Doniel Carter v. State of Wisconsin - Department of Administration
CourtCourt of Appeals of Wisconsin
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket2025AP002287
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
November 19, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.
Appeal No. 2025AP2287 Cir. Ct. No. 2024CV3398
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
DONIEL CARTER, DAVEY & GOLDMAN LAW FIRM, AND CADE LAW GROUP,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,
ERIKA WATSON,
INVOLUNTARY-PLAINTIFF,
V.
STATE OF WISCONSIN - DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION AND
STATE OF WISCONSIN - DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Dane County:
STEPHEN E. EHLKE, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Graham, P.J., Kloppenburg, and Nashold, JJ.
No. 2025AP2287
¶1 KLOPPENBURG, J. Following a jury trial, a federal district court
awarded Doniel Carter punitive damages and attorney fees on his claim that Erika
Watson violated his Eighth Amendment rights by sexually assaulting and sexually
harassing him when she was a correctional officer and he was an inmate at Fox
Lake Correctional Institution. Watson did not seek indemnification by the State of
Wisconsin (“the State”), and the Wisconsin Department of Justice did not
represent Watson, in the federal proceeding.1 Carter and the attorneys who
represented him in the federal proceeding (“Carter and counsel”) filed this action
against the Wisconsin Department of Administration and the Wisconsin
Department of Corrections (collectively also, “the State”), naming Watson as an
involuntary plaintiff. In their amended complaint (“the complaint”), Carter and
counsel sought an order, declaratory judgment, or a writ of mandamus, under WIS.
STAT. §§ 895.46 and 806.04 (2023-24), requiring the State to indemnify Watson
for the federal court judgment and to pay the judgment to them.2
¶2 The State and Watson each moved to dismiss the complaint. The
circuit court granted the motions to dismiss based on the State’s sovereign
immunity. The court specifically concluded that: sovereign immunity bars Carter
and counsel’s claim under WIS. STAT. § 895.46 because only state employees may
seek indemnification from the state under that statute; Watson is not a necessary
party who must be joined under WIS. STAT. § 803.03, so as to allow Carter and
counsel to litigate an indemnification claim by Watson; and sovereign immunity
1
To clarify, we use “the State” to refer to the State of Wisconsin or its agencies in their
role as a party to this or the related federal case and use “the state” to refer to the State of
Wisconsin or its agencies in general.
2
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version unless otherwise
noted.
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No. 2025AP2287
bars Carter and counsel’s claim for declaratory judgment or writ of mandamus
under WIS. STAT. § 806.04 because the claim “at its core seeks to fix the State’s
responsibility to respond to a monetary claim.”
¶3 On appeal, Carter and counsel make numerous arguments in an
attempt to show that the circuit court erred in not allowing their indemnification
claim to circumvent sovereign immunity under WIS. STAT. § 895.46 by naming
Watson as an involuntary plaintiff.3 We conclude that none of their arguments
have merit and, therefore, affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶4 In 2019, Carter filed suit in federal district court against the
Wisconsin Department of Corrections, former correctional officer Watson, and
other correctional officers. Carter alleged that while he was incarcerated at Fox
Lake Correctional Institution, Watson sexually assaulted Carter, demanded that he
perform degrading acts, and threatened him with punishment if he refused to do
so. Carter alleged that Watson’s alleged conduct was “not for a legitimate
purpose.” Carter also alleged that other correctional officers demonstrated
deliberate indifference by failing to report Watson’s conduct. Carter alleged that
Watson’s and the other officers’ alleged conduct violated his Eighth Amendment
rights.
¶5 Shortly after Carter filed the federal lawsuit, the Department of
Corrections sent Watson a letter explaining that it was not requesting Department
Carter and counsel make no argument in their appellants’ brief directed at the circuit
3
court’s dismissal of their claim for declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus under WIS.
STAT. § 806.04. Accordingly, we do not further address that claim.
