State v. N. K. B.

2026 WI 22 STATE OF WISCONSIN, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. N.K.B., Defendant-Appellant. No. 2023AP722-CR Decided June 26, 2026 REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals Milwaukee County Circuit Court (David C. Swanson, J.) No. 2023CF1417 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which JILL J. KAROFSKY, C.J., and BRIAN K. HAGEDORN, JANET C. PROTASIEWICZ, and SUSAN M. CRAWFORD, JJ., joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion. ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J., filed a dissenting opinion. ¶1 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J. Although Naomi1 was involuntarily committed only for treatment to restore her competency to 1 For ease of reading and to protect the confidentiality of these proceedings, we use the pseudonym “Naomi” to refer to the defendant in this case.  STATE v. N.K.B. Opinion of the Court stand trial under WIS. STAT. § 971.14 (2021–22),2 the circuit court ordered that she be involuntarily medicated to alleviate the danger she posed to herself or others. The question presented is whether WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g)3. authorizes that involuntary medication order. We hold that it does not. I ¶2 Naomi was charged with felony battery by a prisoner for slapping a nurse while she was an inmate at the Milwaukee County jail. See WIS. STAT. § 940.20(1). At an initial appearance, Naomi’s counsel advised the circuit court that Naomi might be incompetent to proceed, and the circuit court accordingly ordered that Naomi undergo an examination to assess her competency. See generally WIS. STAT. § 971.14; see also WIS. STAT. § 971.13.3 The Department of Health Services (DHS) also requested a hearing to determine whether Naomi was competent to refuse medication and, if not, whether she should be involuntarily medicated to restore her competency.4 2All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021–22 version unless otherwise indicated. 3 A criminal defendant “who lacks substantial mental capacity to understand the proceedings or assist in his or her own defense” may not be tried, convicted, or sentenced for an offense “so long as the incapacity endures.” WIS. STAT. § 971.13(1). A circuit court proceeds under WIS. STAT. § 971.14 “[w]henever there is reason to doubt a defendant’s competency.” § 971.14(1r)(a). That section provides for examination of the defendant, submission of a written report, and the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. § 971.14(2)–(4). If the court finds “that the defendant is not competent but is likely to become competent . . . if provided with appropriate treatment,” then it “shall suspend the proceedings and commit the defendant to the custody of the [Department of Health Services] for treatment.” § 971.14(5)(a)1. 4If certain findings are made, a circuit court may order the involuntary medication of an incompetent defendant to restore their competency to proceed. See § 971.14(4)(b), (5)(am) (requiring a finding that the defendant is not competent to refuse medication); State v. Fitzgerald, 2019 WI 69, ¶2, 387 Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 165 (holding that a circuit court must make the findings required by Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), before ordering involuntary medication to restore competency). 2  STATE v. N.K.B. Opinion of the Court ¶3 At the competency hearing, the circuit court found Naomi incompetent to proceed but likely to regain competency with treatment, and committed Naomi to DHS’s custody. The circuit court also found that Naomi was incompetent to refuse medication and that the factors set forth in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), were met,5 and thus ordered that Naomi be involuntarily medicated. Naomi filed a notice of appeal, and the circuit court stayed its involuntary medication order. The next day, DHS wrote a letter to the court asking it to reconsider the stay because, according to DHS, Naomi posed a danger to herself or others without the medication. ¶4 Following another hearing, the circuit court determined that Naomi was dangerous to herself and others and that she was not competent to make her own medication decisions. The circuit court then vacated its prior involuntary medication order and ordered that Naomi be involuntarily medicated “on grounds of dangerousness.” In doing so, the circuit court underscored that it was imposing a new involuntary medication order based on Naomi’s dangerousness, rather than the need to restore her competency, and that it therefore “did not need to and should not reach the Sell factors.”6 5 In Sell, the United States Supreme Court held that the government may involuntarily medicate a criminal defendant for the purpose of restoring the defendant’s competency only if the court makes the following findings: (1) important governmental interests are at stake; (2) involuntary medication will significantly further those interests; (3) involuntary medication is necessary to further those interests; and (4) administration of the medication is medically appropriate. 