Racine County v. R. P. L.

2026 WI 26 RACINE COUNTY, Petitioner-Respondent, v. R.P.L., Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. No. 2025AP813-FT Decided July 7, 2026 REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals Racine County Circuit Court (Timothy D. Boyle, J.) No. 2023GN73 SUSAN M. CRAWFORD, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which JILL J. KAROFSKY, C.J., and ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and BRIAN K. HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. BRIAN K. HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion in which SUSAN M. CRAWFORD, J., joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion. REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion. JANET C. PROTASIEWICZ, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J., joined. ¶1 SUSAN M. CRAWFORD, J. Robert1 appeals an order continuing his protective placement in an adult family home under WIS. 1 For ease of reading and to protect the confidentiality of these proceedings, we use the pseudonym “Robert” to refer to the defendant in this case.  RACINE COUNTY v. R.P.L. Opinion of the Court STAT. §§ 55.08(1), 55.12, and 55.18(3) (2023–24).2 We first hold that Robert’s appeal from the order continuing the protective placement was not rendered moot by a subsequent court order continuing the protective placement in 2025. We address the standards of review that apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support an order of protective placement. Finally, in our de novo review, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the circuit court’s order to continue Robert’s protective placement. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. I. BACKGROUND ¶2 On May 31, 2023, a Meals on Wheels food delivery service worker found 65-year-old Robert lying on the floor in his Racine home and brought him to a local hospital. The hospital filed a petition for the appointment of a guardian under WIS. STAT. § 54.40 and an order for protective placement under WIS. STAT. § 55.08. The petition stated that Robert had a history of stroke, a seizure disorder, an anxiety disorder, and aphasia (a language disorder). It stated that Robert suffered from severe confusion, memory loss, poor judgment, and poor insight. It alleged that Robert was unable to make informed health care or financial decisions on his own. After a hearing on August 8, 2023, the circuit court entered orders for guardianship and protective placement, specifying that the least restrictive placement consistent with Robert’s needs was an unlocked unit and recommending placement at a “nursing/rehabilitation facility or community based residential facility.” Robert was transferred to a nursing/rehabilitation facility shortly thereafter. A few months later, he was transferred to an adult family home.3 ¶3 In June 2024, as part of an annual review of the protective placement, Robert’s guardian filed a written report stating that Robert continued to meet the standards for protective placement under WIS. STAT. § 55.08(1) and that the adult family home in which he was residing was the least restrictive placement, given his needs. The guardian’s report 2All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023–24 version unless otherwise indicated. 3 As relevant to this case, an “adult family home” is “[a] place where 3 or 4 adults who are not related to the operator reside and receive care, treatment or services that are above the level of room and board and that may include up to 7 hours per week of nursing care per resident.” WIS. STAT. § 50.01(1)(b). 2  RACINE COUNTY v. R.P.L. Opinion of the Court noted that Robert had requested an independent evaluation, modification or termination of the protective placement, appointment of adversary counsel, and a full due process hearing. Accordingly, the circuit court appointed counsel for Robert and ordered an independent evaluation by Dr. Steven Braam, a licensed psychologist. ¶4 The circuit court held a hearing on the continuation of the protective placement on August 9, 2024. Dr. Braam was the only witness who testified and his evaluation report was received into evidence. He expressed opinions regarding Robert’s diagnoses, his mental and physical incapacity, and the permanency of his cognitive impairments. The circuit court made findings of fact and ruled that the County had met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Robert met the criteria for protective placement. Accordingly, it entered orders for the continuation of Robert’s guardianship and protective placement. ¶5 Robert appealed the 2024 order to continue the protective placement, arguing that the County failed to prove two of the statutory criteria at the annual review hearing: that his incapacity endangered himself or others and that his disability was permanent.4 The court of appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed the circuit court order. II. DISCUSSION A. MOOTNESS ¶6 As an initial matter, we discuss whether Robert’s appeal of the 2024 order is moot, given that the circuit court issued another order in 2025 continuing the protective placement, which Robert did not appeal. We hold that Robert’s appeal of the 2024 order is not moot. 4 These are the only issues Robert raised in his appeal from the order continuing the protective