Wisconsin State Legislature v. Josh Kaul

2026 WI 28 WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE, et al., Plaintiff, Appellant, Cross-Respondent, v. JOSH KAUL, et al., Defendants, Respondents, Cross-Appellants, Petitioners. No. 2022AP431 Decided July 10, 2026 REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals Polk County Circuit Court (Jeffrey L. Anderson, J.) No. 2021CV152. REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which JILL J. KAROFSKY, C.J., and JANET C. PROTASIEWICZ and SUSAN M. CRAWFORD, JJ., joined. BRIAN K. HAGEDORN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J., joined with respect to ¶¶30–87. ¶1 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J. The attorney general represents the state in legal matters, including by bringing civil actions to enforce state statutes or otherwise to represent the state’s interests. See generally WIS. STAT. § 165.25 (2023–24).1 Sometimes those civil actions end in settlements through which the attorney general recovers money on behalf of the state. 1All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023–24 version unless otherwise indicated.  WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE v. KAUL Opinion of the Court Such settlements may include money earmarked for specific purposes like restitution or attorneys’ fees. But they can also include “uncommitted” funds, that is, money that is not designated for a particular purpose by the settlement and is instead left to the attorney general’s discretion. This case raises two questions about the depositing and crediting within the state treasury of these uncommitted settlement funds. ¶2 First, when the attorney general deposits uncommitted settlement funds into the general fund and credits them to one or more program appropriations, is he complying with the directive in WIS. STAT. § 165.10 to “deposit all settlement funds into the general fund”? We hold that he is, and therefore reverse in relevant part2 the contrary decision of the court of appeals. Second, when we granted review in this case, we raised sua sponte the question of whether “the services rendered by Department of Justice personnel in litigating a civil action on behalf of the State of Wisconsin or an executive branch agency constitute ‘proceeds from services,’ under WIS. STAT. § 20.455(3)(g)?” The court is too divided to reach a majority mandate on that issue. Under these circumstances, we conclude this second issue must be dismissed as improvidently granted. I A ¶3 We first set the stage by explaining how revenues wind up in the state treasury and by differentiating between two key terms used in the budget statutes, “deposit” and “credit.” When a state agency receives money on behalf of the state, it must place that money into a “fund” within the state treasury. The budget statutes refer to this act as “depositing.” See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 20.001(2)(d) (describing state revenues as being “deposited into funds”). There are two types of “fund,” namely, the “general fund” and “segregated funds.” The “general fund” consists of “[a]ll moneys in the state treasury not specifically designated in any statute as belonging to any other funds.” WIS. STAT. § 25.20. The rest of the treasury is made up of “segregated funds,” that is, “revenues which, by law, are deposited into 2 We reverse the court of appeals’ decision only in part because we did not grant review of its separate holdings regarding standing and the interpretation of WIS. STAT. § 165.08(1), and those issues are thus not before us. See Wis. State Legis. v. Kaul, 2025 WI App 2, ¶¶55–56, 414 Wis. 2d 633, 17 N.W.3d 24 (2024). 2  WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE v. KAUL Opinion of the Court funds other than the general fund and are available for the purposes for which such funds are created.” § 20.001(2)(d). This case concerns only revenues deposited into the general fund. ¶4 When money is deposited into the general fund, it must be directed to a specific part of the general fund. The budget statutes refer to this act as “crediting.” For example, WIS. STAT. § 55.107(2) (emphasis added), provides that reimbursements of costs associated with public- defender representation shall be “deposited in the general fund and credited to the appropriation account under s. 20.550(1)(L).” The side-by-side use of “deposit” and “credit” in this statute, and in numerous others like it, 3 makes clear that the terms have different meanings. See Sojenhomer v. Village of Egg Harbor, 2024 WI 25, ¶¶18–19, 412 Wis. 2d 244, 7 N.W.3d 455 (explaining that side-by-side usage of two terms in a statute can “signify that each term has a separate, non-overlapping meaning”). “Deposit” refers