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No. 2025AP2287
of Justice representation for Watson because “the allegations against [Watson] fall
outside of [Watson’s] job duties and scope of employment.” Watson subsequently
retained private counsel. In her answer to Carter’s complaint, Watson “reserve[d]
[her] right … to have the State … pay the damages as she was acting within the
scope of her employment at all times.” The State moved to dismiss the
Department of Corrections, and the federal court granted the motion. The case
proceeded to trial against Watson and another correctional officer, Tara
Weidemann. The Department of Justice represented Weidemann.
¶6 At the trial in the federal court proceeding in November 2021, the
jury found that Watson had violated Carter’s Eighth Amendment rights and had
been “deliberately indifferent to … Carter’s health and safety.” The jury found
that Weidemann had not violated Carter’s rights. The jury awarded Carter no
compensatory damages and $125,000 in punitive damages. Before and during the
trial no party requested, and the jury was not provided, a jury instruction or verdict
question on whether Watson had been acting within the scope of her employment.
¶7 After the trial in the federal court proceeding, the State moved to
intervene and for a declaratory judgment that Watson was not acting within the
scope of her employment and, therefore, the State was not liable for
indemnification. The federal court denied the State’s motion to intervene and for a
declaratory judgment. The court explained that the State’s motion was not ripe
because neither Carter nor Watson had made a claim for indemnification, and that
the motion was untimely because it was based on facts that had been developed in
a different legal context. The court also awarded Carter approximately $141,000
in attorney fees. In November 2023, Watson filed a petition for bankruptcy,
seeking to discharge the federal court judgment.
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No. 2025AP2287
¶8 In November 2024, Carter and counsel filed this action against the
State, naming Watson as an involuntary plaintiff. Carter and counsel sought an
order under WIS. STAT. § 895.46, requiring that the State indemnify Watson and
pay Carter “the verdict and attorney fees awarded” in the federal lawsuit, plus
attorney fees in this action.
¶9 The State filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as barred by
sovereign immunity. Pertinent here, the State argued that under WIS. STAT.
§ 895.46, only a public employee may maintain an action for indemnification
against the state and, therefore, Carter and counsel could not bring a claim seeking
indemnification, whether or not Carter and counsel named Watson as an
involuntary plaintiff. Watson submitted a letter to the circuit court asking that the
complaint be dismissed and stating that “I do not wish to file for
indemnification.... It is also factual that I have informed all parties in this case that
I am not filing for indemnification rights, nor did I agree to be a party in this case
or sign an admission of service agreement.”
¶10 The circuit court granted the State’s and Watson’s motions and
dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Carter and counsel appeal.
DISCUSSION
¶11 “A motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity challenges a
court’s personal jurisdiction.” DNR v. Timber & Wood Prods. Located in Sawyer
Cnty., 2018 WI App 6, ¶17, 379 Wis. 2d 690, 906 N.W.2d 707 (2017). We
independently review the circuit court’s decision granting a motion to dismiss.
State ex rel. Lawton v. Town of Barton, 2005 WI App 16, ¶9, 278 Wis. 2d 388,
692 N.W.2d 304 (2004).
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No. 2025AP2287
¶12 The state’s sovereign immunity derives from article IV, section 27 of
the Wisconsin Constitution, which provides, “The legislature shall direct by law in
what manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the state.” Courts
have repeatedly and consistently construed this provision to mean that the
legislature has the exclusive right to consent to a suit against the state, and that
such consent must be clearly and expressly stated. Erickson Oil Prods., Inc. v.
DOT, 184 Wis. 2d 36, 52-53, 516 N.W.2d 755 (Ct. App. 1994). The state cannot
be sued without the legislature’s consent, and a lawsuit against a state agency is a
lawsuit against the state for purposes of sovereign immunity. PRN Assocs. LLC v.
DOA, 2009 WI 53, ¶51, 317 Wis. 2d 656, 766 N.W.2d 599. Unless the legislature
has “specifically consented to the suit,” “sovereign immunity deprives the court of
personal jurisdiction over the State.” Id.
¶13 Here, as stated, Carter and counsel sought an order under WIS. STAT.
§ 895.46 requiring the State to indemnify Watson and to pay Carter “the verdict
and attorney fees awarded” in the federal lawsuit, plus attorney fees in this action.
