William Gordon Lacher v. Terry Case; Case Concrete, LLC; and Case Construction
CourtWyoming Supreme Court
Date FiledJuly 16, 2026
DocketS-26-0005
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING
2026 WY 82
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2026
July 16, 2026
WILLIAM GORDON LACHER,
Appellant
(Plaintiff),
v.
S-26-0005
TERRY CASE; CASE CONCRETE,
LLC; and CASE CONSTRUCTION,
Appellees
(Defendants).
Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater County
The Honorable Suzannah G. Robinson, Judge
Representing Appellant:
Jason C. Gay, Green River, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Gay.
Representing Appellee:
Nathan W. Jeppsen, Rock Springs, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Jeppsen.
Before BOOMGAARDEN, C.J., and GRAY, FENN, JAROSH, and HILL, JJ.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are
requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of
any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the
permanent volume.
BOOMGAARDEN, Chief Justice.
[¶1] William Gordon Lacher hired Terry Case of Case Concrete LLC and Case
Construction (collectively Mr. Case) to construct a wheelchair ramp and covered addition
connected to his home (the Project). After multiple delays and concerns with work
quality, Mr. Lacher sued Mr. Case for breach of contract and other related causes of
action. Mr. Case timely filed a motion in limine, requesting the district court exclude any
evidence of Mr. Lacher’s damages due to his failure to disclose any damages calculations
before trial. The court granted Mr. Case’s motion in limine in part. After a bench trial, the
court determined the parties’ oral contract was unenforceable due to indefinite contract
terms. The court also concluded it lacked sufficient evidence to award damages.
Mr. Lacher appeals the court’s 1) partial grant of Mr. Case’s motion in limine, 2)
conclusion the oral contract was unenforceable, and 3) conclusion regarding the lack of
sufficient evidence to award damages. We affirm the court’s partial grant of the motion in
limine and finding of insufficient evidence to award damages. Because Mr. Lacher failed
to present sufficient evidence of contract damages, we need not address enforceability of
the oral contract.
ISSUES
[¶2] We restate the dispositive issues as:
1. Whether Mr. Lacher’s failure to make an offer of proof
precludes meaningful review of the district court’s partial
grant of Mr. Case’s motion in limine.
2. Whether the district court’s factual finding concerning
Mr. Lacher’s lack of damages was clearly erroneous.
FACTS
[¶3] In February 2022, Mr. Case agreed to construct a wheelchair ramp and an
enclosed porch, or partial addition, at Mr. Lacher’s home in Green River, Wyoming.
Mr. Lacher’s wife’s occasional use of a walker and wheelchair necessitated the ramp.
The parties never signed a contract and Mr. Case did not provide a quote; instead the
parties exchanged texts discussing the Project’s scope. Mr. Case began construction in
spring 2022. Between March and September 2022, Mr. Lacher paid Mr. Case a total of
$73,000.00 for the Project, including $30,000.00 for siding.
[¶4] In August 2022, the Green River Building Official drove by Mr. Lacher’s home
and noticed new construction. Upon checking permits, the Building Official found no
permits issued for the Project, and issued a stop work notice. Mr. Case obtained an
enclosed porch permit shortly thereafter.
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[¶5] In March 2023, Green River officials inspected the Project. Though the inspection
notice contained a box checked “Inspection Passed,” it included a narrative stating the
materials used did not comply with the IRC, 1 and an engineer would need to provide a
letter of compliance before work could continue. Mr. Case retained an engineer to
perform an inspection on the foundation wall and trusses in April 2023 but did not
request the inspection letter until April 2024. The engineer’s letter recommended fixes to
the trusses to improve structural integrity. Mr. Case testified he completed those fixes in
spring 2023.
[¶6] By mid-2023, the Project was not complete. In October 2023, while waiting to
complete the siding, Mr. Case told Mr. Lacher he was out of money, had been trying to
complete other jobs to catch up on funds, and just needed money to order the siding to
complete to Project. In response to Mr. Lacher’s follow-up text regarding the $30,000.00
he previously paid for siding, Mr. Case estimated he received approximately $60,000.00
for the Project and offered to perform the labor at no charge if Mr. Lacher paid for the
siding. Mr. Case performed no additional work after this text exchange. He did not put
siding on the home or deliver siding to Mr. Lacher. Green River did not issue a certificate
of compliance by trial, but Mr. Lacher and his wife continued to live at the home during
trial.