simply to placing money into the general fund or a segregated fund of the state treasury. “Credit” refers to directing money deposited into the general fund to a specific part of the general fund. ¶5 The default crediting rule is that money deposited into the general fund “shall be credited to the general purpose revenues of the 3 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 293.87(4)(b) (stating that the Department of Justice “shall deposit in the state treasury for deposit into the general fund” ”[t]he costs of investigation and the expenses of prosecution, including attorney fees,” from certain actions, and those funds “shall be credited to the appropriation account under s. 20.455(1)(gh)” (emphasis added)); WIS. STAT. § 103.805(1) (stating that DWD “shall deposit” fees collected for certain permits “in the general fund and credit $5 of that amount forwarded to the appropriation account under s. 20.455(1)(gk)” (emphasis added)); WIS. STAT. § 71.10(5)(h)5. (directing that “[f]rom moneys received for designations for the endangered resources program, an amount equal to the sum of administrative expenses . . . shall be deposited in the general fund and credited” to an appropriation, and “the net amount remaining . . . shall be deposited in the conservation fund and credited” to a different appropriation (emphasis added)); WIS. STAT. § 51.605(2) (providing that court- ordered reimbursements for certain public-defender representations “shall be deposited in the general fund and credited to” a particular appropriation account (emphasis added)); WIS. STAT. § 85.63(2) (mandating that fees charged by the Department of Transportation for access to a surveying-reference-station system “shall be deposited in the general fund and credited to” an appropriation account (emphasis added)). 3  WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE v. KAUL Opinion of the Court general fund unless otherwise specifically provided by law.” WIS. STAT. § 20.906(1). Money credited to the general purpose revenues of the general fund is “available for appropriation by the legislature.” § 20.001(2)(a). When the legislature has “otherwise specifically provided by law,” however, deposits are credited elsewhere. See § 20.906(1). For example, “program revenues” are “revenues which are paid into the general fund and are credited by law to an appropriation to finance a specific program or state agency.” § 20.001(2)(b). Thus, while program revenues are part of the general fund, they are not credited to the general purpose revenues of the general fund. Instead, program revenues must be credited to a particular program appropriation and are available for spending by a specific state agency according to the terms of that program appropriation. ¶6 The following diagram shows the relationships between the funds described in the paragraphs above. It is not drawn to scale, or meant to illustrate anything else within the treasury, or depict the relative dollar amounts contained in each part of the treasury. State Treasury Segregated General Fund Funds Program Revenues General Purpose Revenues of the General Fund B ¶7 For many years, attorneys general from both political parties have negotiated settlements through which the state recovered significant sums of “uncommitted” funds—in other words, money that was not 4  WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE v. KAUL Opinion of the Court specifically designated in the settlement for restitution, attorneys’ fees, or another specific purpose. Those attorneys general, in turn, deposited the uncommitted funds into the general fund and credited them to a program appropriation, specifically the Department of Justice’s § 20.455(3)(g) program appropriation as “proceeds from services.” Once there, the funds were available for the attorney general to spend on the Department’s programs and activities pursuant to the program appropriation. See id. ¶8 In 2017, the legislature included a provision in the biennial budget, 2017 Wis. Act 59, § 1672g, creating § 165.10 (2017).4 That version of § 165.10 provided in relevant part that “before the attorney general may expend settlement funds under s. 20.455(3)(g) that are not committed under the terms of the settlement,” he had to submit a proposed spending plan to the legislature’s joint committee on finance for approval. See § 165.10 (2017). If the committee did not schedule a meeting to review the plan within 14 days, the attorney general could spend the money as planned. Id. If the committee scheduled a meeting within that period, however, the attorney general could spend the money “only to implement the plan as approved by the committee.” Id. ¶9 Approximately fifteen months later, in