We conclude that the circuit court properly dismissed Carter and counsel’s
complaint because their claim under § 895.46 is barred by sovereign immunity.4
4
As we repeat throughout this opinion, Carter and counsel in their complaint sought an
order requiring the State to pay the judgment against Watson entered in the federal proceeding,
including damages and attorney fees. Then, in their appellate briefing, they ask that we reverse
with directions that the circuit court enter such an order or, alternatively, that we reverse with
directions that the circuit court hold an evidentiary hearing on whether Watson acted within the
scope of her employment. Because we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of the complaint, we
need not address what the remand order would say were we to reverse.
6
No. 2025AP2287
¶14 WISCONSIN STAT. § 895.46 addresses indemnification of public
officers and employees by the state.5 Under § 895.46(1)(a), the state shall pay a
judgment as to damages and costs, in excess of applicable insurance, entered
against a state employee when the court or jury finds that the employee acted
within the scope of the employee’s employment:
If the defendant in any action or special proceedings is a
public officer or employee and is proceeded against in an
official capacity or is proceeded against as an individual
because of acts committed while carrying out duties as an
officer or employee and the jury or the court finds that the
defendant was acting within the scope of employment, the
judgment as to damages and costs entered against the
officer or employee [with an exception not relevant here],
in excess of any insurance applicable to the officer or
employee shall be paid by the state or political subdivision
of which the defendant is an officer or employee.
¶15 Also under WIS. STAT. § 895.46(1)(a), if the state does not provide
counsel for the employee in the action, the state must pay the employee’s attorney
fees and costs of defending the action unless the court or jury finds that the
employee did not act within the scope of employment:
Regardless of the results of the litigation the governmental
unit, if it does not provide legal counsel to the defendant
officer or employee, shall pay reasonable attorney fees and
costs of defending the action, unless it is found by the court
or jury that the defendant officer or employee did not act
within the scope of employment.
¶16 In addition, WIS. STAT. § 895.46(1)(a) provides that the attorney
general may appear in the action against the employee to contest whether the
5
WISCONSIN STAT. § 895.46 also applies to the indemnification of state agents by the
state and to the indemnification by political subdivisions of officers and employees of the
political subdivisions. Because this appeal concerns a state employee, we refer only to the state
and state employees, or simply to employees, except when quoting language in the statute.
7
No. 2025AP2287
employee was acting within the scope of employment, without waiving the state’s
sovereign immunity from suit:6
If the employing state agency or the attorney general denies
that the state officer, employee or agent was doing any act
growing out of or committed in the course of the discharge
of [the defendant’s] duties, the attorney general may appear
on behalf of the state to contest that issue without waiving
the state’s sovereign immunity to suit.
¶17 WISCONSIN STAT. § 895.46(1)(a) further provides that an employee
is not entitled to indemnification if the employee fails to give timely notice of the
action against the employee, refuses the state’s offer of legal counsel, or refuses to
cooperate in the defense of the litigation.
¶18 Wisconsin courts have long held that WIS. STAT. § 895.46 does not
provide the express legislative consent necessary for a tort victim to bring a direct
action against the state as an indemnitor of a state employee. Fiala v. Voight, 93
Wis. 2d 337, 343, 347-48, 286 N.W.2d 824 (1980); Carlson v. Pepin Cnty., 167
Wis. 2d 345, 356, 481 N.W.2d 498 (Ct. App. 1992) (Section 895.46 “does not
permit a tort victim to sue the state directly.”). Instead, the focus of the statute is
on protecting state employees. The statutory history of § 895.46 “shows that the
legislature has attempted to offer the broadest protection reasonably available to
public officials and to public employees.” Schroeder, Gedlen, Riester & Moerke
6
This part of WIS. STAT. § 895.46(1)(a) uses the phrase “doing any act growing out of or
committed in the course of the discharge of [the defendant’s] duties.” As quoted, another part of
the statute provides that the state shall indemnify a state employee who is sued “because of acts
committed while carrying out duties as an officer or employee and the jury or the court finds that
the defendant was acting within the scope of employment.” The parties do not argue that the two
phrases “growing out of or committed in the course of the discharge of … duties” and “within the
scope of employment” differ in any way that matters for purposes of this appeal. For ease of
reading, we generally use the phrase “acting within the scope of employment.”