placement. In her dissent, Justice Bradley suggests that protective services provided in Robert’s own home would have been “the least restrictive environment and . . . the least restrictive manner consistent with [his] needs.” See Justice Bradley’s dissent, ¶68. However, Robert raises no issue on appeal contesting the circuit court’s finding that the adult family home was the least restrictive placement consistent with his needs. Notably, Robert’s guardian ad litem reported to the circuit court that Robert refused services or help in his home. 3  RACINE COUNTY v. R.P.L. Opinion of the Court ¶7 Mootness is a question of law this court reviews de novo. PRN Assocs. v. DOA, 2009 WI 53, ¶25, 317 Wis. 2d 656, 766 N.W.2d 559. “An issue is moot when its resolution will have no practical effect on the underlying controversy.” Id. Accordingly, appellate courts generally do not rule on moot issues. State ex rel. Riesch v. Schwarz, 2005 WI 11, ¶12, 278 Wis. 2d 24, 692 N.W.2d 219. ¶8 The County argues that the order continuing Robert’s protective placement in 2025—which Robert did not contest or appeal— renders his appeal moot because he is no longer subject to the 2024 protective placement order. The County contends that vacating the 2024 order would have no practical effect, noting that Robert was not assessed costs for the hospital’s attorney’s fees related to the filing of the petitions for protective placement and guardianship.5 As such, the County urges this court to decline to rule on the merits of this case. ¶9 Robert contends that the appeal is not moot because collateral consequences of the 2024 protective placement order persist, in the form of liability for the costs of his care. We have recognized, in a variety of contexts, that an appeal is not moot if “the direct or collateral consequences of the order persist and vacatur of that order would practically affect those consequences.” Sauk County v. S.A.M., 2022 WI 46, ¶19, 402 Wis. 2d 379, 975 N.W.2d 162 (considering collateral consequences of involuntary civil commitment order on mootness); see also State v. Theoharopoulos, 72 Wis. 2d 327, 333, 240 N.W.2d 635 (1976) (considering collateral consequences of a criminal conviction on mootness); State v. Wilhite, 2025 WI App 64, ¶1 n.1, 418 Wis. 2d 471, 27 N.W.3d 238 (considering collateral consequences of order of commitment of person found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect on mootness). ¶10 A person under a protective placement pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 55.12 “shall be liable for the cost of the care, maintenance, services and supplies.” WIS. STAT. § 46.10(2). Thus, by statute, Robert is liable for 5 The County concedes that Robert is liable for the reasonable fees of the court-appointed guardian and his own counsel, if his income or assets are sufficient. Robert does not rely on the order requiring him to pay the attorneys’ fees as a collateral consequence of the order extending the protective placement order. Nor do we. As discussed herein, we hold that Robert’s liability for the costs related to protective placement under WIS. STAT. § 46.10 is a collateral consequence that renders the appeal not moot. 4  RACINE COUNTY v. R.P.L. Opinion of the Court such costs related to his protective placement. In the context of an appeal from an order extending an involuntary civil commitment under Chapter 51, we have held that a person’s mandatory liability under the same statute, WIS. STAT. § 46.10(2), for the cost of the care received during the commitment is a collateral consequence that renders an appeal non-moot, even when the commitment order has expired. S.A.M., 402 Wis. 2d 379, ¶24. ¶11 The County concedes that Robert may be required to pay costs related to his care under the protective placement order, but argues that these potential costs are not a collateral consequence making the appeal non-moot. It contends that WIS. STAT. § 55.045 provides the legal basis for the County to seek reimbursement for the costs of care from Robert, and that the imposition of costs under that provision is not mandatory. ¶12 Section 55.045 requires a county, within certain funding limitations, to provide for the “reasonable program needs” of individuals who are provided protective placement. It further provides that a county “may require that an individual who is provided protective placement . . . under this chapter provide reimbursement for services or care and custody received, based on the ability of the individual to pay for such costs.” The County argues that because this provision states only that a county “may” seek such reimbursement, it does not create mandatory liability as a collateral consequence of the protective placement order. We rejected a similar argument in S.A.M., holding that “it is irrelevant whether collection efforts have begun because, regardless, [the individual] remains liable solely by virtue of § 46.10(2)’s mandatory language (‘shall be liable’). And . . . it is enough to overcome mootness when there is the ‘potential’ for collection actions because of the liability.” 