late 2018, the legislature adopted the current version of § 165.10 (2023–24), which provides in its entirety that “[t]he attorney general shall deposit all settlement funds into the general fund.” See id. In the same act, 2017 Wis. Act 369, the legislature made two other salient changes. First, it ordered a one time “lapse[]” of the “unencumbered balance” of any “settlement funds” in the § 20.455(3)(g) appropriation account “as determined by the attorney general” to the general purpose revenues of the general fund.5 2017 Wis. Act 369, § 103(1). Second, it amended the language of § 20.455(3)(g), effectively capping the amount the attorney general could spend from that appropriation. See 2017 Wis. Act 369, § 21. 4 Because this version of § 165.10 was superseded by an amendment after just fifteen months, it never appeared in the published versions of the statutes. For that reason, we cite to that version of the statute as “§ 165.10 (2017).” 5 The then-attorney general determined that all settlement funds in the § 20.455(3)(g) appropriation were “encumbered,” and thus lapsed no funds to the general purpose revenues of the general fund. 5  WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE v. KAUL Opinion of the Court C ¶10 After Attorney General Kaul took office in 2019, the legislature argued that § 165.10 required him to deposit all uncommitted settlement funds into the general fund and credit them to the general purpose revenues of the general fund. After both sides exchanged numerous letters that failed to resolve their dispute, the legislature and an individual plaintiff, Adam Jarchow,6 filed this case in Polk County Circuit Court. The complaint sought a declaration that § 165.10 “requires the Attorney General to ‘deposit all settlement funds into the general fund,’ . . . and does not allow for the depositing of settlement funds into the appropriation account under [WIS. STAT.] § 20.455(3)(g) or any other statute.” Additionally, the complaint requested injunctive relief or a writ of mandamus requiring the attorney general, by operation of § 165.10, to “deposit[] all settlement funds into the general fund . . . and not into the appropriation account under [WIS. STAT.] § 20.455(3)(g) or any other statute.” In other words, the legislature asked for declaratory and injunctive relief requiring that all settlement funds be deposited into the general purpose revenues of the general fund. ¶11 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment in the attorney general’s favor, concluding that § 165.10 requires only that settlement funds be deposited into the general fund, and does not require those funds to be credited to the general purpose revenues of the general fund. As the circuit court explained, the legislature “want[s] me to say not only does it go to the general fund, but it goes to the general purposes revenue. But that’s reading the term general purposes revenue into 165.10. It does not say that.” Accordingly, the circuit court declared that § 165.10 requires only that all settlement funds be deposited into the general fund. Because the attorney general was already doing that, the circuit court concluded he was 6For simplicity, we will refer to the legislature and Jarchow collectively as “the legislature.” In addition to naming Attorney General Josh Kaul as a defendant, the legislature also included then-Secretary of the Department of Administration Joel Brennan as a defendant. After Secretary Brennan was succeeded in office by Secretary Kathy Koltin Blumenfeld, the circuit court granted a motion to substitute her as a party. See WIS. STAT. § 803.10(4)(a). For ease of reference, we refer to Kaul and Blumenfeld collectively as the “attorney general.” 6  WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE v. KAUL Opinion of the Court complying with § 165.10. Finally, addressing the legislature’s assertion in its summary judgment briefing that the attorney general may not credit uncommitted settlement funds to the program appropriation under § 20.455(3)(g) as “proceeds from services,” the circuit court said “[t]he issue is, I don’t have a declaratory action before me in order to make that declaration. The declaratory action is with 165.10, not with regard to 20.455(3)(g).” As a result, the circuit court declined to issue a declaratory judgment interpreting § 20.455(3)(g). ¶12 The legislature appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the circuit court’s decision regarding § 165.10. See Wis. State Legis. v. Kaul, 2025 WI App 2, ¶3, 414 Wis. 2d 633, 17 N.W.3d 24. According to the court of appeals, “the circuit court erred in holding that the attorney general could deposit relevant settlement funds not into the general fund but into