Court has stated,
Traditionally, witnesses and those who participate in judicial
proceedings enjoy absolute immunity for civil claims which
could result from their statements made in open court. The
immunity of parties and witnesses from subsequent damages
liability for their testimony in judicial proceedings was well
established in English common law. The United States
Supreme Court summarized the two main reasons for affording
witnesses civil immunity for their testimony:
A witness’ apprehension of subsequent damages liability might
induce two forms of self-censorship. First, witnesses might be
reluctant to come forward to testify. And once a witness is on
the stand, his testimony might be distorted by the fear of
subsequent liability.
Elmore, 844 P.2d at 1084 (quoting Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330–31, 333, 103 S.
Ct. 1108, 1113–14, 75 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1983) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
5
See, e.g., Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 333, 103 S. Ct. 1108, 1114, 75 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1983) (“A witness
who knows that he might be forced to defend a subsequent lawsuit, and perhaps to pay damages, might be
inclined to shade his testimony in favor of the potential plaintiff, to magnify uncertainties, and thus to
deprive the finder of fact of candid, objective, and undistorted evidence.”); Westfield Dev. Co v. Rifle Inv.
Assocs., 786 P.2d 1112, 1117 (Colo. 1990) (noting “the basis of an absolute privilege” is “encouraging free
access to the courts”); Louise Lark Hill, The Litigation Privilege: Its Place in Contemporary Jurisprudence,
44 Hofstra L. Rev. 401, 402 (2015) (“Often used in response to defamation claims, the privilege has been
noted to be ‘the backbone to an effective and smoothly operating judicial system.’”) (quoting Tuff-N-
Rumble Mgmt., Inc. v. Sugarhill Music Publ’g Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 673, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
8
[¶32] Despite the privilege’s ancient roots, many issues remain as to its application. See,
e.g., Hill, supra, at 404–06. The same is true here. As noted above, Sue claims the litigation
privilege protected her filing of the lis pendens on the Commercial Property from liability
for Intentional Interference. This Court, however, has never determined whether the
absolute privilege protects the act of filing lis pendens against liability for Intentional
Interference.
[¶33] Courts have answered this question differently. Some have held the act of filing lis
pendens is absolutely privileged from liability for Intentional Interference. See, e.g., Salma
v. Capon, 161 Cal. App. 4th 1275, 1290, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 873, 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
Others have held the absolute privilege protects only statements made within the notice of
lis pendens, and not the act of recording the lis pendens itself. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown,
269 A.3d 1215, 1219–20 (N.J. 2022). Still others have held the act of filing of lis pendens
is entitled to only qualified immunity from Intentional Interference liability under
Restatement of Torts § 773. See, e.g., Westfield Dev. Co., 786 P.2d at 1118.
[¶34] Our precedent dictates Westfield’s approach is proper. See Wartensleben, 415 P.2d
at 614 (adopting § 773’s qualified immunity for Intentional Interference). Section 773
provides,
One who, by asserting in good faith a legally protected interest
of his own or threatening in good faith to protect the interest
by appropriate means, intentionally causes a third person not
to perform an existing contract or enter into a prospective
contractual relation with another does not interfere improperly
with the other’s relation if the actor believes that his interest
may otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the performance of
the contract or transaction.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 773 (1979). Section 773 acts as an affirmative defense,
which Sue bore the burden of proving at trial. Sweetwater Station, LLC v. Pedri, 2022 WY
163, ¶¶ 34–35, 522 P.3d 617, 627 (Wyo. 2022). It is both qualified and narrow: it “protects
the actor only when (1) he has a legally protected interest, and (2) in good faith asserts or
threatens to protect it, and (3) the threat is to protect it by appropriate means.” Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 773 cmt. a (1979); Sunshine Custom Paints & Body, Inc., 2007 WY
206, ¶ 24, 173 P.3d at 404–05; Westfield Dev. Co., 786 P.2d at 1118.
[¶35] Because § 773 safeguards only those acting in good faith to protect a legally
recognized interest through appropriate means, the absolute litigation privilege does not
apply here. Section 773 specifically targets liability for Intentional Interference, while the
litigation privilege traditionally sought to protect in-court statements from liability for
defamation. See Elmore, 844 P.2d at 1084 (quoting Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 330–31, 103 S.
9
Ct. at 1113); Hill, supra, at 405. Moreover, § 773 recognizes the need to protect current or
prospective contractual or economic relationships from bad faith conduct or interference
by inappropriate means—conduct wholly antithetical to the objectives of the litigation
privilege. We therefore decline to absolutely shield lis pendens filings from liability for
Intentional Interference, and instead conclude a party has only a qualified privilege under
§ 773 to interfere with another’s contractual relationship, business expectancy, or
prospective economic advantage.