402 Wis. 2d 379, ¶25. The same is true here. Although § 55.045 grants a county discretion to seek reimbursement for costs from an individual under protective placement, § 46.10(2) grants no discretion to the individual to pay those costs. Moreover, at the hearing to continue the protective placement order, Robert’s guardian, in explaining why she sought an order for the sale of Robert’s house, advised the court that Robert was, in fact, being assessed a “cost share” for his care. ¶13 The financial consequences to Robert of the order continuing protective placement in 2024 did not disappear when the court ordered the continuation of protective placement in 2025. Robert is “liable for the cost of the care, maintenance, services and supplies” under WIS. STAT. 5  RACINE COUNTY v. R.P.L. Opinion of the Court § 46.10(2), including the costs of his care incurred while the 2024 order was in effect. Over Robert’s objection, his home was sold to generate assets to cover those costs, in part. Robert’s liability for the costs related to his protective placement is a collateral consequence of the order extending the protective placement. We hold that his appeal is not moot and we proceed with our analysis of the merits. B. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶14 We next address the appellate standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a circuit court’s order of protective placement under WIS. STAT. § 55.08. ¶15 Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a protective placement order presents a mixed question of fact and law. See Walworth County v. Therese B., 2003 WI App 223, ¶21, 267 Wis. 2d 310, 671 N.W.2d 377. Appellate courts uphold a circuit court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and we review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence to meet the requirements for continued protective placement. See id.; WIS. STAT. § 805.17(2); Coston v. Joseph P., 222 Wis. 2d 1, 22–23, 586 N.W.2d 52 (Ct. App. 1998). A circuit court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous unless “the finding is against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.” Royster-Clark, Inc. v. Olsen's Mill, Inc., 2006 WI 46, ¶12, 290 Wis. 2d 264, 714 N.W.2d 530.6 C. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE ¶16 Applying the mixed standard of review to Robert’s appeal, we uphold the circuit court’s factual findings as not clearly erroneous and conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence to meet the legal 6 The Wisconsin Counties Association’s amicus brief advocates that we adopt a “clear error” standard of review when reviewing protective placement determinations. This court has not previously addressed the standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a Chapter 55 protective placement. The parties themselves agree that the mixed standard of review discussed herein applies, in accordance with court of appeals’ precedent, and do not ask this court to adopt the “clear error” standard. Thus, we apply the mixed standard of review and decline to take up the amicus’ proposal to abandon it in favor of the “clear error” standard. 6  RACINE COUNTY v. R.P.L. Opinion of the Court requirements for continued protective placement under WIS. STAT. § 55.08.7 ¶17 An order for protective placement requires a County to prove by clear and convincing evidence that an individual: (1) “has a primary need for residential care and custody”; (2) “has been determined to be incompetent by a circuit court”; (3) “is so totally incapable of providing for his or her own care or custody as to create a substantial risk of serious harm to himself or herself or others” due to “developmental disability, degenerative brain disorder, serious and persistent mental illness, or other like incapacities”; and (4) “has a disability that is permanent or likely to be permanent.” WIS. STAT. § 55.08(1)(a)–(d); see also Fond du Lac County v. Helen E.F., 2012 WI 50, ¶14, 340 Wis. 2d 500, 814 N.W.2d 179. To order the continuation of a protective placement, a circuit court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the individual 7 In her dissent, Justice Protasiewicz contends that this court did not faithfully apply the mixed standard of review applicable to protective placement appeals. See Justice Protasiewicz’s dissent, ¶108. Her dissent discusses the two- pronged standard at length and claims that the majority did not conduct a meaningful de novo review of the sufficiency of the evidence in this case. See id., ¶88. As demonstrated in the following section, we faithfully apply the mixed standard of review. We uphold the circuit court’s findings of fact and conclude that the record contained sufficient evidence to establish that Robert continued to meet the standards for dangerousness and permanence required by WIS. STAT. § 55.08. See infra ¶¶17–29. We acknowledge that, as Justice Hagedorn notes in his concurrence, “the [legal] determination is fundamentally factual.” Justice Hagedorn’s concurrence, ¶50. In his view, “there’s nothing left to do” after we determine what facts were found by the circuit court and determine that the factual findings were not clearly erroneous. See id. Justice Hagedorn astutely explains how the lines between the review of factual findings and legal determinations are blurred when statutory requirements rest on factual determinations, as they do here. See id., ¶¶42–49. In such situations, he contends, the mixed standard of review is collapsed. See id., ¶¶44–49 (citing this court’s decisions in State v. Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d 214, 225, 558 N.W.2d 626 (1997) and State v. J.D.B., 2026 WI 5, ¶3, 419 Wis. 2d 383, 31 N.W.3d 314). Justice Hagedorn makes a compelling case for this court to consider adopting a clearly erroneous standard of review for Chapter 55 protective placement orders. See id., ¶¶50–53. Nevertheless, we leave that issue for another day and apply the mixed standard here, recognizing that the statutory requirements for protective placement at issue in this case are fact intensive. 7  RACINE COUNTY v. R.P.L. Opinion of the Court continues to meet these standards and that the placement is the least restrictive consistent with the individual’s needs. See WIS. STAT. § 55.18(3)(e)1. ¶18 Robert argues that the County failed to prove he qualified for protective placement, challenging the circuit court’s findings regarding the third and fourth standards under § 55.08(1)(c)–(d). Robert first argues that the County needed to prove more than the existence of a disability or vague concerns for his well-being to meet its burden of proving that he presents a substantial risk of serious harm to himself or others. Robert also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that his disability is permanent or likely to be permanent, given Dr. Braam’s testimony regarding the “possibility” that Robert “has the ability to regain some of his cognitive abilities.” The County, on the other hand, maintains that it presented clear and convincing proof as to both elements and that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the circuit court’s order continuing Robert’s 2024 protective placement. ¶19 Under § 55.08(1)(c), the County must show that the “risk of serious harm” from Robert’s incapacities is “substantial.” See K.N.K. v. Buhler, 139 Wis. 2d 190, 202, 407 N.W.2d 281 (Ct. App. 1987). This means “[t]he harm envisioned may not be based on mere speculation but must be directly foreseeable from the overt acts or omissions of the individual.” Id. However, “the statute does not require that dangerousness be proven by recent acts or omissions.” Id. at 203 (emphasis omitted). ¶20 The circuit court credited and gave weight to Dr. Braam’s hearing testimony and professional opinions. Dr. Braam testified that Robert was diagnosed with a neurocognitive disorder due to a cerebrovascular accident (a stroke or similar incident), right-side hemiparesis, and expressive aphasia, incapacitating him both physically and mentally and causing him to have difficulty communicating. He described Robert’s speech and language impairment as “severe.” ¶21 Dr. Braam testified that Robert’s functional knowledge is diminished, describing him as “marginally aware of . . . what was going on.” He described Robert’s orientation as “mildly impaired,” commenting that he was “off on the dates” and “not really able to have much of a discussion about current events.” He testified that Robert’s attention and concentration are mildly impaired and that he has mild to moderate memory impairment. Dr. Braam testified that Robert’s “most concerning” cognitive impairments related to his executive functioning, describing him 8  RACINE COUNTY v. R.P.L. Opinion of the Court as having “difficulties with higher level thinking to be able to make decisions, informed decisions,” and as “overestimating” his own abilities. ¶22 Dr. Braam offered his professional opinions regarding how Robert’s incapacities affected his capability to care for himself. He explained that Robert’s impaired critical thinking skills interfered with his ability to “protect himself from financial abuse and protect his health and safety.” He testified that, in his opinion, Robert required 24-hour supervision and monitoring “due to [his] need for assistance with activities of daily living, food preparation, transportation and organization of the transportation to medical appointments,” to name “just a few things.” He expressed the opinion that Robert needed assistance in remembering to take his medications in proper doses, due to his cognitive impairments. Dr. Braam acknowledged that Robert is prescribed a large number of medications. ¶23 The circuit court made factual findings regarding Robert’s physical and cognitive impairments and his needs related to his care and custody based on Dr. Braam’s largely uncontested testimony. These findings included that Robert suffered from a neurocognitive disorder, expressive aphasia, and hemiparesis. The court specifically credited and adopted Dr. Braam’s opinions that Robert’s critical thinking skills were impaired to the point that he is unable to make competent decisions related to his care and custody. The circuit court also found that Robert’s incapacities left him unable to provide for his own care, including taking medication, bathing, obtaining proper food, and planning for and coordinating proper medical treatment, again crediting Dr. Braam’s testimony regarding these limitations.8 8 We note that Justice Protasiewicz’s dissent largely disregards these specific factual findings, instead critiquing the lack of detail and inconsistencies in the evidence presented by the County. For example, her dissent dissects Dr. Braam’s testimony that Robert required assistance in taking his medication, complaining that Dr. Braam did not “identify any of the medications Robert was taking, the dosage and frequency