other accounts over which the [Department of Justice] maintains sole discretion for expenditures.” Id. That was so, the court of appeals explained, because § 165.10, together with two other statutes, §§ 25.20 and 20.906(1), required that “all settlement funds must be deposited into the general purpose revenue fund.” Id., ¶35 (emphasis in original). Based on that reasoning, the court of appeals remanded with instructions to the circuit court to issue a declaratory judgment requiring that all uncommitted “settlement funds . . . be deposited into the general purpose revenues of the general fund.” Id., ¶55. ¶13 The court of appeals’ broad holding that § 165.10 required all uncommitted settlement funds to be “deposit[ed]” into the general purpose revenues of the general fund meant that it did not have to reach the legislature’s narrower, alternative contention about the scope and interpretation of § 20.455(3)(g). See Kaul, 414 Wis. 2d 633, ¶35. That was true even though the legislature argued in its briefing before the court of appeals that the text of § 20.455(3)(g) could not “reasonably apply to settlement funds,” and that the changes 2017 Wis. Act 369 made to § 165.10— specifically deleting the words “settlement funds under s. 20.455(3)(g)”— foreclosed any crediting of uncommitted settlement funds to that appropriation as “proceeds from services.” See § 20.455(3)(g). Although the court of appeals noted that this issue “was sufficiently raised in the briefs and addressed in the oral argument,” it did not resolve it directly. See Kaul, 414 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶16 n.11. That is because if the court’s broad interpretation of § 165.10 were correct, that would necessarily imply that uncommitted settlement funds cannot be credited to § 20.455(3)(g) or to any other program appropriation. See Kaul, 414 Wis. 2d 633, ¶35. Accordingly, the court of appeals’ decision never even used the words “proceeds from 7  WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE v. KAUL Opinion of the Court services,” let alone interpreted them by addressing this alternative argument. Nevertheless, when we granted review of the court of appeals’ decision regarding § 165.10, we asked the parties to address whether “the services rendered by Department of Justice personnel in litigating a civil action on behalf of the State of Wisconsin or an executive branch agency constitute ‘proceeds from services’ under WIS. STAT. § 20.455(3)(g)?” II ¶14 We review decisions granting or denying summary judgment de novo. See Estate of Lorbiecki v. Pabst Brewing Co., 2026 WI 12, ¶14, 419 Wis. 2d 755, 33 N.W.3d 800. In doing so, we also must interpret statutes, another question of law that we review de novo. See Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Healthcare Wis. v. WERC, 2025 WI 29, ¶5, 416 Wis. 2d 688, 22 N.W.3d 876. III ¶15 The legislature’s primary contention is that the attorney general is violating § 165.10 when he deposits uncommitted settlement funds in the general fund and credits those funds anywhere except the general purpose revenues of the general fund. Assuming we disagree, however, and in response to the court’s order granting review and adding a second issue, the legislature further contends that uncommitted settlement funds may not be credited to the program appropriation in § 20.455(3)(g) because they are not “proceeds from services” as that phrase is used in the statute. A ¶16 Section 165.10, entitled “Deposit of settlement funds,” provides in its entirety that “[t]he attorney general shall deposit all settlement funds into the general fund.” ¶17 This simple, declarative sentence identifies a class of state money (“settlement funds”) and imposes a single, narrow restriction on where that money must be deposited (into the state treasury, specifically “the general fund”). See id. It says nothing whatsoever about where that money may or must be credited after it is deposited. Further, the “general fund,” as explained above, consists of “[a]ll moneys in the state treasury not specifically designated in any statute as belonging to any other funds.” See § 25.20. In other words, everything except money belonging to “segregated funds” falls under the broad umbrella of the “general fund.” See § 8  WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE v. KAUL Opinion of the Court 20.001(2)(a)–(dm). That includes not just the general purpose revenues of the general fund, but also program revenues credited to specific program appropriations. See id. (2)(a)–(c). Thus, when settlement funds deposited into the general fund are credited to a specific program appropriation, those funds remain within the general fund. For this reason, the attorney general is