B. Intentional Interference
[¶36] We now turn to Sue’s remaining arguments concerning Intentional Interference and
her claim of privilege under § 773.
[¶37] This Court has adopted the definition of Intentional Interference laid out in
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B, which provides:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another’s
prospective contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is
subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary harm resulting
from loss of the benefits of the relation, whether the
interference consists of
(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter
into or continue the prospective relation or
(b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the
prospective relation.
Downs v. Homax Oil Sales, Inc., 2018 WY 71, ¶ 21, 421 P.3d 518, 523 (Wyo. 2018)
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B (1979)). A plaintiff must satisfy four
elements to prove Intentional Interference:
(1) The existence of a valid contractual relationship or business
expectancy; (2) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy
on the part of the interferer; (3) intentional and improper
interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the
relationship or expectancy; and (4) resultant damage to the
party whose relationship or expectancy has been disrupted.
Downs, 2018 WY 71, ¶ 21, 421 P.3d at 524 (quoting Gore v. Sherard, 2002 WY 114, ¶ 13,
50 P.3d 705, 710 (Wyo. 2002)).
10
[¶38] No party disputes that Appellees had a valid contractual relationship and business
expectancy with PVHP under the PVHP Deal. Sue, however, challenges the district court’s
findings relating to the remaining elements and her claim of privilege under § 773. We turn
first to Sue’s intentional, improper interference causing PVHP to terminate the PVHP Deal,
and Sue’s related claim of privilege under § 773, before addressing Sue’s knowledge of
the PVHP Deal at the time of that interference.
1. Sue’s intentional, improper interference caused PVHP to
terminate the PVHP Deal, leaving Sue unprotected by § 773.
[¶39] Sue maintains the district court erred by 1) finding she intentionally and improperly
caused PVHP to terminate its relationship with the Appellees under the PVHP Deal,
2) failing to apply the Toltec factors for determining impropriety, and 3) denying her claim
of privilege under § 773. The district court committed no such errors.
[¶40] The third element of Intentional Interference requires “intentional and improper
interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy.”
Downs, 2018 WY 71, ¶ 21, 421 P.3d at 524. Whether Sue’s interference with the PVHP
Deal was intentional, improper, and caused PVHP to terminate its relationship with
Appellees are all questions of fact, which we review for clear error. Gore, 2002 WY 114,
¶ 14, 50 P.3d at 710; Allmaras v. Mudge, 820 P.2d 533, 542 (Wyo. 1991).
A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence
to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed. In considering a trial court’s factual findings, we
assume that the evidence of the prevailing party below is true
and give that party every reasonable inference that can fairly
and reasonably be drawn from it. We do not substitute
ourselves for the trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we
defer to those findings unless they are unsupported by the
record or erroneous as a matter of law.
Anderson v. Messinger, 2026 WY 42, ¶ 28, 587 P.3d 519, 527–28 (Wyo. 2026) (quoting
Leeks Canyon Ranch, LLC v. Jackson Hole Hereford Ranch, LLC, 2025 WY 63, ¶ 31, 569
P.3d 1120, 1130 (Wyo. 2025)).
[¶41] Although the third element is framed as one requiring intent, its focal point is
impropriety. See Sunshine Custom Paints & Body, Inc., 2007 WY 206, ¶¶ 21–27, 173 P.3d
at 403–05 (upholding district court’s finding of liability because the interferer acted
improperly, and listing among the factors for determining impropriety, “the actor’s
motive”); Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Comm., 868 P.2d 211, 225 (Wyo. 1994)
(“To be actionable as intentional interference with prospective contractual relations, the
11
claimed interference must be improper, although malice need not be shown.”) (citing Four
Nines Gold, Inc. v. 71 Constr., Inc., 809 P.2d 236, 238 (Wyo. 1991)). When determining
whether conduct that intentionally interferes with a contract or business expectancy is
improper, we have stated the seven factors listed in Toltec prove useful. See Toltec, 717
P.2d at 814 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766). 6
[¶42] Nevertheless, when undisputed facts show the interferer’s conduct was improper,
weighing these factors is not required. Sunshine Custom Paints & Body, Inc., 2007 WY
206, ¶ 26, 173 P.3d at 405.
[¶43] In its July 15, 2025 order, the district court listed the Toltec factors and then
independently analyzed the impropriety of Sue’s course of conduct. The court found Sue
improperly interfered with the PVHP Deal by 1) filing the lis pendens with knowledge of
the PVHP Deal for the improper purpose of preserving a speculative damages award
against potential “money laundering,” 2) failing to notify Appellees or PVHP of the lis
pendens during easement negotiations, and 3) attempting to extract further concessions
from PVHP through her counteroffer, which Mr. Newton cautioned may “shut the whole
[PVHP Deal] down.” Collectively, this conduct formed the basis for the court’s finding of
liability.