Breach of Contract Litigation
[¶7] In April 2024, Mr. Lacher sued Mr. Case for breach of contract, negligence, unjust
enrichment, 2 and breach of warranty. Mr. Lacher designated a retained engineering
expert to testify about engineering standards. His expert designation listed two additional,
unretained experts who would testify about the repairs required to fix Mr. Case’s work to
comply with Green River’s standards. In December 2024, Mr. Lacher served his initial
disclosures. Mr. Lacher’s initial disclosures stated “[d]amages include loss of revenue,
damages to the building and continuing damage to the building, Plaintiff is still
computing damages and will supplement this disclosure when such computation is
received.” Mr. Lacher never supplemented his initial disclosures.
[¶8] When Mr. Case’s counsel deposed Mr. Lacher shortly after the discovery cutoff,
Mr. Lacher did not provide a claimed damages figure. Consequently, counsel for
Mr. Case emailed counsel for Mr. Lacher and asked if there were “any documents that
1
The “IRC” is the International Residential Code which addresses design and construction of single-
family dwellings. The International Residential Code, International Code Council,
https://www.iccsafe.org/products-and-services/i-codes/2018-i-codes/irc/ (last visited Jul. 6, 2026).
2
During the bench trial, Mr. Lacher voluntarily dismissed his unjust enrichment claim.
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[Mr. Lacher has] produced already that show [Mr.] Lacher’s damages?” (emphasis in
original) Mr. Lacher’s counsel responded he
will have an estimate for the work to be completed. You have
received the history of payment, the draft engineer’s report,
and the summary from [a non-retained expert]. [These]
outline Mr. Lacher’s costs as well as the work that will need
to be done to finish the work Mr. Case never completed and
correct the defects in the work that was done.
[¶9] Mr. Case included a motion in limine in his pretrial memo requesting the district
court exclude evidence “of any dollar computation of damages or dollar value of
damages” due to Mr. Lacher’s failure to disclose any damages values. For the first time
in his pretrial memorandum, Mr. Lacher claimed breach of contract damages totaling
$73,000.00—the amount he paid Mr. Case for the Project work.
[¶10] After the pretrial conference, the district court took Mr. Case’s motion in limine
under advisement. In a subsequent order, the court recognized the detrimental effect
excluding damages evidence would have on Mr. Lacher’s claims, and again took the
motion under advisement, informing counsel it would hear further argument the first day
of trial and render a verbal ruling then.
[¶11] On the first day of trial when addressing Mr. Case’s pending motion in limine,
Mr. Lacher argued his complaint made clear he sought to recover the entire contract
amount because none of the work was salvageable. The district court granted Mr. Case’s
motion in limine and noted the ruling could “hamstring” Mr. Lacher’s case. It also
permitted Mr. Lacher to file a motion to reconsider and continued the bench trial.
[¶12] Mr. Lacher filed a motion to reconsider, arguing the cases the district court relied
on were distinguishable from his case. The court granted Mr. Lacher’s motion to
reconsider in part, determining Mr. Lacher’s discovery violation was harmless because
the bench trial continuance gave Mr. Case additional time to prepare his response to
Mr. Lacher’s alleged damages. The court permitted Mr. Lacher to present previously
disclosed evidence supporting his theory damages were equal to the contract amount but
did not modify its conclusion Mr. Lacher could not present any damages evidence not
disclosed prior to the original trial date.
Bench Trial
[¶13] At the continued bench trial, Mr. Lacher did not call his retained expert. The only
non-party witnesses who testified were 1) the Green River Building Official who testified
regarding the Project’s code violations and 2) Mr. Case’s designated engineering expert
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who testified about the adequacy of the Project as built and the adjustments required to
meet code.