complying with § 165.10 when he deposits uncommitted settlement funds into the general fund, even if he also credits those funds to a program appropriation. ¶18 The legislature nonetheless argues that the attorney general violates § 165.10 when he deposits uncommitted settlement funds into the general fund and credits them anywhere except the general purpose revenues of the general fund. But to reach that conclusion, we would have to conflate two distinct terms—“credit” and “deposit”—or read restrictions on where money may be credited into a statute that contains none. Indeed, that is what the court of appeals did when it interpreted § 165.10 as requiring that “[uncommitted] settlement funds must be deposited into the general purpose revenue fund.” See Kaul, 414 Wis. 2d 633, ¶35 (emphasis in original). As that sentence alone makes clear, the court of appeals conflated § 165.10’s requirement that uncommitted settlement funds be “deposit[ed]” into the general fund with a requirement that those funds also be credited to the general purpose revenues of the general fund. In other words, the court of appeals read into § 165.10 a requirement that deposits of uncommitted settlement funds be credited to the general purpose revenues of the general fund. See Kaul, 414 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶33–35. In defending the court of appeals’ decision, the legislature makes a similar argument, namely that we should read crediting restrictions imposed by other statutes 7 into the single depositing restriction imposed by § 165.10. 7 The legislature relies on several such statutes in service of this argument. See, e.g., § 20.906(1) (requiring that “[a]ll moneys paid into the treasury shall be credited to the general purpose revenues of the general fund unless otherwise specifically provided by law”); § 20.455(3)(g) (providing for crediting of, among other things, “all proceeds from services” to a program appropriation to the Department of Justice); § 20.455(1)(gh) (creating a program appropriation to the Department of Justice for “[m]oneys received under” various statutes “for the expenses of investigation and prosecution of violations, including attorney fees”). But whether the attorney general is violating with these statutes, and the restrictions they impose on where deposited money may be credited, tells us nothing about whether the attorney general is violating § 165.10. Nevertheless, we emphasize that, as explained in part III.B, infra, we express no view about the 9  WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE v. KAUL Opinion of the Court ¶19 The problem with these arguments is that “we interpret the statutory language the legislature enacted, and will not read into a statute language that it does not contain or reasonably imply.” See Sojenhomer, 412 Wis. 2d 244, ¶20 (collecting cases)). As the many statutes cited in ¶4 and n.3, supra, demonstrate, when the legislature wants to direct both that money is to be deposited into the general fund and that it must be credited somewhere specific, it knows how to do so. But § 165.10 does not even reference crediting, let alone restrict where the attorney general may credit money he deposits within the general fund. Accordingly, like the circuit court, we decline to read into § 165.10 atextual restrictions on where deposits to the general fund may be credited. Therefore, we hold that the attorney general is complying with § 165.10 when he deposits uncommitted settlement funds in the general fund, even if those settlement funds are credited to a specific program appropriation within the general fund. B ¶20 When we granted review in this case, we added a second issue, namely “does the language of WIS. STAT. § 20.455(3)(g) authorize the crediting of civil action proceeds to that appropriation? In other words, do the services rendered by Department of Justice personnel in litigating a civil action on behalf of the State . . . or an executive branch agency constitute ‘proceeds from services’ under WIS. STAT. § 20.455(3)(g)?” ¶21 After reviewing the record and the briefs of both parties, and after hearing oral arguments, the court is too divided to reach a majority mandate on that issue. Generally, when the court is too divided to reach a majority as to the mandate, we affirm the decision under review. See, e.g., Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., Inc. v. Emps. Ins. Co., 2023 WI 42, ¶1, 407 Wis. 2d 384, 990 N.W.2d 267 (per curiam). Under these circumstances, however, there is no decision to affirm with respect to § 20.455(3)(g). That is because neither the circuit court nor the court of appeals decided this question we raised,8 and as the circuit court previously explained, the proper