539 U.S. 166, 180–81. A circuit court must make these findings before ordering involuntary medication to restore competency under § 971.14. Fitzgerald, 387 Wis. 2d 384, ¶2. 6 When entering this new order for involuntary medication, the circuit court used the September 2022 version of form CR-206. That version provided for two alternative grounds to order involuntary medication for an individual committed under § 971.14: dangerousness or the individual’s need to regain competency to proceed. The form has since been updated, and the current version, dated December 2024, no longer includes dangerousness as a ground for ordering involuntary medication. 3  STATE v. N.K.B. Opinion of the Court ¶5 Naomi appealed, arguing that the circuit court did not have legal authority to order that an individual committed only for competency restoration under § 971.14 be involuntarily medicated upon a finding of dangerousness. The court of appeals agreed with Naomi. State v. N.K.B., 2024 WI App 63, ¶20, 414 Wis. 2d 218, 14 N.W.3d 681. In its decision, it considered and rejected several proposed sources of legal authority offered by the State, including WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g)1. and 3., § 971.14(2)(f), and two decisions by the United States Supreme Court: Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), and Sell, 539 U.S. 166. See N.K.B., 414 Wis. 2d 218, ¶¶22, 29–31, 41–42. Before this court, the State relies exclusively on a portion of § 51.61(1)(g)3. as the source of authority for the circuit court’s order. II ¶6 The interpretation of WIS. STAT. §§ 51.61(1)(g)3. and 971.14 is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. State v. Anthony D.B., 2000 WI 94, ¶8, 237 Wis. 2d 1, 614 N.W.2d 435. III ¶7 A circuit court must have statutory authority to order the involuntary medication of a committed individual. Id., ¶24. WISCONSIN STAT. § 971.14 does not grant statutory authority for the order at issue here, and the State does not argue otherwise. That is because the language of § 971.14 provides for court-ordered involuntary medication only to restore competency, and not because a defendant is found to be dangerous.7 The State instead argues that a portion of WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g)3. authorizes the involuntary medication order in this case. Naomi responds that the language, context, and statutory history of § 51.61(1)(g)3., as well as our existing case law, demonstrate that the relevant portion of § 51.61(1)(g)3. does not permit a circuit court to order 7 Section 971.14(5)(a)1. (emphasis added) states that a defendant shall be committed to the custody of DHS for treatment if a “court determines that the defendant is not competent but is likely to become competent . . . if provided with appropriate treatment.” This provision makes clear that the purpose of the treatment permitted by § 971.14, which may include court-ordered involuntary medication when additional requirements are met, is to restore the defendant’s competency to proceed. 4  STATE v. N.K.B. Opinion of the Court involuntary medication for an individual committed exclusively under § 971.14.8 We agree with Naomi. ¶8 We begin with the text of § 51.61(1)(g)3. See Meyers v. DNR, 2019 WI 5, ¶18, 385 Wis. 2d 176, 922 N.W.2d 47 (“Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute.”). Section 51.61(1) sets forth various rights that “shall” be afforded to “each patient.” “Patient” is defined as “any individual who is receiving services for mental illness, developmental disabilities, alcoholism or drug dependency,” and includes individuals like Naomi who are committed under chapter 971. § 51.61(1). The subdivision at issue, § 51.61(1)(g)3., affords each patient “the right to exercise informed consent with regard to all medication” after a final commitment order unless one of two exceptions applies: (1) “the committing court or the court in the county in which the individual is located . . . makes a determination, following a hearing, that the individual is not competent to refuse medication;” or (2) “a situation exists in which the medication or treatment is necessary to prevent serious physical harm to the individual or others.” § 51.61(1)(g)3. The State relies exclusively on the first exception. Because individuals committed under § 971.14 are included in the definition of “patient,” this exception appears at first glance to authorize a circuit court to determine that an individual committed under that section is not competent to refuse medication. ¶9 When determining whether the first exception in § 51.61(1)(g)3. authorizes court-ordered involuntary medication for an individual committed exclusively under § 971.14, we cannot read § 51.61(1)(g)3. in isolation. Rather, we must interpret the first exception in § 51.61(1)(g)3. in light of context provided by related provisions. See Clean Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 2021 WI 72, ¶10, 398 Wis. 2d 433, 961 N.W.2d 611. Here, that context includes § 971.14, which contains its own process for a circuit court to determine that an individual committed for competency restoration is not competent to refuse medication. And while that determination is subject to the same procedural and substantive 8Naomi was committed exclusively under § 971.14. Parallel commitments, however, are possible. See infra, ¶14. Our conclusion in this case does not address a situation in which there is a parallel commitment or in which an individual is committed under a statute other than § 971.14. 5  STATE v. N.K.B. Opinion of the Court requirements as a determination under § 51.61(1)(g)3.,9 § 971.14 imposes additional requirements. Those requirements include a mandate that the motion for involuntary medication be based on the report of a licensed physician,10 that the State bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence, and that the order for involuntary medication must state that “whoever administers the medication or treatment to the defendant shall observe appropriate medical standards.” § 971.14(4)(b). Finally, whereas § 51.61(1)(g)3.’s first exception does not address the grounds for court-ordered involuntary medication, § 971.14 is clear that any treatment provided to individuals committed under that section is for the purpose of restoring their competency to proceed. See supra, ¶7 n.7. ¶10 We conclude that the best way to read § 51.61(1)(g)3. in light of § 971.14’s separate, and more rigorous, process is that § 51.61(1)(g)3.’s first exception does not apply to individuals committed exclusively under § 971.14. After all, there would be no reason to enact a separate process for individuals committed under § 971.14 alone, subject to additional procedural and substantive requirements, if § 51.61(1)(g)3.’s less rigorous process continued to apply to those same individuals. If that were the case, the additional requirements of § 971.14 would be essentially be dead letter, since the State could always avoid them by proceeding under § 51.61(1)(g)3. whenever it sought a determination that an individual committed under § 971.14 was not competent to refuse medication. To avoid that outcome, we must read these statutes “dealing with the same matter . . . in harmony such that each has force and effect.” Belding v. Demoulin, 2014 WI 8, ¶17, 352 Wis. 2d 359, 843 N.W.2d 373. In other words, we must conclude that § 51.61(1)(g)3. does not authorize court- 9 Those requirements include the filing of a motion, provision of notice to the subject individual and their counsel, a hearing within ten days of the motion’s filing, and a determination that the individual is not competent to refuse medication. See §§ 971.14(5)(am), 51.61(1)(g)3. The court’s determination that the individual is not competent to refuse medication is also subject to the same standard under both statutes. See §§ 971.14(3)(dm), 51.61(1)(g)4. 10Section § 51.61(1)(g)3., by contrast, permits but does not require such a report. Compare § 971.14(5)(am) (“A report on which the motion is based shall accompany the motion . . . .” (emphasis added)) with § 51.61(1)(g)3. (“A report, if any, on which the motion is based shall accompany the motion . . . .”(emphasis added)). 6  STATE v. N.K.B. Opinion of the Court ordered involuntary medication for individuals committed exclusively under § 971.14. ¶11 This reading is also consistent with the statutory history of § 51.61(1) and related statutes, and how we have interpreted that history in the past. See Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Healthcare Wis. v. WERC, 2025 WI 29, ¶11, 416 Wis. 2d 688, 22 N.W.3d 876 (“Statutory history is therefore part of the statutory context and, where relevant, should be examined when a court determines the meaning of a statutory provision.”). 