8
No. 2025AP2287
v. Schoessow, 108 Wis. 2d 49, 67, 321 N.W.2d 131 (1982) (emphasis added). By
“providing this protection [to employees], the statute encourages public employees
to perform their duties without hesitation or fear that they will be personally
liable.” Crawford v. City of Ashland, 134 Wis. 2d 369, 377, 396 N.W.2d 781 (Ct.
App. 1986) (emphasis added). The indemnification statute “protects the employee
against financial loss from a judgment in favor of a tort victim and is not intended
to affect the victim’s rights against the employee.” Yotvat v. Roth, 95 Wis. 2d
357, 370-71, 290 N.W.2d 524 (Ct. App. 1980) (emphasis added).
¶19 This case law makes clear that WIS. STAT. § 895.46 does not protect
a non-employee against the state, and does not provide legislative consent for a
non-employee to sue the state directly for payment of a judgment for an
employee’s conduct. Accordingly, Carter and counsel’s complaint suing the State
for just such payment under § 895.46 is barred by sovereign immunity. We now
explain why Carter and counsel’s numerous arguments to the contrary lack merit,
and we group those arguments under subheadings for ease of reading.
Liberal construction of consent to sue statute
¶20 Carter and counsel argue that WIS. STAT. § 895.46 “is a clear,
express, and broadly worded consent to sue statute” and, therefore, must be
liberally construed. The case cited by Carter and counsel to support this argument
concerns a direct action by state patrol officers for wages under a statute, WIS.
STAT. § 109.03(5) (1995-96), that provided a “clear, express and broadly worded
consent to suit.” German v. DOT, 223 Wis. 2d 525, 531-33, 589 N.W.2d 651 (Ct.
App. 1998) (Section 109.03(5) (1995-96) provided that “[e]ach employe[e] shall
have a right of action against any employer for the full amount of the employe[e]’s
wages due.”). However, Carter and counsel do not point to any such broadly
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No. 2025AP2287
worded consent to sue language in § 895.46. Nor do Carter and counsel point to
any language in that statute that specifically consents to suit by a non-employee
for payment against the State. We see nothing in German that supports Carter and
counsel’s argument. To the contrary, the case law cited above clearly states that
the remedy of indemnification under § 895.46 belongs only to the employee.
Post-judgment indemnification actions by third parties
¶21 Carter and counsel assert that the case law bars tort victims from
suing the state for indemnification only pre-judgment in the underlying tort actions
and allows post-judgment indemnification actions by employees. From these two
assertions, Carter and counsel appear to argue that WIS. STAT. § 803.30 allows the
tort victim, by naming the employee as an involuntary plaintiff, to sue the state in
a separate post-judgment action for indemnification under WIS. STAT. § 895.46.
¶22 However, Carter and counsel cite no case law that supports this
proposition. They cite the following cases: Forseth v. Sweet, 38 Wis. 2d 676, 680,
688, 690, 158 N.W.2d 370 (1968) (ruling that a tort plaintiff may not join the state
as an indispensable party in the underlying tort action, but noting that the tort
plaintiff “may seek to have [the plaintiff’s] judgment paid by the state after
verdict” when there has been a finding that the employee was acting within the
scope of employment); Cords v. Ehly, 62 Wis. 2d 31, 37-38, 214 N.W.2d 432
(1974) (concluding that the indemnification statute, which was intended to protect
employees from monetary loss, does not apply until after a judgment of liability is
entered, and is not an agreement to a direct suit by the employees); Fiala, 93
Wis. 2d at 344-45 (noting that the indemnification statute was intended to protect
employees and ruling that the statute does not apply until after a judgment of
liability against an employee is entered); Yotvat, 95 Wis. 2d at 366-67 (noting that
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No. 2025AP2287
the indemnification statute was intended “to protect a public employee from
personal financial loss because of a judgment resulting from an act committed
within the scope of employment” and that the statute “does not permit a tort victim
to bring suit against the state”).