interpretation of these other crediting statutes, or whether the attorney general is violating with them. 8As explained previously, the court of appeals never addressed this question due to its erroneous interpretation of § 165.10. In holding that § 165.10 required the attorney general to “deposit[]” all uncommitted settlement funds into 10  WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE v. KAUL Opinion of the Court legislature did not seek a declaratory judgment regarding the proper interpretation of the phrase “proceeds from services” in § 20.455(3)(g) in its complaint. Given that, we conclude that dismissal of this additional issue as improvidently granted is warranted. IV ¶22 We conclude that the attorney general complies with § 165.10 when, in accordance with the straightforward language of the statute, he deposits settlement funds into the general fund. That is true even if the attorney general also credits those deposited settlement funds to one or more program appropriations contained within the general fund. Accordingly, we reverse in relevant part the court of appeals’ decision. We further determine that the second issue regarding the program appropriation in § 20.455(3)(g) should be dismissed as improvidently granted. By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is reversed in part. “the general purpose revenue fund,” the court of appeals incorrectly assumed that § 165.10 precludes the attorney general from crediting such funds to the appropriation in § 20.455(3)(g), or any other program appropriation. See Kaul, 414 Wis. 2d 633, ¶35. For that reason, the court of appeals never interpreted the words “proceeds from services” in § 20.455(3)(g), or determined whether uncommitted settlement funds fall within that phrase. Because neither the court of appeals nor this court have answered that question, it remains unresolved. 11  WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE v. KAUL JUSTICE HAGEDORN, concurring in part and dissenting in part BRIAN K. HAGEDORN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. ¶23 I agree with the majority that the court of appeals misconstrued WIS. STAT. § 165.10. However, I strongly disagree with the court’s failure to decide whether the monies received from settlements in civil cases litigated by the Department of Justice constitute “proceeds from services” under WIS. STAT. § 20.455(3)(g). The majority declares this an “issue” which we are now dismissing as “improvidently granted.” But we granted review in a case, and the court is not dismissing the case as a whole. Rather, it is declining to decide an issue—one that was briefed, argued, opined on by the court of appeals, and central to the dispute between the parties. Prior to this, I am unaware of this court dismissing an issue as improvidently granted. ¶24 It is true that this court asked the parties, as a second issue, to address the meaning of WIS. STAT. § 20.455(3)(g). But we did not do so out of thin air. The court of appeals majority and dissent both opined on whether the attorney general may treat settlement funds as “proceeds from services” under § 20.455(3)(g), reaching different conclusions. See Wis. State Legis. v. Kaul, 2025 WI App 2, ¶34, 414 Wis. 2d 633, 17 N.W.3d 24; id., ¶¶58, 72–75 (Neubauer, J., dissenting). We added this issue to ensure it was separately and fully addressed, and to ensure the larger dispute between the parties had a resolution. ¶25 The court justifies its decision to dismiss an issue as “improvidently granted” on the grounds that the court cannot reach a resolution. However, we are not divided on the meaning of WIS. STAT. § 20.455(3)(g). In fact, a majority of the court agrees on the proper interpretation of the statute. Our disagreement is simply on how to style the mandate on the second issue, even though—regardless of how we label it—that particular postscript will have no practical effect on the parties in this case. The court’s inability to come together leaves the parties with no clarity about how to conform their actions to the law with respect to § 20.455(3)(g). It is most unfortunate that the court—even while we agree— cannot produce an opinion effectuating our agreement.1 The parties 1 When the court is divided on an issue and cannot resolve it, we have, at times, explained where we agree and disagree. For example, in State v. Hambly, in a case seating six justices, the court equally divided on an issue and explained— by name—how each of the six justices would have resolved the issue. 