[¶14] The district court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law and
determined: 1) Mr. Lacher did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence the parties’
oral contract was enforceable; 2) Mr. Case breached his duty of reasonable care by not
constructing the ramp in workmanlike manner due its slope; 3) Mr. Case did not perform
the work in a diligent manner and therefore breached his duty of warranty; and 4) though
Mr. Lacher was damaged, he failed to establish the value or calculation of his damages
by a preponderance of the evidence. The court later entered judgment in favor of
Mr. Case and dismissed all claims brought by Mr. Lacher against Mr. Case.
[¶15] Mr. Lacher timely appealed, challenging the district court’s partial grant of
Mr. Case’s motion in limine, its contract enforceability finding, and its finding
Mr. Lacher failed to prove damages.
DISCUSSION
I. Mr. Lacher’s failure to make an offer of proof precludes meaningful review of
the district court’s partial grant of Mr. Case’s motion in limine.
[¶16] “The purpose of a motion in limine is to obtain the court’s pretrial ruling on the
admissibility of evidence.” Elsner v. Campbell Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 2025 WY 37, ¶ 75, 566
P.3d 894, 914 (Wyo. 2025) (quoting Three Way, Inc. v. Burton Enters., Inc., 2008 WY
18, ¶ 18, 177 P.3d 219, 225 (Wyo. 2008)). “[T]he question of whether or not to grant a
motion in limine is left to the sound discretion of the district court.” Elsner, 2025 WY 37,
¶ 75, 566 P.3d at 914 (quoting Three Way, Inc., 2008 WY 18, ¶ 18, 177 P.3d at 225). “A
trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence are entitled to considerable
deference, and, as long as there exists a legitimate basis for the trial court’s ruling, that
ruling will not be disturbed on appeal.” Int. of AC, 2026 WY 65, ¶ 9, 590 P.3d 1235,
1238 (Wyo. 2026) (quoting Interest of AM, 2021 WY 119, ¶ 17, 497 P.3d 914, 920 (Wyo.
2021)). “We need only determine whether the court could have reasonably concluded as
it did.” AC, 2026 WY 65, ¶ 9, 590 P.3d at 1238 (quoting Boyer v. State, 2025 WY 100,
¶ 25, 576 P.3d 30, 38 (Wyo. 2025)).
[¶17] Importantly, “error based on a trial court’s ruling to exclude evidence cannot be
raised unless the party makes an offer of proof in the trial court as to the substance of
excluded evidence.” Parker v. Cook, 2022 WY 3, ¶ 9, 501 P.3d 1253, 1256 (Wyo. 2022);
Wyo. R. Evid. 103(a)(2) (“Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which . . . excludes
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and . . . the substance of the
evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within
which questions were asked.”). Without an offer of proof, we “‘will have a difficult time
evaluating the propriety and effect’ of the trial court’s ruling and determining whether
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there was error.” Parker, 2022 WY 3, ¶ 9, 501 P.3d at 1256 (quoting Contreras v.
Carbon Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 843 P.2d 589, 596 (Wyo. 1992)).
[¶18] The district court partially granted Mr. Case’s motion in limine and excluded non-
disclosed damages evidence. But its partial grant of the motion in limine resulted in no
exclusion of evidence because Mr. Lacher did not make any offers of proof at trial. 3 The
court therefore had no proffered evidence to consider, nor do we have any excluded
evidence to review. Silva, 2012 WY 37, ¶ 21, 271 P.3d at 450 (“Appellant’s decision not
to give an offer of proof stripped the district court’s ability to reconsider its exclusion of
evidence at an appropriate time during trial, and it now inhibits meaningful appellate
review of the district court’s action.”).
[¶19] With no excluded evidence to review, we cannot determine whether the exclusion
of any alternative damages evidence would have affected Mr. Lacher’s substantial rights
and whether that evidence would have been relevant and admissible. See Wyo. R. Evid.
103(a)(2). Mr. Lacher’s “omission to make an offer of proof must result in a waiver of his
ability to attribute error to the district court.” Silva, 2012 WY 37, ¶ 21, 271 P.3d at 450.
Consequently, we cannot conclude the district court improperly excluded non-disclosed
damages evidence under its partial grant of Mr. Case’s motion in limine. By failing to
make an offer of proof, Mr. Lacher did not properly preserve this issue for our review.
II. The district court’s finding Mr. Lacher failed to prove his damages by a
preponderance of the evidence was not clearly erroneous.