11 When § 51.61(1) was first enacted, it applied only to individuals “admitted or committed” under chapter 51, a detailed statutory framework governing, among other things, the involuntary commitment of individuals who are mentally ill, proper subjects for treatment, and dangerous to themselves or others. See § 60, ch. 430, Laws of 1975; see also Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2022 WI 40, ¶17, 402 Wis. 2d 1, 974 N.W.2d 733. The legislature later expanded the application of § 51.61(1) to include “any individual . . . who is detained, committed or placed under [ch. 51] or ch. 48, 55, 971, 975 or 980.” § 51.61(1).12 At the time, none of those chapters included their own provisions addressing competency to refuse medication. Since then, the legislature has enacted such provisions in chapters 55, 971, and 975,13 but not in chapters 48 or 980. ¶12 This history was essential to our holding in State v. Anthony D.B., a case closely related to this one. See generally 237 Wis. 2d 1. There we were asked whether § 51.61(1)(g)3. authorizes a circuit court to order the 11 While legislative history can also shed light on a statute’s meaning, there is no such relevant legislative history here. See, e.g., Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Healthcare Wis. v. WERC, 2025 WI 29, ¶32, 416 Wis. 2d 688, 22 N.W.3d 876. 12See also § 96, ch. 428, Laws of 1977 (adding chapters 55, 971, and 975); 1993 Wis. Act 479, § 16 (adding chapter 980); 1997 Wis. Act 292, § 309 (adding chapter 48). 13See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 55.14, 971.14(3)(dm), (4)(b), (5)(am), 975.06(7); see also 1989 Wis. Act 31, §§ 2848h, 2848t, 2850m, 2885m (adding medication provisions to chapters 971 and 975); 2005 Wis. Act 264, § 165 (adding medication provisions to chapter 55). 7  STATE v. N.K.B. Opinion of the Court involuntary medication of an individual committed under chapter 980. See 237 Wis. 2d 1, ¶8. We read § 51.61(1)(g)3. in its full context, including the statutory history14 outlined above, and concluded that it authorizes court- ordered involuntary medication of an individual committed under a chapter listed in § 51.61(1) “unless and until the legislature provides alternative provisions” in the relevant chapter.15 Id., ¶20; see also id., ¶¶17– 19. Because the legislature had not added separate involuntary-medication provisions to chapter 980, we accordingly held that “the provisions of § 51.61(1)(g) . . . control involuntary medication orders for persons committed under [that] chapter.” Id., ¶20. ¶13 Here, by contrast, the legislature has added separate involuntary-medication provisions to § 971.14. We conclude that those provisions, rather than § 51.61(1)(g)3.’s first exception, govern court- ordered involuntary medication for individuals committed exclusively under § 971.14.16 This reading of § 51.61(1)(g)3. takes into account its text, 14 In State v. Anthony D.B., we referred to this history as “legislative history.” 2000 WI 94, ¶¶17, 20, 237 Wis. 2d 1, 614 N.W.2d 435. Since this history involves comparing statutes with prior enacted versions, however, it is actually statutory history. See Brey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2022 WI 7, ¶20, 400 Wis. 2d 417, 970 N.W.2d 1. 15 The State argues that this “unless and until” statement is “best viewed as an imprecise articulation of the well-established rule that where closely- related statutes conflict, the more specific statute controls.” Our interpretation of § 51.61(1)(g)3. in Anthony D.B., however, was a contextualized reading of that statute’s text in light of relevant statutory history and related provisions, and not the result of applying rules about how to interpret conflicting statutes. See 237 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶17–20. 16 The State also argues that Sell requires a § 971.14 committing court “to consider whether involuntary medication can be justified on dangerousness grounds before turning to [the] competency-restoration inquiry.” See also, e.g., 539 U.S. at 181–82 (“A court need not consider whether to allow forced medication for [the purpose of restoring trial competency], if forced medication is warranted for a different purpose, such as the purposes set out in Harper related to the individual’s dangerousness . . . .”) (emphasis in original); id. at 182 (“There are often strong reasons for a court to determine whether forced administration of drugs can be justified on these alternative grounds before turning to the trial competence question.”) (emphasis in original). This argument assumes, however, 8  STATE v. N.K.B. Opinion of the Court full statutory context (including the related provisions of § 971.14), and its statutory history, and is consistent with Anthony D.B.’s conclusion that § 51.61(1)(g)3. authorizes court-ordered involuntary medication of an individual committed under a chapter listed in § 51.61(1) “unless and until the legislature provides alternative provisions” in the relevant chapter. 