2008 WI 10,  WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE v. KAUL JUSTICE HAGEDORN, concurring in part and dissenting in part deserve better, and so does Wisconsin. I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. ¶¶4–5, 307 Wis. 2d 98, 745 N.W.2d 48; see also Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 26 Wis. 2d 470, 473–74, 132 N.W.2d 584 (1965); State v. Brookshaw, 70 Wis. 2d 605, 609– 10, 235 N.W.2d 520 (1975). 2  WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE v. KAUL JUSTICE REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, dissenting REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., with whom ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J., joins with respect to ¶¶30–87, dissenting. Preliminary Statement ¶26 If an attorney makes a false statement of fact or law, she may be sanctioned for violating the rules of professional conduct for attorneys. SCR 20:3.3. Unfortunately, supreme court justices can deceive the People of Wisconsin with impunity. Reaching an opinion favorable to Democratic Attorney General Josh Kaul (who faces a contested election in November), the majority dodges the issue we asked the parties to brief: If the court determines that WIS. STAT. § 165.10 and § 20.906(1) should be interpreted not to prohibit the attorney general from crediting settlement funds into the appropriation under WIS. STAT. § 20.455(3)(g), does the language of WIS. STAT. § 20.455(3)(g) authorize the crediting of civil action settlement proceeds to that appropriation? In other words, do the services rendered by Department of Justice personnel in litigating a civil action on behalf of the State of Wisconsin or an executive branch agency constitute “proceeds from services” under WIS. STAT. § 20.455(3)(g)? Order Granting Petition for Review at 1–2, Wis. State Legislature v. Kaul, No. 2022AP431 (Wis. Dec. 5, 2025) (emphasis added). ¶27 The majority erases WIS. STAT. § 20.906(1) from this court’s grant order, Majority op., ¶2, because § 20.906(1) contradicts the majority’s holding—and the majority knows it. The majority later acknowledges “[t]he default crediting rule is that money deposited into the general fund ‘shall be credited to the general purpose revenues of the general fund unless otherwise specifically provided by law.’ WIS. STAT. § 20.906(1).” Majority op., ¶5. The majority refuses to apply the law, which favors the Republican- controlled legislature over Democrat Attorney General Josh Kaul. Lady Justice wears a blindfold, not blinders.  WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE v. KAUL JUSTICE REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, dissenting ¶28 The majority rationalizes its game of dodgeball1 by misrepresenting the legislature’s argument. The majority says, “In defending the court of appeals’ decision, the legislature makes a similar argument, namely that we should read crediting restrictions imposed by other statutes into the single depositing restriction imposed by § 165.10.” Id., ¶18. The legislature never isolated its arguments to WIS. STAT. § 165.10. The legislature’s argument is replete with references to § 20.906(1). The legislature specifically asked this court to interpret and apply § 20.906(1)’s default crediting rule, arguing that “section 165.10—read in tandem with section 20.906(1)’s default rule that deposits of state funds into the treasury must be credited to the general purpose revenues of the general fund ‘unless otherwise specifically provided by law’—obligates the Attorney General to deposit all settlement funds into the general fund for general purpose revenue” (emphasis added). ¶29 The majority’s machinations have left insufficient time to convert my previously-drafted opinion into a dissent, so (consistent with precedent established by other members of the court) I reproduce below what the majority opinion should have been. See State v. McAdory, 2025 WI 30, ¶41, 417 Wis. 2d 194, 22 N.W.2d 844 (Ziegler, J., concurring); Data Key Partners v. Permira Advisers LLC, 2014 WI 86, ¶72, 356 Wis. 2d 665, 849 N.W.2d 693 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). This is not the first time justice has taken a back seat to political interests. The members of the majority extend the Democrats’ almost unbroken winning streak in litigation against the Republican legislature since the progressives took control. 2 In 1“If you can dodge a wrench,” you can dodge the merits of a politically inconvenient case. DODGEBALL: A TRUE UNDERDOG STORY, Disney+ (20th Century Fox 2004) (“If you can dodge a wrench, you can dodge a ball.”). 2 As I documented in Evers v. Marklein, “With respect to the exercise of governmental powers, three members of the majority (Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, Rebecca Frank Dallet, and Jill J. Karofsky) have invariably ruled against the legislature and in favor of the executive branch.” 