Mr. Storage, LLC v. JJ Briggs Consulting, LLC
CourtCourt of Appeals of Wisconsin
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket2026AP001057
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
November 18, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.
Appeal No. 2026AP1057 Cir. Ct. No. 2026SC438
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II
MR. STORAGE, LLC,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
JJ BRIGGS CONSULTING, LLC,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT,
JAMIE BRIGGS AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS
OF 23 E. JACKSON ST., WAUPUN, WI 53963,
DEFENDANTS.
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Fond du Lac County: DOUGLAS R. EDELSTEIN, Judge. Affirmed.
No. 2026AP1057
¶1 GROGAN, J.1 JJ Briggs Consulting, LLC (Briggs)2 appeals pro se
from a judgment evicting it from a commercial property following a bench trial
and from an order denying its motion for reconsideration. Briggs raises four
issues: (1) “[t]he circuit court applied the wrong legal standard by treating an
occupancy permit as equivalent to lawful occupancy under WIS. STAT.
§ 704.07(4)”; (2) “[t]he circuit court’s findings are incomplete under WIS. STAT.
§ 805.17(2), and those incomplete findings do not support the denial of appellant’s
counterclaim”; (3) “[t]he May 26 order should be vacated because the circuit court
did not apply the stay undertaking and WIS. STAT. § 799.445 to the post-surrender
circumstances”; and (4) “[t]he amended money judgment requires redetermination
of post-judgment rent and fails to apply an ordered signage credit.” 3 This court
will address only the first two issues raised. The third and fourth issues challenge
orders entered after Briggs filed its notice of appeal, and this court does not have
jurisdiction to address those orders.4 For the reasons set forth below, this court
affirms.
1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2023-24). All
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
2
Jamie Briggs is the owner of the business and will be referred to as “Jamie” when the
opinion refers directly to her.
3
Briggs presents a fifth “issue” in its brief requesting a new circuit court judge if this
court remands the matter. This is not an issue the court of appeals decides, but is a statutory right
when certain circumstances set forth in WIS. STAT. § 799.205(4) are met.
4
The notice of appeal filed on May 4, 2026, challenges the eviction judgment and the
reconsideration order, both entered in April 2026. Briggs’s third issue challenges an order dated
May 26, 2026, and the fourth issue challenges an order dated July 17, 2026. Both of these orders
post-date the notice of appeal, and this court cannot address them. See Chicago & N.W.R.R. v.
LIRC, 91 Wis. 2d 462, 473, 283 N.W.2d 603 (Ct. App. 1979), aff’d, 98 Wis. 2d 592, 297 N.W.2d
819 (1980) (“An appeal from a judgment does not embrace an order entered after the
judgment.”).
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No. 2026AP1057
I. BACKGROUND
¶2 Jamie entered into a year-long commercial lease agreement with
Mr. Storage, LLC (Mr. Storage) to lease a warehouse space for its business, with
the lease starting on January 15, 2026, and continuing through January 14, 2027.5
The applicable contractual provisions in the lease provide:
3. Leased Premises
3. … The Premises will be used for only the following
permitted use (the “Permitted Use”): Insurance
Company office/Retail and Studio Art space.
….
5. The premises are provided to the Tenant without any
fixtures, chattels or leasehold improvements.
6. Term
6. The term of the Lease is a periodic tenancy
commencing … on January 15, 2026, and
continuing for a term of one year ending Jan[uary]
14, 2027.
7. Rent
7. Subject to the provisions of this Lease, the Tenant
will pay a base rent of $2500.00, payable per month
(the “Base Rent”), without setoff, abatement or
deduction. In addition to the Base Rent, the Tenant
will pay for any fees or taxes arising from the
Tenant’s business.
….
35. General Provisions
.…
5
This lease followed a short-term lease that ran from September 15, 2025, through
January 14, 2026.
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No. 2026AP1057
40. This Lease will constitute the entire agreement
between the Landlord and the Tenant. Any prior
understanding or representation of any kind
preceding the date of this Lease will not be binding
on either party to this Lease except to the extent
incorporated in this Lease. In particular, no
warranties of the Landlord not expressed in this
Lease are to be implied.
According to Jamie, the City of Waupun conducted an occupancy walkthrough of
the premises she leased, and a city inspector determined that there was “not
independent egress from the space and that it required exit signage.” As a result,
Jamie did not pay the “full rent” because she could not “open [her] business as the
permitted use statement in the lease.” Jamie’s failure to pay rent led to
Mr. Storage initiating an eviction lawsuit against Briggs. Jamie filed a
counterclaim to the lawsuit alleging that Mr. Storage had leased her premises not
capable of occupancy:
[Mr. Storage] leased [Briggs] premises that were not
capable of lawful occupancy … including lack of
independent secondary egress and required exit signage. …
As a result, [Briggs] incurred mitigation expenses, loss of
business use, reduced rental opportunities, … and other
consequential damages, presently estimated at $20903.00.