[¶20] We apply the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 348 to determine contract
damages. Legacy Builders, LLC v. Andrews, 2014 WY 103, ¶ 18, 335 P.3d 1063, 1068
(Wyo. 2014). Subsection (2) of that section governs construction contract damages:
(2) If a breach results in defective or unfinished construction
and the loss in value to the injured party is not proved with
sufficient certainty, he may recover damages based on
(a) the diminution in the market price of the property
caused by the breach, or
3
To the extent Mr. Lacher suggests he could not proffer any non-disclosed damages evidence at trial, he
incorrectly interprets the requirements of Wyo. R. Evid. 103(a)(2). See Bloomfield v. State, 2010 WY 97,
¶ 23, 234 P.3d 366, 375 (Wyo. 2010) (“[T]here is only one prudent way for an offer of proof to be made
at trial. The attorney who seeks to offer evidence, which has been refused or to which an objection has
been upheld, should take the initiative.”) (quoting Rudolph v. State, 829 P.2d 269, 275 (Wyo. 1992));
Silva v. State, 2012 WY 37, ¶ 20, 271 P.3d 443, 450 (Wyo. 2012) (noting appellant had to make a timely
showing a substantial right was affected by the exclusion of evidence and the trial court knew the
substance of the evidence to comply with Wyo. R. Evid. 103(a)(2)).
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(b) the reasonable cost of completing performance or
of remedying the defects if that cost is not clearly
disproportionate to the probable loss in value to him.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 348.
[¶21] The district court, considering Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 348(2), made
express findings of fact and conclusions of law after the bench trial. We review the
court’s post-bench trial ruling under the following standard:
The factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited
review afforded a jury verdict. While the findings are
presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of
the properly admissible evidence in the record. Due regard is
given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the
credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail
reweighing disputed evidence. Findings of fact will not be set
aside unless they are clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly
erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. In
considering a trial court’s factual findings, we assume that the
evidence of the prevailing party below is true and give that
party every reasonable inference that can fairly and
reasonably be drawn from it. We do not substitute ourselves
for the trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we defer to
those findings unless they are unsupported by the record or
erroneous as a matter of law. The district court’s conclusions
of law are reviewed de novo.
Anderson v. Messinger, 2026 WY 42, ¶ 28, 587 P.3d 519, 527–28 (Wyo. 2026) (quoting
Leeks Canyon Ranch, LLC v. Jackson Hole Hereford Ranch, LLC, 2025 WY 63, ¶ 31,
569 P.3d 1120, 1130 (Wyo. 2025)). “Damages are factual findings which we do not
reverse unless they are clearly erroneous.” Holloway v. Hidden Creek Outfitters, LLC,
2025 WY 59, ¶ 18, 569 P.3d 756, 760 (Wyo. 2025) (quoting Ruby Drilling Co., Inc. v.
Duncan Oil Co., Inc., 2002 WY 85, ¶ 29, 47 P.3d 964, 973 (Wyo. 2002)).
[¶22] “The plaintiff has the burden of producing sufficient evidence to prove his
damages.” Knight v. TCB Const. & Design, LLC, 2011 WY 27, ¶ 17, 248 P.3d 178, 184
(Wyo. 2011) (quoting Capshaw v. Schieck, 2002 WY 54, ¶ 10, 44 P.3d 47, 52 (Wyo.
2002)). Damages “must be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, but proof of
exact damages is not required.” Holloway, 2025 WY 59, ¶ 18, 569 P.3d at 760 (quoting
Robinson v. Black, 2025 WY 25, ¶ 20, 564 P.3d 1030, 1037 (Wyo. 2025)). Neither
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speculation nor conjecture may justify a proper damages award. Holloway, 2025 WY 59,
¶ 18, 569 P.3d at 760. “[W]hile the plaintiff has the burden of proving damages at trial, it
is the defendant’s burden to challenge the reasonableness or disproportionality of the
plaintiff’s method and, where appropriate, to present evidence supporting an alternative
measure of damages.” Legacy Builders, 2014 WY 103, ¶ 28, 335 P.3d at 1070.