of each, the illnesses or conditions for which they were prescribed, or how Robert’s mental or physical condition might be effected if he did not take them as prescribed.” Justice Protasiewicz’s dissent, ¶98. The circuit court, by contrast, was satisfied that Dr. Braam’s testimony showed that Robert, while compliant in taking his medications, needs assistance in remembering to take them in the correct doses and at the proper times. At bottom, Justice Protasiewicz’s conclusions related to both dangerousness and permanency rest on a rejection of the circuit court’s factual findings. Because we 9  RACINE COUNTY v. R.P.L. Opinion of the Court ¶24 Because these findings of fact are not against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence, we uphold them under the clearly erroneous standard of review and accept them as true. Our de novo review requires us to determine whether, in light of the established facts regarding Robert’s impairments and their profound effects on his ability to care for himself, the legal standard of dangerousness was met. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish, under the clear and convincing standard, that Robert’s incapacities left him so incapable of providing for his own care or custody that he presented a danger to himself or others. ¶25 Robert also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that his disability is permanent or likely to be permanent, as required by WIS. STAT. § 55.08(1)(d), largely because Dr. Braam conceded it was difficult to predict the extent to which Robert’s disability is permanent. ¶26 Dr. Braam acknowledged that Robert’s ability to communicate could potentially improve with therapy. He testified that communication training and use of assistive communication devices could be “extremely helpful” and “reduce his needs for guardianship.” On the other hand, he stated that such therapy would take time to learn and would reduce Robert’s needs for assistance only if it was effective and improved his communication skills. Dr. Braam also conceded that it was difficult to assess the extent and permanency of Robert’s cognitive impairments due to his limited ability to communicate. In addition to recommending speech therapy, he testified that a neuropsychological evaluation would provide a more complete picture of Robert’s cognitive defects and the potential for improvement. He testified, however, that in his opinion, other interventions would not eliminate the need for a guardianship. ¶27 In making its factual findings, the circuit court discussed the inconsistencies and reservations in Dr. Braam’s testimony regarding the permanency of Robert’s disability. It placed more weight on Dr. Braam’s believe the circuit court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous, we rely on and apply them in determining de novo that the evidence was sufficient to meet the legal requirements that Robert presents a danger to himself or others and has a disability that is permanent. 10  RACINE COUNTY v. R.P.L. Opinion of the Court testimony regarding the extent to which Robert’s incapacities left him in need of assistance with activities of daily living. The circuit court found that, even if Robert’s communication were improved with therapy, the cumulative effect of his disabilities on his functioning would leave him unable to provide for his own care and custody.9 ¶28 “It is the function of the trier of fact, and not of an appellate court, to fairly resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Barney by Lowe v. Mickelson, 2020 WI 40, ¶32, 391 Wis. 2d 212, 942 N.W.2d 891 (citation modified). The circuit court, acting as fact finder, “is the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and a reviewing court will accept the inference drawn by the trier of fact.” Groshek v. Trewin, 2010 WI 51, ¶11, 325 Wis. 2d 250, 784 N.W.2d 163 (citation modified). ¶29 Although Dr. Braam’s testimony suggests that Robert’s communication abilities could be improved with appropriate therapy, the circuit court resolved the competing inferences relating to the permanency of Robert’s disability by giving greater weight to Dr. Braam’s testimony about Robert’s other impairments. The circuit court reasonably inferred that even if Robert’s communication improved, his other impairments— cognitive and physical—would cause him to continue to need assistance with both daily living activities and complex tasks such as organizing his medical care. The circuit court further inferred from Dr. Braam’s testimony that no other intervention could potentially mitigate Robert’s other physical and cognitive impairments. We accept the circuit court’s reasonable inferences and uphold its findings of fact as not contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. In light of those factual findings, we conclude in our de novo review that the evidence was 9 Justice Bradley accuses the County of “stalling” Robert’s recovery by failing to offer him speech therapy or a neuropsychological evaluation. See Justice Bradley’s dissent, ¶72. The initial order for protective placement did not order the County to provide those services. At the hearing on the continuation of the protective placement, Robert’s guardian ad litem, his attorney, and the County’s attorney jointly requested that the court order speech and language therapy, but none requested an order for a neuropsychological examination. Robert’s attorney conceded that she was “not sure” Robert would agree to a neuropsychological evaluation. Accordingly, the circuit court ordered speech and language therapy, but declined to order a psychological evaluation. 