2024 WI 31, ¶57 n.2, 412 Wis. 2d 525, 8 N.W.3d 395 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring), citing the following cases: 2  WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE v. KAUL JUSTICE REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, dissenting  Clarke v. WEC, 2023 WI 79, 410 Wis. 2d 1, 998 N.W.2d 370 (adopting Governor Evers’ position and invalidating the legislature's redistricting maps);  Wis. Mfrs. & Com. v. Evers, 2022 WI 38, 401 Wis. 2d 699, 977 N.W.2d 374 (allowing Governor Evers’ Department of Health Services to release the names of Wisconsin employers whose employees tested positive for COVID-19);  Johnson v. WEC, 2022 WI 14, 400 Wis. 2d 626, 971 N.W.2d 402, rev’d sub nom. Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, 595 U.S. 398 (2022) (per curiam) (adopting Governor Evers’ proposed congressional map and state legislative maps and rejecting the legislature’s);  Clean Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 2021 WI 72, 398 Wis. 2d 433, 961 N.W.2d 611 (ruling against the legislature and expanding executive branch power by allowing administrative agencies to impose requirements not explicitly permitted by statute);  Clean Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 2021 WI 71, 398 Wis. 2d 386, 961 N.W.2d 346 (ruling against the legislature and in favor of Governor Evers’ Department of Natural Resources in allowing the DNR to impose requirements not explicitly permitted by statute);  Fabick v. Evers, 2021 WI 28, ¶¶74–148, 396 Wis. 2d 231, 956 N.W.2d 856 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., dissenting) (joined by Dallet and Karofsky, JJ.) (dissenting from decision that Governor Evers’ executive orders proclaiming successive states of emergency based on COVID-19 exceeded the Governor's powers);  Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 2020 WI 80, ¶¶15–27, 394 Wis. 2d 33, 949 N.W.2d 423 (Dallet, J., dissenting) (joined by Ann Walsh Bradley and Karofsky, JJ.) (dissenting from decision recognizing legislature’s right to participate as a party in litigation defending the validity of state laws);  Bartlett v. Evers, 2020 WI 68, ¶¶109–71, 393 Wis. 2d 172, 945 N.W.2d 685 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (joined by Dallet, J.) (in original action requesting a declaration that Governor Evers exceeded his constitutional authority to partially veto appropriation bills, 3  WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE v. KAUL JUSTICE REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, dissenting Justices Ann Walsh Bradley and Dallet were the only justices who would have declared all of Governor Evers’ vetoes constitutional);  Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶¶163–88, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35 (Dallet, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (joined by Ann Walsh Bradley, J.) (dissenting from decision upholding the constitutionality of the legislature’s involvement in certain litigation prosecuted or defended by the attorney general and joining decision invalidating legislature’s regulation of guidance documents issued by the executive branch);  Wis. Legislature v. Palm, 2020 WI 42, ¶¶122–30, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., dissenting) (joined by Dallet, J.) (dissenting from decision declaring Governor Evers’ appointed DHS Secretary failed to follow the emergency rulemaking procedures established by the legislature and exceeded her powers in issuing order confining all people to their homes, forbidding travel and closing businesses); id., ¶¶132–63 (Dallet, J., dissenting) (joined by Ann Walsh Bradley, J.) (same);  League of Women Voters of Wis. v. Evers, 2019 WI 75, ¶¶43–54, 387 Wis. 2d 511, 929 N.W.2d 209 (Dallet, J., dissenting) (joined by Ann Walsh Bradley, J.) (dissenting from decision declaring the December 2018 extraordinary session of the legislature constitutional and embracing Governor Evers' position to the contrary). The new majority has continued its political favoritism since Evers v. Marklein:  Priorities USA v. WEC, 2024 WI 32, 412 Wis. 2d 594, 8 N.W.3d 429 (ruling in favor of Governor Evers’ Wisconsin Elections Commission and against the legislature in overruling this court’s precedent from just two years prior establishing that WIS. STAT. § 6.87 precludes the use of secure drop boxes for the return of absentee ballots to municipal clerks);  LeMieux v. Evers, 2025 WI 12, 415 Wis. 2d 422, 19 N.W.3d 76 (granting Governor Evers unrestricted authority to exercise his “partial veto” to rewrite appropriation bills without the legislature’s approval, including the creation of an infamous 400-year tax increase); 4  WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE v. KAUL J