237 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20. ¶14 Nevertheless, we emphasize that it is still possible to administer involuntary medication to individuals committed for competency restoration under § 971.14 who present a danger to themselves or others because of mental illness. For example, even though § 51.61(1)(g)3. does not authorize court-ordered involuntary medication of an individual committed under § 971.14 alone, it does permit medical professionals working with such an individual to administer medication on an involuntary basis when “a situation exists in which the medication or treatment is necessary to prevent serious physical harm to the individual or others.”17 § 51.61(1)(g)3. Additionally, the State may initiate commitment proceedings under WIS. STAT. § 51.20, a statute that specifically addresses commitment and treatment of individuals who are mentally ill, proper subjects for treatment, and dangerous to themselves or others. See M.W., 402 Wis. 2d 1, ¶17. When involuntary medication of an individual committed for competency restoration is ordered on the basis of dangerousness, requiring a parallel commitment under § 51.20 respects the policy choices the legislature made and protects every individual’s “significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs.” Harper, 494 U.S. at 221; see also Sell, 539 U.S. at 180– 81. Notably, this requirement would not delay the already paused criminal proceedings or result in any meaningful delay in the provision of involuntary medication based on dangerousness.18 that § 971.14 committing courts have statutory authority to order involuntary medication based on dangerousness in the first place. Section 971.14 does not provide that authority, and we hold that § 51.61(1)(g)3. does not do so either. Since this case involves only a court order for involuntary medication, 17 we need not determine the parameters of this provision. 18When a criminal defendant is committed for competency restoration under § 971.14, the criminal proceedings are immediately suspended for the duration of the commitment. § 971.14(5)(a)1. Initiating a parallel proceeding under § 51.20 during the pendency of a § 971.14 commitment, therefore, would 9  STATE v. N.K.B. Opinion of the Court IV ¶15 We hold that § 51.61(1)(g)3. does not authorize court- ordered involuntary medication of an individual committed exclusively under § 971.14. Because Naomi was committed solely under that section, we therefore conclude that § 51.61(1)(g)3. did not authorize the circuit court’s involuntary-medication order in this case. By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. not interrupt the progress of the criminal case. Further, when a petition for commitment under § 51.20 is filed, the circuit court must hold a probable-cause hearing within 72 hours. § 51.20(7)(a). If probable cause is found, the court may order involuntary medication based on dangerousness at that same hearing when additional requirements are met. See § 51.61(1)(g)2. Involuntary medication may also be administered based on dangerousness in emergency situations until the probable-cause hearing is held. See § 51.61(1)(g)1. 10  STATE v. N.K.B. JUSTICE REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, concurring REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., concurring. I. A DEFENSE OF TEXTUALISM ¶16 The majority relies on statutory history but the statutory text resolves the case and the analysis should stop there. WISCONSIN STAT. § 51.61(1)(g)3. does not authorize a criminal court to forcibly medicate a defendant based on dangerousness. The textualism espoused in State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County remains the bedrock of statutory interpretation in Wisconsin, and it controls this court’s methods. 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. The majority doesn’t cite Kalal, and its omission is intentional. Loosening the primacy of the text and inserting other factors into the inquiry establishes a “totality of the circumstances” analysis, in which judges examine all the “evidence” and assign each piece varying weight based on subjective preferences. The majority’s analysis, coming on the heels of repeated calls to replace textualism with a “holistic” approach represents another step toward analytical anarchy, giving judges leeway to reach whatever result they desire. ¶17 For more than two decades, this court has explicitly recognized the judiciary’s role “to faithfully give effect to the laws enacted by the legislature.” Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶44. This court does not divine legislative “intent” from legislative backstory. “Judicial deference to the policy choices enacted into law . . . requires that statutory interpretation focus primarily on the language of the statute.” Id. The written text— currently enacted—is the law that binds the People and it is the law the judiciary is duty bound to apply. See id., ¶44–46. ¶18 Kalal presented nothing new; the case expressed venerable principles of textualism uniformly followed until a fringe movement of jurists decided to twist the judicial power into a sword of social activism.1 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 1 “Since the mid-20th century, legal theorists have been prodding judges to make policy” leading some judges to “’conform [their] decision[s] to what honest men would think right’” and to believe “’it is better for [them] to look into [their] own heart[s] to find out what that is.’ This was not a parody.” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 347 (2012).  STATE v. N.K.B. JUSTICE REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, concurring ENGLAND 59 (1765) (“Words are generally to be understood in their usual and most known signification; not so much regarding the propriety of grammar, as their general and popular use.”); “We do not pause to consider whether a statute differently conceived and framed would yield results more consonant with fairness and reason. We take the statute as we find it.” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 347 (2012) (quoting Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20, 27 (1933) (Carodozo, J.)). Since its inception, this court looked for the “intention of the legislature” in “the language employed in the act itself.” Haseltine v. Hewitt, 61 Wis. 121, 124, 20 N.W. 676 (1884). If statutory text reveals “clear, plain language” there is “no room for construction or interpretation” by courts. Id. Far from charting a new course, Kalal chronicled, clarified and reaffirmed this court’s longstanding practice. Wisconsin courts give text its “common, ordinary, and accepted meaning,” read in context as part of a coherent statutory structure. Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45–46; see also WIS. STAT. § 990.01(1); Brey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2022 WI 7, ¶11, 400 Wis. 2d 417, 970 N.W.2d 1. We start with the text and “[i]f the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.” Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 (citation omitted). Often, statutory interpretation starts and ends with the text. ¶19 Courts may consult all relevant intrinsic sources—including related statutes and statutory structure—to understand statutory meaning in the proper context. Id., ¶¶43, 46, 48–49. Such sources illuminate the text of a provision, but do not displace it. Nothing in our jurisprudence supports a methodology of statutory interpretation that begins with anything but the text. ¶20 There are many debates over statutory interpretation. This is not one of them. Even “[p]urposivists begin with text.” Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 90 (2012). “[W]e’re all textualists now,” Justice Kagan famously declared. HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, The 2015 Scalia Lecture Series: A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, at 08:29 (YouTube, Nov. 25, 2015), http://youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg. Even a leading article arguing courts should be “sensitive to current policy concerns” and that interpretation involves the “creation of meaning” concedes “the rule of law requires that statutes enacted by the majoritarian legislature be given effect” and that “[w]hen the statutory text clearly answers the interpretive question . . . it normally will be the most important consideration.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1483, 1498 (1987) (cleaned up). Even those justices of this court who 2  STATE v. N.K.B. JUSTICE REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, concurring have lobbied for a “holistic” interpretive approach have agreed “[w]e should of course start with the text of the statute.” Clean Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 2021 WI 71, ¶43, 398 Wis. 2d 386, 961 N.W.2d 346 (Dallet, J., concurring) (emphasis added); Servs. Emps. Int’l Union Healthcare Wis. v. WERC (SEIU), 2025 WI 29, ¶55, 416 Wis. 2d 688, 22 N.W.2d 876 (Dallet, J., joined by Ann Walsh Bradley, C.J., and Karofsky, Protasiewicz, JJ., concurring) (“Everyone, myself included, agrees we should of course start with the text of the statute, since it is the best available evidence of what the statute means.”) (emphasis added) (cleaned up) (citation omitted). Of course, the text is much more than “evidence” of meaning. “The words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 56. ¶21 A study of this court’s decisions since Kalal reveals the court does not often examine statutory history. As