These conditions substantially interfered with [Briggs]’s
lawful beneficial use of the premises and frustrated the
essential purpose of the lease. [Briggs] therefore seeks
offset, abatement, and monetary relief.
¶3 The circuit court held a bench trial. Mr. Storage called its
representative Jodi Mallas to testify. Mallas testified that by entering the lease,
Mr. Storage did not have to complete any improvements to the property, nor did it
promise to make any. Speaking about the occupancy permit, Mallas indicated that
it was tied to the “particular business” rather than the premises’ owner and the
premises itself. Jamie testified next. She told the court that this was her first time
occupying a business with a physical space “[u]nder a lease[.]” She also said she
4
No. 2026AP1057
had no prior experience working with the city on occupancy permit compliance.
She testified that she was unable to operate her business because she was told it
was “not legal to operate a public facing business … without exit signage and
independent egress.” Jamie explained she “did not pay the full rent because I was
not able to open the business as the permitted use statement in the lease. And the
agreed use, as it was the only use permitted.”
¶4 After hearing the testimony, the circuit court found that “[n]o where
in the terms of the lease is there assignment of responsibility, such that the
occupancy permit would be the responsibility of [Mr. Storage].” It also found
“[t]he space itself very well may be suitable, but [Mr. Storage] has not agreed to
bear the cost of updating, renovating, or otherwise to ensure that that would likely
be an additional cost or reference within the contract.” The court found: (1) the
lease was “clear” and “unambiguous”; (2) there was no evidence the space was
untenantable; and (3) Jamie materially breached the lease by failing to make
payment. The court noted that the unpaid rent totaled $5,500, but ruled that it
would offset the cost Jamie incurred for exit signage if she submitted
documentation of that cost within ten days. Jamie submitted an itemization of
costs in the amount of $208.90 by the deadline. When asked about Jamie’s
counterclaim, the court denied it, explaining it could not “discern that the
contractual relationship placed any obligation on [Mr. Storage] to effectively get
[Briggs’s] business permitted to run there.” Following the ruling, the court
ordered a writ of eviction.
¶5 Shortly after the eviction trial, Jamie filed a motion for
reconsideration, in which she requested clarification as to the status of her
counterclaim, asked the circuit court to reconsider the counterclaim, and grant
“such other relief” the court “deems just and equitable.” The court denied this
5
No. 2026AP1057
motion, finding that “credible evidence” demonstrated a material breach for failure
to pay rent. It also sua sponte referenced WIS. STAT. § 704.07(4), indicating that
the statute only allows rent abatement when “the condition of the premises
‘substantially affects the use and occupancy of the premises[,]’” and there was no
evidence of that in this case. It specifically held that Jamie’s “failure to obtain an
occupancy permit for the premises did not otherwise convert the commercially
available space into an untenantable location.” The court’s reconsideration order
affirmed the writ of eviction and the denial of “any counterclaims.” Briggs
appeals both the eviction judgment and the reconsideration order.
II. DISCUSSION
¶6 Briggs argues that the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard
and that its findings were inadequate. “Whether the circuit court has applied the
correct legal standard is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Landwehr v.
Landwehr, 2006 WI 64, ¶8, 291 Wis. 2d 49, 715 N.W.2d 180. This court
“uphold[s] a circuit court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.”
Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2009 WI 74, ¶34, 319 Wis. 2d 1, 768
N.W.2d 615.
¶7 Briggs argues that “the circuit court answered a question of
contractual responsibility for an occupancy permit rather than the statutory
question presented under WIS. STAT. § 704.07(4)[,]” and alleges the court’s
findings are inadequate, the case should be remanded so the court can make
adequate findings, and the “incomplete findings do not support the denial of
[Briggs]’s counterclaim.” Mr. Storage responds that Briggs’s first issue is
“illogical, inadequately developed, and forfeited[,]” and that the court’s findings
regarding Briggs’s defense and counterclaim were adequate.
6
No. 2026AP1057
A. Issue One
¶8 This court agrees with Mr. Storage that Briggs forfeited the WIS.
STAT. § 704.07(4) argument because it failed to raise it at the bench trial. See
State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶10, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (“[I]ssues
must be preserved at the circuit court. Issues that are not preserved at the circuit
court, even alleged constitutional errors, generally will not be considered on
appeal.”). And although Briggs is correct that the court addressed it in its written
order denying the reconsideration motion, the forfeiture rule exists to prevent
sandbagging a party that never had a chance to address the issue in the circuit
court. See Schonscheck v. Paccar, Inc., 2003 WI App 79, ¶¶10-11, 261 Wis. 2d
769, 661 N.W.2d 476 (party forfeits challenge when it fails to fully develop the
argument before the circuit court). Nevertheless, because the court addressed
§ 704.07(4) in its reconsideration order, this court will briefly address it.
¶9 Briggs’s briefing is difficult to decipher. Briggs seems to argue that
at trial, the circuit court should have included an analysis under WIS. STAT.