11  RACINE COUNTY v. R.P.L. Opinion of the Court sufficient to support the circuit court’s finding that Robert’s disability is permanent or likely to be permanent. III. CONCLUSION ¶30 Chapter 55 of the Wisconsin Statutes “is designed to establish [] protective services and protective placements, to assure their availability to all individuals when in need of them, and to place the least possible restriction on personal liberty and exercise of constitutional rights consistent with due process and protection from abuse, financial exploitation, neglect, and self-neglect.” WIS. STAT. § 55.001. Robert’s appeal of the order continuing protective placement is not moot given his potential financial liability, including the costs related to his protective placement. In our de novo review, we hold that the record contains sufficient evidence to establish that Robert’s disability continued to create a substantial risk of serious harm to himself or others and that his disability was permanent or likely to be permanent. Accordingly, we uphold the circuit court’s order continuing the protective placement. By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. 12  RACINE COUNTY v. R.P.L. JUSTICE HAGEDORN, concurring BRIAN K. HAGEDORN, J., with whom SUSAN M. CRAWFORD, J., joins, concurring. ¶31 The opinion for the court correctly explains and applies the law as it now stands. I join it in full. In the course of briefing, the Wisconsin Counties Association, appearing as amicus curiae, urged this court to reconsider the standard of appellate review that should govern in Chapter 55 cases. This issue was not raised by the parties, and addressing it was unnecessary to resolve the dispute before us. However, this suggestion has considerable merit. I therefore write separately to explain why this court should reexamine this issue in a future case. I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW GENERALLY ¶32 The standard of review in a case operates as a decisional framework for reviewing the work of lower courts and other state actors. It is, at root, an exercise in apportioning power and responsibility among decisionmakers. State v. J.D.B., 2026 WI 5, ¶15, 419 Wis. 2d 383, 31 N.W.3d 314. The standard of review is a legal question, and it may be set by the legislature or an appellate court. For example, in review of administrative proceedings, the legislature provides that an agency’s determination of fact is accorded substantial deference, while an agency’s interpretation of law is reviewed de novo. WIS. STAT. § 227.57(6), (11).1 But when neither the legislature nor the United States Supreme Court mandate a specific standard of review, it is incumbent upon this court or the court of appeals to determine which standard of review should govern. See J.D.B., 419 Wis. 2d 383, ¶19. ¶33 At the outset, establishing the proper standard of review requires an examination of the type of issue being reviewed. Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review-Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 231, 233 (1991). Generally speaking, decisions fall into three categories: discretion, fact, or law. J.D.B., 419 Wis. 2d 383, ¶15. With this in view, the court then examines more fundamental questions, including “which court 1WISCONSIN STAT. § 227.57(11) codified our decision in Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21.  RACINE COUNTY v. R.P.L. JUSTICE HAGEDORN, concurring is better positioned to decide the question as a final matter” and “whether uniformity or flexibility is important in the rule's application.” Id., ¶19. ¶34 In some matters, the law is designed to afford flexibility to lower courts. These are matters of judgment where the law provides guidance and boundaries, but otherwise grants the decisionmaker discretion to determine the best course of action. For example, evidentiary rules grant trial courts discretion to determine whether evidence is relevant or prejudicial. State v. Johnson, 2021 WI 61, ¶33, 397 Wis. 2d 633, 961 N.W.2d 18. Similarly, the law entrusts circuit courts with broad discretion in sentencing those found guilty of crimes. State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197. In handing down a sentence, circuit court judges are both empowered and encouraged to determine what justice requires. This decision comes with first-hand observation of the criminal defendant, the victim, and others impacted by the crime. The proper sentence relies peculiarly on the personal knowledge and judgment of the circuit court judge. Id., ¶18. In this circumstance, and others like it, courts review such decisions for an erroneous exercise of discretion. Under this standard, we affirm a court’s exercise of discretion as long as it is a decision a reasonable judge could make within the bounds of the governing law. Gudex v. Franklin Collection Service, Inc., 2026 WI 6, ¶8, 419 Wis. 2d 534, 31 N.W.3d 338. ¶35 Other decisions are questions of fact. These go to the fundamental question of what happened and which witnesses or evidence are credible. Factual