¶23 While these cases were reviewing claims against the State pre-
judgment, none of them hold, or even suggest, that WIS. STAT. § 895.46 allows a
non-employee to sue the State post-judgment for indemnification of the liable
employee. To the contrary, the holdings in these cases are broadly stated to apply
to tort victims without limitation, regardless of the procedural posture of their
claims, and to interpret the indemnification statute as allowing claims only by
employees under the circumstances specified in the statute.
¶24 Specifically, in Forseth, the court expressly distinguished the
liability for an employee’s tort, which is imposed on the state by the
indemnification statute, from the state’s consent to suit by the tort victim, which is
absent in that statute. Forseth, 38 Wis. 2d at 680-84. The language quoted by
Carter and counsel—“while [the tort plaintiff] may seek to have [the plaintiff’s]
judgment paid by the state after verdict”—is not tethered to any language in the
indemnification statute or any other statute consenting to suit by the plaintiff
against the state to collect that payment. Id. at 690. Nothing in that case or the
other cases cited by Carter and counsel supports the proposition that a tort victim
may sue the state directly for an indemnification payment. As the Cords court in
1974 observed, the courts had for over 70 years consistently interpreted the
indemnification statute to disallow suits against the state by non-employees.
Cords, 62 Wis. 2d at 36. Carter and counsel cite no case law in the 50 years since
loosening that interpretation based on the clear and express language in the statute.
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No. 2025AP2287
Waiver of sovereign immunity
¶25 Carter and counsel argue that the State waived its sovereign
immunity because it moved to intervene in the federal litigation after trial to argue
that Watson did not act within the scope of employment, and that motion was
denied. Their argument fails because it disregards the language in WIS. STAT.
§ 895.46(1)(a) that provides that the attorney general “may appear” to contest
whether the employee was acting within the scope of employment “without
waiving the state’s sovereign immunity to suit.” They point to no language in the
statute that waives sovereign immunity when the attorney general does so. They
also point to the State’s failure to request a scope of employment verdict question
during the federal trial, but they do not explain how that failure would result in the
State waiving its sovereign immunity.
Watson sought indemnification
¶26 Carter and counsel assert that Watson has in this case made a claim
for indemnification under WIS. STAT. § 895.46 because she filed motions in the
circuit court, other than her motion to dismiss, seeking a reduction in the amount
of the federal judgment and asserting that her conduct was within the scope of her
employment. We do not address whether Carter and counsel are correct because,
regardless of whether Watson made a claim for indemnification, Carter and
counsel do not develop an argument explaining that, if so, § 895.46 provides
consent for them to file their own lawsuit against the State. Accordingly, their
conclusory assertion fails.
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No. 2025AP2287
Joinder of Watson as an involuntary plaintiff
¶27 Carter and counsel argue that the joining of Watson as an
involuntary plaintiff under WIS. STAT. § 803.03 allows them to sue the State
directly for an indemnification payment under WIS. STAT. § 895.46. Carter and
counsel rely again on German, 223 Wis. 2d 525, to support their argument that,
read together, these two statutes require that a judgment creditor may sue on
behalf of a non-indemnified state employee to require the circuit court to hold a
hearing to determine whether the employee’s conduct forming the basis of the
judgment falls with the scope of the employee’s conduct. However, as explained
above, German addresses neither statute.
¶28 Carter and counsel argue that, nevertheless, Watson is a proper
involuntary plaintiff under WIS. STAT. § 803.03. Carter and counsel’s arguments
fail because they turn on the faulty premise that they are entitled to relief under
WIS. STAT. § 895.46.
¶29 Under WIS. STAT. § 803.03(1)(a), a person shall be joined as a party
to the action if “[i]n the person’s absence complete relief cannot be accorded
among those already parties.” However, as explained above, WIS. STAT. § 895.46
protects state employees, not third parties; it expressly waives the state’s sovereign
immunity to allow claims against the state for indemnification for judgments of
damages and costs and attorney fees only by state employees. Thus, § 895.46
does not provide relief from the State to “those already parties” to the action here
because they are not state employees. See § 803.03(1)(a).