§ 704.07(4) and answered whether “the premises were capable of the Permitted
Use,” rather than resolving occupancy-permit responsibility. But § 704.07(4) only
applies to commercial leases that do not have a “contrary provision in writing
signed by both parties.” Sec. 704.07(1). The lease that Mr. Storage and Jamie
signed appears to have a contrary provision.6 But even if it did not, § 704.07(4)
only allows rent abatement under certain conditions, which Briggs failed to
6
The lease provides: (1) “[t]he [p]remises are provided to the [t]enant without any
fixtures, chattels, or leasehold improvements[,]” and (2) “the [t]enant will pay [rent] … without
setoff, abatement or deduction.”
7
No. 2026AP1057
establish at trial. Briggs fails to establish the court erred by not applying the
statute.
¶10 Briggs’s first issue also seems to contend that the conditions
imposed by the city for occupancy—a proper egress and exit signage—rendered
the premises “life-safety deficiencies” and that the circuit court’s failure to
specifically address the egress deficiency constituted reversible error. This court
rejects Briggs’s contentions. The first of these arguments is tied to the statutory
argument already rejected above or the counterclaim argument rejected below.
Further, the circuit court was not obligated to make a specific finding regarding
egress, particularly given the lack of evidence on that point—even if it chose to
address exit signage.
B. Issue Two
¶11 The second issue is whether the circuit court made adequate findings
to reject Briggs’s defense/counterclaim. The counterclaim alleged that
Mr. Storage leased to Briggs:
premises that were not capable of lawful occupancy for the
agreed public-facing use due to unresolved egress and
life-safety deficiencies, including lack of independent
secondary egress and required exit signage. After city
inspection, [Briggs] promptly notified [Mr. Storage],
purchased and affixed exit signage (without wiring),
restored an existing exit door, and added panic hardware in
a good-faith effort to mitigate the conditions. Further
corrective work required building permits, structural
authority, and owner action, which remained
[Mr. Storage]’s responsibility as property owner.
This court reviewed the trial transcript. There is no mention of Briggs’s
counterclaim until after the court rendered judgment in favor of Mr. Storage. At
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No. 2026AP1057
that point, Mr. Storage’s attorney asked about the counterclaim. The court
responded:
Well, there has been no counterclaim presented. In terms
of the nature of the pleadings, there is no advancement of
that claim by Ms. Briggs. She was given multiple
opportunities to present the case, including what I
summarized was the issue of nonpayment for the eviction.
She did not put forth any additional evidence.
I cannot discern from this record that there was a
lack of good faith, such there would be a form of punitive
damages. And damages in this respect would likely be a
potential insurance issue, but I can’t discern that the
contractual relationship placed any obligation on
[Mr. Storage] to effectively get [Briggs’s] business
permitted to run there. So I’m denying any counterclaim.
And, as noted, when Briggs sought reconsideration of the counterclaim ruling, the
court affirmed its denial.
¶12 The transcript shows the circuit court made the following findings:
• the lease provided the premises without any fixtures,
chattels or improvements;
• Briggs failed to obtain an occupancy permit;
• the lease did not make the occupancy permit “the
responsibility of the landlord”;
• the lease was clear and unambiguous; and
• a material breach occurred due to Briggs’s failure to
make payment.
Briggs has failed to show that any other findings were required. The court made
the necessary findings based on the evidence presented at trial. When a party fails
to present any evidence on a counterclaim, a court needs to only do what the court
did here. Further, “in the absence of specific findings, we assume findings were
made that support the ruling[.]” State v. Lindberg, 175 Wis. 2d 332, 342, 500
9
No. 2026AP1057
N.W.2d 322 (Ct. App. 1993). Briggs has not met its burden to show the court
made inadequate findings. See Gaethke v. Pozder, 2017 WI App 38, ¶36, 376
Wis. 2d 448, 899 N.W.2d 381 (An appellant bears the burden to demonstrate how
the circuit court erred.).
¶13 Finally, Briggs contends the circuit court ordered an offset for the
costs it incurred to install the exit signage, which was presumably left affixed to
the premises. The Record confirms the court did order the offset contingent upon
Briggs timely submitting an itemization of the costs incurred for the exit signage
to the attorney for Mr. Storage.7 The Record reflects Briggs filed receipts for
“materials” in the amount of $108.90 and for “labor” in the amount of $100 to the
court within the ordered ten days. It is unclear whether Briggs sent the itemization
to the attorney for Mr. Storage as ordered by the court. It does not appear that any
offset was credited to Briggs. Upon receipt of this opinion, the circuit court is
directed to determine whether Briggs complied with the court’s offset order, and,
if so, the circuit court shall amend the judgment to reflect the offset.
By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.
7
The circuit court stated: “And so, Ms. Briggs, I’m going to give you 10 days to itemize
the cost of that signage. You are to submit that to [the] Attorney [for Mr. Storage].”
10