questions often require judgment as well—the judgment to decide who is telling the truth and who is not, or for example, to decide who offers a more convincing explanation of a person’s medical situation. Trial courts are uniquely designed to decide these questions. “Determining what is true as a factual matter involves evaluating witnesses and evidence and otherwise making numerous credibility judgments based on both written and in-person evidence.” J.D.B., 419 Wis. 2d 383, ¶16. Appellate courts, in contrast, “review only a cold paper record.” Id., ¶17. We are simply not institutionally competent to find facts in the ordinary course. As such, the general rule is that we accept the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id., ¶18. Under this standard, “a circuit court’s finding of fact is not clearly erroneous unless it is against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence, even if the evidence may have presented competing factual 2  RACINE COUNTY v. R.P.L. JUSTICE HAGEDORN, concurring inferences.” State v. Wiskerchen, 2019 WI 1, ¶30, 385 Wis. 2d 120, 921 N.W.2d 730. ¶36 Finally, some decisions are questions of law. While circuit courts must determine what law to apply to the issues in a case, they are no better equipped to do so than appellate courts. Appellate courts are intentionally structured “to deliberate and decide what the law is— matters determined by reference to legal authorities such as statutes, constitutions, and precedent.” See J.D.B., 419 Wis. 2d 383, ¶17. This is why we independently review questions of law, without affording deference to the legal determination below. See id., ¶18. ¶37 These three buckets make sense in theory. In practice, however, the lines between the buckets are often blurred. That brings us to the standard of review in ch. 55. II. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW AND CHAPTER 55 ¶38 Before a person can be put into protective placement under ch. 55, the county must meet its threshold burden of proof. Walworth County v. Therese B., 2003 WI App 223, ¶7 n.3, 267 Wis. 2d 310, 671 N.W.2d 377. The county must prove that four specific requirements are met by clear and convincing evidence: (1) PROTECTIVE PLACEMENT. A court may under s. 55.12 order protective placement for an individual who meets all of the following standards: (a) The individual has a primary need for residential care and custody. (b) The individual is a minor who is not alleged to have a developmental disability and on whose behalf a petition for guardianship has been submitted, or is an adult who has been determined to be incompetent by a circuit court. (c) As a result of developmental disability, degenerative brain disorder, serious and persistent 3  RACINE COUNTY v. R.P.L. JUSTICE HAGEDORN, concurring mental illness, or other like incapacities, the individual is so totally incapable of providing for his or her own care or custody as to create a substantial risk of serious harm to himself or herself or others. Serious harm may be evidenced by overt acts or acts of omission. (d) The individual has a disability that is permanent or likely to be permanent. WIS. STAT. § 55.08(1)(a)–(d); K.N.K. v. Buhler, 139 Wis. 2d 190, 197, 407 N.W.2d 281 (Ct. App. 1987). ¶39 This section, then, establishes a legal standard that must be met. Yet each of the four required “legal” findings, at bottom, are questions of medical or procedural fact. Paragraph (a) asks whether an individual has a “primary need” for certain medical care. Paragraph (b) is an inquiry into procedural prerequisites. Paragraph (c) articulates the criteria of dangerousness—i.e., the person is so unable to take care of themselves that they risk harming themselves or others. And para. (d) requires a court to conclude the disability is, or is likely to be, permanent. Other than para. (b), each of the other findings will depend heavily, if not entirely, on a factfinder’s assessment of the medical evidence. It will likely require sifting through competing inferences, dueling expert reports, and otherwise assessing the credibility of expert reports and testimony. ¶40 This makes the standard of review question difficult. On the one hand, these are statutory requirements—legal standards that must be satisfied. On the other hand, these findings are essentially a series of factual determinations. Wisconsin courts have addressed this kind of situation in other contexts, but we have done so in ways that are arguably inconsistent, heightening the need for reexamination. ¶41 In State v. Garfoot, we were tasked with deciding the standard of review for cases under WIS. STAT. § 971.14—which concern a defendant’s competency to stand for trial. 207 Wis. 2d 214, 216–17, 221–22, 558 N.W.2d 626 (1997). Rooted in United States Supreme Court precedent and WIS. STAT. § 971.13(1), the test for competency requires the court to determine whether a person “possesses sufficient present ability to consult 4  RACINE COUNTY v. R.P.L. JUSTICE HAGEDORN, concurring with his or her lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding,” and that “he or she possesses a rational as well as factual understanding of a proceeding against him or her.” Id. at 222. ¶42 We recognized that although this was a legal test, “its determination is functionally a factual one: either the state has convinced the court