[¶23] Mr. Lacher argues he suffered $73,000.00 in damages: the total amount he paid to
Mr. Case for the Project. The district court found Mr. Lacher was damaged but he failed
to present evidence about diminution in the value of his home during or after the Project.
It also found he failed to present evidence regarding the reasonable cost of completing the
Project or remedying Project defects. The court finally found “[n]o credible evidence was
presented that the entire Project would have to be torn down and rebuilt” and it was
“unable to make such an assumption based solely on [Green River] having not issued a
certificate of occupancy at the time of trial.” We review these conclusions with the
presumption the “evidence of the prevailing party below is true and give that party every
reasonable inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from it” and we defer to the
court’s findings “unless they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as a matter of
law.” Messinger, 2026 WY 42, ¶ 28, 587 P.3d at 527–28 (quoting Leeks Canyon, 2025
WY 63, ¶ 31, 569 P.3d at 1130).
[¶24] Mr. Lacher asserts Mr. Case “chose not to give evidence as pertains to damages.”
But this misconstrues the evidentiary burden in breach of contract cases. While the
damages burden can shift to the breaching party, the non-breaching party first must meet
its burden of proving damages at trial. Legacy Builders, 2014 WY 103, ¶¶ 27–28, 335
P.3d at 1070; see also Crouch v. Cooper, 2024 WY 98, ¶ 35, 556 P.3d 199, 210 (Wyo.
2024) (determining plaintiff met its initial burden of proving damages and therefore the
burden was on defendants to assert mitigation or reduction of damages evidence).
Mr. Lacher only presented evidence of the amount he paid to Mr. Case for the Project. As
a result, his sole damage theory demands the conclusion the entire Project must be
removed and the cost of a new Project would be the agreement price. The district court
found it could not presume demolition and reconstruction was Mr. Lacher’s sole remedy.
Therefore, Mr. Lacher’s damages burden never shifted to Mr. Case.
[¶25] The record is unclear about the classification of the Project as an “addition” or as a
“covered porch.” Under Green River code, these classifications have different structural
requirements related to foundation depth and reinforcement. 4 The Building Official
testified he was unsure whether the poured foundation met Green River code
4
Mr. Lacher testified the Project was an addition with an entryway, storage area, and ramp. According to
Mr. Case, the Project was a covered, enclosed porch with a handicap ramp and steps. Early in the Project,
Mr. Case texted Mr. Lacher, stating they would need to call the Project a covered porch rather than an
addition. Mr. Lacher responded “okay,” and testified he believed Mr. Case used the covered porch
classification with Green River and he “wasn’t getting involved with none of the city stuff.”
7
requirements. He also testified the Project, if classified as an “addition” would not meet
code, but if classified as a “covered porch,” the Project would meet code. He further
testified the truss concerns could be resolved without their removal. In addition, after the
Building Official identified truss concerns, the parties exchanged texts regarding planned
repairs to the trusses. Finally, the Building Official testified the wheelchair ramp was too
steep to meet code but was not sure if the ramp was within the range permitted when
ramp location prevents extension of the ramp to ease the slope.
[¶26] Mr. Case’s expert engineer testified the foundation extended an adequate depth
below ground, but he did not know if it contained the necessary rebar for an “addition”
foundation. Mr. Lacher’s only evidence in this regard speculated as to the existence of
rebar in the foundation. He presented no evidence substantiating his assertion the ramp
must be removed and replaced. Because the record shows Mr. Lacher did not
demonstrate the Project required wholesale removal and replacement, the district court
did not err when it found the contract price was not an accurate measure of Mr. Lacher’s
damages. As a result, he failed to prove his damages with sufficient clarity. Holloway,
2025 WY 59, ¶ 18, 569 P.3d at 760. The court’s evidentiary finding was therefore not
clearly erroneous.
CONCLUSION
[¶27] Because the district court’s partial grant of Mr. Case’s motion in limine did not
result in the exclusion of any proffered evidence, we cannot meaningfully review the
district court’s partial grant of that motion. We conclude the court’s finding Mr. Lacher
failed to prove his damages by a preponderance of the evidence was not clearly
erroneous. Because we reach this conclusion, we do not address the enforceability of the
parties’ oral contract.
[¶28] Affirmed.
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