of March 31, 2026, this court has cited Kalal at least four-hundred and twenty times. After Kalal, only three opinions interpreting statutes ostensibly began their analyses with statutory history. See generally Borek Cranberry Marsh, Inc. v. Jackson Cnty., 2010 WI 95, 328 Wis. 2d 613, 785 N.W.2d 615; Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581; State v. Warbelton, 2009 WI 6, 315 Wis. 2d 253, 759 N.W.2d 557. ¶22 One of those cases—Borek—should be overruled. See Cobb v. King, 2022 WI 59, ¶¶7–56, 403 Wis. 2d 198, 976 N.W.2d 410 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting). Borek illustrates common pitfalls of statutory history. First, “[t]he Borek majority did not start with the statute’s language.” Id., ¶22. Jurists who lend statutory history the same pedigree as text will lead with statutory history, if convenient. Second, jurists consulting statutory history—which should be limited to the comparison of currently-enacted text with earlier enactments—rarely analyze statutory history properly. See Brey, 400 Wis. 2d 417, ¶20 (“Statutory history . . . involves comparing the statute with its prior versions.”). Purporting to analyze “statutory history,” the Borek court adduced a New York intermediate appellate court’s interpretation of a New York statute under the banner of “statutory history,” as if it were intrinsic evidence of a Wisconsin statute’s meaning. Cobb, 403 Wis. 2d 198, ¶¶30–35, 40. The court also dismissed certain amendments to the Wisconsin statute as “stylistic.” Id., ¶38. Finally, the Borek court primarily pursued an impossible search for nonexistent “legislative intent.” Id., ¶43– 46; State v. Lopez, 2019 WI 101, ¶39, 389 Wis. 2d 156, 936 N.W.2d 125 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (demonstrating 3  STATE v. N.K.B. JUSTICE REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, concurring that a collective “intent” underlying the enactment of law is a fiction; individual legislators have their own motivations). ¶23 Statutory history is often ambiguous and therefore often offers only low-quality evidence of meaning. Failing to say much on it own, statutory history tempts jurists to draw upon other historical “evidence” to make sense of enactments and amendments, ultimately leading courts to stray down the path of divining legislative “intent.” See Warbelton, 315 Wis. 2d 253, ¶29–30 (starting inappropriately with statutory history and using it incorrectly to infer legislative “intent”). It is impossible to “infer” that which does not exist. ¶24 In cases for which this court has examined statutory history since Kalal, the court has begun with currently-enacted text at least thirty- seven times. E.g., Fleming v. Amateur Athletic Union of U.S., Inc., 2023 WI 40, ¶21, 407 Wis. 2d 273, 990 N.W.2d 244 (“As always, we begin with the text of the statute.”); Legue v. City of Racine, 2014 WI 92, ¶62, 357 Wis. 2d 250, 849 N.W.2d 837 (“We look first to the text of the two relevant statutes.”). Courts may use statutory history to verify a plain text analysis, but we always analyze the text first. E.g., State v. Williams, 2014 WI 64, ¶21, 355 Wis. 2d 581, 852 N.W.2d 467 (considering statutory history only after concluding “the language itself does not reveal a plain meaning”); Force ex rel. Welcenbach v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 82, ¶¶55, 111, 356 Wis. 2d 582, 850 N.W.2d 866 (starting with “[a] study of the text” and proceeding to statutory history only after the court could not discern an answer from the text). ¶25 Abandoning the text in favor of a “holistic” methodology untethers courts from the rule of law and replaces neutral interpretation with results-oriented decision-making. See, e.g., Clean Wis., Inc., 398 Wis. 2d 386, ¶88 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) (explaining that textualism is “rooted in and fundamental to the rule of law,” because “[i]t is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver” (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶52)) (emphasis original). Elevating any sources or other considerations over currently-enacted text invites judicial overreach by giving judges cover to substitute their policy preferences for the law. Cath. Charities Bureau, Inc. v. LIRC 2024 WI 13, ¶¶110–159, 411 Wis. 2d 1, 3 N.W.3d 666 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) overruled on other grounds by Cath. Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wis. Lab. & Indust. Rev. Comm’n, 605 U.S. 238 (2025). Sources beyond the text itself serve only to confirm, not rewrite, the law. SEIU, 416 Wis. 2d 688, ¶¶36–47 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring). This court clarified in SEIU that we first analyze 4  STATE v. N.K.B. JUSTICE REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, concurring “intrinsic” evidence of a statute’s meaning, and “intrinsic sources [do] include . . . statutory history.” SEIU, 416 Wis. 2d 688, ¶8 (citation omitted). We made that point only to emphasize our rejection of a “myopic focus on the singular statutory provision in question.” Id., ¶10. We explained it is “not necessary . . . for the language of a statute to be deemed ambiguous before a reviewing court looks at intrinsic sources such as [statutory] scope, [statutory] history, and [statutory] context.” Id. SEIU did not, however, place all “intrinsic” evidence on equal footing, nor did it displace, downgrade, or depreciate the primary source of plain meaning— the text. ¶26 A judicial opinion may discuss statutory history, but (to state the obvious) an opinion is not history, and sometimes only an inaccurate recitation of it. This court’s cases and party briefing often characterize this court’s precedents analyzing statutory history as statutory history itself. Doing so lacks any foundation. Probative as precedent can be, it is not enacted text. It has not survived legislative compromises, bicameralism, or presentment. The legislature writes Wisconsin law, not this court. ¶27 The enacted text alone supplies the answer to the question presented to this court. Chapter 51 permits a circuit court to commit a subject based on dangerousness. Once a court commits a subject under ch. 51, WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g)3. provides the committing court with authority to issue an involuntary medication order after a hearing and after finding the subject not competent to refuse medication. No statute authorizes a court to order involuntary medication predicated on a subject’s “dangerousness” alone. Neither statutory history or precedent have anything relevant to contribute to the statutory analysis. II. WISCONSIN STAT. § 971.14 DOES NOT AUTHORIZE INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION BASED SOLEY ON DANGEROUSNESS. ¶28 WISCONSIN STAT. § 51.61(1)(g)3.—a patients’ rights provision for individuals receiving mental health services—plainly does not authorize a criminal court to forcibly medicate a defendant based on dangerousness. Section 51.61(1)(g)3. delineates the rights of “patient[s],” including individuals “detained, committed or placed” under ch. 51 or ch. 971, among other statutes. WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1). Even when read in conjunction with WIS. STAT. § 971.14, § 51.61(1)(g)3. does not authorize a criminal court to forcibly medicate a defendant based on dangerousness. Section 971.14 authorizes criminal courts to order the involuntary 5  STATE v. N.K.B. JUSTICE REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, concurring medication of defendants only to restore trial competency. A court- ordered stay of a medication order under § 971.14 may not be lifted under § 51.61(1)(g)3., which authorizes the involuntary administration of medication—by physicians—only if “a situation exists in which the medication or treatment is necessary to prevent serious physical harm to the individual or others.” Nothing in § 51.61(1)(g)3. authorizes a ch. 971 court to order the involuntary administration of medication in response to an individual’s dangerousness. A. Wisconsin Stat. § 971.14 IS LIMITED TO COMPETENCY RESTORATION. ¶29 WISCONSIN STAT. § 971.14 authorizes involuntary medication for the singular purpose of restoring a defendant’s trial competency. Section 971.14 applies “whenever there is reason to doubt a defendant’s competency to proceed.” WIS. STAT. § 971.14(1r).2 If the court finds a defendant incompetent but likely to regain competency with appropriate treatment, the court must suspend the criminal proceeding and commit the defendant to the Department of Health Services. WIS. STAT. § 971.14(5)(a)1.3 2 WISCONSIN STAT. § 971.14(1r) provides: (1r) PROCEEDINGS. (a) The court shall proceed under this section whenever there is reason to doubt a defendant’s competency to proceed. 3 WISCONSIN STAT. § 971.14(5)(a)1. provides: (5) COMMITMENT. (a) 1. If the court determines that the defendant is not competent but is likely to become competent within the period specified in this paragraph if provided with appropriate treatment, the court shall suspend the proceedings and commit the defendant to the custody of the department for treatment for a period not to exceed 12 months, or the maximum sentence specified 6  STATE v. N.K.B. JUSTICE REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, concurring ¶30 WISCONSIN STAT. § 971.14 tethers both “treatment” and “commitment” solely to restoring a defendant’s competency to stand trial. All subsections of § 971.14—from the initi