¶30 Under WIS. STAT. § 803.03(1)(b), a person shall be joined if the
person “claims an interest relating to the subject of the action” and the disposition
of the action in the person’s absence may: “impair or impede the person’s ability
13
No. 2025AP2287
to protect that interest;” or leave those already parties subject to the “risk of …
multiple or … inconsistent obligations” by reason of the person’s claimed interest.
Here, Watson does not claim an interest in Carter and counsel’s claim for the
State’s indemnification of Watson. And, while Carter and counsel claim an
interest in the State’s indemnification of Watson, for reasons explained above, that
claim is not actionable against the State under WIS. STAT. § 895.46. Accordingly,
there is no “risk of … multiple or … inconsistent obligations” and, therefore, no
basis under § 803.03(1)(b) for Watson to be joined as an involuntary plaintiff in
this action by Carter and counsel.
¶31 Carter and counsel focus their arguments to the contrary on
Watson’s purported interest “in resolving the scope of employment and
indemnification claim.” However, these arguments disregard the language in WIS.
STAT. § 803.03(1) cited above that requires that Carter and counsel themselves
have a claim against the State under WIS. STAT. § 895.46. Because the claim that
they assert under that statute is barred by sovereign immunity, their arguments fail.
¶32 Carter and counsel assert that, “It cannot be that an unwilling state
employee participant can derail a [WIS. STAT.] § 895.46 action but no other
unwilling participant has a right to derail any other civil action because WIS. STAT.
§ 803.03 commands their participation.” They further assert that rejecting joinder
in such a situation would “defeat the legislature’s intent in § 895.46.” However,
they point to no language in § 803.03 that circumvents sovereign immunity; nor do
they point to language in § 895.46 that expresses the legislature’s intent to waive
sovereign immunity for claims by parties other than state employees. Carter and
counsel also suggest that § 803.03 and § 895.46 conflict, but they identify no such
conflict.
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No. 2025AP2287
Scope of employment
¶33 Carter and counsel make a number of arguments directed at the
“scope of employment” requirement in WIS. STAT. § 895.46. As stated,
§ 895.46(1)(a) allows a state employee to seek indemnification for damages and
costs when “the jury or the court finds that the [employee] was acting within the
scope of employment,” and for attorney fees when the state does not provide legal
counsel “unless it is found by the court or jury that the … employee did not act
within the scope of employment.” Given our conclusion that Carter and counsel’s
claim under § 895.46 is barred by sovereign immunity, their scope of employment
arguments are not relevant. That is, regardless of whether Watson would be
entitled to indemnification, Carter and counsel cannot under § 895.46 file a direct
action seeking indemnification on her behalf. Accordingly, we do not further
address Carter and counsel’s scope of employment arguments. See Barrows v.
American Fam. Ins. Co., 2014 WI App 11, ¶9, 352 Wis. 2d 436, 842 N.W.2d 508
(2013) (“An appellate court need not address every issue raised by the parties
when one issue is dispositive.”).
Voidable fraudulent transaction
¶34 Carter and counsel argue that Watson’s declining to seek
indemnification constitutes a “voidable fraudulent transaction” under WIS. STAT.
§ 242.04. That statute provides: “A transfer made … by a debtor is voidable as to
a creditor … if the debtor made the transfer … [w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay
or defraud any creditor of the debtor.” § 242.04(1)(a). Carter and counsel assert
that they have a claim against Watson and are therefore creditors; Watson is the
debtor liable on that claim; her entitlement to seek indemnification for that claim
is an asset; and she has transferred her right of indemnification to the State by
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No. 2025AP2287
refusing to seek indemnification. Thus, Carter and counsel argue, the State is an
indispensable party with an interest in Watson’s right of indemnification “and
does not enjoy sovereign immunity.” Even if Carter and counsel were correct as
to the application of § 242.04 to the federal judgment against Watson in Carter’s
favor, they point to no law supporting the proposition that the State has waived
sovereign immunity to allow them to obtain payment of that judgment against the
State under WIS. STAT. § 895.46. We reject their argument under § 242.04 on that
basis.
CONCLUSION
¶35 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s order dismissing
Carter and counsel’s complaint.
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
Not recommended for publication in the official reports.
16