[¶44] Giving Appellees the benefit of all reasonable factual inferences and assuming the
evidence supporting Sue’s impropriety to be true, the district court did not clearly err in
holding Sue intentionally and improperly interfered with the PVHP Deal. See Anderson,
2026 WY 42, ¶ 28, 587 P.3d at 527–28 (quoting Leeks Canyon Ranch, 2025 WY 63, ¶ 31,
569 P.3d at 1130) (“[W]e assume that the evidence of the prevailing party below is true
and give that party every reasonable inference . . . .”)
[¶45] First, when asked why she filed lis pendens on the Commercial Property, Sue
testified as follows:
Well, there were monies, certainly, that were at stake,
and if the lawsuit was, call it, won by me in the Laramie County
action, then Chuck would owe me money. And this was a
mechanism to assure that, basically, there wasn’t any money
laundering between the various entities within which [Chuck]
was involved.
6
These factors are “(a) the nature of the actor’s conduct, (b) the actor’s motive, (c) the interests of the other
with which the actor’s conduct interferes, (d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, (e) the social
interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other, (f) the
proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the interference, and (g) the relations between the parties.”
Toltec, 717 P.2d at 814 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766)
12
Sue’s then-attorney who helped file the lis pendens also stated it was “designed to ensure
that assets did not come or go to the entities that were engaged, that, for lack of a better
term, would get away.”
[¶46] We agree that filing a lis pendens for this purpose is improper. A lis pendens may
be filed in an action “affecting the title or right of possession of real property” to notify the
world of pending litigation affecting property rights. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-6-106, -108
(2025); Matter of Est. of Fisher, 2023 WY 25, ¶ 17, 526 P.3d 901, 907 (Wyo. 2023) (“[T]he
purpose of lis pendens is to give notice of pending litigation affecting property rights.”)
(citing Wyo. Bank & Tr. v. Haught, 2003 WY 111, ¶ 13, 76 P.3d 301, 307 (Wyo. 2003)).
Clearly, that was not Sue’s purpose for filing the lis pendens here.
[¶47] Sue’s failure to disclose the improperly filed lis pendens during negotiations with
PVHP, despite knowing it clouded title to the Commercial Property acreage underlying the
PVHP Deal, bolsters the district court’s finding of impropriety. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-
6-106 (“When a summons has been served or publication made, the action is pending so
as to charge third persons with notice of its pendency, and while pending no interest can
be acquired by third persons in the subject matter thereof as against the plaintiff’s title.”)
Mr. Faust, Chuck, and Deb all testified that despite their ongoing negotiations with Sue,
they learned of the lis pendens only through a later title search and PVHP’s letter notifying
Appellees of a defect in title caused by the lis pendens. What’s more, Sue conceded at trial
she never informed Appellees or PVHP she filed the lis pendens.
[¶48] Sue’s interactions with Chuck and Deb following her recording of the lis pendens
further support the district court’s finding of impropriety. After receiving PVHP’s letter,
Chuck and Deb asked Sue to remove the lis pendens to clear title to the Commercial
Property as required under their initial contract with PVHP. Sue declined to do so absent
Chuck and Deb’s assent to further demands relating to Davidson Ranch access—demands
Chuck and Deb branded as “blackmail,” “extortion,” and a “hostage situation.”
[¶49] Finally, given the circumstances surrounding Sue’s easement negotiations with
Appellees and PVHP and her actions related to the lis pendens, Sue’s counteroffer
buttressed the impropriety of her interference. After receiving PVHP’s offer to purchase
her rights in the Chet Davidson Ranch Road and facilitate alternative access to the
Davidson Ranch, Sue counteroffered, despite that the other parties were ready to move
forward with the PVHP Deal and relocate the easement road. This counteroffer sought
additional concessions, the monetary value of which exceeded PVHP’s $10,000 purchase
offer and the benefits of which extended to only Sue.
[¶50] Together, these undisputed facts support the district court’s finding that Sue
interfered with the PVHP Deal intentionally, improperly, and without good faith. The
court, therefore, was not required to apply the factors listed in Toltec. Sunshine Custom
Paints & Body, Inc., 2007 WY 206, ¶ 26, 173 P.3d at 405. To that end, the district court
13
also did not clearly err in finding Sue unprotected by § 773. See Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 773 cmt. a (The rule “is of narrow scope and protects the actor only when